芬芳襲人花枝俏,喜氣盈門捷報到。心花怒放看通知,夢想實(shí)現(xiàn)今日事。喜笑顏開憶往昔,勤學(xué)苦讀美麗。繼續(xù)揚(yáng)鞭再向前,前途無量正燦爛。努力備考,愿你前途無量,考入理想院校。以下是為大家整理的《2018年10月自考英語(二)閱讀強(qiáng)化輔導(dǎo)【17-20】》 供您查閱。

【篇一】
The Campaign for Election
Although presidential elections occur every 4 years, many people feel that they do not have a true understanding of how presidential campaigns operate.
The winner in the November general election is almost certain to be either the Republican or the Democratic nominee. A minor-party or independent candidate, such as George Wallace in 1968, John Anderson in 1980, or Ross Perot in 1992 and 1996, can draw votes away from the major-party nominees but stands almost no chance of defeating them.
A major-party nominee has the critical advantage of support from the party faithful. Earlier in the twentieth century, this support was so firm and steady that the victory of the stronger party's candidate was almost a certainty. Warren G. Harding accepted the 1920 Republican nomination at his Ohio home, stayed there throughout most of the campaign, and won a full victory simply because most of the voters of his time were Republicans. Party loyalty has declined in recent decades, but more than two-thirds of the nation's voters still identify themselves as Democrats or Republicans, and most of them support their party's presidential candidate. Even Democrat George McGovern, who had the lowest level of party support among recent nominees, was backed in 1972 by nearly 60 percent of his party'svoters.
Presidential candidates act strategically. In deciding whether to pursue a course of action, they try to estimate its likely impact on the voters. During the 1992 campaign, a sign on the wall of Clinton's headquarters in Little Rock read, "The economy, Stupid." The slogan was the idea of James Carville, Clinton's chief strategist, and was meant as a reminder to the candidate and the staff to keep the campaign focused on the nation's slow-moving economy, which ultimately was the issue that defeated Bush. As in 1980, when Jimmy Carter lostto Ronald Reagan during tough economic times, the voters were motivated largely by a desire for change.
Candidates try to project a strong leadership image. Whether voters accept this image, however, depends more on external factors than on a candidate's personal characteristics. In 1991, after the
Gulf War, bush's approval rating reached 91 percent, the highest level recorded since polling began in the 1930s. A year later, with the nation's economy in trouble, Bush's approval rating dropped below 40 percent. Bush tried to stir images of his strong leadership of the war, but voters remained concerned about the economy.
The candidates' strategies are shaped by many considerations, including the constitutional provision that each state shall have electoral votes equal in number to its representation in Congress.
Each state thus gets two electoral votes for its Senate representation and a varying number of electoral votes depending on its House representation. Altogether, there are 538 electoral votes (including three for the District of Columbia, even though it has no voting representatives in Congress). To win the presidency, a candidate must receive at least 270 votes, an electoral majority.
Candidates are particularly concerned with winning the states which have the largest population, such as California (with 54 electoral votes), New York (33), Texas (32), Florida (25), Pensylvania (23), lllinois (22), and Ohio (21). Victory in the eleven largest states alone would provide an electoral majority, and presidential candidates therefore spend most of their time campaigning in those states. Clinton recived only 43 percent of the popular vote in 1992, compared with Bush's 38 percent and Perot's 19 percent; but Clinton won in states that gave him an overwhelming 370 electoral votes, compared with 168 for Bush and none for Perot.
競選活動
雖然總統(tǒng)競爭每四年舉行,但是許多人感到對競選大戰(zhàn)的運(yùn)作沒有真正的理解。
11月份大選的獲勝者幾乎肯定是共和黨或*黨的提名者。小黨派或獨(dú)立候選人,如1968年的喬治·華萊士,1980年的約翰·安德森或1992年和1996年的羅絲·佩羅,可能從大黨的提名人那里拉走了一些選票,但幾乎沒有人可能戰(zhàn)勝他們。
大黨提名人具有得到黨的忠實(shí)信徒支持這一關(guān)鍵的優(yōu)勢。20世紀(jì)早期,這種支持是如此堅定、可靠,以至于較大黨派候選人的勝利幾乎是肯定的。華倫·G·哈定在俄亥俄州的家鄉(xiāng)接受了1920年共和黨的提名,并且在競選大戰(zhàn)大部分時間里都呆在俄亥俄。他大獲全勝只是因?yàn)楫?dāng)時投票的大部分是共和黨黨員。在近幾十年內(nèi),黨員對黨派的忠誠削弱了,但2/3強(qiáng)的國家的投票人依然認(rèn)為他們自己是共和黨人或*黨人,他們大多支持自己黨派的總統(tǒng)候選人。即使是來擁有低水平黨派支持的*人喬治·麥戈?duì)枺?972年仍得到了近60%本黨派投票人的支持。
總統(tǒng)候選人的行為頗講究策略。在決定是否遵循一項(xiàng)行動方針時,他們要盡量估計一下該方針對投票人可能具有的影響。在1992年競選大戰(zhàn)期間,小石城 克林頓競選總部的墻上有一個牌子,上面寫著"經(jīng)濟(jì)、蠢貨"。這條標(biāo)語是克林頓的首席戰(zhàn)略詹姆斯·卡維爾的,主意,作為候選人和競選班子全體成員的警世語,使這場競選大戰(zhàn)集中在國家緩慢增漲的經(jīng)濟(jì)上,這成為后擊敗布什的策略。
如同在1980年的經(jīng)濟(jì)困難時期,吉米·卡特輸給了羅納德·里根,投票人的積極性主要來源于意圖改變的愿望。
候選人盡辦突出表現(xiàn)一種強(qiáng)有力的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)形象。然而,投票人是否接受這一形象,比起候選人的個人特點(diǎn)來更要依靠外部因素。在1991年海灣戰(zhàn)爭后,布什的支持率達(dá)到91%,這是本世紀(jì)30年代開始*測驗(yàn)以來的高記錄。一年后,因國民經(jīng)濟(jì)陷入困境,布什的支持率降低到40%以下。布什盡力去激起人們對他在戰(zhàn)爭時期強(qiáng)有力的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)形象的回憶,但投標(biāo)票人依然關(guān)心經(jīng)濟(jì)問題。
候選人的策略的形成要考慮到許多因素,包括憲法的這一條款:每個州具有的選舉人的票數(shù)與其在國會中的代表人數(shù)相同。因此,每個州因其參議院代表得到兩張選舉人票,依靠其眾議院代表得到不同數(shù)量的選舉人票??偣灿?38張選舉人票。要贏得總統(tǒng)職務(wù),一個候選人必須得到選舉的多數(shù)票,即270張選票。
候選人特別關(guān)注是否能贏得人口多的州,如加利福尼亞州(有54張選舉人票)、紐約州(33張)、得克薩斯州(32張)、佛羅里達(dá)州(25 張)、賓夕法尼亞州(23張)、伊里諾伊斯州(22張)和俄亥俄州(21張)。僅在11個大的州的勝利就可提供選舉的大多數(shù),因此總統(tǒng)候選人在那些州花費(fèi)大部分時間進(jìn)行活動。1992年,克林頓只得到43%的大眾選票,相比之下布什得到38%,佩羅19%。但克林頓獲取支持的州給了壓倒優(yōu)勢的370張選舉人票,相比之下給了布什168張,佩羅一張也沒有。
【篇二】
The American Two-party System
No one now living in the United States can remember when the contest began between the Democratic and the Republican parties. It has been going on for more than a century, making it one of the oldestpolitical rivalries in the world.
