2016年考研英語閱讀材料:The United States
GOOD news out of Washington is rare. Last week congressional leaders agreed on a bipartisan bill which, if passed, would for the first time in years give the president “fast-track” authority when negotiating trade deals. The bill would be a boost for the prospects of a huge trade deal, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), binding America with 11 economies (including Japan but not China) around the Pacific rim. Now, as if on cue, come welcome signals about the TPP itself. As Japan's prime minister, Shinzo Abe, prepared to head to Washington for a much-anticipated trip including an invitation to address a joint session of Congress (see article), he claimed that America and Japan were close to agreement over their bilateral terms―on which the whole TPP deal hinges.
Yet there are two big caveats. First, fast track, formally known as Trade Promotion Authority, may still fall foul of Congress. Second, Japan may not make any serious cuts to tariffs that protect its farmers. Those outcomes are more likely because the Obama administration and the Japanese government have made a similar mistake: both have been too quick to cast the TPP as a weapon in the containment of China.
Flanked by Japan and America, the TPP would link countries which make up 40% of global GDP. It could boost world output by $220 billion a year by 2025. It is supposed to reform difficult areas such as intellectual property, state-owned firms and environmental and labour standards. It would join economies―from Vietnam to Australia―that lie at different ends of the spectrum of development.
But the TPP will not happen without fast track, which forces Congress into a yes/no vote on any pending trade deal and so avoids the risk that it will be amended into oblivion. And the passage of fast track faces a lot of scepticism from Democrats (see article). Some are implacably opposed. Others want America to have a bigger arsenal with which to fight against unfair traders. Driven by a conviction that China artificially holds its currency down and destroys American jobs, Charles Schumer, a powerful senator from New York, is determined that fast track should include a provision that would make sure a trade deal included sanctions on currency manipulation.
Attaching a currency-manipulation clause to trade deals is a poor idea, both because the practice is hard to define and because the addition of such clauses makes reaching an agreement less likely. But since the Obama administration has pitched TPP as a counterbalance to an assertive China, Mr Schumer's demands are harder to ignore.
The same mistaken logic looks set to cause problems in Japan. Mr Abe committed his country to joining the TPP on strategic grounds―as a counterweight to China―rather than because he is a born admirer of free trade. When he entered negotiations, some of his backers thought that, by playing the China card, Japan would be spared from making real concessions: that America would care more about a pact that excluded China than about prising open Japan's most protected markets, particularly rice. Even now, Japan seems to want to keep tariffs high. The best it may offer is to allow in a fixed quota of tariff-free rice from the TPP's other members, America included.
If the China-containment logic leads to a minimalist agreement, then the economic gains from TPP will be slim. TPP's real value is to set high new standards for world trade, and that demands the boldest possible agreement. And in the long run the world gains most if China joins. The rhetoric makes trade negotiations sound like a contest. In fact, it is a battle where the more you give away the more you win.
參考譯文:
從華盛頓傳來了罕見的好消息。上周美國兩黨達成共識，如法案通過，美國總統(tǒng)在貿(mào)易協(xié)定談判領(lǐng)域可獲得快車道授權(quán)。該法案將成為促進貿(mào)易協(xié)議的助力點，且能促進跨太平洋伙伴關(guān)系(TPP)的形成。TPP即指，美國聯(lián)合環(huán)太平洋的十一個國家(包括日本，但不包括中國)而形成的經(jīng)濟戰(zhàn)略伙伴關(guān)系?，F(xiàn)在，不出人所料，一切的好消息都是向著TPP順利談成而發(fā)展的。備受矚目下，日本首相安倍晉三 (Shinzo Abe)將前往華盛頓，包括受邀在國會議席上發(fā)表講話(見文章)，他聲稱美國和日本正在就TPP協(xié)定關(guān)鍵的雙邊協(xié)議條款進行商討，就快達成一致了。
但有兩大阻力值得引起重視。首先，快車道授權(quán)(正式上稱為貿(mào)易促進授權(quán))，仍會受到國會的干涉。其次，日本為了保護農(nóng)民，不可能果斷地削減關(guān)稅。就目前的阻力而言，奧巴馬及安倍晉三政府都犯了一個極為相似的錯誤：過快的將TPP作為牽制中國的武器。
TPP以日本和美國為兩個的經(jīng)濟體，其覆蓋的國家GDP總值能夠占全球GDP的40%。且TPP預(yù)計可于2025年，為世界經(jīng)濟每年帶來2200億美元的額外收益。同時TPP還在一些困難領(lǐng)域上支持改革，比如知識產(chǎn)權(quán)、國有企業(yè)及環(huán)境問題，以及勞工標準。協(xié)議將覆蓋從越南到澳大利亞的眾多經(jīng)濟體，盡管它們處在不同的發(fā)展領(lǐng)域。
但TPP必須以快車道授權(quán)為先決條件，才有其存在的意義。這也迫使國會盡快對這個一直懸而未決的貿(mào)易協(xié)定進行投票,以避免該法案被遺忘。但快車道授權(quán)仍受到許多來自民主黨的質(zhì)疑(見文章)。其中一些人對此法案表示堅決反對。而其他人則希望美國有一個更為強大的軍力來對抗不公平的交易。 來自紐約的強有力的參議員查爾斯?舒默(Charles Schumer)，堅信中國人為的控制人民幣匯率并破壞美國的就業(yè)機會, 因而他認為快軌授權(quán)應(yīng)包括一項足以確保貿(mào)易協(xié)議能對匯率操縱進行制裁的條款。
在貿(mào)易協(xié)議上增加人民幣匯率操縱的條款，這是一個卑鄙的想法,原因有兩個：其一操縱作法很難定義;其二，添加這樣的條款只會讓協(xié)議達成一致遙遙無期。但是因為奧巴馬政府是把TPP作為牽制強硬的中國的一種手段，所以舒默的提議更不容忽視。
相同錯誤的邏輯似乎會給日本帶來問題。安倍承諾日本將加入TPP的戰(zhàn)略基礎(chǔ)是因為想牽制中國發(fā)展,而不是因為他是一個天生的自由貿(mào)易的崇拜者。當他加入談判,他的一些支持者認為,只有打中國牌,日本才能免于真正去承認：美國更關(guān)心摒棄掉中國市場的協(xié)定，而不是撬開日本一直以來保護的市場,尤其是大米市場。即使是現(xiàn)在,日本似乎仍想保持高關(guān)稅。而的解決方案是從包括美國在內(nèi)的TPP其他成員國那里，準予日本需以一個固定的大米免關(guān)稅配額進入。
如果說牽制中國這一邏輯造就了極簡主義的協(xié)議，那么從TPP獲取的經(jīng)濟收益將會減少。TPP的真正價值是為世界貿(mào)易設(shè)置更高的新標準,并要求盡可能大膽的提出協(xié)議。從長遠來看，如若能讓中國加入TPP協(xié)議，世界獲益也?，F(xiàn)在的措辭使貿(mào)易談判聽起來像一場競爭。
GOOD news out of Washington is rare. Last week congressional leaders agreed on a bipartisan bill which, if passed, would for the first time in years give the president “fast-track” authority when negotiating trade deals. The bill would be a boost for the prospects of a huge trade deal, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), binding America with 11 economies (including Japan but not China) around the Pacific rim. Now, as if on cue, come welcome signals about the TPP itself. As Japan's prime minister, Shinzo Abe, prepared to head to Washington for a much-anticipated trip including an invitation to address a joint session of Congress (see article), he claimed that America and Japan were close to agreement over their bilateral terms―on which the whole TPP deal hinges.
Yet there are two big caveats. First, fast track, formally known as Trade Promotion Authority, may still fall foul of Congress. Second, Japan may not make any serious cuts to tariffs that protect its farmers. Those outcomes are more likely because the Obama administration and the Japanese government have made a similar mistake: both have been too quick to cast the TPP as a weapon in the containment of China.
Flanked by Japan and America, the TPP would link countries which make up 40% of global GDP. It could boost world output by $220 billion a year by 2025. It is supposed to reform difficult areas such as intellectual property, state-owned firms and environmental and labour standards. It would join economies―from Vietnam to Australia―that lie at different ends of the spectrum of development.
But the TPP will not happen without fast track, which forces Congress into a yes/no vote on any pending trade deal and so avoids the risk that it will be amended into oblivion. And the passage of fast track faces a lot of scepticism from Democrats (see article). Some are implacably opposed. Others want America to have a bigger arsenal with which to fight against unfair traders. Driven by a conviction that China artificially holds its currency down and destroys American jobs, Charles Schumer, a powerful senator from New York, is determined that fast track should include a provision that would make sure a trade deal included sanctions on currency manipulation.
Attaching a currency-manipulation clause to trade deals is a poor idea, both because the practice is hard to define and because the addition of such clauses makes reaching an agreement less likely. But since the Obama administration has pitched TPP as a counterbalance to an assertive China, Mr Schumer's demands are harder to ignore.
The same mistaken logic looks set to cause problems in Japan. Mr Abe committed his country to joining the TPP on strategic grounds―as a counterweight to China―rather than because he is a born admirer of free trade. When he entered negotiations, some of his backers thought that, by playing the China card, Japan would be spared from making real concessions: that America would care more about a pact that excluded China than about prising open Japan's most protected markets, particularly rice. Even now, Japan seems to want to keep tariffs high. The best it may offer is to allow in a fixed quota of tariff-free rice from the TPP's other members, America included.
If the China-containment logic leads to a minimalist agreement, then the economic gains from TPP will be slim. TPP's real value is to set high new standards for world trade, and that demands the boldest possible agreement. And in the long run the world gains most if China joins. The rhetoric makes trade negotiations sound like a contest. In fact, it is a battle where the more you give away the more you win.
參考譯文:
從華盛頓傳來了罕見的好消息。上周美國兩黨達成共識，如法案通過，美國總統(tǒng)在貿(mào)易協(xié)定談判領(lǐng)域可獲得快車道授權(quán)。該法案將成為促進貿(mào)易協(xié)議的助力點，且能促進跨太平洋伙伴關(guān)系(TPP)的形成。TPP即指，美國聯(lián)合環(huán)太平洋的十一個國家(包括日本，但不包括中國)而形成的經(jīng)濟戰(zhàn)略伙伴關(guān)系?，F(xiàn)在，不出人所料，一切的好消息都是向著TPP順利談成而發(fā)展的。備受矚目下，日本首相安倍晉三 (Shinzo Abe)將前往華盛頓，包括受邀在國會議席上發(fā)表講話(見文章)，他聲稱美國和日本正在就TPP協(xié)定關(guān)鍵的雙邊協(xié)議條款進行商討，就快達成一致了。
但有兩大阻力值得引起重視。首先，快車道授權(quán)(正式上稱為貿(mào)易促進授權(quán))，仍會受到國會的干涉。其次，日本為了保護農(nóng)民，不可能果斷地削減關(guān)稅。就目前的阻力而言，奧巴馬及安倍晉三政府都犯了一個極為相似的錯誤：過快的將TPP作為牽制中國的武器。
TPP以日本和美國為兩個的經(jīng)濟體，其覆蓋的國家GDP總值能夠占全球GDP的40%。且TPP預(yù)計可于2025年，為世界經(jīng)濟每年帶來2200億美元的額外收益。同時TPP還在一些困難領(lǐng)域上支持改革，比如知識產(chǎn)權(quán)、國有企業(yè)及環(huán)境問題，以及勞工標準。協(xié)議將覆蓋從越南到澳大利亞的眾多經(jīng)濟體，盡管它們處在不同的發(fā)展領(lǐng)域。
但TPP必須以快車道授權(quán)為先決條件，才有其存在的意義。這也迫使國會盡快對這個一直懸而未決的貿(mào)易協(xié)定進行投票,以避免該法案被遺忘。但快車道授權(quán)仍受到許多來自民主黨的質(zhì)疑(見文章)。其中一些人對此法案表示堅決反對。而其他人則希望美國有一個更為強大的軍力來對抗不公平的交易。 來自紐約的強有力的參議員查爾斯?舒默(Charles Schumer)，堅信中國人為的控制人民幣匯率并破壞美國的就業(yè)機會, 因而他認為快軌授權(quán)應(yīng)包括一項足以確保貿(mào)易協(xié)議能對匯率操縱進行制裁的條款。
在貿(mào)易協(xié)議上增加人民幣匯率操縱的條款，這是一個卑鄙的想法,原因有兩個：其一操縱作法很難定義;其二，添加這樣的條款只會讓協(xié)議達成一致遙遙無期。但是因為奧巴馬政府是把TPP作為牽制強硬的中國的一種手段，所以舒默的提議更不容忽視。
相同錯誤的邏輯似乎會給日本帶來問題。安倍承諾日本將加入TPP的戰(zhàn)略基礎(chǔ)是因為想牽制中國發(fā)展,而不是因為他是一個天生的自由貿(mào)易的崇拜者。當他加入談判,他的一些支持者認為,只有打中國牌,日本才能免于真正去承認：美國更關(guān)心摒棄掉中國市場的協(xié)定，而不是撬開日本一直以來保護的市場,尤其是大米市場。即使是現(xiàn)在,日本似乎仍想保持高關(guān)稅。而的解決方案是從包括美國在內(nèi)的TPP其他成員國那里，準予日本需以一個固定的大米免關(guān)稅配額進入。
如果說牽制中國這一邏輯造就了極簡主義的協(xié)議，那么從TPP獲取的經(jīng)濟收益將會減少。TPP的真正價值是為世界貿(mào)易設(shè)置更高的新標準,并要求盡可能大膽的提出協(xié)議。從長遠來看，如若能讓中國加入TPP協(xié)議，世界獲益也?，F(xiàn)在的措辭使貿(mào)易談判聽起來像一場競爭。