★英語(yǔ)聽(tīng)力頻道為大家整理的英語(yǔ)聽(tīng)力材料：伊朗革命 等待真主。更多閱讀請(qǐng)查看本站英語(yǔ)聽(tīng)力頻道。
Iran's revolution 伊朗革命
Waiting for God
等待真主
Debunking the myths that sustained Ayatollah Khomeini's republic
揭示領(lǐng)袖霍梅尼共和國(guó)之謎
Revolutionary Iran: A History of the Islamic Republic. By Michael Axworthy.
《伊朗革命：伊朗共和國(guó)的歷史》，作者：Michael Axworthy
“SLEEP easily, Cyrus, for we are awake,” assured Iran's last shah, Muhammad-Reza Pahlavi, speaking at the tomb of his imperial ancestor in 1971. This staged event helped forge the myth that the Pahlavis were an adored monarchy stretching back millennia to the Achaemenid empire, a claim to which the shah clung dearly. Yet in less than a decade his embittered people had delivered his throne into the hands of an obscure Shia cleric, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. James Buchan's elegant “Days of God”, which came out last November, focused on how all this came to pass. Now Michael Axworthy, a former diplomat and director of the Centre for Persian and Iranian Studies at Exeter University, goes over much of the same ground and explains how the Islamic republic has survived.
“Cyrus，有我們?cè)冢銈儼残乃?”，1971年伊朗最后一位國(guó)王Muhammad-Reza Pahlavi在其先王墓前信心十足。從千年前緊握王權(quán)的阿契美尼德王朝直到巴列維王朝，一直深受愛(ài)戴，簡(jiǎn)直是一個(gè)謎。盡管近10年來(lái)飽受疾苦的人民把其王朝政權(quán)交與一位不甚知名的牧師Ruhollah Khomeini之手，去年11月出版的James Buchan的《真主之日》簡(jiǎn)潔而又著重解釋了這一形成原因。前外交官兼埃克塞特大學(xué)伊朗研究中心負(fù)責(zé)人Michael Axworthy在書(shū)中探討了這一地區(qū)，同時(shí)解釋了伊朗政權(quán)幸存下來(lái)的原因。
The shah's gaudy fete at Persepolis, not far from Cyrus's tomb, held to celebrate the monarchy's 2,500th birthday, epitomised a half-century of montazh: a succession of flashy buildings and self-congratulatory statues which helped to conceal the dislocations of a society on fast-forward. Construction faltered for lack of cement; many of Iran's ports became clogged with shiploads of imports. The minister of the shah's court, driving through Tehran in his Chrysler Imperial in 1969, noticed dingy side streets with “not an ounce of asphalt”. Lashing out at the grandiose party at Persepolis, Ali Shariati, an Iranian leftist writer, denounced 5,000 years of deprivation and social injustice. Khomeini, then in exile in Iraq, thundered for the first time that Islam was fundamentally opposed to monarchy.
離伊朗王賽勒斯墳?zāi)共贿h(yuǎn)處的波斯波利斯曾舉行了盛大的宴會(huì)慶祝伊朗王朝成立2500周年，通過(guò)畫(huà)面剪輯簡(jiǎn)單回顧了一下伊朗半個(gè)世紀(jì)以來(lái)的歷史：一排排高樓大廈，一座座自我標(biāo)榜的雕像，這些都掩蓋了這個(gè)快速發(fā)展國(guó)家背后的混亂。缺乏混凝土結(jié)構(gòu)的建筑搖搖欲墜，船舶上的進(jìn)口商品使得港口混亂不堪。1969年伊朗王朝法官乘坐克萊斯勒帝國(guó)旗艦名車(chē)前往德黑蘭(Tehran)，就注意到街道兩邊混亂不堪，沒(méi)有一條柏油路。伊朗左翼作家Ali Shariati猛烈抨擊波斯波利斯的奢華盛會(huì)，指責(zé)5000年的政權(quán)廢止和社會(huì)的不公。當(dāng)時(shí)被流放伊拉克的霍梅尼大聲疾呼伊朗人民是堅(jiān)決反對(duì)皇權(quán)的。
A hodgepodge of Marxists and other leftists allied themselves at first to the religious fundamentalists in common cause against the shah, inspiring Iranian students, in particular, to rise up against his rule. Within a few years, though, the left had lost out to Shia Islamic political groups that were, Mr Axworthy writes, “more flexible, more charismatic, more in tune with Iranian realities and less hidebound”. Like Mr Buchan, Mr Axworthy has mined newly opened archives to good effect. He lays bare the failure of Western governments to keep abreast of fast-changing events. One British dispatch saw “no threat to basic stability” in late 1977; another asked whether Iranians were still “the epitome of idleness”. The Iranian hostage-takers were astounded to find that, of the four CIA officers in the American embassy in Tehran, none could speak Persian.
