The Case of MGM v. Grokster
The Supreme Court Finally Steps Into The Fray Between Online File Swappers And The Major Movie And Recording Studios：
The Case of MGM v. Grokster
By JULIE HILDEN
Tuesday, Feb. 15, 2005
On March 29, the Supreme Court will hear arguments in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., a closely-watched case involving peer-to-peer file sharing - a process in which people send or receive music or movies over the Internet.
The most famous peer-to-peer file sharing site was, of course, Napster. However, after a number of rounds of litigation, Napster has now been transformed into a site that, for a monthly payment, allows only legal downloads of music （that is, downloads of copyright music for which a license has been granted）. Other sites, however, continue to offer peer-to-peer file sharing software despite the fact that one of its uses is to pirate copyrighted music and movies - and Grokster is one such site.
The Court's ultimate decision in MGM v. Grokster is very likely to be one of the landmarks of this term.
The Plaintiffs, the Defendants, and the Allegations in the Case
The list of plaintiffs in the case is a virtual "Who's Who" of influential Hollywood record and film companies. The defendants in the case are Grokster and StreamCast Networks - which provide software that allows peer-to-peer file sharing of music and movies on personal computers.
According to the plaintiffs, over 90% of the files that are actually exchanged using the software consist of copyrighted material that the swapper - that is, the person who makes files available for download on his or her computer - has no right to distribute. For this reason, the plaintiffs - who say they own the lion's share of the copyrights at issue - seek whopping damages against Grokster and StreamCast.
Their theory of liability holds that Grokster and StreamCast are responsible for the software users' copyright infringement - either because they contribute to users' infringement, or because the infringement is, in effect, their own. These two varieties of infringement are called "contributory" and "vicarious" infringement, respectively.
Will the Sony BetamaxCase Favor Defendants？
The last Supreme Court decision that seems closely analogous to this one was Sony Corp. v. Universal Studios Inc. - which was decided in 1984. It held that sellers of VCRs were not liable for users' copyright infringement - rejecting the claim that selling VCRs amounted to contributory infringement.
That holding, at first glance, sounds pretty good for the defendants in the MGM v. Grokster case： Like VCR makers, they, too, provide a means that enables copyright infringement on the part of some users, but not of all users. They, too, have created a new technology with a range of different uses, some legal and some illegal.
So shouldn't they, too, be off the hook - based on the Sony precedent？
The problem is, there's a big difference between VCRs and the software at issue here. At the time Sony was decided, the Court noted, the average American's use of his or her VCR was for "time-shifting" - that is, to record favorite television programs to be seen at a more convenient time. In short, VCRs were sort of like an old-time TiVo.
"Time-shifting" is a classic instance of "fair use" exempt from the copyright law. And in any event, as the Court pointed out, it would not seem to cause the typical kind of damages one sees in a copyright infringement case： lost profits from potential future legal sale of the copyrighted material.
In sum, the most common use of the VCR, according to the Supreme Court, was a legal one： time-shifting favorite television shows. In contrast, the average - indeed, the overwhelmingly likely - use of the software at issue in MGM v. Grokster is an illegal one： pirating copyrighted music and movies, which constitutes copyright infringement.
Indeed, the evidence shows that nine out of ten users use Grokster this way. （It is worth noting, though, that users whose use is perfectly legal actually do exist： Grokster offered the court affidavits from users who either were themselves copyright owners, or who were licensed to use the copyrighted material they distributed.）
In sum, the Court in Sony thought it was dealing with a mostly innocuous technology. But the Court in MGM v. Grokster knows it has a rattler, not a garden snake, in its hands. The idea, then, that the Court will blindly follow Sony here would be na？e. No matter how the Court decides this case, it will not be simply by applying past precedent.
Why the Stakes in the Case Are Potentially Momentous
The stakes in the case are very high, too - higher than in Sony. If the plaintiffs win, distributors of software that allows peer-to-peer file sharing will face immense damage awards that are likely to put them out of business - as well as, potentially, court injunctions that direct them to cease distributing their software.
The possibility would still remain, however, that the use of offshore servers and companies - which are beyond the jurisdiction of U.S. courts —— as well as of anonymity - you can't effectively hold an unknown person liable —— will mean that peer-to-peer file sharing continues. Thus, as I argued in a prior column, it may well be that this is, in effect, an unstoppable technology.
However, the Supreme Court's decision in favor of the plaintiffs would, at a minimum, impose practical impediments to peer-to-peer file sharing. It might also stigmatize peer-to-peer file sharing in the eyes of some - especially if the Supreme Court used stern language equating piracy to theft, and derogating peer-to-peer file sharing software as a criminal's tool.
It may be one thing for the record and movie industry - trying to preserve profits - to label file sharers criminal, and another thing for the Supreme Court - interpreting the law - to do so. On the other hand, though, some file sharers may only greet the Court's ruling with the same contempt they reserve for the RIAA's and MPAA's anti- piracy campaigns.
Importantly, too, courts have consistently held that when users swap copyrighted files without owning the copyright or having a license to do so, they are illegally infringing copyright. So suits against users will remain open-and-shut, no matter what the Supreme Court decides.
（Some theorists argue that sharing is "fair use," and thus exempt from copyright law. On their view, it is as innocuous as inviting one's friends over to listen to music, or lending them a DVD. But courts have held to the contrary： Unlike these practices, file-sharing typically involves some copying, or the equivalent - and thus, courts tend to see it as a straightforward copyright violation.）
On the other hand, if the defendants win, the market for peer-to-peer file sharing software will probably boom.
In addition, the software distributed by Grokster and StreamCast will provide a model of how to craft such software so that it passes legal muster； so those who seek to distribute similar software may simply opt to reverse-engineer the software that the Court has already blessed.
Who Will Win This Case Is Anybody's Guess
So who will win the case？ It is extremely hard to predict.
