★以下是英語(yǔ)資源頻道為大家整理的《china daily雙語(yǔ)新聞：TPP談判美國(guó)難容有失》，供大家參考。更多內(nèi)容請(qǐng)看本站英語(yǔ)資源頻道。
In the sparring between China and the US over leadership in Asia, Beijing recently landed a tidy, if almost accidental, punch. Washington’s attempt to lead a boycott of the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank ended in farce after Britain broke ranks and other nations from Germany to South Korea fell over themselves to join.
在中美這場(chǎng)對(duì)亞洲領(lǐng)導(dǎo)權(quán)的爭(zhēng)奪戰(zhàn)中，北京最近打出了漂亮的一拳，盡管那一拳贏得近乎意外。華盛頓原本企圖帶頭抵制中國(guó)牽頭籌建的亞洲基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施投資銀行（Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank，簡(jiǎn)稱亞投行），然而在英國(guó)打亂了隊(duì)形、從德國(guó)到韓國(guó)的其他國(guó)家也爭(zhēng)相加入之后，美國(guó)的企圖最終淪為笑柄。
If round one was a defeat for America, round two hangs in the balance. Washington is trying to convince 11 Pacific nations to join a “next generation” trade agreement called the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Billed as the most important trade initiative since the collapse of the 2001 launch of the World Trade Organisation’s Doha round, it would bind two of the biggest economies — the US and Japan — into a bloc covering 40 per cent of global output. Supporters say it would also reaffirm US commitment to the region at a time when China’s economic pull is growing.
如果說(shuō)美國(guó)在雙方的第一輪較量中落敗，第二輪雙方則勢(shì)均力敵。華盛頓正努力說(shuō)服11個(gè)太平洋沿岸國(guó)家加入所謂《跨太平洋伙伴關(guān)系協(xié)定》（Trans-Pacific Partnership，簡(jiǎn)稱TPP）的“新一代”貿(mào)易協(xié)定。TPP被宣揚(yáng)為世貿(mào)組織(WTO)多哈回合談判（啟動(dòng)于2001年）泡湯以來(lái)最重要的貿(mào)易協(xié)定，將把該地區(qū)兩個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)體——美國(guó)和日本——納入同一個(gè)占全球產(chǎn)出40%的貿(mào)易區(qū)。支持者表示，在中國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)吸引力日益上升之際，TPP還能再次確認(rèn)美國(guó)對(duì)該地區(qū)的承諾沒有動(dòng)搖。
The stakes are high. If the TPP disappoints — or worse still, if it is not concluded at all — it will be another embarrassing setback for US regional diplomacy. The omens are mixed at best.
TPP對(duì)美國(guó)事關(guān)重大。如果TPP表現(xiàn)令人失望甚至根本沒有達(dá)成，那么將標(biāo)志著美國(guó)地區(qū)外交遭遇又一個(gè)令人難堪的挫折。目前的種種兆頭至多算是好壞摻半。
The TPP excludes China. That is quite an omission. It is also precisely the point. The region’s most important trading nation has not been invited to join on the grounds that its economy is too centrally planned and too rigged to be part of such a highfalutin arrangement. Yet in a peculiar display of diplomatic contortion, Vietnam — a country whose economy is as centrally planned and as rigged as the best of them — is somehow considered fit for entry.
TPP排除了中國(guó)。這是個(gè)挺大的遺漏，也正是有意為之。該地區(qū)最重要的貿(mào)易國(guó)未獲邀加入，理由是其經(jīng)濟(jì)太多地由中央政府計(jì)劃、受操縱太嚴(yán)重，因而不夠格參加這么上檔次的協(xié)定。然而，不知為什么，經(jīng)濟(jì)由中央政府計(jì)劃和受操縱程度絲毫不亞于中國(guó)的越南卻被認(rèn)為適合加入，離奇地顯示出美國(guó)在外交上的扭曲。
The exclusion of China serves twin objectives. Neither bears close scrutiny. The TPP is a “trade pivot” to Asia; the commercial equivalent of Washington’s commitment to remain militarily engaged in the region. Yet it is just as likely to annoy allies as reassure them.
排除中國(guó)能滿足兩個(gè)目的，但都經(jīng)不起推敲。TPP是美國(guó)“重返亞洲”戰(zhàn)略的貿(mào)易版本，是華盛頓承諾在亞洲保持軍事威力的商業(yè)版本。然而，這個(gè)協(xié)定惹惱盟友與讓他們放心的可能性一樣大。
Almost all have expressed concern that some provisions intrude into their internal affairs. That is, indeed, the point of the TPP, which goes beyond tariff reduction to deal with “behind the border” issues thought to impede trade and investment. These include tendering processes, financial regulations, data protection rules and intellectual property laws. Opponents from Australia to Japan see it not as an act of US benevolence but rather as a charter for meddling in everything from pharmaceutical pricing to cigarette advertising.
幾乎所有國(guó)家都對(duì)一些條款干涉他們的內(nèi)政表達(dá)了擔(dān)心。而這又確實(shí)是TPP的意義所在，它超越了降關(guān)稅，想要拿被認(rèn)為阻礙貿(mào)易和投資的“國(guó)內(nèi)”事務(wù)開刀。這些事務(wù)包括招標(biāo)過(guò)程、金融監(jiān)管、數(shù)據(jù)保護(hù)規(guī)則以及知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)法規(guī)。從澳大利亞到日本，反對(duì)這一點(diǎn)的國(guó)家都認(rèn)為，此舉并非體現(xiàn)了美國(guó)的善意，而是為它干涉從藥品定價(jià)到香煙廣告的一切事務(wù)開出了許可證。
The other reason for shutting out China is also questionable. The hope is that Beijing, slighted by its exclusion, may be goaded into reforming its economy so it can join at a later stage. Some in Beijing would indeed like to call Washington’s bluff by seeking TPP membership. At least theoretically, China is already moving in a direction that might be conducive to that aim by allowing a greater role for market forces.
另一個(gè)排除中國(guó)的理由也值得質(zhì)疑。這個(gè)理由是，希望中國(guó)在感受到被排除的輕慢后，能夠發(fā)奮改革經(jīng)濟(jì)，以便以后能夠加入。北京方面有些人確實(shí)想要通過(guò)謀求加入TPP來(lái)戳穿華盛頓的假話。至少在理論上，中國(guó)允許市場(chǎng)發(fā)揮更大作用，已經(jīng)在朝著可能有利于它加入TPP的方面前進(jìn)。
Yet it is folly to imagine it will be induced to move more quickly to obtain membership of a club to which it has only the most grudging of invitations. More, Beijing is supporting alternative regional trade initiatives, including the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. Pointedly, that is a club to which the US is not invited.
然而，對(duì)于一個(gè)最不歡迎中國(guó)的俱樂部，想象中國(guó)有動(dòng)力加快腳步爭(zhēng)取成為它的一員是愚蠢的。此外，北京還在支持其他區(qū)域性貿(mào)易協(xié)定，包括“區(qū)域全面經(jīng)濟(jì)伙伴關(guān)系協(xié)定”(Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership)。顯然，這個(gè)協(xié)定是美國(guó)沒有獲邀的。
There is a further hitch. If the TPP is seen in much of Asia as designed for the benefit of US corporations, in the US itself it is regarded with equal suspicion. Most members of President Barack Obama’s Democratic party are wary of trade deals, which they blame for hollowing out manufacturing jobs and suppressing middle-class wages. Consumer groups say the TPP will expose Americans to all sorts of evils from dodgy Vietnamese seafood to slack financial regulation.
還有一個(gè)難題。亞洲大部分國(guó)家都認(rèn)為，TPP是為了美國(guó)企業(yè)的利益而設(shè)計(jì)的，而美國(guó)本身對(duì)這個(gè)協(xié)定也有同樣強(qiáng)烈的懷疑。巴拉克•奧巴馬(Barack Obama)總統(tǒng)所屬的民主黨大部分人都對(duì)貿(mào)易協(xié)定懷有戒心，他們譴責(zé)貿(mào)易協(xié)定是導(dǎo)致制造業(yè)就業(yè)崗位流向海外、中產(chǎn)階級(jí)工資停滯不前的原因。消費(fèi)者團(tuán)體表示，TPP會(huì)讓美國(guó)人面臨各種危險(xiǎn)，從劣質(zhì)越南海鮮、到不夠嚴(yán)格的金融監(jiān)管。
The TPP is nonetheless regarded as one of Mr Obama’s best shots at a foreign policy legacy. If so, he could have sold it better to his own party. He remains uncomfortably reliant on the Republican majority in Congress to grant him the fast-track authority he needs to push it over the line.
然而，TPP仍被認(rèn)為可能成為奧巴馬外交政策遺產(chǎn)中最棒的成就之一。如果真是這樣的話，他本可以讓所在的民主黨更好地為自己買賬。他仍然要尷尬地依賴國(guó)會(huì)中的共和黨多數(shù)派給予他推進(jìn)TPP所需要的“快車道”談判授權(quán)。
While most Republicans support a deal in the name of free trade, some on the Tea Party end of the spectrum are opposed. Others may deny Mr Obama the authority he needs out of spite. Ian Bremmer, president of the Eurasia Group consultancy, says the vote on trade promotion authority will be “razor thin”, though he believes ultimately Mr Obama will prevail.
雖然大多數(shù)共和黨人支持一項(xiàng)以自由貿(mào)易為名義的協(xié)議，但一些極端的茶黨人士對(duì)此表示反對(duì)。還有人可能出于解恨的目的拒絕給予奧巴馬授權(quán)。咨詢公司歐亞集團(tuán)(Eurasia Group)總裁伊恩•布雷默(Ian Bremmer)說(shuō)，盡管他相信奧巴馬在關(guān)于“貿(mào)易促進(jìn)授權(quán)”(trade promotion authority)的表決中最終會(huì)取勝，但也只是“險(xiǎn)勝”。
Even if TPP is finally concluded, the chances are it will be too watered down to satisfy trade purists and too intrusive to please Washington’s Pacific partners. For Beijing, fresh from its triumph over the infrastructure bank, the whole spectacle must be quite amusing.
即使TPP最終締結(jié)完成，很大的可能性是，它將被削弱至無(wú)法滿足貿(mào)易純粹主義者，同時(shí)又太具有侵入性而無(wú)法使美國(guó)的太平洋合作伙伴們高興。在剛剛?cè)〉脕喭缎袆倮闹袊?guó)看來(lái)，整個(gè)場(chǎng)面一定相當(dāng)有趣。
In the sparring between China and the US over leadership in Asia, Beijing recently landed a tidy, if almost accidental, punch. Washington’s attempt to lead a boycott of the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank ended in farce after Britain broke ranks and other nations from Germany to South Korea fell over themselves to join.
在中美這場(chǎng)對(duì)亞洲領(lǐng)導(dǎo)權(quán)的爭(zhēng)奪戰(zhàn)中，北京最近打出了漂亮的一拳，盡管那一拳贏得近乎意外。華盛頓原本企圖帶頭抵制中國(guó)牽頭籌建的亞洲基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施投資銀行（Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank，簡(jiǎn)稱亞投行），然而在英國(guó)打亂了隊(duì)形、從德國(guó)到韓國(guó)的其他國(guó)家也爭(zhēng)相加入之后，美國(guó)的企圖最終淪為笑柄。
If round one was a defeat for America, round two hangs in the balance. Washington is trying to convince 11 Pacific nations to join a “next generation” trade agreement called the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Billed as the most important trade initiative since the collapse of the 2001 launch of the World Trade Organisation’s Doha round, it would bind two of the biggest economies — the US and Japan — into a bloc covering 40 per cent of global output. Supporters say it would also reaffirm US commitment to the region at a time when China’s economic pull is growing.
如果說(shuō)美國(guó)在雙方的第一輪較量中落敗，第二輪雙方則勢(shì)均力敵。華盛頓正努力說(shuō)服11個(gè)太平洋沿岸國(guó)家加入所謂《跨太平洋伙伴關(guān)系協(xié)定》（Trans-Pacific Partnership，簡(jiǎn)稱TPP）的“新一代”貿(mào)易協(xié)定。TPP被宣揚(yáng)為世貿(mào)組織(WTO)多哈回合談判（啟動(dòng)于2001年）泡湯以來(lái)最重要的貿(mào)易協(xié)定，將把該地區(qū)兩個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)體——美國(guó)和日本——納入同一個(gè)占全球產(chǎn)出40%的貿(mào)易區(qū)。支持者表示，在中國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)吸引力日益上升之際，TPP還能再次確認(rèn)美國(guó)對(duì)該地區(qū)的承諾沒有動(dòng)搖。
The stakes are high. If the TPP disappoints — or worse still, if it is not concluded at all — it will be another embarrassing setback for US regional diplomacy. The omens are mixed at best.
TPP對(duì)美國(guó)事關(guān)重大。如果TPP表現(xiàn)令人失望甚至根本沒有達(dá)成，那么將標(biāo)志著美國(guó)地區(qū)外交遭遇又一個(gè)令人難堪的挫折。目前的種種兆頭至多算是好壞摻半。
The TPP excludes China. That is quite an omission. It is also precisely the point. The region’s most important trading nation has not been invited to join on the grounds that its economy is too centrally planned and too rigged to be part of such a highfalutin arrangement. Yet in a peculiar display of diplomatic contortion, Vietnam — a country whose economy is as centrally planned and as rigged as the best of them — is somehow considered fit for entry.
TPP排除了中國(guó)。這是個(gè)挺大的遺漏，也正是有意為之。該地區(qū)最重要的貿(mào)易國(guó)未獲邀加入，理由是其經(jīng)濟(jì)太多地由中央政府計(jì)劃、受操縱太嚴(yán)重，因而不夠格參加這么上檔次的協(xié)定。然而，不知為什么，經(jīng)濟(jì)由中央政府計(jì)劃和受操縱程度絲毫不亞于中國(guó)的越南卻被認(rèn)為適合加入，離奇地顯示出美國(guó)在外交上的扭曲。
The exclusion of China serves twin objectives. Neither bears close scrutiny. The TPP is a “trade pivot” to Asia; the commercial equivalent of Washington’s commitment to remain militarily engaged in the region. Yet it is just as likely to annoy allies as reassure them.
排除中國(guó)能滿足兩個(gè)目的，但都經(jīng)不起推敲。TPP是美國(guó)“重返亞洲”戰(zhàn)略的貿(mào)易版本，是華盛頓承諾在亞洲保持軍事威力的商業(yè)版本。然而，這個(gè)協(xié)定惹惱盟友與讓他們放心的可能性一樣大。
Almost all have expressed concern that some provisions intrude into their internal affairs. That is, indeed, the point of the TPP, which goes beyond tariff reduction to deal with “behind the border” issues thought to impede trade and investment. These include tendering processes, financial regulations, data protection rules and intellectual property laws. Opponents from Australia to Japan see it not as an act of US benevolence but rather as a charter for meddling in everything from pharmaceutical pricing to cigarette advertising.
幾乎所有國(guó)家都對(duì)一些條款干涉他們的內(nèi)政表達(dá)了擔(dān)心。而這又確實(shí)是TPP的意義所在，它超越了降關(guān)稅，想要拿被認(rèn)為阻礙貿(mào)易和投資的“國(guó)內(nèi)”事務(wù)開刀。這些事務(wù)包括招標(biāo)過(guò)程、金融監(jiān)管、數(shù)據(jù)保護(hù)規(guī)則以及知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)法規(guī)。從澳大利亞到日本，反對(duì)這一點(diǎn)的國(guó)家都認(rèn)為，此舉并非體現(xiàn)了美國(guó)的善意，而是為它干涉從藥品定價(jià)到香煙廣告的一切事務(wù)開出了許可證。
The other reason for shutting out China is also questionable. The hope is that Beijing, slighted by its exclusion, may be goaded into reforming its economy so it can join at a later stage. Some in Beijing would indeed like to call Washington’s bluff by seeking TPP membership. At least theoretically, China is already moving in a direction that might be conducive to that aim by allowing a greater role for market forces.
另一個(gè)排除中國(guó)的理由也值得質(zhì)疑。這個(gè)理由是，希望中國(guó)在感受到被排除的輕慢后，能夠發(fā)奮改革經(jīng)濟(jì)，以便以后能夠加入。北京方面有些人確實(shí)想要通過(guò)謀求加入TPP來(lái)戳穿華盛頓的假話。至少在理論上，中國(guó)允許市場(chǎng)發(fā)揮更大作用，已經(jīng)在朝著可能有利于它加入TPP的方面前進(jìn)。
Yet it is folly to imagine it will be induced to move more quickly to obtain membership of a club to which it has only the most grudging of invitations. More, Beijing is supporting alternative regional trade initiatives, including the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. Pointedly, that is a club to which the US is not invited.
然而，對(duì)于一個(gè)最不歡迎中國(guó)的俱樂部，想象中國(guó)有動(dòng)力加快腳步爭(zhēng)取成為它的一員是愚蠢的。此外，北京還在支持其他區(qū)域性貿(mào)易協(xié)定，包括“區(qū)域全面經(jīng)濟(jì)伙伴關(guān)系協(xié)定”(Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership)。顯然，這個(gè)協(xié)定是美國(guó)沒有獲邀的。
There is a further hitch. If the TPP is seen in much of Asia as designed for the benefit of US corporations, in the US itself it is regarded with equal suspicion. Most members of President Barack Obama’s Democratic party are wary of trade deals, which they blame for hollowing out manufacturing jobs and suppressing middle-class wages. Consumer groups say the TPP will expose Americans to all sorts of evils from dodgy Vietnamese seafood to slack financial regulation.
還有一個(gè)難題。亞洲大部分國(guó)家都認(rèn)為，TPP是為了美國(guó)企業(yè)的利益而設(shè)計(jì)的，而美國(guó)本身對(duì)這個(gè)協(xié)定也有同樣強(qiáng)烈的懷疑。巴拉克•奧巴馬(Barack Obama)總統(tǒng)所屬的民主黨大部分人都對(duì)貿(mào)易協(xié)定懷有戒心，他們譴責(zé)貿(mào)易協(xié)定是導(dǎo)致制造業(yè)就業(yè)崗位流向海外、中產(chǎn)階級(jí)工資停滯不前的原因。消費(fèi)者團(tuán)體表示，TPP會(huì)讓美國(guó)人面臨各種危險(xiǎn)，從劣質(zhì)越南海鮮、到不夠嚴(yán)格的金融監(jiān)管。
The TPP is nonetheless regarded as one of Mr Obama’s best shots at a foreign policy legacy. If so, he could have sold it better to his own party. He remains uncomfortably reliant on the Republican majority in Congress to grant him the fast-track authority he needs to push it over the line.
然而，TPP仍被認(rèn)為可能成為奧巴馬外交政策遺產(chǎn)中最棒的成就之一。如果真是這樣的話，他本可以讓所在的民主黨更好地為自己買賬。他仍然要尷尬地依賴國(guó)會(huì)中的共和黨多數(shù)派給予他推進(jìn)TPP所需要的“快車道”談判授權(quán)。
While most Republicans support a deal in the name of free trade, some on the Tea Party end of the spectrum are opposed. Others may deny Mr Obama the authority he needs out of spite. Ian Bremmer, president of the Eurasia Group consultancy, says the vote on trade promotion authority will be “razor thin”, though he believes ultimately Mr Obama will prevail.
雖然大多數(shù)共和黨人支持一項(xiàng)以自由貿(mào)易為名義的協(xié)議，但一些極端的茶黨人士對(duì)此表示反對(duì)。還有人可能出于解恨的目的拒絕給予奧巴馬授權(quán)。咨詢公司歐亞集團(tuán)(Eurasia Group)總裁伊恩•布雷默(Ian Bremmer)說(shuō)，盡管他相信奧巴馬在關(guān)于“貿(mào)易促進(jìn)授權(quán)”(trade promotion authority)的表決中最終會(huì)取勝，但也只是“險(xiǎn)勝”。
Even if TPP is finally concluded, the chances are it will be too watered down to satisfy trade purists and too intrusive to please Washington’s Pacific partners. For Beijing, fresh from its triumph over the infrastructure bank, the whole spectacle must be quite amusing.
即使TPP最終締結(jié)完成，很大的可能性是，它將被削弱至無(wú)法滿足貿(mào)易純粹主義者，同時(shí)又太具有侵入性而無(wú)法使美國(guó)的太平洋合作伙伴們高興。在剛剛?cè)〉脕喭缎袆倮闹袊?guó)看來(lái)，整個(gè)場(chǎng)面一定相當(dāng)有趣。