英語資源頻道為大家整理的china daily 雙語新聞：日本應反思新財政刺激計劃，供大家學習參考:)
What happens when an economy runs out of fiscal space? The presumption is embodied in the image of “hitting the wall”. Under this assumption, public debt exceeds a certain limit and financial confidence collapses. As a result, interest rates rise, the currency falls and panic ensues. At times this scenario holds true – for economies with sizeable foreign-denominated public debt or for economies that create political breakdowns.
經(jīng)濟體缺乏財政空間(fiscal space)會發(fā)生什么？這一假定情形體現(xiàn)為一種類似于“生理極點”的現(xiàn)象。在這一情形下，公共債務超過某個限額，金融信心一落千丈。結(jié)果，利率出現(xiàn)上升，匯率出現(xiàn)下跌，公眾進而產(chǎn)生恐慌情緒。對有龐大外幣計價公共債務的經(jīng)濟體或面臨政治崩潰的經(jīng)濟體來說，這一假定情形有時真的會發(fā)生。
Japan demonstrates a different reality about the problems of excessive debt – one that Shinzo Abe, its new prime minister, should keep in mind as he launches a fiscal stimulus package. Japanese public debt has ballooned for 20 years, rising from 60 per cent to 220 per cent of gross domestic product (though the true figure net of government holdings may be 130 per cent). During that time Japan has been in recession, recovery and back in recession, but interest rates on Japanese government bonds have remained below 2 per cent for the past 13 years. While the debt accumulated, the yen appreciated from Y130 to Y78 to the dollar, before reversing to Y89 over the past few months.
就債務過多引發(fā)的問題而言，日本展示出一種與上述情形不同的現(xiàn)實。日本新首相安倍晉三(Shinzo Abe)在出臺財政刺激計劃時，應牢記這一現(xiàn)實。20年來，日本公共債務大幅增加，其相對于國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值(GDP)的比例從60%一路升至220%（盡管扣除政府持有量后的真實數(shù)字可能是130%）。在這20年里，日本經(jīng)歷了衰退、復蘇和再次衰退，但日本國債利率在過去13年里始終保持在2%以下。雖然公共債務不斷增加，但日元匯率卻從1美元兌130日元升至1美元兌78日元，只在最近幾個月才回落至1美元兌89日元。
Japan was able to get away with such unremittingly high deficits without an overt crisis for four reasons. First, Japan’s banks were induced to buy huge amounts of government bonds on a recurrent basis. Second, Japan’s households accepted the persistently low returns on their savings caused by such bank purchases. Third, market pressures were limited by the combination of few foreign holders
雖然赤字高居不下，日本卻能不發(fā)生任何明顯的危機，原因有四點。首先，日本銀行被鼓勵定期購買巨額國債。其次，盡管銀行的這類購買活動造成日本家庭部門儲蓄的回報率始終很低，日本老百姓卻接受了這一現(xiàn)實。第三，日本國債很少由外國人持有（外國人持有量只占日本國債總額的不到8%），而且人們擔心即使日本國債沒人想要，日本央行(BoJ)也會出手購買，這兩者結(jié)合起來使得市場承受的壓力受到了限制。第四，稅收和政府支出在日本國民總收入中的占比較低。
of JGBs (less than 8 per cent of the total) and the threat that the Bank of Japan could purchase unwanted bonds. Fourth, the share of taxation and government spending in total Japanese income was low.
