CENTRAL LONDON PROPERTY TRUST LIMITED v. HIGH TREES HOUSE LIMITED.
1946 July 18. Denning J.
Case fact
On September 24 in 1937, the central property of London of plaintiff trusted the limited company and the accused high tree house property limited companies to sign a stamp seal leasing contract, the plaintiff leased a apartment building to the accused, renting to expect 99 years, starting counting on September 29 from 1937, the rental was pound 2500 of every year.This apartment building was lately- set up.Because very quick started World War II, many persons left London, so the apartment building has no all of quilts to turn to lease out.At that time the war situation that can't converse next, the accused was obviously impossible to turn apartment completely to rent.Two representative directors of the companies all were aware of confessed, the accused could't obtain the enough income from turn to rent in this kind of case, thus also very difficult pay the reserved rental toward plaintiff.After both parties negotiate, reached in 1941 beginning of years written form agreement, rental from lease and start the hour since the reduction was every year pound 1250.
Thus, the accused pressed the quantity of pound 1250 to pay annually from 1941 to the rental of 1945 beginning of years.While arriving 1945 beginning of years, two wars will soon ended, all partments within the apartment building rented to go out, but henceforth the accused still presses this quantity to pay.On September 21 in 1945, the plaintiff writed a letter for accused to call, rental should from the leasing expect one beginning according to first contract provision of whole sum（ every year pound 2500） pay, and said that the accused owes to rent the quantity as pound 7916.Afterwards, the plaintiff brought up this friendly litigation toward in the British deluxe court, to clear up and should pay in the accused how much rental the law condition of the problem.In the litigation, the plaintiff sued the amount of money of request was pound 625, this was 1945 later an accused of two quarters did not wish the paying rental sum, the accused was only wish the idea pays with the rental sum of year of pound 1250 because the plaintiff lays claimed to the rental of year and should be pound 2500,, thus in the degree of two quarters the accused did not wish to pay but the plaintiff thought and should pay of rental sum was pound 625. By their defence the defendants pleaded （1.） that the letter of January 3, 1940, constituted an agreement that the rent reserved should be 1,250l. only, and that such agreement related to the whole term of the lease, （2.） they pleaded in the alternative that the plaintiff company were estopped from alleging that the rent exceeded 1,250l. per annum and （3.） as a further alternative, that by failing to demand rent in excess of 1,250l. before their letter of September 21, 1945 （received by the defendants on September 24）, they had waived their rights in respect of any rent, in excess of that at the rate of 1,250l., which had accrued up to September 24, 1945.
Queen's Bench Division of the High Court of Justice
DENNING J.stated the facts and continued: If I were to consider this matter without regard to recent developments in the law, there is no doubt that had the plaintiffs claimed it, they would have been entitled to recover ground rent at the rate of 2,500l. a year from the beginning of the term, since the lease under which it was payable was a lease under seal which, according to the old common law, could not be varied by an agreement by parol （whether in writing or not）, but only by deed. Equity, however stepped in, and said that if there has been a variation of a deed by a simple contract （which in the case of a lease required to be in writing would have to be evidenced by writing）, the courts may give effect to it as is shown in Berry v. Berry [1929] 2 K. B. 316. That equitable doctrine, however, could hardly apply in the present case because the variation here might be said to have been made without consideration. With regard to estoppel, the representation made in relation to reducing the rent, was not a representation of an existing fact. It was a representation, in effect, as to the future, namely, that payment of the rent would not be enforced at the full rate but only at the reduced rate. Such a representation would not give rise to an estoppel, because, as was said in Jorden v. Money （1854） 5 H. L. C. 185, a representation as to the future must be embodied as a contract or be nothing.
But what is the position in view of developments in the law in recent years? The law has not been standing still since Jorden v. Money （1854） 5 H. L. C. 185. There has been a series of decisions over the last fifty years which, although they are said to be cases of estoppel are not really such. They are cases in which a promise was made which was intended to create legal relations and which, to the knowledge of the person making the promise, was going to be acted on by the person to whom it was made and which was in fact so acted on. In such cases the courts have said that the promise must be honoured. The cases to which I particularly desire to refer are: Fenner v. Blake [1900] 1 Q. B. 426, In re Wickham （1917） 34 T. L. R. 158, Re William Porter & Co., Ld. [1937] 2 All E. R. 361 and Buttery v. Pickard [1946] W. N. 25. As I have said they are not cases of estoppel in the strict sense. They are really promises - promises intended to be binding, intended to be acted on, and in fact acted on. Jorden v. Money （1854） 5 H. L. C. 185 can be distinguished, because there the promisor made it clear that she did not intend to be legally bound, whereas in the cases to which I refer the proper inference was that the promisor did intend to be bound. In each case the court held the promise to be binding on the party making it, even though under the old common law it might be difficult to find any consideration for it. The courts have not gone so far as to give a cause of action in damages for the breach of such a promise, but they have refused to allow the party making it to act inconsistently with it. It is in that sense, and that sense only, that such a promise gives rise to an estoppel. The decisions are a natural result of the fusion of law and equity: for the cases of Hughes v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. （1877） 2 App. Cas. 439, 448, Birmingham and District Land Co. v. London & North Western Ry. Co. （1888） 40 Ch. D. 268, 286 and Salisbury （Marquess） v. Gilmore [1942] 2 K. B. 38, 51, afford a sufficient basis for saying that a party would not be allowed in equity to go back on such a promise. In my opinion, the time has now come for the validity of such a promise to be recognized. The logical consequence, no doubt is that a promise to accept a smaller sum in discharge of a larger sum, if acted upon, is binding notwithstanding the absence of consideration: and if the fusion of law and equity leads to this result, so much the better. That aspect was not considered in Foakes v. Beer （1884） 9 App. Cas. 605. At this time of day however, when law and equity have been joined together for over seventy years, principles must be reconsidered in the light of their combined effect. It is to be noticed that in the Sixth Interim Report of the Law Revision Committee, pars. 35, 40, it is recommended that such a promise as that to which I have referred, should be enforceable in law even though no consideration for it has been given by the promisee. It seems to me that, to the extent I have mentioned that result has now been achieved by the decisions of the courts.
I am satisfied that a promise such as that to which I have referred is binding and the only question remaining for my consideration is the scope of the promise in the present case. I am satisfied on all the evidence that the promise here was that the ground rent should be reduced to 1,250l. a year as a temporary expedient while the block of flats was not fully, or substantially fully let, owing to the conditions prevailing. That means that the reduction in the rent applied throughout the years down to the end of 1944, but early in 1945 it is plain that the flats were fully let, and, indeed the rents received from them （many of them not being affected by the Rent Restrictions Acts）, were increased beyond the figure at which it was originally contemplated that they would be let. At all events the rent from them must have been very considerable. I find that the conditions prevailing at the time when the reduction in rent was made, had completely passed away by the early months of 1945. I am satisfied that the promise was understood by all parties only to apply under the conditions prevailing at the time when it was made, namely, when the flats were only partially let, and that it did not extend any further than that. When the flats became fully let, early in 1945, the reduction ceased to apply.
In those circumstances, under the law as I hold it, it seems to me that rent is payable at the full rate for the quarters ending September 29 and December 25, 1945.
If the case had been one of estoppel, it might be said that in any event the estoppel would cease when the conditions to which the representation applied came to an end, or it also might be said that it would only come to an end on notice. In either case it is only a way of ascertaining what is the scope of the representation. I prefer to apply the principle that a promise intended to be binding, intended to be acted on and in fact acted on, is binding so far as its terms properly apply. Here it was binding as covering the period down to the early part of 1945, and as from that time full rent is payable.
I therefore give judgment for the plaintiff company for the amount claimed.
中央的倫敦財產(chǎn)信賴有限 v 高的樹眾議院有限。
1946 七月 18 日. 目錄驅(qū)動網(wǎng)絡(luò) J .
情形事實
在 1937 年在九月 24 日，原告的倫敦中央財產(chǎn)信賴了有限公司和被告的高樹房子財產(chǎn)有限公司簽署一份郵票印章虛偽契約,原告對被告者出租了一楝公寓建筑物, 租用 99 年期待, 在九月 29 日開始計算從 1937, 出租是磅 2500 每年。這一楝公寓建筑物近來- 組在上面。因為非常快的開始第二次世界大戰(zhàn) , 許多人離開了倫敦，因此，公寓建筑物沒有所有的棉被準備出租出。那時不能交談下一個的戰(zhàn)爭情形,被告者是明顯不可能完全地轉(zhuǎn)公寓租用。二位公司的代表性指導者全部知道承認,被告的 could't 在這種情況獲得充足的從旋轉(zhuǎn)到租金的收入, 如此也非常困難的薪資向原告的沉默寡言的出租。因為減少每年是磅 1250 ，在兩者的黨商議, 在被寫形式協(xié)議的數(shù)年 1941 開始，來自租約的出租中到達并且開始小時之后。
因此，被告者壓進了磅 1250 的量每年從 1941 支付到數(shù)年的 1945 開始的出租。當?shù)竭_的時候數(shù)年的 1945 開始,二個戰(zhàn)爭將會很快結(jié)束,所有的分開在公寓建筑物里面租用出去，但是被告者仍然壓這量支付自此以后。在 1945 年在九月 21 日，原告為控告寫了一封信呼叫, 出租應(yīng)該從虛偽期待一依照整個總數(shù) （ 每年磅 2500） 的第一契約準備開始薪資, 而且說被告者虧欠租用如磅 7916. Afterwards 的量, 原告提出這個友好的訴訟向在英國的高級法院中, 澄清而且應(yīng)該繳款被告者如何多租借問題的法律情況。在訴訟中，原告控告請求的錢數(shù)量是磅 625, 這是 1945 稍后一控告四分之二沒有愿支付的出租總數(shù),因為原告絞宣稱到年的出租而且應(yīng)該是磅 2500 ，所以被告者是的希望主意和租借量年的磅 1250 的薪資,, 如此在四分之二被告者的程度中沒有愿支付但是原告想而且應(yīng)該租借總數(shù)支付是磅 625. 藉著他們的防衛(wèi)被告辯護 （1.） 1940 年一月 3 日的信, 構(gòu)成了協(xié)議租金沉默寡言的應(yīng)該是 1,250 l. 只有, 而且被講到租約的整個期限的如此協(xié)議,（2.） 他們辯護在替代選擇中原告公司從聲稱被禁止翻供租金超過了 1,250 l . 每一年和 （3.） 如較進一步的替代選擇, 那藉由失敗超過 1,250 l 要求租金。 在他們的 1945 年九月 21 日 （在九月 24 日藉著被告收到） 的信之前，他們已經(jīng)免除關(guān)于任何的租金他們的權(quán)利,以 1,250 l 的比率超過那。, 直到 1945 年九月 24 日已經(jīng)自然增加.
皇后的正義高等法院的長椅子區(qū)分
目錄驅(qū)動網(wǎng)絡(luò) J.stated 事實而且繼續(xù): 如果我準備考慮對法律的最近發(fā)展的沒有關(guān)心的這一個物質(zhì),有宣稱原告它的沒有懷疑,他們以 2,500 l 的比率有權(quán)復原土地的租金。 來自期限的開始一年, 因為它是可付的租約是，依照舊的通常法律，無法被 parol（ 是否在寫作方面） 的協(xié)議改變的在印章下面的租約, 但是被行為只有改變。 公正, 然而踏在, 而且說當在草莓類植物 v 被顯示之時，如果已經(jīng)有一份簡單的契約 （ 在寫方面必需的是租約的情況會必須在藉由寫被證據(jù)） 的行為一種變化, 法院可能把效果給它。 草莓類植物 [1929]2 K. B.316. 哪一公平的教義,然而, 無法目前應(yīng)用情形因為變化這里可能被說不需要考慮就已經(jīng)被做。 關(guān)于禁止反言，表現(xiàn)關(guān)于減少租金制造, 現(xiàn)有的事實表現(xiàn)不是。資訊科技是表現(xiàn),有效，關(guān)于未來，即，租金的那付款不被以完整的比率但是只有以被減少的比率運行。 一個如此表現(xiàn)不引起一個禁止反言,因為, 當做在 Jorden v 被說。 錢 （1854）5 H. L. C.185,關(guān)于未來的表現(xiàn)一定被具體表達如一份契約或者什么也不是。
但是近幾年來考慮到法律的發(fā)展位置是什么? 法律已經(jīng)沒有是自從～以后 Jorden v 站好。 錢 （1854）5 H. L. C.185. 在過去五十年以來已經(jīng)有一系列的決定, 雖然他們被說是禁止反言的情形不是真的如此。 他們是情形在哪一想要的是一個諾言被做產(chǎn)生合法的關(guān)系和哪一，到作諾言的人知識，正在去被它被做的人有所反應(yīng)和哪一事實上如此被有所反應(yīng)。 在如此的情況法院已經(jīng)說諾言一定被給予榮譽。 我特別地需要提到的情形是: Fenner v. 布萊克 [1900]1 Q. B.426, 在關(guān)于 Wickham（1917）34 T. L. R.158,關(guān)于威廉門房 &公司， Ld. [1937]2 所有的 E. R.361 和像奶油的 v. Pickard[1946] W. N.25. 當我已經(jīng)說他們不是嚴厲的感覺禁止反言的情形。 他們真的是承諾 -承諾想要綁,想要被有所反應(yīng), 而且事實上有所反應(yīng)。 Jorden v.錢 （1854） 因為在那里契約者使它清楚她沒有想要合法約束，所以 5 H. L. C.185 能被區(qū)別, 然而在那情況該哪一是契約者確實想要約束的。 在每個情況法院舉行了諾言在黨上綁做到,即使在舊的通常法律之下它可能難以為它找任何的考慮。 法院到現(xiàn)在為止沒有同樣地離去為一個如此諾言的裂口在損害中提供行動的因素，但是他們已經(jīng)拒絕允許做到不一致地以它行動的黨。 資訊科技是在那一個感覺中，而且那只感覺,一個如此諾言引起一個禁止反言。 決定是法律和公正的融合物的一個天然結(jié)果: 對于修 v 的情形。 大都市的 Ry. 公司 （1877）2個應(yīng)用。 加州。 439,448,伯明罕和區(qū)域土地公司 v. 西方 Ry 的倫敦 & 北的。 公司 （1888）40 章 D.268,286 和索爾斯堡 （Marquess） v. Gilmore[1942]2 K. B.38,51,為敘述一個黨不被允許公正在一個如此諾言上回去負擔一種充份的基礎(chǔ)。 依我之見，時間現(xiàn)在已經(jīng)為一個如此諾言的有效性受到的影響被辨認出。 合乎邏輯的結(jié)果, 沒有懷疑是一個諾言接受較大的總數(shù)解除的較小總數(shù),如果, 有所反應(yīng)正在縱使缺少考慮綁: 而且如果法律的融合物和公正導致這一個結(jié)果,這么多比較好。 那一個方面在 Foakes v 沒被考慮。 啤酒 （1884）9個應(yīng)用。 加州。 605. 在日子的這次然而，當法律和公正已經(jīng)被一起叁加達超過七十年之久的時候,原則一定鑒于他們的組合效果被再考慮。 資訊科技要在第六個法律校訂委員會，標準的暫時報告中注意。 35,40, 一般推薦即使沒有考慮已經(jīng)為它被受約人給，如我已經(jīng)提到的那一個諾言, 應(yīng)該是可運行的在法律中。 資訊科技似乎我那, 到那范圍我現(xiàn)在已經(jīng)提到那一個結(jié)果已經(jīng)被法院的判決達成。
我是滿意的，我已經(jīng)提到的像如此的諾言正在綁，而且為我的考慮保持的問題目前是諾言的范圍情形。 我被使～滿意在所有的證據(jù)上諾言這里是土地的租金應(yīng)該被轉(zhuǎn)為 1,250 l .如一個暫時的權(quán)宜之計的一年一會兒公寓的區(qū)段不完全, 或?qū)嵸|(zhì)上完全讓,由于情況獲勝。那意謂，在租金中的減少應(yīng)用一整年 ??落到 1944 底,但是在 1945 年初期它是簡單的公寓完全被讓,和,的確從他們 （ 多數(shù)的他們不被租金限制動作游戲影響） 收到的租金,被超過它本來被注視的身材增加他們會被讓。 無論如何來自他們的租金以前一定是非常相當多的。 我找，在租金的減少被做的時間獲勝的情況,已經(jīng)被完全在 1945 年早數(shù)個月之前過世。我被使～滿意，當它被做的時候諾言被所有黨了解了不料竟會在情況獲勝之下應(yīng)用,即，當公寓只有部份地被讓的時候，而且它超過那沒有擴充更進一步了。 當公寓完全變成讓的時候,在 1945 年初期，減少停止應(yīng)用。
在那些環(huán)境中，在法律之下當我支撐它之時, 它似乎我以完整的比率四分之一終止九月 29 日和 1945 年十二月 25 日的租金是可付的.
假如情形是禁止反言之一, 它可能被說那無論如何禁止反言會停止當情況到哪一被應(yīng)用的表現(xiàn)結(jié)束,或它也可能被說它只會在注意上結(jié)束。 在任一情況它只是確定什么是表現(xiàn)的范圍方法。 我偏愛應(yīng)用原則，一個諾言想要綁,想要被有所反應(yīng)而且事實上有所反應(yīng),當它的期限適當?shù)貞?yīng)用，正在遠這么綁。它正在綁同樣地包含的時期到早期的這里 ??落 1945, 而且當從全部租用的那次起是可付的之時。
因為數(shù)量宣稱，我因此為原告公司給裁判。
1946 July 18. Denning J.
Case fact
On September 24 in 1937, the central property of London of plaintiff trusted the limited company and the accused high tree house property limited companies to sign a stamp seal leasing contract, the plaintiff leased a apartment building to the accused, renting to expect 99 years, starting counting on September 29 from 1937, the rental was pound 2500 of every year.This apartment building was lately- set up.Because very quick started World War II, many persons left London, so the apartment building has no all of quilts to turn to lease out.At that time the war situation that can't converse next, the accused was obviously impossible to turn apartment completely to rent.Two representative directors of the companies all were aware of confessed, the accused could't obtain the enough income from turn to rent in this kind of case, thus also very difficult pay the reserved rental toward plaintiff.After both parties negotiate, reached in 1941 beginning of years written form agreement, rental from lease and start the hour since the reduction was every year pound 1250.
Thus, the accused pressed the quantity of pound 1250 to pay annually from 1941 to the rental of 1945 beginning of years.While arriving 1945 beginning of years, two wars will soon ended, all partments within the apartment building rented to go out, but henceforth the accused still presses this quantity to pay.On September 21 in 1945, the plaintiff writed a letter for accused to call, rental should from the leasing expect one beginning according to first contract provision of whole sum（ every year pound 2500） pay, and said that the accused owes to rent the quantity as pound 7916.Afterwards, the plaintiff brought up this friendly litigation toward in the British deluxe court, to clear up and should pay in the accused how much rental the law condition of the problem.In the litigation, the plaintiff sued the amount of money of request was pound 625, this was 1945 later an accused of two quarters did not wish the paying rental sum, the accused was only wish the idea pays with the rental sum of year of pound 1250 because the plaintiff lays claimed to the rental of year and should be pound 2500,, thus in the degree of two quarters the accused did not wish to pay but the plaintiff thought and should pay of rental sum was pound 625. By their defence the defendants pleaded （1.） that the letter of January 3, 1940, constituted an agreement that the rent reserved should be 1,250l. only, and that such agreement related to the whole term of the lease, （2.） they pleaded in the alternative that the plaintiff company were estopped from alleging that the rent exceeded 1,250l. per annum and （3.） as a further alternative, that by failing to demand rent in excess of 1,250l. before their letter of September 21, 1945 （received by the defendants on September 24）, they had waived their rights in respect of any rent, in excess of that at the rate of 1,250l., which had accrued up to September 24, 1945.
Queen's Bench Division of the High Court of Justice
DENNING J.stated the facts and continued: If I were to consider this matter without regard to recent developments in the law, there is no doubt that had the plaintiffs claimed it, they would have been entitled to recover ground rent at the rate of 2,500l. a year from the beginning of the term, since the lease under which it was payable was a lease under seal which, according to the old common law, could not be varied by an agreement by parol （whether in writing or not）, but only by deed. Equity, however stepped in, and said that if there has been a variation of a deed by a simple contract （which in the case of a lease required to be in writing would have to be evidenced by writing）, the courts may give effect to it as is shown in Berry v. Berry [1929] 2 K. B. 316. That equitable doctrine, however, could hardly apply in the present case because the variation here might be said to have been made without consideration. With regard to estoppel, the representation made in relation to reducing the rent, was not a representation of an existing fact. It was a representation, in effect, as to the future, namely, that payment of the rent would not be enforced at the full rate but only at the reduced rate. Such a representation would not give rise to an estoppel, because, as was said in Jorden v. Money （1854） 5 H. L. C. 185, a representation as to the future must be embodied as a contract or be nothing.
But what is the position in view of developments in the law in recent years? The law has not been standing still since Jorden v. Money （1854） 5 H. L. C. 185. There has been a series of decisions over the last fifty years which, although they are said to be cases of estoppel are not really such. They are cases in which a promise was made which was intended to create legal relations and which, to the knowledge of the person making the promise, was going to be acted on by the person to whom it was made and which was in fact so acted on. In such cases the courts have said that the promise must be honoured. The cases to which I particularly desire to refer are: Fenner v. Blake [1900] 1 Q. B. 426, In re Wickham （1917） 34 T. L. R. 158, Re William Porter & Co., Ld. [1937] 2 All E. R. 361 and Buttery v. Pickard [1946] W. N. 25. As I have said they are not cases of estoppel in the strict sense. They are really promises - promises intended to be binding, intended to be acted on, and in fact acted on. Jorden v. Money （1854） 5 H. L. C. 185 can be distinguished, because there the promisor made it clear that she did not intend to be legally bound, whereas in the cases to which I refer the proper inference was that the promisor did intend to be bound. In each case the court held the promise to be binding on the party making it, even though under the old common law it might be difficult to find any consideration for it. The courts have not gone so far as to give a cause of action in damages for the breach of such a promise, but they have refused to allow the party making it to act inconsistently with it. It is in that sense, and that sense only, that such a promise gives rise to an estoppel. The decisions are a natural result of the fusion of law and equity: for the cases of Hughes v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. （1877） 2 App. Cas. 439, 448, Birmingham and District Land Co. v. London & North Western Ry. Co. （1888） 40 Ch. D. 268, 286 and Salisbury （Marquess） v. Gilmore [1942] 2 K. B. 38, 51, afford a sufficient basis for saying that a party would not be allowed in equity to go back on such a promise. In my opinion, the time has now come for the validity of such a promise to be recognized. The logical consequence, no doubt is that a promise to accept a smaller sum in discharge of a larger sum, if acted upon, is binding notwithstanding the absence of consideration: and if the fusion of law and equity leads to this result, so much the better. That aspect was not considered in Foakes v. Beer （1884） 9 App. Cas. 605. At this time of day however, when law and equity have been joined together for over seventy years, principles must be reconsidered in the light of their combined effect. It is to be noticed that in the Sixth Interim Report of the Law Revision Committee, pars. 35, 40, it is recommended that such a promise as that to which I have referred, should be enforceable in law even though no consideration for it has been given by the promisee. It seems to me that, to the extent I have mentioned that result has now been achieved by the decisions of the courts.
I am satisfied that a promise such as that to which I have referred is binding and the only question remaining for my consideration is the scope of the promise in the present case. I am satisfied on all the evidence that the promise here was that the ground rent should be reduced to 1,250l. a year as a temporary expedient while the block of flats was not fully, or substantially fully let, owing to the conditions prevailing. That means that the reduction in the rent applied throughout the years down to the end of 1944, but early in 1945 it is plain that the flats were fully let, and, indeed the rents received from them （many of them not being affected by the Rent Restrictions Acts）, were increased beyond the figure at which it was originally contemplated that they would be let. At all events the rent from them must have been very considerable. I find that the conditions prevailing at the time when the reduction in rent was made, had completely passed away by the early months of 1945. I am satisfied that the promise was understood by all parties only to apply under the conditions prevailing at the time when it was made, namely, when the flats were only partially let, and that it did not extend any further than that. When the flats became fully let, early in 1945, the reduction ceased to apply.
In those circumstances, under the law as I hold it, it seems to me that rent is payable at the full rate for the quarters ending September 29 and December 25, 1945.
If the case had been one of estoppel, it might be said that in any event the estoppel would cease when the conditions to which the representation applied came to an end, or it also might be said that it would only come to an end on notice. In either case it is only a way of ascertaining what is the scope of the representation. I prefer to apply the principle that a promise intended to be binding, intended to be acted on and in fact acted on, is binding so far as its terms properly apply. Here it was binding as covering the period down to the early part of 1945, and as from that time full rent is payable.
I therefore give judgment for the plaintiff company for the amount claimed.
中央的倫敦財產(chǎn)信賴有限 v 高的樹眾議院有限。
1946 七月 18 日. 目錄驅(qū)動網(wǎng)絡(luò) J .
