China’s provision of development finance to the emerging world has always been about much more than building infrastructure to reap a commercial return. It has also been about changing destinies. Beijing selected countries that it aimed to lift from poverty, while forging political alliances and creating markets for Chinese goods.
中國(guó)為新興世界提供發(fā)展融資一直以來(lái)都不只是為了通過(guò)建設(shè)基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施獲取商業(yè)回報(bào)。它還關(guān)乎改變一些國(guó)家的命運(yùn)。中國(guó)精心選擇一些國(guó)家，希望幫助他們擺脫貧困，同時(shí)與他們建立政治聯(lián)盟，并為中國(guó)商品打開(kāi)市場(chǎng)。
The defining characteristic of China’s power projection is its ability to get things done.
中國(guó)力量投射出的鮮明特征是其把事情做成的能力。
Thus, a mounting economic crisis in Venezuela comes as a big blow. Caracas is the biggest client of China’s state-orchestrated development lending, accepting some $65bn in loans since 2007 for projects such as oil refineries, gold mines and railways. But in May this year, Venezuela engineered a default under which it has deferred paying the principal — and only honours the interest — on outstanding debts estimated at $20bn-$24bn.
因此，委內(nèi)瑞拉愈演愈烈的經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)對(duì)中國(guó)是一個(gè)沉重打擊。加拉加斯是中國(guó)政府主導(dǎo)的發(fā)展貸款的客戶(hù)。自2007年以來(lái)，委內(nèi)瑞拉在煉油廠、金礦及鐵路等項(xiàng)目上共獲得中國(guó)約650億美元的貸款。但今年5月，委內(nèi)瑞拉違約了，拖延支付約200億至240億美元未償債務(wù)的本金，只支付利息。
Worse may be yet to come. Venezuelan inflation is running at about 800 per cent and a chronic shortage of US dollars is preventing Caracas from paying some of the contractors that keep its oil supplies flowing. Since China’s loans are secured against this dwindling output of oil, pulses are racing in Beijing. In addition, some of the projects undertaken with Chinese money, including a partly built high-speed railway, have been vandalised and abandoned.
更糟糕的可能還在后面。委內(nèi)瑞拉的通脹率已經(jīng)高達(dá)800%左右，長(zhǎng)期美元短缺使加拉加斯無(wú)法付款給保障其石油供應(yīng)流暢的部分承包商。由于中國(guó)的貸款以這些產(chǎn)量不斷減少的石油為擔(dān)保，北京方面對(duì)此感到緊張。此外，一些依靠中國(guó)資金建設(shè)的項(xiàng)目已被破壞或放棄，包括一條半途而廢的高鐵。
The reversal also suggests that Beijing’s developmental model is at fault. Its institutions have eschewed the strict conditionality and emphasis on governance that characterises the approach of the World Bank and other western-backed multilateral organisations. Instead of looking backwards into a country’s credit record, it has tried to look forward to what it might achieve with sufficient investment and infrastructure.
這種反轉(zhuǎn)也表明，北京的發(fā)展貸款模式存在問(wèn)題。中國(guó)的金融機(jī)構(gòu)回避了世界銀行和其他西方支持的多邊機(jī)構(gòu)奉行的嚴(yán)格貸款條件以及對(duì)治理的重視。中國(guó)不去回顧一個(gè)國(guó)家的信用記錄，而是展望在大力投資建設(shè)基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施后自己可以實(shí)現(xiàn)什么。
In the case of Venezuela, at least, this approach is found to be wanting. The unorthodox nature of Venezuela’s economic policies were abundantly clear a decade ago when China’s leaders conducted a diplomatic love affair with Hugo Chávez, the charismatic late president. But Beijing nevertheless poured money into a country that had defaulted on or rescheduled debts to overseas creditors four times in the preceding 30 years.
至少在向委內(nèi)瑞拉放貸這件事上，這種貸款方式是有欠缺的。中國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人10年前對(duì)委內(nèi)瑞拉魅力非凡的已故總統(tǒng)烏戈.查韋斯發(fā)展密切外交關(guān)系時(shí)，委內(nèi)瑞拉經(jīng)濟(jì)政策的非正統(tǒng)性已經(jīng)非常清楚了。然而，北京方面還是將大量資金貸給這個(gè)過(guò)去30年曾經(jīng)對(duì)海外債權(quán)人違約或進(jìn)行債務(wù)重組已達(dá)四次的國(guó)家。
Now, Chinese officials say, a colder, harder approach towards extending loans is being adopted not only in the case of Venezuela but all over the emerging world. This is likely to have important ramifications: China is the biggest source of global development finance with more loans outstanding than the six western-backed multilateral agencies put together.