處于某種狀態(tài)而不出問題，不等于毫無代價地擺脫這種狀態(tài)。以上四個令日本能持續(xù)負債運營的因素，都讓日本付出了相應的代價。向銀行的資產(chǎn)負債表注滿日本國債，已對它們的商業(yè)放貸造成抑制（就算在2003-08年的經(jīng)濟復蘇期間也是如此），阻礙了小企業(yè)和新企業(yè)的發(fā)展。日本儲蓄的長期低回報率進一步損害了投資機會，加重了通縮和年長儲蓄者的風險厭惡情緒，從而形成惡性循環(huán)。缺乏外部壓力既助長了日元的長期升值，又導致日本股市回報率停滯，這兩者都嚴重扭曲了日本經(jīng)濟。鑒于政府支出在日本GDP中所占的比重相對固定，償債就擠占了必要的公共投資以及充分醫(yī)療和災后重建所需的資金。
Getting away with something is not the same as getting off cost-free. Each of these factors enabling the ongoing fiscal deficits has had its costs to Japan. Stuffing bank balance sheets with JGBs has constrained commercial lending by those banks – even during the recovery of 2003-08 – which harmed small and new business development. The persistently low returns on Japanese savings have further squandered investment opportunities, thereby creating a negative feedback loop with deflation and older savers’ risk aversion. The absence of external pressure has fed the combined long-term appreciation of the yen and stagnation of Japanese stock market returns, both severely distorting the economy. Needed public investment and funds for adequate healthcare and disaster recovery have been crowded out by debt payments, given a relatively fixed share of government in Japanese GDP.
我和其他人曾經(jīng)力主日本在上世紀90年代后半段實行積極的刺激，這種刺激旨在對三個條件作出臨時回應。第一個條件是，日本當時的衰退既急又重，而且還在損害本已受到龐大不良貸款拖累的日本金融體系的穩(wěn)定性。第二個條件是，總體上說日本當時財政政策的實際立場是主張經(jīng)濟緊縮。第三個條件是，日本當時的凈公共債務水平還足夠低，短期刺激不會擠占公共投資（更不要說私人投資了）。
When I and others advocated aggressive stimulus in Japan in the second half of the 1990s, it was intended as a temporary response to three conditions. First, the recession was acute, severe and eroding the stability of a Japanese financial system already weakened by substantial non-performing loans. Second, the actual stance of Japanese fiscal policy then was, on balance, contractionary. And third, the net public debt level was low enough that short-term stimulus would not crowd out public investment (let alone private investment).
但到2003年年中時，日本繼續(xù)實行赤字性支出的理由就不復存在了。人們常常忽略的一點是，日本經(jīng)濟是在政府于2002-03年修正金融和宏觀經(jīng)濟政策（包括銀行業(yè)資本重組）后才復蘇的。2003年到2007年，日本人均實際收入增長與美國相同，都是年均增長1.8%，而且平均而言與美國始終齊頭并進，即便在2008-11年的動蕩時期也是如此。另外，在經(jīng)濟擴張期維持經(jīng)常性赤字的成本也在增加。
The case for continued deficit spending in Japan ended by mid-2003. Though it is often overlooked, Japan’s economy recovered well following a rectification of financial and macroeconomic policies – including banking recapitalisation – in 2002-03. From 2003 to 2007, per capita real income growth was the same in Japan as in the US (averaging 1.8 per cent annually) and kept pace with the US on average even during the volatile years of 2008-11. Meanwhile, the costs of running recurring deficits during an expansion accumulated.
因此，安倍的新財政刺激計劃是有問題的。這并不是因為日本債務相對GDP的比例再上升2%就到了所謂的臨界點、日本債務就將變得難以維系，理由是上述使日本免于發(fā)生明顯財政危機的四個因素依然存在；也不是因為這一計劃不會產(chǎn)生效果，相反，若輔以貨幣擴張和不久后可能會實行的消費稅上調(diào)，我認為該計劃產(chǎn)生的倍增效應以及短期影響并不低。
Mr Abe’s new fiscal stimulus initiative is therefore questionable. Not because another 2 per cent of GDP will be the proverbial tipping point on Japanese debt sustainability, for the factors protecting Japan from overt fiscal crisis remain. Nor because it will be ineffective; if anything, when combined with monetary expansion and a likely consumption tax rise in the near future, I expect its multiplier and thus short-run impact to be high.