The American political system is a classical example of the two-party system. When we say that we have a two-party system in the United States we do not mean that we have only two parties. Usually about a dozen parties nominate presidential candidates. We call it a two-party system because we have two large parties and a number of small parties, and the large parties are so large that we often forget about the rest. Usually the small parties collectively poll less than 5 per cent of the vote cast in national elections.
The democratic and Republican parties are the largest and most competitive organizations in the American community. The organize the electorate very simply by maintaining the two-party system. Americans almost inevitably become Democrats or Republicans because there is usually no other place for them go to. Moreover, because the rivalry of these parties is very old, most Americans know where they belong in the system. As a consequence of the dominance of the major parties, most elected officials are either Republicans or Democrats. Attempts to break up this old system have been made in every presidential election in the past one hundred years, but the system has survived all assaults.
How does it happen that the two-party system is so strongly rooted in American politics? The explanation is probably to be found in the way elections are conducted. In the United States, unlike countries with a parliamentary system of government, we elect not only the President, but a large number of other officials, about 800,000 of them. We also elect congressmen from single-member districts. For example, we elect 435 members of the House of Representatives from 435 districts (there are a few exceptions), one member for each district.
Statistically, this kind of election favors the major parties. The system of elections makes it easy for the major parties to maintain their dominant position, because they are likely to win more than >their share of the offices.
One of the great consequences of the system is that it produces majorities automatically. Because there are only two competiors in the running, it is almost inevitable that one will receive a majority.
Moreover, the system tends slightly to exaggerate the victory of the winning party. This is not always true, but the strong tendency to produce majorities is built into the system.
In over 200 years of constitutional history, Americans have learned much about the way in which the system can be managed so as to make possible the peaceful transfer of power from one party to the other. At the level of presidential elections, the party in power has been overturned by the party out of power nineteen times, almost once a decade. In the election of 1860, the political system broke down, and the Civil War, the worst disaster in American history, resulted.
Our history justifies our confidence in the system but also shows that it is not foolproof.
The second major party is able to survive a defeat because the statistical tendency that exaggerates the victory of the winning party operates even more strongly in favor of the second party against the third, fourth, and fifth parties. As a result, the defeated major party is able to maintain a monopoly of the opposition. The advantage of the second party over the third is so great that it is the only party that is likely to be able to overturn the party in power. It is able, therefore, to attract the support of everyone seriously opposed to the party in power. The second party is important as long as it can monopolize the movement to overthrow the party in power, because it is certain to come into power sooner or later.
Another consequence of the two-party system is that whereas minor parties are likely to identify themselves with special interests or special programs and thus take extreme positions, the major parties are so large that they tend to be moderate. Evidence of the moderation of the major parties is that much business is conducted across party lines. What happens when the Democrats control one house of Congress and the Republicans control the other? About the same volume of legislation is passed as when one party controls both houses, although some important legislation is likely to be blocked temporarily. It is possible to carry on the work of the government even when party control is divided because party differences are not fundamental.
美國的兩黨制
現(xiàn)在生活在美國的人沒人能記起*黨和共和黨之間的競爭是什么時候開始的。這種競爭進(jìn)行了一個多世紀(jì),是世界上早的政治競爭之一。
美國的政治體制是兩黨制的典型范例。當(dāng)我們說美國有兩黨制時,并不是指美國只有兩個政黨。通常約有十幾個政黨提名總統(tǒng)候選人。我們之所以稱之為兩黨制,是因?yàn)橛袃蓚€大黨派和許多小黨派。通常小黨派合在一起在全國選舉是得票低于全國所投票數(shù)的5%。
在美國社會里,*黨和共和黨是大和有競爭力的組織。他們通過維持兩黨制,很輕松地組織選民。因?yàn)橥ǔ]有其他選擇,美國人幾乎無可避免地成為*黨員或共和黨員。此外,因?yàn)檫@些黨的競爭歷史很久,多數(shù)美國人知道自己屬于兩黨中的哪一派。作為兩大黨占優(yōu)勢的結(jié)果,多數(shù)當(dāng)選官員不是共和黨員就是*黨員。在過去的100年里,每年的總統(tǒng)選舉中都進(jìn)行了一些打破舊體制的嘗試,但這種體制經(jīng)受住了所有的攻擊繼續(xù)存在。
兩黨制是如何能如此堅實(shí)地扎根于美國政治中的呢?答案可能就在選舉的運(yùn)作方式中。美國不同于政府議會制國家,我們不僅選舉總統(tǒng),而且還選舉許多官員,他們大約有80萬人。國會議員也是從每區(qū)一票的選舉中選出的。例如:我們從435個選區(qū)選舉435名參議員,每一個選區(qū)選舉一名參議員。從統(tǒng)計學(xué)上來講,這種選舉對大黨派有利。選舉制度使大黨輕而易舉地保持著他們的統(tǒng)治地位,因?yàn)樗麄冓A得的席位可能比他們應(yīng)得的份額多。
這種制度的大結(jié)果就是它自動地產(chǎn)生了多數(shù)黨。因?yàn)橹挥袃蓚€競爭者參加競選,幾乎可以肯定其中一個將贏得多數(shù)。而且,這種制度似乎有些夸大獲勝黨的勝利。雖然并不總是如此。但是產(chǎn)生多數(shù)黨的巨大傾向在這種制度中形成了。在200多年的憲法史中,美國人對兩黨制的運(yùn)作方法已經(jīng)有很多了解,以使政權(quán)能夠和平地從一個政黨移交到另一個政黨。在總統(tǒng)選舉中,執(zhí)政黨已被在野黨擊敗了19次,幾乎每十年。在1860年的選舉中,這種政治制度中斷了,結(jié)果導(dǎo)致了南北戰(zhàn)爭――美國歷大的災(zāi)難。歷史證明我們有理由對這一制度保持信心,但歷史也表明這一制度不是萬無一失的。
第二大黨能在失敗下繼續(xù)生存,是因?yàn)樵诮y(tǒng)計上夸大獲勝黨的獲勝,這能夠更有力地支持第二大黨對第三、第四、第五黨派的對抗。因此,失敗的大黨能夠保持在反對派中的壟斷。第二大黨相對于第三黨派有巨大的優(yōu)勢,它是可能擊敗執(zhí)政黨的黨派,從而能夠吸引強(qiáng)烈反對執(zhí)政黨的每一個黨派的支持。只要第二大黨能夠壟斷擊敗執(zhí)政黨的運(yùn)動,它就是重要的,因?yàn)檫t早它肯定能上臺執(zhí)政。
兩黨制的另一個結(jié)果是:鑒于小黨派可能把自己與特殊的利益和特殊的綱領(lǐng)認(rèn)同為一,因而有可能采取極端立場,而大黨很強(qiáng)大所以傾向于溫和。大黨溫和傾向的證據(jù)是許多事務(wù)都是超越黨派界限進(jìn)行。當(dāng)*黨控制國會的一個院而共和黨控制另一個院時,會發(fā)生什么呢?像一個黨控制國會兩院一樣,雖然一些重要法規(guī)可能被擱置,大約相同卷冊的法規(guī)會得到批準(zhǔn)。由于黨派的分歧不是根本的,即使在兩個黨控制不同部門時,政府工作仍然能夠進(jìn)行。
【篇三】
Aging in European Countries
We have to realise how old, how very old, we are. Nations are classified as "aged" when they have 7 per cent or more of their people aged 65 or above, and by about 1970 every one of the advanced countries had become like this. Of the really ancient societies, with over 13 per cent above 65, all are in Northwestern Europe. At the beginning of the 1980's East Germany had 15.6 per cent, Austria,
Sweden, West Germany and France had 13.4 per cent or above, and England and Wales 13.3 per cent. Scotland had 12.3 per cent. Northern Ireland 10.8 percent and the United States 9.9 per cent. We know that we are getting even older, and that the nearer a society approximates to zero population growth, the older its population is likely to be - at least, for any future that concerns us now.