中國(guó)官員稱(chēng)，如今，不僅對(duì)委內(nèi)瑞拉，中國(guó)在對(duì)整個(gè)新興世界提供貸款時(shí)都采取了更冷靜、更嚴(yán)格的方式。這很可能帶來(lái)重大的影響，因?yàn)橹袊?guó)是全球發(fā)展融資的來(lái)源地，其貸款額度超過(guò)了六個(gè)西方支持的多邊機(jī)構(gòu)的總和。
But as China rethinks its approach, the west should resist schadenfreude. At times, the approach of its development-lending institutions has been as dilatory, nitpicking and superior, as China’s has been impulsive and cavalier. Besides, the world needs Chinese money and the expertise of its huge infrastructure construction corporations. In Asia alone, the infrastructure gap requires about $1tn a year by 2020.
但在中國(guó)反思其放貸方式之際，西方不應(yīng)對(duì)此幸災(zāi)樂(lè)禍。中國(guó)的發(fā)展貸款機(jī)構(gòu)魯莽、不計(jì)后果，而西方的發(fā)展貸款機(jī)構(gòu)有時(shí)則行事拖沓、吹毛求疵、傲慢。除此之外，世界需要中國(guó)的資金和中國(guó)大型基建公司的專(zhuān)業(yè)知識(shí)。僅在亞洲，2020年之前的基建資金缺口每年就需要約1萬(wàn)億美元。
One way forward would be for Chinese and western-backed development institutions to work together. Their qualities — the singularity of purpose and speed of execution of China and the due diligence of the World Bank, Asian Development Bank and others — could combine for optimum results.
未來(lái)的一條出路是中西方的發(fā)展機(jī)構(gòu)攜手合作。雙方的特點(diǎn)——中國(guó)的目的性和執(zhí)行速度與世行、亞洲開(kāi)發(fā)銀行等機(jī)構(gòu)的盡職調(diào)查——結(jié)合起來(lái)可能實(shí)現(xiàn)結(jié)果。
But this can only be a partial solution because China is overwhelmingly a bilateral actor. For its own sake and that of the countries it lends to, it should borrow more liberally from the west’s playbook, assessing country risks on the basis of governance, transparency and due process.
但這只是一部分解決方案，解決不了全部問(wèn)題，因?yàn)橹袊?guó)奉行雙邊路線。為了本國(guó)和借貸國(guó)的利益，中國(guó)應(yīng)更多地借鑒西方模式，從治理、透明度和正當(dāng)程序等方面評(píng)估一個(gè)國(guó)家的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。
中國(guó)為新興世界提供發(fā)展融資一直以來(lái)都不只是為了通過(guò)建設(shè)基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施獲取商業(yè)回報(bào)。它還關(guān)乎改變一些國(guó)家的命運(yùn)。中國(guó)精心選擇一些國(guó)家，希望幫助他們擺脫貧困，同時(shí)與他們建立政治聯(lián)盟，并為中國(guó)商品打開(kāi)市場(chǎng)。
The defining characteristic of China’s power projection is its ability to get things done.
中國(guó)力量投射出的鮮明特征是其把事情做成的能力。
Thus, a mounting economic crisis in Venezuela comes as a big blow. Caracas is the biggest client of China’s state-orchestrated development lending, accepting some $65bn in loans since 2007 for projects such as oil refineries, gold mines and railways. But in May this year, Venezuela engineered a default under which it has deferred paying the principal — and only honours the interest — on outstanding debts estimated at $20bn-$24bn.
因此，委內(nèi)瑞拉愈演愈烈的經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)對(duì)中國(guó)是一個(gè)沉重打擊。加拉加斯是中國(guó)政府主導(dǎo)的發(fā)展貸款的客戶(hù)。自2007年以來(lái)，委內(nèi)瑞拉在煉油廠、金礦及鐵路等項(xiàng)目上共獲得中國(guó)約650億美元的貸款。但今年5月，委內(nèi)瑞拉違約了，拖延支付約200億至240億美元未償債務(wù)的本金，只支付利息。
Worse may be yet to come. Venezuelan inflation is running at about 800 per cent and a chronic shortage of US dollars is preventing Caracas from paying some of the contractors that keep its oil supplies flowing. Since China’s loans are secured against this dwindling output of oil, pulses are racing in Beijing. In addition, some of the projects undertaken with Chinese money, including a partly built high-speed railway, have been vandalised and abandoned.