日本新出臺的刺激之所以會適得其反，是因為該計劃加大了長期成本，卻沒有解決日本面臨的真正問題，即重回通縮和日元匯率受到高估。安倍及其經(jīng)濟顧問濱田宏一(Koichi Hamada)主張日本央行通過大規(guī)模收購各種資產(chǎn)實現(xiàn)更高的通脹目標，這一主張是正確的，日本央行照此執(zhí)行其實足以解決問題，而且甚為妥當。
The additional stimulus in Japan is counterproductive because it adds to the long-term costs without addressing Japan’s real problem: a return to deflation and an overvalued exchange rate. The BoJ pursuing a higher inflation target through large-scale purchases of a wide range of assets, as Mr Abe and his economic adviser Koichi Hamada rightly advocate, would be sufficient and appropriate.
如果財政政策一成不變、不能適應不斷變化的周期性條件，就會造成長期損害。無論政府的財政政策是緊縮得過了頭（就像歐洲最近那樣），還是寬松得過了頭（就像日本10年前經(jīng)濟復蘇以來那樣），這一論點都是成立的。這兩種情形的后果都是切實的，盡管不像“生理極點”那般極端明顯。如果意大利、英國和美國不打算在復蘇后立即終止財政擴張，它們恐怕也會像日本那樣受到結(jié)構(gòu)性損傷。一個擁有本國貨幣的大國達到其財政上，經(jīng)濟增長不會突然停止，而會像“溫水煮青蛙”一樣逐漸喪失活力和彈性。
Persistent fiscal policies that fail to adapt to changing cyclical conditions result in long-term damage. This holds true whether a government errs on the side of excessive austerity, as in Europe of late, or on the side of unjustified indiscipline, as in Japan since its recovery a decade ago. Either way, the consequences are real, though rarely as dramatically visible as hitting a wall. Italy, the UK and the US should fear the structural damage of following Japan’s example if fiscal expansion is not timed to end with recovery. When a large country with its own currency reaches its fiscal limit, growth ends not with a bang but a whimper of declining vitality and diminishing resilience.
本文作者是美國彼得森國際經(jīng)濟研究所(Peterson Institute for International Economics)總裁，曾任英國央行(BoE)貨幣政策委員會(MPC)委員。
The writer is president of the Peterson Institute for International Economics and a former member of the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee
What happens when an economy runs out of fiscal space? The presumption is embodied in the image of “hitting the wall”. Under this assumption, public debt exceeds a certain limit and financial confidence collapses. As a result, interest rates rise, the currency falls and panic ensues. At times this scenario holds true – for economies with sizeable foreign-denominated public debt or for economies that create political breakdowns.
經(jīng)濟體缺乏財政空間(fiscal space)會發(fā)生什么？這一假定情形體現(xiàn)為一種類似于“生理極點”的現(xiàn)象。在這一情形下，公共債務超過某個限額，金融信心一落千丈。結(jié)果，利率出現(xiàn)上升，匯率出現(xiàn)下跌，公眾進而產(chǎn)生恐慌情緒。對有龐大外幣計價公共債務的經(jīng)濟體或面臨政治崩潰的經(jīng)濟體來說，這一假定情形有時真的會發(fā)生。
Japan demonstrates a different reality about the problems of excessive debt – one that Shinzo Abe, its new prime minister, should keep in mind as he launches a fiscal stimulus package. Japanese public debt has ballooned for 20 years, rising from 60 per cent to 220 per cent of gross domestic product (though the true figure net of government holdings may be 130 per cent). During that time Japan has been in recession, recovery and back in recession, but interest rates on Japanese government bonds have remained below 2 per cent for the past 13 years. While the debt accumulated, the yen appreciated from Y130 to Y78 to the dollar, before reversing to Y89 over the past few months.