那些信奉傳統(tǒng)基督教的馬克思主義者和左派人士首次聯(lián)合起來(lái)，尤其還煽動(dòng)學(xué)生共同抵抗伊朗王的統(tǒng)治。Axworthy寫(xiě)到，在近幾年里，脫離什葉派團(tuán)體的左翼人士“更加靈活，有感召力，與時(shí)俱進(jìn)與伊朗現(xiàn)實(shí)相結(jié)合”。與Mr Buchan一樣，他也恰到好處地引用了最近公開(kāi)的史料，還指出了西方政府在獲取重大事件方面的不足，例如1977年底英國(guó)報(bào)道認(rèn)為“不會(huì)威脅到基本穩(wěn)定”，另一西方媒體認(rèn)為伊朗是不是在虛張聲勢(shì)。伊朗人質(zhì)劫持者驚奇地發(fā)現(xiàn)美國(guó)駐德黑蘭大使館的4名CIA人員不會(huì)說(shuō)波斯語(yǔ)。
Balancing scholarly precision with narrative flair, Mr Axworthy depicts an Islamic movement that exploited and distorted traditional Shia beliefs in order to seize and hold on to power. Cycles of protest and mourning, 40 days long and timed to coincide with Shia holy days—Mr Buchan's “days of God”—were like “a great revolutionary lung”, inhaling indignation, exhaling more demonstrations. Khomeini's theory of divine rule, velayat-e faqih, still unknown to most in 1979, represented a complete innovation in Shia religious thinking. The Shia Muslim tradition believes the Mahdi, its messiah, will return, but its adherents had not previously considered putting themselves in power.
為了平衡學(xué)術(shù)的準(zhǔn)確性和敘述的技巧，Axworthy曲解了傳統(tǒng)的什葉派信仰來(lái)描述伊朗運(yùn)動(dòng)。在長(zhǎng)達(dá)40天的什葉圣日期間，伊朗人民的不斷*和哀悼就像“一個(gè)巨大的革命之肺”，吸入怨恨，吐出更多的**。代表什葉派精神全面革新的霍梅尼神權(quán)統(tǒng)治—法吉赫的監(jiān)護(hù)在1979年還不為大多數(shù)人所知。什葉派穆斯林堅(jiān)信他們的救世主會(huì)降臨，但是其擁蹙之前并沒(méi)有讓他們掌權(quán)。
Revolutionary jargon justified purges and trials (the regime executed 2,946 people in 1981 alone, according to Amnesty International). Those who survived bombs set off by the radical left and other secularists were glorified as shaheed-e zendeh, or living martyrs. Fundamentalist rhetoric also fed popular fervour for an eight-year war against Iraq, framing the struggle as a continuation of the ancient fight between the evil caliph Yazid and the martyred Hussein, who was killed at the battle of Karbala in 680. Military offensives were named after that sacred Shia site; the last big assault, Karbala-5, fought around Fish Lake, a huge artificial basin on Iraqi defence lines, was also the most wretchedly wasteful. Around 20,000 Iranians are believed to have died.
假借革命之意使得審查肅反合理化。那些幸免于左派引發(fā)的戰(zhàn)亂和非宗教信仰者被歌頌為shaheed-e zendeh，英雄。正統(tǒng)基督主義輿論也支持長(zhǎng)達(dá)八年的兩伊戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)，仿佛古代殘暴領(lǐng)袖Yazid和烈士Hussein戰(zhàn)斗的續(xù)曲?！翱柊屠?號(hào)”軍事行動(dòng)以什葉圣城—卡爾巴拉命名，在伊拉克防線(xiàn)人工湖—魚(yú)湖附近展開(kāi)戰(zhàn)斗，戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)極其殘酷，據(jù)稱(chēng)有20000伊朗人死亡。
Mr Axworthy does the best job so far of describing the Iran-Iraq war. He draws on first-hand accounts of pilots, lieutenants and militia, and challenges the accepted notion that the Iranian air force was inept. The attacks were carried out according to intricate plans drafted under the shah, whose highly trained pilots were released from prison. He also breaks from Mr Buchan's thesis that Khomeini was bent on exporting Islamic government to Iraq, arguing instead that he saw the conflict as a just war to fend off a real threat. Drawing on Persian eyewitness accounts, he conjures up the chaos: the scramble for masks in nerve-gas attacks; paper-thin lungs blistered by mustard gas; fish, rotting and floating belly-up in an Iraqi lake brimming with barbed wire, electrodes and mines, “adding a new stench to the battlefield”.