On one hand, I think it's unlikely that the Supreme Court will simply rule for the defendants, because the Justices will be uncomfortable with, in effect, licensing wide-scale copyright infringement.
The Court typically does not want to give its blessing to numerous instances of lawless behavior - remember, there's little, if any, question that peer-to-peer users are breaking the law - by otherwise law-abiding citizens. It might even fear that to do so, would create a scofflaw community where the attitude is, "It's okay as long as I don't get caught." And the Court is all too aware of the practical and public relations costs if companies must go after users one by one.
But on the other hand, simply ruling for the plaintiffs would also make the Justices uncomfortable, I think, in a different way： It's not the Court's job to censor American technology, and tell companies what they can and cannot create.
The upshot of this analysis is that the Court may reach for a compromise solution. One such solution might be to require Grokster and StreamCast to police their networks for users' infringement.
But there are reasons that the Court might be averse to this kind of solution, too： The Court probably is not much more inclined to tell software distributors how to interact with their customers, than it is inclined to tell them what software they can, and cannot, create and distribute.
In sum, a win for the defendants here seems lawless - as if it would, in effect, give a Supreme Court blessing to a possible scofflaw community. But a win for the plaintiffs seems somehow un-American - allowing courts to tell companies what to do, even though the companies aren't themselves breaking the law.
We don't even do this with gun manufacturers whose products are used by some to kill. Is the Supreme Court likely to mandate it for mere software distributors whose products are used by some to infringe copyright？
Given Flexible Legal Standards, the Court Has Substantial Freedom Here
One thing is clear： The law in this area is malleable enough that it can be argued either way. For instance, "contributory infringement" requires that the software distributor "materially contribute" to users' infringement of copyright, and have knowledge of it. But what kind of contribution is, or is not, "material"？
There's the rub. Grokster makes illegality possible - but when the illegality happens, later, it's through the user's own choice. So has Grokster made a "material contribution" - or virtually no contribution at all？
Similarly, when software is later used by many to infringe, and some to legally distribute files, does the software maker have "knowledge" of infringement？ This is another requirement for contributory infringement - and, like the material contribution requirement, it's susceptible to debate： For instance, does the software maker have to know about a particular instance of infringement, or is the general knowledge that the product is being used to infringe copyrights - which Grokster surely has by now —— enough？
Similar difficult questions arise within a theory of "vicarious" infringement. A key question is： Did the software distributor have the "right and ability" to supervise for infringement？
How might the distributor reserve the right and ability to supervise for infringement？ It might require users to agree to provide copyright registration or licenses for each use of the software. Obviously, that would be quite burdensome for the user. And doing so might only put the distributor in a worse legal position： Ironically, this test seems to suggest that the distributor will be better off if it remains ignorant of illegal uses, for then it cannot be held vicariously liable for them.