就債務過多引發(fā)的問題而言，日本展示出一種與上述情形不同的現(xiàn)實。日本新首相安倍晉三(Shinzo Abe)在出臺財政刺激計劃時，應牢記這一現(xiàn)實。20年來，日本公共債務大幅增加，其相對于國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值(GDP)的比例從60%一路升至220%（盡管扣除政府持有量后的真實數(shù)字可能是130%）。在這20年里，日本經(jīng)歷了衰退、復蘇和再次衰退，但日本國債利率在過去13年里始終保持在2%以下。雖然公共債務不斷增加，但日元匯率卻從1美元兌130日元升至1美元兌78日元，只在最近幾個月才回落至1美元兌89日元。
Japan was able to get away with such unremittingly high deficits without an overt crisis for four reasons. First, Japan’s banks were induced to buy huge amounts of government bonds on a recurrent basis. Second, Japan’s households accepted the persistently low returns on their savings caused by such bank purchases. Third, market pressures were limited by the combination of few foreign holders
雖然赤字高居不下，日本卻能不發(fā)生任何明顯的危機，原因有四點。首先，日本銀行被鼓勵定期購買巨額國債。其次，盡管銀行的這類購買活動造成日本家庭部門儲蓄的回報率始終很低，日本老百姓卻接受了這一現(xiàn)實。第三，日本國債很少由外國人持有（外國人持有量只占日本國債總額的不到8%），而且人們擔心即使日本國債沒人想要，日本央行(BoJ)也會出手購買，這兩者結(jié)合起來使得市場承受的壓力受到了限制。第四，稅收和政府支出在日本國民總收入中的占比較低。
of JGBs (less than 8 per cent of the total) and the threat that the Bank of Japan could purchase unwanted bonds. Fourth, the share of taxation and government spending in total Japanese income was low.
處于某種狀態(tài)而不出問題，不等于毫無代價地擺脫這種狀態(tài)。以上四個令日本能持續(xù)負債運營的因素，都讓日本付出了相應的代價。向銀行的資產(chǎn)負債表注滿日本國債，已對它們的商業(yè)放貸造成抑制（就算在2003-08年的經(jīng)濟復蘇期間也是如此），阻礙了小企業(yè)和新企業(yè)的發(fā)展。日本儲蓄的長期低回報率進一步損害了投資機會，加重了通縮和年長儲蓄者的風險厭惡情緒，從而形成惡性循環(huán)。缺乏外部壓力既助長了日元的長期升值，又導致日本股市回報率停滯，這兩者都嚴重扭曲了日本經(jīng)濟。鑒于政府支出在日本GDP中所占的比重相對固定，償債就擠占了必要的公共投資以及充分醫(yī)療和災后重建所需的資金。
Getting away with something is not the same as getting off cost-free. Each of these factors enabling the ongoing fiscal deficits has had its costs to Japan. Stuffing bank balance sheets with JGBs has constrained commercial lending by those banks – even during the recovery of 2003-08 – which harmed small and new business development. The persistently low returns on Japanese savings have further squandered investment opportunities, thereby creating a negative feedback loop with deflation and older savers’ risk aversion. The absence of external pressure has fed the combined long-term appreciation of the yen and stagnation of Japanese stock market returns, both severely distorting the economy. Needed public investment and funds for adequate healthcare and disaster recovery have been crowded out by debt payments, given a relatively fixed share of government in Japanese GDP.
我和其他人曾經(jīng)力主日本在上世紀90年代后半段實行積極的刺激，這種刺激旨在對三個條件作出臨時回應。第一個條件是，日本當時的衰退既急又重，而且還在損害本已受到龐大不良貸款拖累的日本金融體系的穩(wěn)定性。第二個條件是，總體上說日本當時財政政策的實際立場是主張經(jīng)濟緊縮。第三個條件是，日本當時的凈公共債務水平還足夠低，短期刺激不會擠占公共投資（更不要說私人投資了）。
When I and others advocated aggressive stimulus in Japan in the second half of the 1990s, it was intended as a temporary response to three conditions. First, the recession was acute, severe and eroding the stability of a Japanese financial system already weakened by substantial non-performing loans. Second, the actual stance of Japanese fiscal policy then was, on balance, contractionary. And third, the net public debt level was low enough that short-term stimulus would not crowd out public investment (let alone private investment).