Axworthy對(duì)兩伊戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)做了迄今為止的描述，他引用了飛行員，軍官和民兵組織的第一手描述，對(duì)伊朗空軍實(shí)力孱弱這一根深蒂固的觀(guān)念提出了質(zhì)疑，那些從監(jiān)獄里釋放出來(lái)在伊朗王精細(xì)的指揮下襲擊敵人的飛行員，都是訓(xùn)練素質(zhì)很高的。對(duì)Buchan的關(guān)于霍梅尼想把伊朗政府轉(zhuǎn)移至伊拉克的論據(jù)Axworthy也提出了異議，他認(rèn)為此次戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)只是為了避免真正的威脅。根據(jù)伊朗目擊者描述，他在書(shū)中寫(xiě)到這場(chǎng)混亂：大家爭(zhēng)搶防毒面具，肺部受到芥子氣的感染而起水泡變薄，伊拉克湖里的腐魚(yú)漫過(guò)鐵絲電網(wǎng)，礦井，使得“戰(zhàn)場(chǎng)上臭氣熏天”。
Yet the repressive Islamic republic of today was not at all inevitable. Reformist Iranian presidents succeeded one another, from Mehdi Bazargan and Abolhassan Bani-Sadr in 1980 to Muhammad Khatami in 1997. Evidence shows that Khomeini genuinely wanted to work with progressive governments—not least because he needed their credibility to rule. Mr Axworthy paints a nuanced picture of the ayatollah, who let army generals lead the war and his assembly of experts end it, although the ceasefire was “more deadly to than poison”.
然而今天專(zhuān)制的伊朗共和國(guó)并不都是不可避免的，伊朗改革派領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人一個(gè)接一個(gè)，從1980年的Mehdi Bazargan ，Abolhassan Bani-Sadr到1997年的Muhammad Khatami，這些都表明霍梅尼想與改革政府合作，而不只是因?yàn)樗枰麄兊男湃蝸?lái)治理國(guó)家。Axworthy 對(duì)伊斯蘭宗教領(lǐng)袖也做了細(xì)致描述，其讓軍隊(duì)將領(lǐng)和集結(jié)的專(zhuān)家結(jié)束了這場(chǎng)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)，盡管此次?；饏f(xié)議“對(duì)于他而言比毒藥更致命”。
Mr Axworthy's analytical approach helps him demystify a revolutionary regime that has needed to feed off myths. He revisits, and convincingly reinterprets, defining moments of the Islamic republic. One is Khomeini's infamous response to a journalist as he returned to Tehran in February 1979, to cheering crowds. He felt “nothing”, he said—not because of a cold indifference to the Iranian people, but because he believed himself to be only a vehicle for the mind of God on Earth. The strength of Mr Buchan's rendering of Iran's story lies in its detail and its delicious storytelling; Mr Axworthy's, in his scholarly rigour and first-class analysis. Anyone interested in this most complex of revolutions would do well to read both.
Axworthy的分析揭開(kāi)了革命政黨需要依靠宗教的神秘面紗，他重新清楚而又令人信服地解釋了伊朗共和國(guó)的種種事件，例如1979年2月霍梅尼重返德黑蘭鼓舞人民的那次臭名昭著的答記者問(wèn)，霍梅尼感覺(jué)這沒(méi)有什么，并不是他對(duì)伊朗人民冷漠，而是因?yàn)樗麍?jiān)信她就是上帝意志的使者。Buchan著重于故事的趣味性和細(xì)節(jié)，而Axworthy則側(cè)重于學(xué)術(shù)的嚴(yán)謹(jǐn)和精湛的分析技巧。如果對(duì)這段復(fù)雜的革命史感興趣，不妨都拿來(lái)讀一讀。
Iran's revolution 伊朗革命
Waiting for God
等待真主
Debunking the myths that sustained Ayatollah Khomeini's republic
揭示領(lǐng)袖霍梅尼共和國(guó)之謎
Revolutionary Iran: A History of the Islamic Republic. By Michael Axworthy.
《伊朗革命：伊朗共和國(guó)的歷史》，作者：Michael Axworthy
“SLEEP easily, Cyrus, for we are awake,” assured Iran's last shah, Muhammad-Reza Pahlavi, speaking at the tomb of his imperial ancestor in 1971. This staged event helped forge the myth that the Pahlavis were an adored monarchy stretching back millennia to the Achaemenid empire, a claim to which the shah clung dearly. Yet in less than a decade his embittered people had delivered his throne into the hands of an obscure Shia cleric, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. James Buchan's elegant “Days of God”, which came out last November, focused on how all this came to pass. Now Michael Axworthy, a former diplomat and director of the Centre for Persian and Iranian Studies at Exeter University, goes over much of the same ground and explains how the Islamic republic has survived.
“Cyrus，有我們?cè)冢銈儼残乃?”，1971年伊朗最后一位國(guó)王Muhammad-Reza Pahlavi在其先王墓前信心十足。從千年前緊握王權(quán)的阿契美尼德王朝直到巴列維王朝，一直深受愛(ài)戴，簡(jiǎn)直是一個(gè)謎。盡管近10年來(lái)飽受疾苦的人民把其王朝政權(quán)交與一位不甚知名的牧師Ruhollah Khomeini之手，去年11月出版的James Buchan的《真主之日》簡(jiǎn)潔而又著重解釋了這一形成原因。前外交官兼埃克塞特大學(xué)伊朗研究中心負(fù)責(zé)人Michael Axworthy在書(shū)中探討了這一地區(qū)，同時(shí)解釋了伊朗政權(quán)幸存下來(lái)的原因。
The shah's gaudy fete at Persepolis, not far from Cyrus's tomb, held to celebrate the monarchy's 2,500th birthday, epitomised a half-century of montazh: a succession of flashy buildings and self-congratulatory statues which helped to conceal the dislocations of a society on fast-forward. Construction faltered for lack of cement; many of Iran's ports became clogged with shiploads of imports. The minister of the shah's court, driving through Tehran in his Chrysler Imperial in 1969, noticed dingy side streets with “not an ounce of asphalt”. Lashing out at the grandiose party at Persepolis, Ali Shariati, an Iranian leftist writer, denounced 5,000 years of deprivation and social injustice. Khomeini, then in exile in Iraq, thundered for the first time that Islam was fundamentally opposed to monarchy.
離伊朗王賽勒斯墳?zāi)共贿h(yuǎn)處的波斯波利斯曾舉行了盛大的宴會(huì)慶祝伊朗王朝成立2500周年，通過(guò)畫(huà)面剪輯簡(jiǎn)單回顧了一下伊朗半個(gè)世紀(jì)以來(lái)的歷史：一排排高樓大廈，一座座自我標(biāo)榜的雕像，這些都掩蓋了這個(gè)快速發(fā)展國(guó)家背后的混亂。缺乏混凝土結(jié)構(gòu)的建筑搖搖欲墜，船舶上的進(jìn)口商品使得港口混亂不堪。1969年伊朗王朝法官乘坐克萊斯勒帝國(guó)旗艦名車(chē)前往德黑蘭(Tehran)，就注意到街道兩邊混亂不堪，沒(méi)有一條柏油路。伊朗左翼作家Ali Shariati猛烈抨擊波斯波利斯的奢華盛會(huì)，指責(zé)5000年的政權(quán)廢止和社會(huì)的不公。當(dāng)時(shí)被流放伊拉克的霍梅尼大聲疾呼伊朗人民是堅(jiān)決反對(duì)皇權(quán)的。
A hodgepodge of Marxists and other leftists allied themselves at first to the religious fundamentalists in common cause against the shah, inspiring Iranian students, in particular, to rise up against his rule. Within a few years, though, the left had lost out to Shia Islamic political groups that were, Mr Axworthy writes, “more flexible, more charismatic, more in tune with Iranian realities and less hidebound”. Like Mr Buchan, Mr Axworthy has mined newly opened archives to good effect. He lays bare the failure of Western governments to keep abreast of fast-changing events. One British dispatch saw “no threat to basic stability” in late 1977; another asked whether Iranians were still “the epitome of idleness”. The Iranian hostage-takers were astounded to find that, of the four CIA officers in the American embassy in Tehran, none could speak Persian.