To these now familiar facts a number of further facts may be added, some of them only recently recognised. There is the apparent paradox that the effective cause of the high proportion of the old is births rather than deaths. There is the economic principle that the dependency ratio - the degree to which those who cannot earn depend for a living on those who can - is more advantageous in older societies like ours than in the younger societies of the developing world, because lots of dependent babies are more of a liability than numbers of the inactive aged. There is the appreciation of the salient historical truth that the aging or advanced societies has been a sudden change.
If "revolution" is a rapid resettlement of the social structure, and if the age composition of the society counts as a very important aspect of that social structure, then there has been a social revolution in European and particularly Western European society within the lifetime of everyone over 50. Taken together, these things have implications which are only beginning to be acknowledged. These facts and circumstances were well to the fore earlier this year at a world gathering about aging as a challenge to science and to policy, held at Vichy in France.
There is often resistance to the idea that it is because the birthrate fell earlier in Western and Northwestern Europe than elsewhere, rather than because of any change in the death rate, that we have grown so old. But this is what elementary demography makes clear. Long life is altering our society, of course, but in experiential terms. We have among us a very much greater experience of continued living than any society that has ever preceded us anywhere, and this will continue. But too much of that lengthened experience, even in the wealthy West, will be experience of poverty and neglect, unless we do something about it .
If you are now in your thirties, you ought to be aware that you can expect to live nearly one third of the rest of your life after the age of 60. The older you are now, of course, the greater this proportion will be, and greater still if you are a woman. Expectation of life is a slippery figure, very easy to get wrong at the highest ages. At Vichy the demographers were telling each other that their estimates of how many old there would be and how long they will live in countries like England and Wales are due for revision upwards.
歐洲國家的老齡化
我們不得不認(rèn)識到我們多大歲數(shù)了,有多老了。當(dāng)有7%或更多的65歲或65歲以上的人時,這些國家就被列為"老齡化"國家。到大約1970年,每一個發(fā)展國家就成了這樣的國家。65歲以上的人超過13%的真正的老年人社會,都在西北歐。20世紀(jì)80年代初,東德有15.6%的人超過65歲,在奧地利、瑞典、西德和法國,這個比率為13.4%或更高,英格蘭和威爾士有13.3%,蘇格蘭有12.3%,北愛爾蘭有10.8%,美國有9.9%。我們知道人類在日益變老,人口增長率接近于零的社會離我們越近,人口越可能呈老齡化的趨勢,至少就與影響我們的未來來說是這樣的。
更多的現(xiàn)實(shí),這其中有些只是近來才認(rèn)識到,可能會加入到這些熟悉的現(xiàn)實(shí)中。有這樣一個明顯的似是而非的論點(diǎn):造成老年人比率高的實(shí)際原因是出生人數(shù)而不是死亡人數(shù)。有一條經(jīng)濟(jì)原則:撫養(yǎng)率――不能自食其力的人依靠能掙錢養(yǎng)家的人的程度――在我們這樣的更為老齡化的社會里比在發(fā)展中世界的較年輕社會里要有利一些,因?yàn)榇罅康臒o法獨(dú)立的孩子與一定數(shù)的喪失工作能力的老年人相比,更是個負(fù)擔(dān)。有對這樣一個明顯的歷史真實(shí)的正確評價:先進(jìn)社會的老齡化一直以來都是一種突變。
如果"革命"是對社會結(jié)構(gòu)的迅速重建,如果社會的年齡構(gòu)成被看作社會結(jié)構(gòu)的一個非常重要的方面,那么在歐洲,特別是每一個人的壽命超過50歲的西歐,已經(jīng)有一場革命。綜上所述,人們只是剛剛開始認(rèn)識到這意味著什么。這些事實(shí)和情況早些時候在法國維希舉行的一個世界大會上被視為科學(xué)家和政策的挑戰(zhàn)而置于顯著的地位。
我們?nèi)丝诘睦淆g化,是因?yàn)樵谖鳉W和西北歐出生率比其他地方下降得早,百不是因?yàn)樗劳雎拾l(fā)生了一些變化。對這一觀點(diǎn)經(jīng)常有人不以為然,但這是通過基本的人口統(tǒng)計學(xué)澄清的事實(shí)。當(dāng)然,長壽正改變著我們的社會,但這只是經(jīng)驗(yàn)論。我們之中有一種比先于我們的任何社會多得多的繼續(xù)生存的經(jīng)歷,這種經(jīng)歷將繼續(xù)下去。除非我們能在這方面采取措施,即使在富裕的西方,太多的這種經(jīng)歷將被,視為貧窮和荒廢的過去。你現(xiàn)年三十幾歲,你應(yīng)當(dāng)知道,你可以指望在活到60 歲以后再活上差不多15年?,F(xiàn)在你年紀(jì)越大,這個比例就越高。如果你是女性,這個比例還會更大。預(yù)期壽命不是一個固定數(shù)字,在高年齡上很容易弄錯。在維希,人口學(xué)家互相轉(zhuǎn)告,在像英格蘭和威爾士這些國家,他們對將有多少老人和他們能活多久的估計應(yīng)向上調(diào)整。
【篇四】
Children's Self-esteem
Self-esteem is what people think about themselves - whether or not they feel valued - and when family members have self-respect, pride, and belief in themselves, this high self-esteem makes it possible to cope with the everyday problems or growing up.
Successful parenting begins by communicating to children that they belong, and are loved for no other reason than just because they exist.
Through touch and tone of voice parents tell their infants whether or not they are valued, special, and loved, and it is these messages that form the basis of the child's self-esteem. When children grow up with love and are made to feel lovable despite their mistakes and failures, they are able to interact with others in a responsible, honest, and loving way. A healthy self-esteem is a resource for coping when difficulties arise, making it easier to see a problem as temporary, manageable, and something from which the individual can emerge.