但到2003年年中時，日本繼續(xù)實行赤字性支出的理由就不復存在了。人們常常忽略的一點是，日本經(jīng)濟是在政府于2002-03年修正金融和宏觀經(jīng)濟政策（包括銀行業(yè)資本重組）后才復蘇的。2003年到2007年，日本人均實際收入增長與美國相同，都是年均增長1.8%，而且平均而言與美國始終齊頭并進，即便在2008-11年的動蕩時期也是如此。另外，在經(jīng)濟擴張期維持經(jīng)常性赤字的成本也在增加。
The case for continued deficit spending in Japan ended by mid-2003. Though it is often overlooked, Japan’s economy recovered well following a rectification of financial and macroeconomic policies – including banking recapitalisation – in 2002-03. From 2003 to 2007, per capita real income growth was the same in Japan as in the US (averaging 1.8 per cent annually) and kept pace with the US on average even during the volatile years of 2008-11. Meanwhile, the costs of running recurring deficits during an expansion accumulated.
因此，安倍的新財政刺激計劃是有問題的。這并不是因為日本債務相對GDP的比例再上升2%就到了所謂的臨界點、日本債務就將變得難以維系，理由是上述使日本免于發(fā)生明顯財政危機的四個因素依然存在；也不是因為這一計劃不會產(chǎn)生效果，相反，若輔以貨幣擴張和不久后可能會實行的消費稅上調(diào)，我認為該計劃產(chǎn)生的倍增效應以及短期影響并不低。
Mr Abe’s new fiscal stimulus initiative is therefore questionable. Not because another 2 per cent of GDP will be the proverbial tipping point on Japanese debt sustainability, for the factors protecting Japan from overt fiscal crisis remain. Nor because it will be ineffective; if anything, when combined with monetary expansion and a likely consumption tax rise in the near future, I expect its multiplier and thus short-run impact to be high.
日本新出臺的刺激之所以會適得其反，是因為該計劃加大了長期成本，卻沒有解決日本面臨的真正問題，即重回通縮和日元匯率受到高估。安倍及其經(jīng)濟顧問濱田宏一(Koichi Hamada)主張日本央行通過大規(guī)模收購各種資產(chǎn)實現(xiàn)更高的通脹目標，這一主張是正確的，日本央行照此執(zhí)行其實足以解決問題，而且甚為妥當。
The additional stimulus in Japan is counterproductive because it adds to the long-term costs without addressing Japan’s real problem: a return to deflation and an overvalued exchange rate. The BoJ pursuing a higher inflation target through large-scale purchases of a wide range of assets, as Mr Abe and his economic adviser Koichi Hamada rightly advocate, would be sufficient and appropriate.
如果財政政策一成不變、不能適應不斷變化的周期性條件，就會造成長期損害。無論政府的財政政策是緊縮得過了頭（就像歐洲最近那樣），還是寬松得過了頭（就像日本10年前經(jīng)濟復蘇以來那樣），這一論點都是成立的。這兩種情形的后果都是切實的，盡管不像“生理極點”那般極端明顯。如果意大利、英國和美國不打算在復蘇后立即終止財政擴張，它們恐怕也會像日本那樣受到結(jié)構(gòu)性損傷。一個擁有本國貨幣的大國達到其財政上，經(jīng)濟增長不會突然停止，而會像“溫水煮青蛙”一樣逐漸喪失活力和彈性。
Persistent fiscal policies that fail to adapt to changing cyclical conditions result in long-term damage. This holds true whether a government errs on the side of excessive austerity, as in Europe of late, or on the side of unjustified indiscipline, as in Japan since its recovery a decade ago. Either way, the consequences are real, though rarely as dramatically visible as hitting a wall. Italy, the UK and the US should fear the structural damage of following Japan’s example if fiscal expansion is not timed to end with recovery. When a large country with its own currency reaches its fiscal limit, growth ends not with a bang but a whimper of declining vitality and diminishing resilience.
本文作者是美國彼得森國際經(jīng)濟研究所(Peterson Institute for International Economics)總裁，曾任英國央行(BoE)貨幣政策委員會(MPC)委員。
The writer is president of the Peterson Institute for International Economics and a former member of the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee