英語(yǔ)資源頻道為大家整理的china daily 雙語(yǔ)新聞：法德合作的五十年之癢，供大家學(xué)習(xí)參考。
The official rationale may have been prudent monetary policy. But coming on the eve of the anniversary of the treaty that cemented postwar reconciliation between France and Germany, last week’s announcement of the Bundesbank’s repatriation of its gold from the Banque de France was a poignant symbol of the fraying of the relationship between the two powers at the heart of the EU.
過(guò)去，審慎的貨幣政策或許是德國(guó)官方的基調(diào)。然而，就在奠定戰(zhàn)后法德和解的條約迎來(lái)周年紀(jì)念日之際，上周德國(guó)央行(Bundesbank)卻宣布計(jì)劃將存放在法國(guó)央行(Banque de France)的黃金運(yùn)回本國(guó)。此舉犀利地折射出歐盟(EU)兩大核心國(guó)家之間關(guān)系的裂痕。
From the eurozone crisis to intervention in Libya and Mali, and the failed merger of EADS and BAE Systems, the differences and tensions between Paris and Berlin are palpable. The fabled Franco-German motor appears no longer to be driving European integration.
從歐元區(qū)危機(jī)到介入利比亞和馬里局勢(shì)，再到歐洲航空防務(wù)與航天集團(tuán)(EADS)與BAE系統(tǒng)公司(BAE Systems)的合并失敗，法德之間的分歧和沖突已經(jīng)十分明顯?！胺ǖ掳l(fā)動(dòng)機(jī)”的神話似乎難以繼續(xù)推動(dòng)歐洲一體化。
It all seems a world away from 50 years ago this week, when Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer signed the Elysée treaty. This was no standard intergovernmental pact. They were creating the conditions for the exercise of joint leadership in shaping Europe’s “ever closer union”. They also hoped to lay the foundations of a common strategic – not merely economic – destiny. Even if the partnership has not sundered, those initial high spirits and lofty aspirations seem long gone.
50年前的本周，夏爾·戴高樂(lè)(Charles de Gaulle)與康拉德·阿登納(Konrad Adenauer)簽署《法德友好合作條約》(Elysée treaty)。與現(xiàn)在的情景相比，這簡(jiǎn)直是恍若隔世。該條約并非標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的政府間條約，但兩國(guó)為合力主導(dǎo)建立歐洲的“更緊密聯(lián)盟”創(chuàng)造了條件，并且憧憬著為共同的戰(zhàn)略前景——不只是經(jīng)濟(jì)前景——奠定基矗不過(guò)，即便合作關(guān)系尚未破裂，最初的意氣風(fēng)發(fā)和雄心壯志似乎也已經(jīng)一去不復(fù)返。
So what went wrong, and what will happen now? One ambition was unrealistic from the start. Under US pressure, the Bundestag ratified the treaty with language that precluded any prospect of fulfilling its strategic goals. No surprise, then, that the recent war in Libya, for instance, was not a Franco-German enterprise. It takes time and patience to nurture a common strategic culture.
出了什么問(wèn)題，現(xiàn)在會(huì)發(fā)生什么？從一開(kāi)始，同一個(gè)目標(biāo)就是不現(xiàn)實(shí)的。在美國(guó)的壓力下，德國(guó)聯(lián)邦議院(Bundestag)最終批準(zhǔn)的條約排除了一切實(shí)現(xiàn)其戰(zhàn)略目標(biāo)的可能性。因此，法德沒(méi)能在某些局面下（如近期利比亞戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)）形成戰(zhàn)略聯(lián)盟便不出意外。培養(yǎng)共同的戰(zhàn)略文化需要時(shí)間和耐心。
Conversely, the attempt to jointly shape the EU integration process was largely successful, and its consequences are embedded in institutions and culture. German-style subsidiarity, whereby powers are devolved to the lowest appropriate level, coexists with French-style technocracy. This success was facilitated, not hindered, by the deep divergences in Adenauer and de Gaulle’s visions for Europe – a federal entity for the former, a collection of nation-states for the latter – as once they or their successors had agreed on what to do, the other countries followed. But this process has lost its impetus as a result of bloc’s enlargement – starting with the UK in 1973 – and the rise of generations of leaders who no longer carry the historical baggage of the founding fathers.