情形事實
在 1937 年在九月 24 日，原告的倫敦中央財產(chǎn)信賴了有限公司和被告的高樹房子財產(chǎn)有限公司簽署一份郵票印章虛偽契約,原告對被告者出租了一楝公寓建筑物, 租用 99 年期待, 在九月 29 日開始計算從 1937, 出租是磅 2500 每年。這一楝公寓建筑物近來- 組在上面。因為非常快的開始第二次世界大戰(zhàn) , 許多人離開了倫敦，因此，公寓建筑物沒有所有的棉被準備出租出。那時不能交談下一個的戰(zhàn)爭情形,被告者是明顯不可能完全地轉(zhuǎn)公寓租用。二位公司的代表性指導者全部知道承認,被告的 could't 在這種情況獲得充足的從旋轉(zhuǎn)到租金的收入, 如此也非常困難的薪資向原告的沉默寡言的出租。因為減少每年是磅 1250 ，在兩者的黨商議, 在被寫形式協(xié)議的數(shù)年 1941 開始，來自租約的出租中到達并且開始小時之后。
因此，被告者壓進了磅 1250 的量每年從 1941 支付到數(shù)年的 1945 開始的出租。當?shù)竭_的時候數(shù)年的 1945 開始,二個戰(zhàn)爭將會很快結(jié)束,所有的分開在公寓建筑物里面租用出去，但是被告者仍然壓這量支付自此以后。在 1945 年在九月 21 日，原告為控告寫了一封信呼叫, 出租應(yīng)該從虛偽期待一依照整個總數(shù) （ 每年磅 2500） 的第一契約準備開始薪資, 而且說被告者虧欠租用如磅 7916. Afterwards 的量, 原告提出這個友好的訴訟向在英國的高級法院中, 澄清而且應(yīng)該繳款被告者如何多租借問題的法律情況。在訴訟中，原告控告請求的錢數(shù)量是磅 625, 這是 1945 稍后一控告四分之二沒有愿支付的出租總數(shù),因為原告絞宣稱到年的出租而且應(yīng)該是磅 2500 ，所以被告者是的希望主意和租借量年的磅 1250 的薪資,, 如此在四分之二被告者的程度中沒有愿支付但是原告想而且應(yīng)該租借總數(shù)支付是磅 625. 藉著他們的防衛(wèi)被告辯護 （1.） 1940 年一月 3 日的信, 構(gòu)成了協(xié)議租金沉默寡言的應(yīng)該是 1,250 l. 只有, 而且被講到租約的整個期限的如此協(xié)議,（2.） 他們辯護在替代選擇中原告公司從聲稱被禁止翻供租金超過了 1,250 l . 每一年和 （3.） 如較進一步的替代選擇, 那藉由失敗超過 1,250 l 要求租金。 在他們的 1945 年九月 21 日 （在九月 24 日藉著被告收到） 的信之前，他們已經(jīng)免除關(guān)于任何的租金他們的權(quán)利,以 1,250 l 的比率超過那。, 直到 1945 年九月 24 日已經(jīng)自然增加.
皇后的正義高等法院的長椅子區(qū)分
目錄驅(qū)動網(wǎng)絡(luò) J.stated 事實而且繼續(xù): 如果我準備考慮對法律的最近發(fā)展的沒有關(guān)心的這一個物質(zhì),有宣稱原告它的沒有懷疑,他們以 2,500 l 的比率有權(quán)復原土地的租金。 來自期限的開始一年, 因為它是可付的租約是，依照舊的通常法律，無法被 parol（ 是否在寫作方面） 的協(xié)議改變的在印章下面的租約, 但是被行為只有改變。 公正, 然而踏在, 而且說當在草莓類植物 v 被顯示之時，如果已經(jīng)有一份簡單的契約 （ 在寫方面必需的是租約的情況會必須在藉由寫被證據(jù)） 的行為一種變化, 法院可能把效果給它。 草莓類植物 [1929]2 K. B.316. 哪一公平的教義,然而, 無法目前應(yīng)用情形因為變化這里可能被說不需要考慮就已經(jīng)被做。 關(guān)于禁止反言，表現(xiàn)關(guān)于減少租金制造, 現(xiàn)有的事實表現(xiàn)不是。資訊科技是表現(xiàn),有效，關(guān)于未來，即，租金的那付款不被以完整的比率但是只有以被減少的比率運行。 一個如此表現(xiàn)不引起一個禁止反言,因為, 當做在 Jorden v 被說。 錢 （1854）5 H. L. C.185,關(guān)于未來的表現(xiàn)一定被具體表達如一份契約或者什么也不是。