更糟糕的可能還在后面。委內(nèi)瑞拉的通脹率已經(jīng)高達(dá)800%左右，長(zhǎng)期美元短缺使加拉加斯無(wú)法付款給保障其石油供應(yīng)流暢的部分承包商。由于中國(guó)的貸款以這些產(chǎn)量不斷減少的石油為擔(dān)保，北京方面對(duì)此感到緊張。此外，一些依靠中國(guó)資金建設(shè)的項(xiàng)目已被破壞或放棄，包括一條半途而廢的高鐵。
The reversal also suggests that Beijing’s developmental model is at fault. Its institutions have eschewed the strict conditionality and emphasis on governance that characterises the approach of the World Bank and other western-backed multilateral organisations. Instead of looking backwards into a country’s credit record, it has tried to look forward to what it might achieve with sufficient investment and infrastructure.
這種反轉(zhuǎn)也表明，北京的發(fā)展貸款模式存在問(wèn)題。中國(guó)的金融機(jī)構(gòu)回避了世界銀行和其他西方支持的多邊機(jī)構(gòu)奉行的嚴(yán)格貸款條件以及對(duì)治理的重視。中國(guó)不去回顧一個(gè)國(guó)家的信用記錄，而是展望在大力投資建設(shè)基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施后自己可以實(shí)現(xiàn)什么。
In the case of Venezuela, at least, this approach is found to be wanting. The unorthodox nature of Venezuela’s economic policies were abundantly clear a decade ago when China’s leaders conducted a diplomatic love affair with Hugo Chávez, the charismatic late president. But Beijing nevertheless poured money into a country that had defaulted on or rescheduled debts to overseas creditors four times in the preceding 30 years.
至少在向委內(nèi)瑞拉放貸這件事上，這種貸款方式是有欠缺的。中國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人10年前對(duì)委內(nèi)瑞拉魅力非凡的已故總統(tǒng)烏戈.查韋斯發(fā)展密切外交關(guān)系時(shí)，委內(nèi)瑞拉經(jīng)濟(jì)政策的非正統(tǒng)性已經(jīng)非常清楚了。然而，北京方面還是將大量資金貸給這個(gè)過(guò)去30年曾經(jīng)對(duì)海外債權(quán)人違約或進(jìn)行債務(wù)重組已達(dá)四次的國(guó)家。
Now, Chinese officials say, a colder, harder approach towards extending loans is being adopted not only in the case of Venezuela but all over the emerging world. This is likely to have important ramifications: China is the biggest source of global development finance with more loans outstanding than the six western-backed multilateral agencies put together.
中國(guó)官員稱(chēng)，如今，不僅對(duì)委內(nèi)瑞拉，中國(guó)在對(duì)整個(gè)新興世界提供貸款時(shí)都采取了更冷靜、更嚴(yán)格的方式。這很可能帶來(lái)重大的影響，因?yàn)橹袊?guó)是全球發(fā)展融資的來(lái)源地，其貸款額度超過(guò)了六個(gè)西方支持的多邊機(jī)構(gòu)的總和。
But as China rethinks its approach, the west should resist schadenfreude. At times, the approach of its development-lending institutions has been as dilatory, nitpicking and superior, as China’s has been impulsive and cavalier. Besides, the world needs Chinese money and the expertise of its huge infrastructure construction corporations. In Asia alone, the infrastructure gap requires about $1tn a year by 2020.
但在中國(guó)反思其放貸方式之際，西方不應(yīng)對(duì)此幸災(zāi)樂(lè)禍。中國(guó)的發(fā)展貸款機(jī)構(gòu)魯莽、不計(jì)后果，而西方的發(fā)展貸款機(jī)構(gòu)有時(shí)則行事拖沓、吹毛求疵、傲慢。除此之外，世界需要中國(guó)的資金和中國(guó)大型基建公司的專(zhuān)業(yè)知識(shí)。僅在亞洲，2020年之前的基建資金缺口每年就需要約1萬(wàn)億美元。
One way forward would be for Chinese and western-backed development institutions to work together. Their qualities — the singularity of purpose and speed of execution of China and the due diligence of the World Bank, Asian Development Bank and others — could combine for optimum results.
未來(lái)的一條出路是中西方的發(fā)展機(jī)構(gòu)攜手合作。雙方的特點(diǎn)——中國(guó)的目的性和執(zhí)行速度與世行、亞洲開(kāi)發(fā)銀行等機(jī)構(gòu)的盡職調(diào)查——結(jié)合起來(lái)可能實(shí)現(xiàn)結(jié)果。
But this can only be a partial solution because China is overwhelmingly a bilateral actor. For its own sake and that of the countries it lends to, it should borrow more liberally from the west’s playbook, assessing country risks on the basis of governance, transparency and due process.
但這只是一部分解決方案，解決不了全部問(wèn)題，因?yàn)橹袊?guó)奉行雙邊路線。為了本國(guó)和借貸國(guó)的利益，中國(guó)應(yīng)更多地借鑒西方模式，從治理、透明度和正當(dāng)程序等方面評(píng)估一個(gè)國(guó)家的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。