那些信奉傳統(tǒng)基督教的馬克思主義者和左派人士首次聯(lián)合起來(lái)，尤其還煽動(dòng)學(xué)生共同抵抗伊朗王的統(tǒng)治。Axworthy寫(xiě)到，在近幾年里，脫離什葉派團(tuán)體的左翼人士“更加靈活，有感召力，與時(shí)俱進(jìn)與伊朗現(xiàn)實(shí)相結(jié)合”。與Mr Buchan一樣，他也恰到好處地引用了最近公開(kāi)的史料，還指出了西方政府在獲取重大事件方面的不足，例如1977年底英國(guó)報(bào)道認(rèn)為“不會(huì)威脅到基本穩(wěn)定”，另一西方媒體認(rèn)為伊朗是不是在虛張聲勢(shì)。伊朗人質(zhì)劫持者驚奇地發(fā)現(xiàn)美國(guó)駐德黑蘭大使館的4名CIA人員不會(huì)說(shuō)波斯語(yǔ)。
Balancing scholarly precision with narrative flair, Mr Axworthy depicts an Islamic movement that exploited and distorted traditional Shia beliefs in order to seize and hold on to power. Cycles of protest and mourning, 40 days long and timed to coincide with Shia holy days—Mr Buchan's “days of God”—were like “a great revolutionary lung”, inhaling indignation, exhaling more demonstrations. Khomeini's theory of divine rule, velayat-e faqih, still unknown to most in 1979, represented a complete innovation in Shia religious thinking. The Shia Muslim tradition believes the Mahdi, its messiah, will return, but its adherents had not previously considered putting themselves in power.
為了平衡學(xué)術(shù)的準(zhǔn)確性和敘述的技巧，Axworthy曲解了傳統(tǒng)的什葉派信仰來(lái)描述伊朗運(yùn)動(dòng)。在長(zhǎng)達(dá)40天的什葉圣日期間，伊朗人民的不斷*和哀悼就像“一個(gè)巨大的革命之肺”，吸入怨恨，吐出更多的**。代表什葉派精神全面革新的霍梅尼神權(quán)統(tǒng)治—法吉赫的監(jiān)護(hù)在1979年還不為大多數(shù)人所知。什葉派穆斯林堅(jiān)信他們的救世主會(huì)降臨，但是其擁蹙之前并沒(méi)有讓他們掌權(quán)。
Revolutionary jargon justified purges and trials (the regime executed 2,946 people in 1981 alone, according to Amnesty International). Those who survived bombs set off by the radical left and other secularists were glorified as shaheed-e zendeh, or living martyrs. Fundamentalist rhetoric also fed popular fervour for an eight-year war against Iraq, framing the struggle as a continuation of the ancient fight between the evil caliph Yazid and the martyred Hussein, who was killed at the battle of Karbala in 680. Military offensives were named after that sacred Shia site; the last big assault, Karbala-5, fought around Fish Lake, a huge artificial basin on Iraqi defence lines, was also the most wretchedly wasteful. Around 20,000 Iranians are believed to have died.
假借革命之意使得審查肅反合理化。那些幸免于左派引發(fā)的戰(zhàn)亂和非宗教信仰者被歌頌為shaheed-e zendeh，英雄。正統(tǒng)基督主義輿論也支持長(zhǎng)達(dá)八年的兩伊戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)，仿佛古代殘暴領(lǐng)袖Yazid和烈士Hussein戰(zhàn)斗的續(xù)曲?！翱柊屠?號(hào)”軍事行動(dòng)以什葉圣城—卡爾巴拉命名，在伊拉克防線(xiàn)人工湖—魚(yú)湖附近展開(kāi)戰(zhàn)斗，戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)極其殘酷，據(jù)稱(chēng)有20000伊朗人死亡。
Mr Axworthy does the best job so far of describing the Iran-Iraq war. He draws on first-hand accounts of pilots, lieutenants and militia, and challenges the accepted notion that the Iranian air force was inept. The attacks were carried out according to intricate plans drafted under the shah, whose highly trained pilots were released from prison. He also breaks from Mr Buchan's thesis that Khomeini was bent on exporting Islamic government to Iraq, arguing instead that he saw the conflict as a just war to fend off a real threat. Drawing on Persian eyewitness accounts, he conjures up the chaos: the scramble for masks in nerve-gas attacks; paper-thin lungs blistered by mustard gas; fish, rotting and floating belly-up in an Iraqi lake brimming with barbed wire, electrodes and mines, “adding a new stench to the battlefield”.