Some courts might want to address this irony by saying that the distributor must reserve this right and this ability - and thus must expose itself to a vicarious infringement claim. But arguably, a court that forced this, might be going too far.
Given that Congress has not specifically required the inclusion of such provisions in the relevant contracts, should courts interpreting copyright law take it upon themselves to tell Grokster how to structure its software, and force it to police its own users？ Or should the onus be on copyright owners to devise "lockware" that makes illegal uses of particular files impossible？
Reasonable minds can differ on the answers to all these questions, I think - and for this reason, the Supreme Court will likely feel free to make law, rather than to simply interpret it, in this crucial case.
米高梅訴格羅斯特案
朱莉希爾登
2005，2，15，星期二
在3月29日，法院將聽取米高梅公司訴格羅斯特有限公司一案的辯論，一個(gè)有關(guān)對(duì)等文件共享—人們通過(guò)網(wǎng)絡(luò)傳遞或者接收音樂(lè)或者電影的過(guò)程—被密切關(guān)注的案子。
最的對(duì)等文件共享網(wǎng)站當(dāng)然是，耐伯斯特。但是，在許多輪訴訟之后，耐伯斯特現(xiàn)在已經(jīng)轉(zhuǎn)變成為這樣的網(wǎng)站，按月支付的，只允許合法的音樂(lè)下載（那是，下載已經(jīng)授予許可的版權(quán)音樂(lè)）。別的網(wǎng)站，仍然，繼續(xù)提供對(duì)等文件共享軟件而不考慮它的某一次使用侵犯了享有著作權(quán)音樂(lè)和電影—格羅斯特就是一個(gè)這樣的網(wǎng)站。
法院在米高梅訴格羅斯特案中的最終判決可能成為這一任期具有劃時(shí)代意義的判決之一。
原告，被告，和案中的主張
本案的原告名單是一個(gè)有影響的好萊塢錄音和電影公司的虛擬的“誰(shuí)是誰(shuí)”。本案的被告是格羅斯特和流傳播網(wǎng)絡(luò)—它們提供支持個(gè)人電腦對(duì)等音樂(lè)電影文件共享的軟件。
根據(jù)原告訴稱，超過(guò)90%的實(shí)際使用這個(gè)軟件進(jìn)行交換的文件是由那些交換者—就是，利用他或她的電腦使文件可以下載的人—無(wú)權(quán)傳播的，具有著作權(quán)的材料構(gòu)成。基于這個(gè)理由，原告—享有案件中著作權(quán)份額的人—對(duì)格羅斯特和流傳播尋求龐大的賠償。
他們的責(zé)任理論認(rèn)為格羅斯特和流傳播應(yīng)該為軟件使用者的版權(quán)侵犯行為負(fù)責(zé)—因?yàn)樗麄儗?duì)使用者的侵權(quán)行為做了貢獻(xiàn)，或者因?yàn)榍謾?quán)行為，在效果上，他們也有份。這兩種侵權(quán)分別被稱做“貢獻(xiàn)的”和“替代的”侵權(quán)。
索尼比特麥克斯案會(huì)對(duì)被告有利嗎？
法院上一個(gè)看起來(lái)與此案十分類似的判決是索尼公司訴環(huán)球電影公司案—它是在1984年做出的。它認(rèn)為錄像機(jī)的銷售者對(duì)使用者的侵犯著作權(quán)的行為不負(fù)責(zé)任—駁回出售錄像機(jī)構(gòu)成幫助侵權(quán)的請(qǐng)求。
這個(gè)裁決，乍看起來(lái)，對(duì)美高梅訴格羅斯特案的被告十分有利：就像錄像機(jī)的制造者，他們，也，提供了使部分使用者可以侵犯著作權(quán)的手段，但是不是所有的使用者。他們，也，創(chuàng)造了擁有廣泛使用者的新科技，一些人合法還有一些人不合法。
所以他們就也不用，像脫離了釣鉤—基于索尼的先例？
問(wèn)題是，在錄像機(jī)和本案的軟件之間有一個(gè)很大的不同。索尼案判決的時(shí)候，法院解釋到，通常美國(guó)人使用他或她的錄像機(jī)是為了“改變時(shí)間”—就是，錄制喜歡的電視節(jié)目在一個(gè)更方便的時(shí)候觀看。簡(jiǎn)單的說(shuō)，錄像機(jī)就是類似老式留言電話的一種東西。
改變時(shí)間在知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)法中是一個(gè)典型的公平使用的例子。并且在任何時(shí)候，就像法庭指出的那樣，它不會(huì)看起來(lái)像能夠造成人們?cè)谇謾?quán)案件中看到的那種典型的損害：失去潛在的將來(lái)合法出售享有知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)的材料所取得的利益。
總體上，錄像機(jī)最普遍的使用，依照法院，是合法的：改變喜歡的電視節(jié)目的時(shí)間。相反，通常—真正地，很大可能—對(duì)米高梅訴格羅斯特案中軟件的使用是不合法的：侵犯了音樂(lè)和電影的專利權(quán)，構(gòu)成著作權(quán)侵權(quán)。
確實(shí)，證據(jù)顯示十個(gè)使用者中有九個(gè)這樣使用格羅斯特。（很值得注意的是，雖然這樣，事實(shí)上存在完全合法使用的用戶：格羅斯特提供了一份使用者的法庭宣誓書，他們有的是著作權(quán)的擁有者，或者他們被授權(quán)使用其所傳播的享有著作權(quán)的材料。）
總之，在索尼案中法庭認(rèn)為它處理的是一個(gè)通常無(wú)傷大雅的技術(shù)。但是米高梅訴格羅斯特案中法庭知道它拿的是一條響尾蛇，不是一條花園里的蛇，在它的手中。所以，這種想法，法院會(huì)盲目地遵循索尼案是很天真的。不論法院如何判決，它都不會(huì)簡(jiǎn)單地適用過(guò)去的先例。
為什么這個(gè)案子的代價(jià)是潛在地重大的
這個(gè)案子的代價(jià)也很高，高于索尼案。如果原告勝訴，允許對(duì)等文件共享的軟件的發(fā)布人將要面對(duì)巨額的損害賠償，可能導(dǎo)致它們倒閉—潛在地，法庭要求他們停止傳播他們軟件的禁令也會(huì)這樣。
可能性仍然存在，無(wú)論如何，海外服務(wù)器和公司的使用—它們?cè)诿绹?guó)法庭管轄權(quán)之外—還有匿名—你不能有效地讓一個(gè)不知名的人承擔(dān)責(zé)任—會(huì)意味著對(duì)等文件共享還會(huì)繼續(xù)。這樣，就像我在上一篇專欄中指出的那樣，這有很大可能是，在效果上，無(wú)法阻止的技術(shù)。