If, however, children grow up without hove and without feelings of self-worth, they feel unlovable and worthless and expect to be cheated, taken advantage of, and looked down upon by others.
Ultimately their actions invite this treatment, and their self-defeating behavior turns expectations into reality. They do not have the personal resources to handle everyday problems in a healthy way, and life may be viewed as just one crisis after another. Without a healthy self-esteem they may cope by acting out problems rather than talking them out or by withdrawing and remaining indifferent toward themselves and others.
These individuals grow up to live isolated, lonely lives, lacking the ability to give the love that they have never received.
Self-esteem is a kind of energy, and when it is high, people feel like they can handle anything. It is what one feels when special things are happening or everything is going great. A word of praise, a smile, a good grade on a report card, or doing something that creates pride within oneself can create this energy. When feelings about the self have been threatened and self-esteem is low, everything becomes more of an effort. It is difficult to hear, see, or think clearly, and others seem rude, inconsiderate, and rough. The problem is not with others, it is with the self, but often it is not until energies are back to normal that the real problem is recognized.
Children need help understanding that their self-esteem and the self-esteem of those they interact with have a direct effect on each other. For example, a little girl comes home from school and says, " I need lovings'cause my feelings got hurt today." The mother responds to her child's need to be held and loved. If instead the mother said she was too busy to hold the little girl, the outcome would have been different.
The infant's self-esteem is totally dependent on family members, and it is not until about the time the child enters school that outside forces contribute to feelings about the self. A child must also learn that a major resource for a healthy self-esteem comes for within. Some parents raise their children to depend on external rather than internal reinforcement through practices such as paying for good grades on report cards or exchanging special privileges for good behavior. The child learns to rely on others to maintain a high self-esteem and is not prepared to live in a world in which desirable behavior does not automatically produce a tangible reward such as a smile, money, or special privileges.
Maintaining a healthy self-esteem is challenge that continues throughout life. One family found that they could help each other identify positive attitudes. One evening during an electric storm the family gathered around the kitchen table, and each person wrote down two things that they liked about each family member. These pieces of paper were folded and given to the appropriate person, who one by one opened their special messages. The father later commented, "It was quite an experience, opening each little piece of paper and reading the message. I still have those gifts, and when I've had a really bad day, I read through them and I always come away feeling better."
The foundation of a healthy family depends on the ability of the parents to communicate messages of love, trust, and self-worth to each child. This is the basis on which self-esteem is built, and as the child grows, self-esteem changes from a collection of other's feelings to become personal feelings about the self. Ultimately a person's self-esteem is reflected in the way he or she interacts with others.
孩子們的自尊心
自尊是人們對自己的看法――他們是否感到受到重視――當(dāng)家庭成員有了自尊、自豪、自信時,這種高度的自尊使人們有可能妥善處理孩子們成長的日常問題。
成功的育兒之道是第一步是讓孩子們知道,他們上家庭的一份子,他們受寵愛的原因就是因?yàn)樗麄冏陨淼拇嬖凇Mㄟ^撫摸和聲音的語調(diào),父母告訴他們的幼兒他們是否受到重視、是否很特別、是否被愛。正是這些信息形成了孩子自尊的基礎(chǔ)。當(dāng)孩子們在愛的關(guān)懷下成長,不管他們是錯誤或失敗,都使他們感覺到討人喜愛時,他們就能用可依賴的、誠實(shí)的和愛的方式與別人交往。當(dāng)出現(xiàn)困難時,他們就能用可依賴的、誠實(shí)的和愛的方式與別人交往。當(dāng)出現(xiàn)困難時,健康的自尊心是一種解決困難的手段,使之容易把問題看作是暫的,能處理的,個人可以從中解脫出來。
然而,如果孩子們盛開在沒有愛、沒有自我價值感的氛圍當(dāng)中,他們感到不討人喜歡、沒有價值,料想可能被別人欺騙、利用和看不起。他們的行為終導(dǎo)致了這種結(jié)果,他們的自我挫敗的行為把預(yù)想變成了現(xiàn)實(shí)。他們沒有以健康的方式處理日常問題的個人對策,生活在他們看來是一個又一個危機(jī)。由于沒有健康的自尊心,他們在處理問題時,不是提出問題,而是用行動把問題表現(xiàn)出來,或是采取退縮以及對自己和他人保持冷漠的態(tài)度。這些人長大以后過著與世隔絕的孤獨(dú)生活,缺乏給予愛的能力,這種愛他們也從未得到過。
自尊心是一種能量。自尊心強(qiáng)的時,人們感覺好像能夠處理任何事情。這就是當(dāng)特殊事情發(fā)生或一切進(jìn)行得很順利時一個人的感覺。一句贊揚(yáng)的話、一個微笑、成績報告卡上的一個好分?jǐn)?shù),或者做王碼電腦公司軟件中心些使自己引以自豪有事,都能產(chǎn)生這種能量。當(dāng)自我感覺受到威脅,自尊心不足時,任何事在更大程度上都變成了一種需要費(fèi)力去做的負(fù)擔(dān)。很難聽清楚、看清楚、想清楚,其他人都似乎沒有禮貌、不體諒人、粗暴。問題并不在別人,是在自己。但常常直到恢復(fù)到正常的精神狀態(tài),人們才認(rèn)識到真正的問題所在。
孩子們需要幫助為理解,他們的自尊和與他們交往的人的自尊彼此相互影響。例如:一個小女孩從學(xué)?;丶艺f:"我需要愛撫,因?yàn)榻裉煳业母星槭艿絺α恕?媽媽應(yīng)回應(yīng)她的孩子對被愛撫和被愛的需要。如果反之,媽媽說她太心不能愛撫這個小女孩子,結(jié)果就不同了。
嬰幼兒的自尊完全依賴家庭成員。直到孩子上學(xué)時,外界的力量才對孩子的自我感覺產(chǎn)生影響。孩子必須明白健康的首尊主要來自內(nèi)部一些父母在實(shí)踐中培養(yǎng)他們的孩子依靠外部因素而不是內(nèi)部強(qiáng)化。例如,孩子的成績單上有好成績就可以得到獎賞,或者他們有了好的行為就給他們一些優(yōu)待。孩子們學(xué)會了依靠別人來保持高度的自尊,卻對現(xiàn)實(shí)世界的生活沒有絲毫準(zhǔn)備,因?yàn)樵诂F(xiàn)實(shí)世界中,令人滿意的行為并不會自動帶來實(shí)在的獎勵,如微笑、金錢或特權(quán)。
保持健康的自尊心是持續(xù)一生的挑戰(zhàn)。一個家庭發(fā)現(xiàn)他們可以互相幫助,確定積極的態(tài)度。一個電閃雷鳴的晚上,一家人圍坐在廚房桌子周圍,每個人寫下兩件他們關(guān)于每一個家庭成員的事。這些紙折疊起來給了相應(yīng)的人,他們一個接一個打開他們的特殊訊息。父親后來評論說:"打開每張字條看上面寫的東西,那真是很好的感受。我依然保存著那些禮貌,當(dāng)我遇到一個特別糟糕的日子時,看看它們,我總會從中解脫出來,感覺好多了。"健康家庭的基礎(chǔ)是靠父母傳達(dá)給每一個孩子愛、自尊心從別人的感受變?yōu)樽晕业母惺?。終,一個人的自尊心就反映在他與別人交往的方式上。

【篇一】
The Campaign for Election
Although presidential elections occur every 4 years, many people feel that they do not have a true understanding of how presidential campaigns operate.