但是近幾年來考慮到法律的發(fā)展位置是什么? 法律已經(jīng)沒有是自從～以后 Jorden v 站好。 錢 （1854）5 H. L. C.185. 在過去五十年以來已經(jīng)有一系列的決定, 雖然他們被說是禁止反言的情形不是真的如此。 他們是情形在哪一想要的是一個諾言被做產(chǎn)生合法的關(guān)系和哪一，到作諾言的人知識，正在去被它被做的人有所反應(yīng)和哪一事實上如此被有所反應(yīng)。 在如此的情況法院已經(jīng)說諾言一定被給予榮譽。 我特別地需要提到的情形是: Fenner v. 布萊克 [1900]1 Q. B.426, 在關(guān)于 Wickham（1917）34 T. L. R.158,關(guān)于威廉門房 &公司， Ld. [1937]2 所有的 E. R.361 和像奶油的 v. Pickard[1946] W. N.25. 當我已經(jīng)說他們不是嚴厲的感覺禁止反言的情形。 他們真的是承諾 -承諾想要綁,想要被有所反應(yīng), 而且事實上有所反應(yīng)。 Jorden v.錢 （1854） 因為在那里契約者使它清楚她沒有想要合法約束，所以 5 H. L. C.185 能被區(qū)別, 然而在那情況該哪一是契約者確實想要約束的。 在每個情況法院舉行了諾言在黨上綁做到,即使在舊的通常法律之下它可能難以為它找任何的考慮。 法院到現(xiàn)在為止沒有同樣地離去為一個如此諾言的裂口在損害中提供行動的因素，但是他們已經(jīng)拒絕允許做到不一致地以它行動的黨。 資訊科技是在那一個感覺中，而且那只感覺,一個如此諾言引起一個禁止反言。 決定是法律和公正的融合物的一個天然結(jié)果: 對于修 v 的情形。 大都市的 Ry. 公司 （1877）2個應(yīng)用。 加州。 439,448,伯明罕和區(qū)域土地公司 v. 西方 Ry 的倫敦 & 北的。 公司 （1888）40 章 D.268,286 和索爾斯堡 （Marquess） v. Gilmore[1942]2 K. B.38,51,為敘述一個黨不被允許公正在一個如此諾言上回去負擔一種充份的基礎(chǔ)。 依我之見，時間現(xiàn)在已經(jīng)為一個如此諾言的有效性受到的影響被辨認出。 合乎邏輯的結(jié)果, 沒有懷疑是一個諾言接受較大的總數(shù)解除的較小總數(shù),如果, 有所反應(yīng)正在縱使缺少考慮綁: 而且如果法律的融合物和公正導致這一個結(jié)果,這么多比較好。 那一個方面在 Foakes v 沒被考慮。 啤酒 （1884）9個應(yīng)用。 加州。 605. 在日子的這次然而，當法律和公正已經(jīng)被一起叁加達超過七十年之久的時候,原則一定鑒于他們的組合效果被再考慮。 資訊科技要在第六個法律校訂委員會，標準的暫時報告中注意。 35,40, 一般推薦即使沒有考慮已經(jīng)為它被受約人給，如我已經(jīng)提到的那一個諾言, 應(yīng)該是可運行的在法律中。 資訊科技似乎我那, 到那范圍我現(xiàn)在已經(jīng)提到那一個結(jié)果已經(jīng)被法院的判決達成。
我是滿意的，我已經(jīng)提到的像如此的諾言正在綁，而且為我的考慮保持的問題目前是諾言的范圍情形。 我被使～滿意在所有的證據(jù)上諾言這里是土地的租金應(yīng)該被轉(zhuǎn)為 1,250 l .如一個暫時的權(quán)宜之計的一年一會兒公寓的區(qū)段不完全, 或?qū)嵸|(zhì)上完全讓,由于情況獲勝。那意謂，在租金中的減少應(yīng)用一整年 ??落到 1944 底,但是在 1945 年初期它是簡單的公寓完全被讓,和,的確從他們 （ 多數(shù)的他們不被租金限制動作游戲影響） 收到的租金,被超過它本來被注視的身材增加他們會被讓。 無論如何來自他們的租金以前一定是非常相當多的。 我找，在租金的減少被做的時間獲勝的情況,已經(jīng)被完全在 1945 年早數(shù)個月之前過世。我被使～滿意，當它被做的時候諾言被所有黨了解了不料竟會在情況獲勝之下應(yīng)用,即，當公寓只有部份地被讓的時候，而且它超過那沒有擴充更進一步了。 當公寓完全變成讓的時候,在 1945 年初期，減少停止應(yīng)用。
在那些環(huán)境中，在法律之下當我支撐它之時, 它似乎我以完整的比率四分之一終止九月 29 日和 1945 年十二月 25 日的租金是可付的.
假如情形是禁止反言之一, 它可能被說那無論如何禁止反言會停止當情況到哪一被應(yīng)用的表現(xiàn)結(jié)束,或它也可能被說它只會在注意上結(jié)束。 在任一情況它只是確定什么是表現(xiàn)的范圍方法。 我偏愛應(yīng)用原則，一個諾言想要綁,想要被有所反應(yīng)而且事實上有所反應(yīng),當它的期限適當?shù)貞?yīng)用，正在遠這么綁。它正在綁同樣地包含的時期到早期的這里 ??落 1945, 而且當從全部租用的那次起是可付的之時。
因為數(shù)量宣稱，我因此為原告公司給裁判。