無(wú)論如何，法院傾向原告的判決會(huì)，即使在最小程度上，對(duì)對(duì)等文件共享設(shè)置實(shí)際的阻礙。它也會(huì)在一些人眼中給對(duì)等文件共享打上不好的烙印—特別地如果法院使用嚴(yán)厲的措辭把侵權(quán)等同于盜竊，并且貶損對(duì)等文件共享軟件為犯罪的工具。
錄音和電影工業(yè)—努力保護(hù)利益—使文件共享成為犯罪是一回事，法院—解釋法律—這樣實(shí)施是另一回事。另一方面，盡管如此，一些共享者可能用他們?yōu)槊绹?guó)錄音工業(yè)協(xié)會(huì)和美國(guó)電影協(xié)會(huì)反盜版運(yùn)動(dòng)保留的同樣的蔑視來(lái)回應(yīng)法院的裁決。
同樣重要地，法庭一貫認(rèn)為當(dāng)使用者不擁有著作權(quán)或者沒(méi)有被授權(quán)就去交換享有版權(quán)的文件，他們就是非法侵犯著作權(quán)。所以起訴使用者將是顯而易見的，不論法庭如何判決。
（一些理論者爭(zhēng)辯說(shuō)共享是“公平使用，”并且因此根據(jù)著作權(quán)法免除責(zé)任，它就像邀請(qǐng)朋友過(guò)來(lái)聽音樂(lè)，或者借給他們一部dvd.但是法庭認(rèn)為正相反：不同于這些實(shí)際，文件共享代表性地包括拷貝，或者同樣的行為—因此，法庭傾向于認(rèn)為它是直接的侵犯著作權(quán)。）
另一方面，如果被告獲勝，對(duì)等文件共享軟件的市場(chǎng)將可能會(huì)興隆起來(lái)。
另外，由格羅斯特和流傳播公司發(fā)布的軟件將提供一個(gè)制作合法的類似軟件的典范，所以那些尋求發(fā)布類似軟件的人會(huì)簡(jiǎn)單地選擇反編譯這個(gè)法庭業(yè)已保護(hù)的軟件。
所有人都在猜測(cè)誰(shuí)會(huì)贏得這個(gè)案子
那么誰(shuí)會(huì)贏得這個(gè)案子呢？這很難去預(yù)測(cè)。
一方面，我認(rèn)為法院不可能去簡(jiǎn)單地做出有利于被告的裁定，因?yàn)榉ü贂?huì)覺(jué)得實(shí)際上放縱了范圍廣闊的著作權(quán)侵權(quán)而不舒服。
法庭普遍地不想給予為數(shù)眾多的不法行為的保護(hù)—記住，這樣的時(shí)候很少，如果有的話，問(wèn)題是對(duì)等的使用者違反了法律—超過(guò)其他的守法公民。這樣做會(huì)很恐怖，將會(huì)造成一個(gè)藐視法律的社會(huì)，他們的態(tài)度是“只要我沒(méi)有被抓住，就萬(wàn)事大吉?！辈⑶曳ㄍザ济靼讓?shí)際的和公共關(guān)系的花費(fèi)，如果公司必須一個(gè)一個(gè)地照顧他們的使用者。
但是另一方面，簡(jiǎn)單做傾向于原告的裁決也會(huì)讓法官不舒服，我認(rèn)為，從一個(gè)不同的觀點(diǎn)看：檢查美國(guó)科技并且指示告訴他們可以做什么不可以做什么不是法院的工作。
分析的結(jié)果是法庭可能達(dá)成妥協(xié)的解決方案。一種這樣的方案可能是要求格羅斯特和流傳播去監(jiān)管他們的網(wǎng)絡(luò)防止使用者侵權(quán)。
但是法庭也有理由去反對(duì)這種解決方案：法庭不傾向于告訴軟件發(fā)布者他們可以或者不可以創(chuàng)造什么和傳播什么，就像它可能不傾向于告訴軟件發(fā)布者如何去與他們的顧客交流。
總之，被告的勝利看起來(lái)會(huì)不合法—因?yàn)樗谛Ч媳Ｗo(hù)了一個(gè)可能的藐視法律的社會(huì)。但是原告的勝利看起來(lái)有點(diǎn)不美國(guó)—授權(quán)法庭去告訴企業(yè)什么可以做，甚至企業(yè)自己并沒(méi)有違法。
我們甚至沒(méi)有對(duì)其產(chǎn)品被一些人用來(lái)殺人的槍支制造企業(yè)做這些。法院可能會(huì)這樣做嗎僅僅因?yàn)檐浖l(fā)布者的軟件被用來(lái)侵犯著作權(quán)？
假定可變通法律標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，法庭在這里有真實(shí)的自由
一件事是清楚的：在這個(gè)領(lǐng)域的法律是足夠可塑的可以用不同的方式爭(zhēng)辯。例如，“貢獻(xiàn)侵權(quán)”要求軟件發(fā)布者“實(shí)質(zhì)地貢獻(xiàn)”于使用者的侵權(quán)，并且知道它。但是什么樣的貢獻(xiàn)是，或不是“實(shí)質(zhì)的”？
難就難在這兒。格羅斯特使不法行為成為可能—但是后來(lái)當(dāng)不法行為發(fā)生時(shí)，它是根據(jù)使用者自己的選擇。所以格羅斯特做出了“實(shí)質(zhì)的貢獻(xiàn)”—或者事實(shí)上根本就沒(méi)有什么貢獻(xiàn)？
同樣地，當(dāng)軟件后來(lái)被許多人用來(lái)侵權(quán)，還有一些用于合法地傳播文件，是否軟件制作者知道侵權(quán)？這是另一個(gè)對(duì)貢獻(xiàn)侵權(quán)的要求—并且，像實(shí)質(zhì)貢獻(xiàn)侵權(quán)要求，爭(zhēng)論是沒(méi)有定論的：例如，是否軟件制作者必須知道一個(gè)侵權(quán)的特定例子，或者是否對(duì)軟件被用來(lái)侵犯著作權(quán)有一般的了解—格羅斯特現(xiàn)在確定了解—就足夠？
同樣困難的問(wèn)題也產(chǎn)生于代理侵權(quán)的理論。主要問(wèn)題是：是否軟件發(fā)布者有“權(quán)利和能力”去對(duì)侵權(quán)監(jiān)督？
發(fā)布者怎樣才能保留權(quán)利和能力去對(duì)監(jiān)督侵權(quán)？可能要求使用者同意每次使用軟件時(shí)提供著作權(quán)登記或者授權(quán)。顯然，那對(duì)使用者來(lái)說(shuō)是很繁重的。而且這樣做可能僅僅把發(fā)布者置于一個(gè)更糟糕的法律地位：諷刺地，這個(gè)測(cè)試看起來(lái)建議發(fā)布者離開如果它保持對(duì)非法使用置之不理，因?yàn)槟菢铀筒荒鼙灰鬄樗鼈冐?fù)代理的責(zé)任。
一些法庭可能會(huì)提出這個(gè)反語(yǔ)通過(guò)說(shuō)發(fā)布者必須保留這個(gè)權(quán)利和能力—并且因而必須使它自己暴露于代理侵權(quán)訴訟。但是可以爭(zhēng)論地，一個(gè)強(qiáng)制這樣做的法庭未免走的太遠(yuǎn)了。
假定議會(huì)沒(méi)有特別要求在相關(guān)合同中包括這樣的條款，解釋著作權(quán)法的法庭能夠賦予自己權(quán)力指示格羅斯特如何構(gòu)建它的軟件，并且強(qiáng)制它去監(jiān)管它自己的用戶？或者添置“鎖定軟件”使特定文件的非法使用變得不可能的責(zé)任應(yīng)該由著作權(quán)所有者承擔(dān)？
合理的思維能夠區(qū)分所有這些問(wèn)題的答案，我認(rèn)為—并且根據(jù)這個(gè)理由，法院可能會(huì)自由的造法，而不是簡(jiǎn)單地解釋它，在這樣一個(gè)及其重要的案子中。
The Supreme Court Finally Steps Into The Fray Between Online File Swappers And The Major Movie And Recording Studios：
The Case of MGM v. Grokster
By JULIE HILDEN
Tuesday, Feb. 15, 2005
On March 29, the Supreme Court will hear arguments in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., a closely-watched case involving peer-to-peer file sharing - a process in which people send or receive music or movies over the Internet.
The most famous peer-to-peer file sharing site was, of course, Napster. However, after a number of rounds of litigation, Napster has now been transformed into a site that, for a monthly payment, allows only legal downloads of music （that is, downloads of copyright music for which a license has been granted）. Other sites, however, continue to offer peer-to-peer file sharing software despite the fact that one of its uses is to pirate copyrighted music and movies - and Grokster is one such site.
The Court's ultimate decision in MGM v. Grokster is very likely to be one of the landmarks of this term.
The Plaintiffs, the Defendants, and the Allegations in the Case
The list of plaintiffs in the case is a virtual "Who's Who" of influential Hollywood record and film companies. The defendants in the case are Grokster and StreamCast Networks - which provide software that allows peer-to-peer file sharing of music and movies on personal computers.
According to the plaintiffs, over 90% of the files that are actually exchanged using the software consist of copyrighted material that the swapper - that is, the person who makes files available for download on his or her computer - has no right to distribute. For this reason, the plaintiffs - who say they own the lion's share of the copyrights at issue - seek whopping damages against Grokster and StreamCast.
Their theory of liability holds that Grokster and StreamCast are responsible for the software users' copyright infringement - either because they contribute to users' infringement, or because the infringement is, in effect, their own. These two varieties of infringement are called "contributory" and "vicarious" infringement, respectively.
Will the Sony BetamaxCase Favor Defendants？
The last Supreme Court decision that seems closely analogous to this one was Sony Corp. v. Universal Studios Inc. - which was decided in 1984. It held that sellers of VCRs were not liable for users' copyright infringement - rejecting the claim that selling VCRs amounted to contributory infringement.
That holding, at first glance, sounds pretty good for the defendants in the MGM v. Grokster case： Like VCR makers, they, too, provide a means that enables copyright infringement on the part of some users, but not of all users. They, too, have created a new technology with a range of different uses, some legal and some illegal.
So shouldn't they, too, be off the hook - based on the Sony precedent？
The problem is, there's a big difference between VCRs and the software at issue here. At the time Sony was decided, the Court noted, the average American's use of his or her VCR was for "time-shifting" - that is, to record favorite television programs to be seen at a more convenient time. In short, VCRs were sort of like an old-time TiVo.
"Time-shifting" is a classic instance of "fair use" exempt from the copyright law. And in any event, as the Court pointed out, it would not seem to cause the typical kind of damages one sees in a copyright infringement case： lost profits from potential future legal sale of the copyrighted material.
In sum, the most common use of the VCR, according to the Supreme Court, was a legal one： time-shifting favorite television shows. In contrast, the average - indeed, the overwhelmingly likely - use of the software at issue in MGM v. Grokster is an illegal one： pirating copyrighted music and movies, which constitutes copyright infringement.
Indeed, the evidence shows that nine out of ten users use Grokster this way. （It is worth noting, though, that users whose use is perfectly legal actually do exist： Grokster offered the court affidavits from users who either were themselves copyright owners, or who were licensed to use the copyrighted material they distributed.）
In sum, the Court in Sony thought it was dealing with a mostly innocuous technology. But the Court in MGM v. Grokster knows it has a rattler, not a garden snake, in its hands. The idea, then, that the Court will blindly follow Sony here would be na？e. No matter how the Court decides this case, it will not be simply by applying past precedent.
Why the Stakes in the Case Are Potentially Momentous
The stakes in the case are very high, too - higher than in Sony. If the plaintiffs win, distributors of software that allows peer-to-peer file sharing will face immense damage awards that are likely to put them out of business - as well as, potentially, court injunctions that direct them to cease distributing their software.
The possibility would still remain, however, that the use of offshore servers and companies - which are beyond the jurisdiction of U.S. courts —— as well as of anonymity - you can't effectively hold an unknown person liable —— will mean that peer-to-peer file sharing continues. Thus, as I argued in a prior column, it may well be that this is, in effect, an unstoppable technology.
However, the Supreme Court's decision in favor of the plaintiffs would, at a minimum, impose practical impediments to peer-to-peer file sharing. It might also stigmatize peer-to-peer file sharing in the eyes of some - especially if the Supreme Court used stern language equating piracy to theft, and derogating peer-to-peer file sharing software as a criminal's tool.
It may be one thing for the record and movie industry - trying to preserve profits - to label file sharers criminal, and another thing for the Supreme Court - interpreting the law - to do so. On the other hand, though, some file sharers may only greet the Court's ruling with the same contempt they reserve for the RIAA's and MPAA's anti- piracy campaigns.
Importantly, too, courts have consistently held that when users swap copyrighted files without owning the copyright or having a license to do so, they are illegally infringing copyright. So suits against users will remain open-and-shut, no matter what the Supreme Court decides.
（Some theorists argue that sharing is "fair use," and thus exempt from copyright law. On their view, it is as innocuous as inviting one's friends over to listen to music, or lending them a DVD. But courts have held to the contrary： Unlike these practices, file-sharing typically involves some copying, or the equivalent - and thus, courts tend to see it as a straightforward copyright violation.）
On the other hand, if the defendants win, the market for peer-to-peer file sharing software will probably boom.
In addition, the software distributed by Grokster and StreamCast will provide a model of how to craft such software so that it passes legal muster； so those who seek to distribute similar software may simply opt to reverse-engineer the software that the Court has already blessed.
Who Will Win This Case Is Anybody's Guess
So who will win the case？ It is extremely hard to predict.
On one hand, I think it's unlikely that the Supreme Court will simply rule for the defendants, because the Justices will be uncomfortable with, in effect, licensing wide-scale copyright infringement.
The Court typically does not want to give its blessing to numerous instances of lawless behavior - remember, there's little, if any, question that peer-to-peer users are breaking the law - by otherwise law-abiding citizens. It might even fear that to do so, would create a scofflaw community where the attitude is, "It's okay as long as I don't get caught." And the Court is all too aware of the practical and public relations costs if companies must go after users one by one.
But on the other hand, simply ruling for the plaintiffs would also make the Justices uncomfortable, I think, in a different way： It's not the Court's job to censor American technology, and tell companies what they can and cannot create.
The upshot of this analysis is that the Court may reach for a compromise solution. One such solution might be to require Grokster and StreamCast to police their networks for users' infringement.
But there are reasons that the Court might be averse to this kind of solution, too： The Court probably is not much more inclined to tell software distributors how to interact with their customers, than it is inclined to tell them what software they can, and cannot, create and distribute.
In sum, a win for the defendants here seems lawless - as if it would, in effect, give a Supreme Court blessing to a possible scofflaw community. But a win for the plaintiffs seems somehow un-American - allowing courts to tell companies what to do, even though the companies aren't themselves breaking the law.
We don't even do this with gun manufacturers whose products are used by some to kill. Is the Supreme Court likely to mandate it for mere software distributors whose products are used by some to infringe copyright？
Given Flexible Legal Standards, the Court Has Substantial Freedom Here
One thing is clear： The law in this area is malleable enough that it can be argued either way. For instance, "contributory infringement" requires that the software distributor "materially contribute" to users' infringement of copyright, and have knowledge of it. But what kind of contribution is, or is not, "material"？
There's the rub. Grokster makes illegality possible - but when the illegality happens, later, it's through the user's own choice. So has Grokster made a "material contribution" - or virtually no contribution at all？
Similarly, when software is later used by many to infringe, and some to legally distribute files, does the software maker have "knowledge" of infringement？ This is another requirement for contributory infringement - and, like the material contribution requirement, it's susceptible to debate： For instance, does the software maker have to know about a particular instance of infringement, or is the general knowledge that the product is being used to infringe copyrights - which Grokster surely has by now —— enough？
Similar difficult questions arise within a theory of "vicarious" infringement. A key question is： Did the software distributor have the "right and ability" to supervise for infringement？
How might the distributor reserve the right and ability to supervise for infringement？ It might require users to agree to provide copyright registration or licenses for each use of the software. Obviously, that would be quite burdensome for the user. And doing so might only put the distributor in a worse legal position： Ironically, this test seems to suggest that the distributor will be better off if it remains ignorant of illegal uses, for then it cannot be held vicariously liable for them.
Some courts might want to address this irony by saying that the distributor must reserve this right and this ability - and thus must expose itself to a vicarious infringement claim. But arguably, a court that forced this, might be going too far.
Given that Congress has not specifically required the inclusion of such provisions in the relevant contracts, should courts interpreting copyright law take it upon themselves to tell Grokster how to structure its software, and force it to police its own users？ Or should the onus be on copyright owners to devise "lockware" that makes illegal uses of particular files impossible？
Reasonable minds can differ on the answers to all these questions, I think - and for this reason, the Supreme Court will likely feel free to make law, rather than to simply interpret it, in this crucial case.
米高梅訴格羅斯特案
朱莉希爾登
2005，2，15，星期二
在3月29日，法院將聽取米高梅公司訴格羅斯特有限公司一案的辯論，一個(gè)有關(guān)對(duì)等文件共享—人們通過(guò)網(wǎng)絡(luò)傳遞或者接收音樂(lè)或者電影的過(guò)程—被密切關(guān)注的案子。
最的對(duì)等文件共享網(wǎng)站當(dāng)然是，耐伯斯特。但是，在許多輪訴訟之后，耐伯斯特現(xiàn)在已經(jīng)轉(zhuǎn)變成為這樣的網(wǎng)站，按月支付的，只允許合法的音樂(lè)下載（那是，下載已經(jīng)授予許可的版權(quán)音樂(lè)）。別的網(wǎng)站，仍然，繼續(xù)提供對(duì)等文件共享軟件而不考慮它的某一次使用侵犯了享有著作權(quán)音樂(lè)和電影—格羅斯特就是一個(gè)這樣的網(wǎng)站。
法院在米高梅訴格羅斯特案中的最終判決可能成為這一任期具有劃時(shí)代意義的判決之一。
原告，被告，和案中的主張
本案的原告名單是一個(gè)有影響的好萊塢錄音和電影公司的虛擬的“誰(shuí)是誰(shuí)”。本案的被告是格羅斯特和流傳播網(wǎng)絡(luò)—它們提供支持個(gè)人電腦對(duì)等音樂(lè)電影文件共享的軟件。
根據(jù)原告訴稱，超過(guò)90%的實(shí)際使用這個(gè)軟件進(jìn)行交換的文件是由那些交換者—就是，利用他或她的電腦使文件可以下載的人—無(wú)權(quán)傳播的，具有著作權(quán)的材料構(gòu)成。基于這個(gè)理由，原告—享有案件中著作權(quán)份額的人—對(duì)格羅斯特和流傳播尋求龐大的賠償。
他們的責(zé)任理論認(rèn)為格羅斯特和流傳播應(yīng)該為軟件使用者的版權(quán)侵犯行為負(fù)責(zé)—因?yàn)樗麄儗?duì)使用者的侵權(quán)行為做了貢獻(xiàn)，或者因?yàn)榍謾?quán)行為，在效果上，他們也有份。這兩種侵權(quán)分別被稱做“貢獻(xiàn)的”和“替代的”侵權(quán)。
索尼比特麥克斯案會(huì)對(duì)被告有利嗎？
法院上一個(gè)看起來(lái)與此案十分類似的判決是索尼公司訴環(huán)球電影公司案—它是在1984年做出的。它認(rèn)為錄像機(jī)的銷售者對(duì)使用者的侵犯著作權(quán)的行為不負(fù)責(zé)任—駁回出售錄像機(jī)構(gòu)成幫助侵權(quán)的請(qǐng)求。
這個(gè)裁決，乍看起來(lái)，對(duì)美高梅訴格羅斯特案的被告十分有利：就像錄像機(jī)的制造者，他們，也，提供了使部分使用者可以侵犯著作權(quán)的手段，但是不是所有的使用者。他們，也，創(chuàng)造了擁有廣泛使用者的新科技，一些人合法還有一些人不合法。
所以他們就也不用，像脫離了釣鉤—基于索尼的先例？
問(wèn)題是，在錄像機(jī)和本案的軟件之間有一個(gè)很大的不同。索尼案判決的時(shí)候，法院解釋到，通常美國(guó)人使用他或她的錄像機(jī)是為了“改變時(shí)間”—就是，錄制喜歡的電視節(jié)目在一個(gè)更方便的時(shí)候觀看。簡(jiǎn)單的說(shuō)，錄像機(jī)就是類似老式留言電話的一種東西。
改變時(shí)間在知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)法中是一個(gè)典型的公平使用的例子。并且在任何時(shí)候，就像法庭指出的那樣，它不會(huì)看起來(lái)像能夠造成人們?cè)谇謾?quán)案件中看到的那種典型的損害：失去潛在的將來(lái)合法出售享有知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)的材料所取得的利益。
總體上，錄像機(jī)最普遍的使用，依照法院，是合法的：改變喜歡的電視節(jié)目的時(shí)間。相反，通常—真正地，很大可能—對(duì)米高梅訴格羅斯特案中軟件的使用是不合法的：侵犯了音樂(lè)和電影的專利權(quán)，構(gòu)成著作權(quán)侵權(quán)。
確實(shí)，證據(jù)顯示十個(gè)使用者中有九個(gè)這樣使用格羅斯特。（很值得注意的是，雖然這樣，事實(shí)上存在完全合法使用的用戶：格羅斯特提供了一份使用者的法庭宣誓書，他們有的是著作權(quán)的擁有者，或者他們被授權(quán)使用其所傳播的享有著作權(quán)的材料。）
總之，在索尼案中法庭認(rèn)為它處理的是一個(gè)通常無(wú)傷大雅的技術(shù)。但是米高梅訴格羅斯特案中法庭知道它拿的是一條響尾蛇，不是一條花園里的蛇，在它的手中。所以，這種想法，法院會(huì)盲目地遵循索尼案是很天真的。不論法院如何判決，它都不會(huì)簡(jiǎn)單地適用過(guò)去的先例。
為什么這個(gè)案子的代價(jià)是潛在地重大的
這個(gè)案子的代價(jià)也很高，高于索尼案。如果原告勝訴，允許對(duì)等文件共享的軟件的發(fā)布人將要面對(duì)巨額的損害賠償，可能導(dǎo)致它們倒閉—潛在地，法庭要求他們停止傳播他們軟件的禁令也會(huì)這樣。
可能性仍然存在，無(wú)論如何，海外服務(wù)器和公司的使用—它們?cè)诿绹?guó)法庭管轄權(quán)之外—還有匿名—你不能有效地讓一個(gè)不知名的人承擔(dān)責(zé)任—會(huì)意味著對(duì)等文件共享還會(huì)繼續(xù)。這樣，就像我在上一篇專欄中指出的那樣，這有很大可能是，在效果上，無(wú)法阻止的技術(shù)。
無(wú)論如何，法院傾向原告的判決會(huì)，即使在最小程度上，對(duì)對(duì)等文件共享設(shè)置實(shí)際的阻礙。它也會(huì)在一些人眼中給對(duì)等文件共享打上不好的烙印—特別地如果法院使用嚴(yán)厲的措辭把侵權(quán)等同于盜竊，并且貶損對(duì)等文件共享軟件為犯罪的工具。
錄音和電影工業(yè)—努力保護(hù)利益—使文件共享成為犯罪是一回事，法院—解釋法律—這樣實(shí)施是另一回事。另一方面，盡管如此，一些共享者可能用他們?yōu)槊绹?guó)錄音工業(yè)協(xié)會(huì)和美國(guó)電影協(xié)會(huì)反盜版運(yùn)動(dòng)保留的同樣的蔑視來(lái)回應(yīng)法院的裁決。
同樣重要地，法庭一貫認(rèn)為當(dāng)使用者不擁有著作權(quán)或者沒(méi)有被授權(quán)就去交換享有版權(quán)的文件，他們就是非法侵犯著作權(quán)。所以起訴使用者將是顯而易見的，不論法庭如何判決。
（一些理論者爭(zhēng)辯說(shuō)共享是“公平使用，”并且因此根據(jù)著作權(quán)法免除責(zé)任，它就像邀請(qǐng)朋友過(guò)來(lái)聽音樂(lè)，或者借給他們一部dvd.但是法庭認(rèn)為正相反：不同于這些實(shí)際，文件共享代表性地包括拷貝，或者同樣的行為—因此，法庭傾向于認(rèn)為它是直接的侵犯著作權(quán)。）
另一方面，如果被告獲勝，對(duì)等文件共享軟件的市場(chǎng)將可能會(huì)興隆起來(lái)。
另外，由格羅斯特和流傳播公司發(fā)布的軟件將提供一個(gè)制作合法的類似軟件的典范，所以那些尋求發(fā)布類似軟件的人會(huì)簡(jiǎn)單地選擇反編譯這個(gè)法庭業(yè)已保護(hù)的軟件。
所有人都在猜測(cè)誰(shuí)會(huì)贏得這個(gè)案子
那么誰(shuí)會(huì)贏得這個(gè)案子呢？這很難去預(yù)測(cè)。
一方面，我認(rèn)為法院不可能去簡(jiǎn)單地做出有利于被告的裁定，因?yàn)榉ü贂?huì)覺(jué)得實(shí)際上放縱了范圍廣闊的著作權(quán)侵權(quán)而不舒服。
法庭普遍地不想給予為數(shù)眾多的不法行為的保護(hù)—記住，這樣的時(shí)候很少，如果有的話，問(wèn)題是對(duì)等的使用者違反了法律—超過(guò)其他的守法公民。這樣做會(huì)很恐怖，將會(huì)造成一個(gè)藐視法律的社會(huì)，他們的態(tài)度是“只要我沒(méi)有被抓住，就萬(wàn)事大吉?！辈⑶曳ㄍザ济靼讓?shí)際的和公共關(guān)系的花費(fèi)，如果公司必須一個(gè)一個(gè)地照顧他們的使用者。
但是另一方面，簡(jiǎn)單做傾向于原告的裁決也會(huì)讓法官不舒服，我認(rèn)為，從一個(gè)不同的觀點(diǎn)看：檢查美國(guó)科技并且指示告訴他們可以做什么不可以做什么不是法院的工作。
分析的結(jié)果是法庭可能達(dá)成妥協(xié)的解決方案。一種這樣的方案可能是要求格羅斯特和流傳播去監(jiān)管他們的網(wǎng)絡(luò)防止使用者侵權(quán)。
但是法庭也有理由去反對(duì)這種解決方案：法庭不傾向于告訴軟件發(fā)布者他們可以或者不可以創(chuàng)造什么和傳播什么，就像它可能不傾向于告訴軟件發(fā)布者如何去與他們的顧客交流。
總之，被告的勝利看起來(lái)會(huì)不合法—因?yàn)樗谛Ч媳Ｗo(hù)了一個(gè)可能的藐視法律的社會(huì)。但是原告的勝利看起來(lái)有點(diǎn)不美國(guó)—授權(quán)法庭去告訴企業(yè)什么可以做，甚至企業(yè)自己并沒(méi)有違法。
我們甚至沒(méi)有對(duì)其產(chǎn)品被一些人用來(lái)殺人的槍支制造企業(yè)做這些。法院可能會(huì)這樣做嗎僅僅因?yàn)檐浖l(fā)布者的軟件被用來(lái)侵犯著作權(quán)？
假定可變通法律標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，法庭在這里有真實(shí)的自由
一件事是清楚的：在這個(gè)領(lǐng)域的法律是足夠可塑的可以用不同的方式爭(zhēng)辯。例如，“貢獻(xiàn)侵權(quán)”要求軟件發(fā)布者“實(shí)質(zhì)地貢獻(xiàn)”于使用者的侵權(quán)，并且知道它。但是什么樣的貢獻(xiàn)是，或不是“實(shí)質(zhì)的”？
難就難在這兒。格羅斯特使不法行為成為可能—但是后來(lái)當(dāng)不法行為發(fā)生時(shí)，它是根據(jù)使用者自己的選擇。所以格羅斯特做出了“實(shí)質(zhì)的貢獻(xiàn)”—或者事實(shí)上根本就沒(méi)有什么貢獻(xiàn)？
同樣地，當(dāng)軟件后來(lái)被許多人用來(lái)侵權(quán)，還有一些用于合法地傳播文件，是否軟件制作者知道侵權(quán)？這是另一個(gè)對(duì)貢獻(xiàn)侵權(quán)的要求—并且，像實(shí)質(zhì)貢獻(xiàn)侵權(quán)要求，爭(zhēng)論是沒(méi)有定論的：例如，是否軟件制作者必須知道一個(gè)侵權(quán)的特定例子，或者是否對(duì)軟件被用來(lái)侵犯著作權(quán)有一般的了解—格羅斯特現(xiàn)在確定了解—就足夠？
同樣困難的問(wèn)題也產(chǎn)生于代理侵權(quán)的理論。主要問(wèn)題是：是否軟件發(fā)布者有“權(quán)利和能力”去對(duì)侵權(quán)監(jiān)督？
發(fā)布者怎樣才能保留權(quán)利和能力去對(duì)監(jiān)督侵權(quán)？可能要求使用者同意每次使用軟件時(shí)提供著作權(quán)登記或者授權(quán)。顯然，那對(duì)使用者來(lái)說(shuō)是很繁重的。而且這樣做可能僅僅把發(fā)布者置于一個(gè)更糟糕的法律地位：諷刺地，這個(gè)測(cè)試看起來(lái)建議發(fā)布者離開如果它保持對(duì)非法使用置之不理，因?yàn)槟菢铀筒荒鼙灰鬄樗鼈冐?fù)代理的責(zé)任。
一些法庭可能會(huì)提出這個(gè)反語(yǔ)通過(guò)說(shuō)發(fā)布者必須保留這個(gè)權(quán)利和能力—并且因而必須使它自己暴露于代理侵權(quán)訴訟。但是可以爭(zhēng)論地，一個(gè)強(qiáng)制這樣做的法庭未免走的太遠(yuǎn)了。
假定議會(huì)沒(méi)有特別要求在相關(guān)合同中包括這樣的條款，解釋著作權(quán)法的法庭能夠賦予自己權(quán)力指示格羅斯特如何構(gòu)建它的軟件，并且強(qiáng)制它去監(jiān)管它自己的用戶？或者添置“鎖定軟件”使特定文件的非法使用變得不可能的責(zé)任應(yīng)該由著作權(quán)所有者承擔(dān)？
合理的思維能夠區(qū)分所有這些問(wèn)題的答案，我認(rèn)為—并且根據(jù)這個(gè)理由，法院可能會(huì)自由的造法，而不是簡(jiǎn)單地解釋它，在這樣一個(gè)及其重要的案子中。