Axworthy對(duì)兩伊戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)做了迄今為止的描述，他引用了飛行員，軍官和民兵組織的第一手描述，對(duì)伊朗空軍實(shí)力孱弱這一根深蒂固的觀(guān)念提出了質(zhì)疑，那些從監(jiān)獄里釋放出來(lái)在伊朗王精細(xì)的指揮下襲擊敵人的飛行員，都是訓(xùn)練素質(zhì)很高的。對(duì)Buchan的關(guān)于霍梅尼想把伊朗政府轉(zhuǎn)移至伊拉克的論據(jù)Axworthy也提出了異議，他認(rèn)為此次戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)只是為了避免真正的威脅。根據(jù)伊朗目擊者描述，他在書(shū)中寫(xiě)到這場(chǎng)混亂：大家爭(zhēng)搶防毒面具，肺部受到芥子氣的感染而起水泡變薄，伊拉克湖里的腐魚(yú)漫過(guò)鐵絲電網(wǎng)，礦井，使得“戰(zhàn)場(chǎng)上臭氣熏天”。
Yet the repressive Islamic republic of today was not at all inevitable. Reformist Iranian presidents succeeded one another, from Mehdi Bazargan and Abolhassan Bani-Sadr in 1980 to Muhammad Khatami in 1997. Evidence shows that Khomeini genuinely wanted to work with progressive governments—not least because he needed their credibility to rule. Mr Axworthy paints a nuanced picture of the ayatollah, who let army generals lead the war and his assembly of experts end it, although the ceasefire was “more deadly to than poison”.
然而今天專(zhuān)制的伊朗共和國(guó)并不都是不可避免的，伊朗改革派領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人一個(gè)接一個(gè)，從1980年的Mehdi Bazargan ，Abolhassan Bani-Sadr到1997年的Muhammad Khatami，這些都表明霍梅尼想與改革政府合作，而不只是因?yàn)樗枰麄兊男湃蝸?lái)治理國(guó)家。Axworthy 對(duì)伊斯蘭宗教領(lǐng)袖也做了細(xì)致描述，其讓軍隊(duì)將領(lǐng)和集結(jié)的專(zhuān)家結(jié)束了這場(chǎng)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)，盡管此次?；饏f(xié)議“對(duì)于他而言比毒藥更致命”。
Mr Axworthy's analytical approach helps him demystify a revolutionary regime that has needed to feed off myths. He revisits, and convincingly reinterprets, defining moments of the Islamic republic. One is Khomeini's infamous response to a journalist as he returned to Tehran in February 1979, to cheering crowds. He felt “nothing”, he said—not because of a cold indifference to the Iranian people, but because he believed himself to be only a vehicle for the mind of God on Earth. The strength of Mr Buchan's rendering of Iran's story lies in its detail and its delicious storytelling; Mr Axworthy's, in his scholarly rigour and first-class analysis. Anyone interested in this most complex of revolutions would do well to read both.
Axworthy的分析揭開(kāi)了革命政黨需要依靠宗教的神秘面紗，他重新清楚而又令人信服地解釋了伊朗共和國(guó)的種種事件，例如1979年2月霍梅尼重返德黑蘭鼓舞人民的那次臭名昭著的答記者問(wèn)，霍梅尼感覺(jué)這沒(méi)有什么，并不是他對(duì)伊朗人民冷漠，而是因?yàn)樗麍?jiān)信她就是上帝意志的使者。Buchan著重于故事的趣味性和細(xì)節(jié)，而Axworthy則側(cè)重于學(xué)術(shù)的嚴(yán)謹(jǐn)和精湛的分析技巧。如果對(duì)這段復(fù)雜的革命史感興趣，不妨都拿來(lái)讀一讀。