The winner in the November general election is almost certain to be either the Republican or the Democratic nominee. A minor-party or independent candidate, such as George Wallace in 1968, John Anderson in 1980, or Ross Perot in 1992 and 1996, can draw votes away from the major-party nominees but stands almost no chance of defeating them.
A major-party nominee has the critical advantage of support from the party faithful. Earlier in the twentieth century, this support was so firm and steady that the victory of the stronger party's candidate was almost a certainty. Warren G. Harding accepted the 1920 Republican nomination at his Ohio home, stayed there throughout most of the campaign, and won a full victory simply because most of the voters of his time were Republicans. Party loyalty has declined in recent decades, but more than two-thirds of the nation's voters still identify themselves as Democrats or Republicans, and most of them support their party's presidential candidate. Even Democrat George McGovern, who had the lowest level of party support among recent nominees, was backed in 1972 by nearly 60 percent of his party'svoters.
Presidential candidates act strategically. In deciding whether to pursue a course of action, they try to estimate its likely impact on the voters. During the 1992 campaign, a sign on the wall of Clinton's headquarters in Little Rock read, "The economy, Stupid." The slogan was the idea of James Carville, Clinton's chief strategist, and was meant as a reminder to the candidate and the staff to keep the campaign focused on the nation's slow-moving economy, which ultimately was the issue that defeated Bush. As in 1980, when Jimmy Carter lostto Ronald Reagan during tough economic times, the voters were motivated largely by a desire for change.
Candidates try to project a strong leadership image. Whether voters accept this image, however, depends more on external factors than on a candidate's personal characteristics. In 1991, after the
Gulf War, bush's approval rating reached 91 percent, the highest level recorded since polling began in the 1930s. A year later, with the nation's economy in trouble, Bush's approval rating dropped below 40 percent. Bush tried to stir images of his strong leadership of the war, but voters remained concerned about the economy.
The candidates' strategies are shaped by many considerations, including the constitutional provision that each state shall have electoral votes equal in number to its representation in Congress.
Each state thus gets two electoral votes for its Senate representation and a varying number of electoral votes depending on its House representation. Altogether, there are 538 electoral votes (including three for the District of Columbia, even though it has no voting representatives in Congress). To win the presidency, a candidate must receive at least 270 votes, an electoral majority.
Candidates are particularly concerned with winning the states which have the largest population, such as California (with 54 electoral votes), New York (33), Texas (32), Florida (25), Pensylvania (23), lllinois (22), and Ohio (21). Victory in the eleven largest states alone would provide an electoral majority, and presidential candidates therefore spend most of their time campaigning in those states. Clinton recived only 43 percent of the popular vote in 1992, compared with Bush's 38 percent and Perot's 19 percent; but Clinton won in states that gave him an overwhelming 370 electoral votes, compared with 168 for Bush and none for Perot.
競選活動
雖然總統(tǒng)競爭每四年舉行,但是許多人感到對競選大戰(zhàn)的運(yùn)作沒有真正的理解。
11月份大選的獲勝者幾乎肯定是共和黨或*黨的提名者。小黨派或獨(dú)立候選人,如1968年的喬治·華萊士,1980年的約翰·安德森或1992年和1996年的羅絲·佩羅,可能從大黨的提名人那里拉走了一些選票,但幾乎沒有人可能戰(zhàn)勝他們。
大黨提名人具有得到黨的忠實(shí)信徒支持這一關(guān)鍵的優(yōu)勢。20世紀(jì)早期,這種支持是如此堅定、可靠,以至于較大黨派候選人的勝利幾乎是肯定的。華倫·G·哈定在俄亥俄州的家鄉(xiāng)接受了1920年共和黨的提名,并且在競選大戰(zhàn)大部分時間里都呆在俄亥俄。他大獲全勝只是因?yàn)楫?dāng)時投票的大部分是共和黨黨員。在近幾十年內(nèi),黨員對黨派的忠誠削弱了,但2/3強(qiáng)的國家的投票人依然認(rèn)為他們自己是共和黨人或*黨人,他們大多支持自己黨派的總統(tǒng)候選人。即使是來擁有低水平黨派支持的*人喬治·麥戈?duì)枺?972年仍得到了近60%本黨派投票人的支持。
總統(tǒng)候選人的行為頗講究策略。在決定是否遵循一項(xiàng)行動方針時,他們要盡量估計一下該方針對投票人可能具有的影響。在1992年競選大戰(zhàn)期間,小石城 克林頓競選總部的墻上有一個牌子,上面寫著"經(jīng)濟(jì)、蠢貨"。這條標(biāo)語是克林頓的首席戰(zhàn)略詹姆斯·卡維爾的,主意,作為候選人和競選班子全體成員的警世語,使這場競選大戰(zhàn)集中在國家緩慢增漲的經(jīng)濟(jì)上,這成為后擊敗布什的策略。
如同在1980年的經(jīng)濟(jì)困難時期,吉米·卡特輸給了羅納德·里根,投票人的積極性主要來源于意圖改變的愿望。
候選人盡辦突出表現(xiàn)一種強(qiáng)有力的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)形象。然而,投票人是否接受這一形象,比起候選人的個人特點(diǎn)來更要依靠外部因素。在1991年海灣戰(zhàn)爭后,布什的支持率達(dá)到91%,這是本世紀(jì)30年代開始*測驗(yàn)以來的高記錄。一年后,因國民經(jīng)濟(jì)陷入困境,布什的支持率降低到40%以下。布什盡力去激起人們對他在戰(zhàn)爭時期強(qiáng)有力的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)形象的回憶,但投標(biāo)票人依然關(guān)心經(jīng)濟(jì)問題。
候選人的策略的形成要考慮到許多因素,包括憲法的這一條款:每個州具有的選舉人的票數(shù)與其在國會中的代表人數(shù)相同。因此,每個州因其參議院代表得到兩張選舉人票,依靠其眾議院代表得到不同數(shù)量的選舉人票??偣灿?38張選舉人票。要贏得總統(tǒng)職務(wù),一個候選人必須得到選舉的多數(shù)票,即270張選票。
候選人特別關(guān)注是否能贏得人口多的州,如加利福尼亞州(有54張選舉人票)、紐約州(33張)、得克薩斯州(32張)、佛羅里達(dá)州(25 張)、賓夕法尼亞州(23張)、伊里諾伊斯州(22張)和俄亥俄州(21張)。僅在11個大的州的勝利就可提供選舉的大多數(shù),因此總統(tǒng)候選人在那些州花費(fèi)大部分時間進(jìn)行活動。1992年,克林頓只得到43%的大眾選票,相比之下布什得到38%,佩羅19%。但克林頓獲取支持的州給了壓倒優(yōu)勢的370張選舉人票,相比之下給了布什168張,佩羅一張也沒有。
【篇二】
The American Two-party System
No one now living in the United States can remember when the contest began between the Democratic and the Republican parties. It has been going on for more than a century, making it one of the oldestpolitical rivalries in the world.
The American political system is a classical example of the two-party system. When we say that we have a two-party system in the United States we do not mean that we have only two parties. Usually about a dozen parties nominate presidential candidates. We call it a two-party system because we have two large parties and a number of small parties, and the large parties are so large that we often forget about the rest. Usually the small parties collectively poll less than 5 per cent of the vote cast in national elections.
The democratic and Republican parties are the largest and most competitive organizations in the American community. The organize the electorate very simply by maintaining the two-party system. Americans almost inevitably become Democrats or Republicans because there is usually no other place for them go to. Moreover, because the rivalry of these parties is very old, most Americans know where they belong in the system. As a consequence of the dominance of the major parties, most elected officials are either Republicans or Democrats. Attempts to break up this old system have been made in every presidential election in the past one hundred years, but the system has survived all assaults.
How does it happen that the two-party system is so strongly rooted in American politics? The explanation is probably to be found in the way elections are conducted. In the United States, unlike countries with a parliamentary system of government, we elect not only the President, but a large number of other officials, about 800,000 of them. We also elect congressmen from single-member districts. For example, we elect 435 members of the House of Representatives from 435 districts (there are a few exceptions), one member for each district.
Statistically, this kind of election favors the major parties. The system of elections makes it easy for the major parties to maintain their dominant position, because they are likely to win more than >their share of the offices.
One of the great consequences of the system is that it produces majorities automatically. Because there are only two competiors in the running, it is almost inevitable that one will receive a majority.
Moreover, the system tends slightly to exaggerate the victory of the winning party. This is not always true, but the strong tendency to produce majorities is built into the system.
In over 200 years of constitutional history, Americans have learned much about the way in which the system can be managed so as to make possible the peaceful transfer of power from one party to the other. At the level of presidential elections, the party in power has been overturned by the party out of power nineteen times, almost once a decade. In the election of 1860, the political system broke down, and the Civil War, the worst disaster in American history, resulted.
Our history justifies our confidence in the system but also shows that it is not foolproof.
The second major party is able to survive a defeat because the statistical tendency that exaggerates the victory of the winning party operates even more strongly in favor of the second party against the third, fourth, and fifth parties. As a result, the defeated major party is able to maintain a monopoly of the opposition. The advantage of the second party over the third is so great that it is the only party that is likely to be able to overturn the party in power. It is able, therefore, to attract the support of everyone seriously opposed to the party in power. The second party is important as long as it can monopolize the movement to overthrow the party in power, because it is certain to come into power sooner or later.
Another consequence of the two-party system is that whereas minor parties are likely to identify themselves with special interests or special programs and thus take extreme positions, the major parties are so large that they tend to be moderate. Evidence of the moderation of the major parties is that much business is conducted across party lines. What happens when the Democrats control one house of Congress and the Republicans control the other? About the same volume of legislation is passed as when one party controls both houses, although some important legislation is likely to be blocked temporarily. It is possible to carry on the work of the government even when party control is divided because party differences are not fundamental.
美國的兩黨制
現(xiàn)在生活在美國的人沒人能記起*黨和共和黨之間的競爭是什么時候開始的。這種競爭進(jìn)行了一個多世紀(jì),是世界上早的政治競爭之一。
美國的政治體制是兩黨制的典型范例。當(dāng)我們說美國有兩黨制時,并不是指美國只有兩個政黨。通常約有十幾個政黨提名總統(tǒng)候選人。我們之所以稱之為兩黨制,是因?yàn)橛袃蓚€大黨派和許多小黨派。通常小黨派合在一起在全國選舉是得票低于全國所投票數(shù)的5%。
在美國社會里,*黨和共和黨是大和有競爭力的組織。他們通過維持兩黨制,很輕松地組織選民。因?yàn)橥ǔ]有其他選擇,美國人幾乎無可避免地成為*黨員或共和黨員。此外,因?yàn)檫@些黨的競爭歷史很久,多數(shù)美國人知道自己屬于兩黨中的哪一派。作為兩大黨占優(yōu)勢的結(jié)果,多數(shù)當(dāng)選官員不是共和黨員就是*黨員。在過去的100年里,每年的總統(tǒng)選舉中都進(jìn)行了一些打破舊體制的嘗試,但這種體制經(jīng)受住了所有的攻擊繼續(xù)存在。
兩黨制是如何能如此堅實(shí)地扎根于美國政治中的呢?答案可能就在選舉的運(yùn)作方式中。美國不同于政府議會制國家,我們不僅選舉總統(tǒng),而且還選舉許多官員,他們大約有80萬人。國會議員也是從每區(qū)一票的選舉中選出的。例如:我們從435個選區(qū)選舉435名參議員,每一個選區(qū)選舉一名參議員。從統(tǒng)計學(xué)上來講,這種選舉對大黨派有利。選舉制度使大黨輕而易舉地保持著他們的統(tǒng)治地位,因?yàn)樗麄冓A得的席位可能比他們應(yīng)得的份額多。
這種制度的大結(jié)果就是它自動地產(chǎn)生了多數(shù)黨。因?yàn)橹挥袃蓚€競爭者參加競選,幾乎可以肯定其中一個將贏得多數(shù)。而且,這種制度似乎有些夸大獲勝黨的勝利。雖然并不總是如此。但是產(chǎn)生多數(shù)黨的巨大傾向在這種制度中形成了。在200多年的憲法史中,美國人對兩黨制的運(yùn)作方法已經(jīng)有很多了解,以使政權(quán)能夠和平地從一個政黨移交到另一個政黨。在總統(tǒng)選舉中,執(zhí)政黨已被在野黨擊敗了19次,幾乎每十年。在1860年的選舉中,這種政治制度中斷了,結(jié)果導(dǎo)致了南北戰(zhàn)爭――美國歷大的災(zāi)難。歷史證明我們有理由對這一制度保持信心,但歷史也表明這一制度不是萬無一失的。
第二大黨能在失敗下繼續(xù)生存,是因?yàn)樵诮y(tǒng)計上夸大獲勝黨的獲勝,這能夠更有力地支持第二大黨對第三、第四、第五黨派的對抗。因此,失敗的大黨能夠保持在反對派中的壟斷。第二大黨相對于第三黨派有巨大的優(yōu)勢,它是可能擊敗執(zhí)政黨的黨派,從而能夠吸引強(qiáng)烈反對執(zhí)政黨的每一個黨派的支持。只要第二大黨能夠壟斷擊敗執(zhí)政黨的運(yùn)動,它就是重要的,因?yàn)檫t早它肯定能上臺執(zhí)政。
兩黨制的另一個結(jié)果是:鑒于小黨派可能把自己與特殊的利益和特殊的綱領(lǐng)認(rèn)同為一,因而有可能采取極端立場,而大黨很強(qiáng)大所以傾向于溫和。大黨溫和傾向的證據(jù)是許多事務(wù)都是超越黨派界限進(jìn)行。當(dāng)*黨控制國會的一個院而共和黨控制另一個院時,會發(fā)生什么呢?像一個黨控制國會兩院一樣,雖然一些重要法規(guī)可能被擱置,大約相同卷冊的法規(guī)會得到批準(zhǔn)。由于黨派的分歧不是根本的,即使在兩個黨控制不同部門時,政府工作仍然能夠進(jìn)行。
【篇三】
Aging in European Countries
We have to realise how old, how very old, we are. Nations are classified as "aged" when they have 7 per cent or more of their people aged 65 or above, and by about 1970 every one of the advanced countries had become like this. Of the really ancient societies, with over 13 per cent above 65, all are in Northwestern Europe. At the beginning of the 1980's East Germany had 15.6 per cent, Austria,
Sweden, West Germany and France had 13.4 per cent or above, and England and Wales 13.3 per cent. Scotland had 12.3 per cent. Northern Ireland 10.8 percent and the United States 9.9 per cent. We know that we are getting even older, and that the nearer a society approximates to zero population growth, the older its population is likely to be - at least, for any future that concerns us now.
To these now familiar facts a number of further facts may be added, some of them only recently recognised. There is the apparent paradox that the effective cause of the high proportion of the old is births rather than deaths. There is the economic principle that the dependency ratio - the degree to which those who cannot earn depend for a living on those who can - is more advantageous in older societies like ours than in the younger societies of the developing world, because lots of dependent babies are more of a liability than numbers of the inactive aged. There is the appreciation of the salient historical truth that the aging or advanced societies has been a sudden change.
If "revolution" is a rapid resettlement of the social structure, and if the age composition of the society counts as a very important aspect of that social structure, then there has been a social revolution in European and particularly Western European society within the lifetime of everyone over 50. Taken together, these things have implications which are only beginning to be acknowledged. These facts and circumstances were well to the fore earlier this year at a world gathering about aging as a challenge to science and to policy, held at Vichy in France.
There is often resistance to the idea that it is because the birthrate fell earlier in Western and Northwestern Europe than elsewhere, rather than because of any change in the death rate, that we have grown so old. But this is what elementary demography makes clear. Long life is altering our society, of course, but in experiential terms. We have among us a very much greater experience of continued living than any society that has ever preceded us anywhere, and this will continue. But too much of that lengthened experience, even in the wealthy West, will be experience of poverty and neglect, unless we do something about it .
If you are now in your thirties, you ought to be aware that you can expect to live nearly one third of the rest of your life after the age of 60. The older you are now, of course, the greater this proportion will be, and greater still if you are a woman. Expectation of life is a slippery figure, very easy to get wrong at the highest ages. At Vichy the demographers were telling each other that their estimates of how many old there would be and how long they will live in countries like England and Wales are due for revision upwards.
歐洲國家的老齡化
我們不得不認(rèn)識到我們多大歲數(shù)了,有多老了。當(dāng)有7%或更多的65歲或65歲以上的人時,這些國家就被列為"老齡化"國家。到大約1970年,每一個發(fā)展國家就成了這樣的國家。65歲以上的人超過13%的真正的老年人社會,都在西北歐。20世紀(jì)80年代初,東德有15.6%的人超過65歲,在奧地利、瑞典、西德和法國,這個比率為13.4%或更高,英格蘭和威爾士有13.3%,蘇格蘭有12.3%,北愛爾蘭有10.8%,美國有9.9%。我們知道人類在日益變老,人口增長率接近于零的社會離我們越近,人口越可能呈老齡化的趨勢,至少就與影響我們的未來來說是這樣的。
更多的現(xiàn)實(shí),這其中有些只是近來才認(rèn)識到,可能會加入到這些熟悉的現(xiàn)實(shí)中。有這樣一個明顯的似是而非的論點(diǎn):造成老年人比率高的實(shí)際原因是出生人數(shù)而不是死亡人數(shù)。有一條經(jīng)濟(jì)原則:撫養(yǎng)率――不能自食其力的人依靠能掙錢養(yǎng)家的人的程度――在我們這樣的更為老齡化的社會里比在發(fā)展中世界的較年輕社會里要有利一些,因?yàn)榇罅康臒o法獨(dú)立的孩子與一定數(shù)的喪失工作能力的老年人相比,更是個負(fù)擔(dān)。有對這樣一個明顯的歷史真實(shí)的正確評價:先進(jìn)社會的老齡化一直以來都是一種突變。
如果"革命"是對社會結(jié)構(gòu)的迅速重建,如果社會的年齡構(gòu)成被看作社會結(jié)構(gòu)的一個非常重要的方面,那么在歐洲,特別是每一個人的壽命超過50歲的西歐,已經(jīng)有一場革命。綜上所述,人們只是剛剛開始認(rèn)識到這意味著什么。這些事實(shí)和情況早些時候在法國維希舉行的一個世界大會上被視為科學(xué)家和政策的挑戰(zhàn)而置于顯著的地位。
我們?nèi)丝诘睦淆g化,是因?yàn)樵谖鳉W和西北歐出生率比其他地方下降得早,百不是因?yàn)樗劳雎拾l(fā)生了一些變化。對這一觀點(diǎn)經(jīng)常有人不以為然,但這是通過基本的人口統(tǒng)計學(xué)澄清的事實(shí)。當(dāng)然,長壽正改變著我們的社會,但這只是經(jīng)驗(yàn)論。我們之中有一種比先于我們的任何社會多得多的繼續(xù)生存的經(jīng)歷,這種經(jīng)歷將繼續(xù)下去。除非我們能在這方面采取措施,即使在富裕的西方,太多的這種經(jīng)歷將被,視為貧窮和荒廢的過去。你現(xiàn)年三十幾歲,你應(yīng)當(dāng)知道,你可以指望在活到60 歲以后再活上差不多15年?,F(xiàn)在你年紀(jì)越大,這個比例就越高。如果你是女性,這個比例還會更大。預(yù)期壽命不是一個固定數(shù)字,在高年齡上很容易弄錯。在維希,人口學(xué)家互相轉(zhuǎn)告,在像英格蘭和威爾士這些國家,他們對將有多少老人和他們能活多久的估計應(yīng)向上調(diào)整。
【篇四】
Children's Self-esteem
Self-esteem is what people think about themselves - whether or not they feel valued - and when family members have self-respect, pride, and belief in themselves, this high self-esteem makes it possible to cope with the everyday problems or growing up.
Successful parenting begins by communicating to children that they belong, and are loved for no other reason than just because they exist.
Through touch and tone of voice parents tell their infants whether or not they are valued, special, and loved, and it is these messages that form the basis of the child's self-esteem. When children grow up with love and are made to feel lovable despite their mistakes and failures, they are able to interact with others in a responsible, honest, and loving way. A healthy self-esteem is a resource for coping when difficulties arise, making it easier to see a problem as temporary, manageable, and something from which the individual can emerge.
If, however, children grow up without hove and without feelings of self-worth, they feel unlovable and worthless and expect to be cheated, taken advantage of, and looked down upon by others.
Ultimately their actions invite this treatment, and their self-defeating behavior turns expectations into reality. They do not have the personal resources to handle everyday problems in a healthy way, and life may be viewed as just one crisis after another. Without a healthy self-esteem they may cope by acting out problems rather than talking them out or by withdrawing and remaining indifferent toward themselves and others.
These individuals grow up to live isolated, lonely lives, lacking the ability to give the love that they have never received.
Self-esteem is a kind of energy, and when it is high, people feel like they can handle anything. It is what one feels when special things are happening or everything is going great. A word of praise, a smile, a good grade on a report card, or doing something that creates pride within oneself can create this energy. When feelings about the self have been threatened and self-esteem is low, everything becomes more of an effort. It is difficult to hear, see, or think clearly, and others seem rude, inconsiderate, and rough. The problem is not with others, it is with the self, but often it is not until energies are back to normal that the real problem is recognized.
Children need help understanding that their self-esteem and the self-esteem of those they interact with have a direct effect on each other. For example, a little girl comes home from school and says, " I need lovings'cause my feelings got hurt today." The mother responds to her child's need to be held and loved. If instead the mother said she was too busy to hold the little girl, the outcome would have been different.
The infant's self-esteem is totally dependent on family members, and it is not until about the time the child enters school that outside forces contribute to feelings about the self. A child must also learn that a major resource for a healthy self-esteem comes for within. Some parents raise their children to depend on external rather than internal reinforcement through practices such as paying for good grades on report cards or exchanging special privileges for good behavior. The child learns to rely on others to maintain a high self-esteem and is not prepared to live in a world in which desirable behavior does not automatically produce a tangible reward such as a smile, money, or special privileges.
Maintaining a healthy self-esteem is challenge that continues throughout life. One family found that they could help each other identify positive attitudes. One evening during an electric storm the family gathered around the kitchen table, and each person wrote down two things that they liked about each family member. These pieces of paper were folded and given to the appropriate person, who one by one opened their special messages. The father later commented, "It was quite an experience, opening each little piece of paper and reading the message. I still have those gifts, and when I've had a really bad day, I read through them and I always come away feeling better."
The foundation of a healthy family depends on the ability of the parents to communicate messages of love, trust, and self-worth to each child. This is the basis on which self-esteem is built, and as the child grows, self-esteem changes from a collection of other's feelings to become personal feelings about the self. Ultimately a person's self-esteem is reflected in the way he or she interacts with others.
孩子們的自尊心
自尊是人們對自己的看法――他們是否感到受到重視――當(dāng)家庭成員有了自尊、自豪、自信時,這種高度的自尊使人們有可能妥善處理孩子們成長的日常問題。
成功的育兒之道是第一步是讓孩子們知道,他們上家庭的一份子,他們受寵愛的原因就是因?yàn)樗麄冏陨淼拇嬖凇Mㄟ^撫摸和聲音的語調(diào),父母告訴他們的幼兒他們是否受到重視、是否很特別、是否被愛。正是這些信息形成了孩子自尊的基礎(chǔ)。當(dāng)孩子們在愛的關(guān)懷下成長,不管他們是錯誤或失敗,都使他們感覺到討人喜愛時,他們就能用可依賴的、誠實(shí)的和愛的方式與別人交往。當(dāng)出現(xiàn)困難時,他們就能用可依賴的、誠實(shí)的和愛的方式與別人交往。當(dāng)出現(xiàn)困難時,健康的自尊心是一種解決困難的手段,使之容易把問題看作是暫的,能處理的,個人可以從中解脫出來。
然而,如果孩子們盛開在沒有愛、沒有自我價值感的氛圍當(dāng)中,他們感到不討人喜歡、沒有價值,料想可能被別人欺騙、利用和看不起。他們的行為終導(dǎo)致了這種結(jié)果,他們的自我挫敗的行為把預(yù)想變成了現(xiàn)實(shí)。他們沒有以健康的方式處理日常問題的個人對策,生活在他們看來是一個又一個危機(jī)。由于沒有健康的自尊心,他們在處理問題時,不是提出問題,而是用行動把問題表現(xiàn)出來,或是采取退縮以及對自己和他人保持冷漠的態(tài)度。這些人長大以后過著與世隔絕的孤獨(dú)生活,缺乏給予愛的能力,這種愛他們也從未得到過。
自尊心是一種能量。自尊心強(qiáng)的時,人們感覺好像能夠處理任何事情。這就是當(dāng)特殊事情發(fā)生或一切進(jìn)行得很順利時一個人的感覺。一句贊揚(yáng)的話、一個微笑、成績報告卡上的一個好分?jǐn)?shù),或者做王碼電腦公司軟件中心些使自己引以自豪有事,都能產(chǎn)生這種能量。當(dāng)自我感覺受到威脅,自尊心不足時,任何事在更大程度上都變成了一種需要費(fèi)力去做的負(fù)擔(dān)。很難聽清楚、看清楚、想清楚,其他人都似乎沒有禮貌、不體諒人、粗暴。問題并不在別人,是在自己。但常常直到恢復(fù)到正常的精神狀態(tài),人們才認(rèn)識到真正的問題所在。
孩子們需要幫助為理解,他們的自尊和與他們交往的人的自尊彼此相互影響。例如:一個小女孩從學(xué)?;丶艺f:"我需要愛撫,因?yàn)榻裉煳业母星槭艿絺α恕?媽媽應(yīng)回應(yīng)她的孩子對被愛撫和被愛的需要。如果反之,媽媽說她太心不能愛撫這個小女孩子,結(jié)果就不同了。
嬰幼兒的自尊完全依賴家庭成員。直到孩子上學(xué)時,外界的力量才對孩子的自我感覺產(chǎn)生影響。孩子必須明白健康的首尊主要來自內(nèi)部一些父母在實(shí)踐中培養(yǎng)他們的孩子依靠外部因素而不是內(nèi)部強(qiáng)化。例如,孩子的成績單上有好成績就可以得到獎賞,或者他們有了好的行為就給他們一些優(yōu)待。孩子們學(xué)會了依靠別人來保持高度的自尊,卻對現(xiàn)實(shí)世界的生活沒有絲毫準(zhǔn)備,因?yàn)樵诂F(xiàn)實(shí)世界中,令人滿意的行為并不會自動帶來實(shí)在的獎勵,如微笑、金錢或特權(quán)。
保持健康的自尊心是持續(xù)一生的挑戰(zhàn)。一個家庭發(fā)現(xiàn)他們可以互相幫助,確定積極的態(tài)度。一個電閃雷鳴的晚上,一家人圍坐在廚房桌子周圍,每個人寫下兩件他們關(guān)于每一個家庭成員的事。這些紙折疊起來給了相應(yīng)的人,他們一個接一個打開他們的特殊訊息。父親后來評論說:"打開每張字條看上面寫的東西,那真是很好的感受。我依然保存著那些禮貌,當(dāng)我遇到一個特別糟糕的日子時,看看它們,我總會從中解脫出來,感覺好多了。"健康家庭的基礎(chǔ)是靠父母傳達(dá)給每一個孩子愛、自尊心從別人的感受變?yōu)樽晕业母惺?。終,一個人的自尊心就反映在他與別人交往的方式上。