相反，兩國(guó)共同塑造歐盟一體化進(jìn)程的努力則在很大程度上取得了成功，其影響已經(jīng)深入歐盟的機(jī)構(gòu)和文化中。德式的輔助性原則(subsidiarity)——即將權(quán)力盡可能下放到合適的層級(jí)——與法式的技術(shù)官僚政治在歐洲共存。阿登納和戴高樂(lè)對(duì)歐洲的設(shè)想存在嚴(yán)重分歧，前者的設(shè)想是聯(lián)邦實(shí)體，后者的設(shè)想是單一民族國(guó)家的集合。不過(guò)，這種分歧非但沒(méi)有阻礙歐盟的成功，反而是促進(jìn)了歐盟的成功——一旦阿登納和戴高樂(lè)或二人的繼任者商定了行事方針，其他國(guó)家就會(huì)效仿。但隨著1973年英國(guó)加入以來(lái)的歐盟擴(kuò)張，以及不再肩負(fù)奠基者歷史重任的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人上臺(tái)，這一進(jìn)程失去了動(dòng)力。
More importantly, the willingness of Berlin and Paris to overcome their differences – the imperative underpinning the treaty – has dissipated. The initial division of labour between French political and strategic power and German economic and monetary strength ended with the Soviet Union. A reunited Germany rediscovered its national interests, which no longer needed to be systematically set in a European framework implying French agreement.
更重要的是，法德政府克服分歧的意愿（這正是《法德友好合作條約》的基石）卻在消褪。最初的分工局面——法國(guó)拿出政治與戰(zhàn)略力量，德國(guó)拿出經(jīng)濟(jì)和貨幣力量——已經(jīng)隨著蘇聯(lián)的解體而煙消云散。統(tǒng)一后的德國(guó)重新開(kāi)始謀求國(guó)家利益，而它不用再將國(guó)家利益系統(tǒng)性地置于一個(gè)需要法國(guó)點(diǎn)頭同意的歐洲框架之內(nèi)。
France’s diminishing usefulness in Germany’s eyes, and the change in their relative strength, reduced the incentive to plan together. This in turn removed the complicity characterising relations in the 1970s and 1980s under presidents Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and Fran ois Mitterand and chancellors Helmut Schmidt and Helmut Kohl. Having been involved in the Franco-German security and defence dialogue for the past 30 years, I am deeply struck by this loss of intimacy.
法國(guó)在德國(guó)眼里越來(lái)越無(wú)用，兩國(guó)的實(shí)力對(duì)比也在發(fā)生變化，使得兩國(guó)缺乏共同規(guī)劃的動(dòng)力。這反過(guò)來(lái)破壞了兩國(guó)的融洽，而融洽正是20世紀(jì)70年代和80年代瓦萊里·吉斯卡爾·德斯坦(Valéry Giscard d’Estaing)和弗朗索瓦·密特朗(Fran ois Mitterand)總統(tǒng)及赫爾穆特·施密特(Helmut Schmidt)和赫爾穆特·科爾(Helmut Kohl)總理時(shí)期法德關(guān)系的顯著特征。我參與了過(guò)去30年的法德安全和國(guó)防對(duì)話，兩國(guó)如今的疏遠(yuǎn)讓我深感震驚。
Yet if happiness has become impossible, divorce is quite improbable, and for the most banal reasons. Splitting would be costly and is best avoided for the sake of the “children” (the European project). Abandoning the exclusivity of the relationship would force each partner to build ad hoc coalitions for every initiative in an uncongenial, EU-wide context of economic recession and political acrimony. Both countries would pay an enormous price were the euro and the EU to collapse – and, without French-German convergence, such an implosion becomes more likely.
但即使和睦已成奢望，分道揚(yáng)鑣也不太可能發(fā)生，原因則是老生常談。“分手”代價(jià)高昂，為了“孩子”（歐洲一體化）著想應(yīng)該盡量避免。在全歐盟經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退、政治不和的緊張氣氛下，放棄法德之間牢不可破的關(guān)系，將迫使雙方為每項(xiàng)計(jì)劃組建臨時(shí)的聯(lián)盟。如果歐元和歐盟崩潰，兩國(guó)均將付出巨大的代價(jià)；法國(guó)和德國(guó)若不能取得一致，這種崩潰發(fā)生的概率將更高。
Divorce could become an option if the EU suffers game-changing shocks, the most obvious of which would be a catastrophic evolution of the euro crisis.
如果歐盟遭遇*格局的重大打擊，兩國(guó)可能會(huì)選擇分道揚(yáng)鑣。最明顯的一種可能場(chǎng)景，就是歐元區(qū)危機(jī)向?yàn)?zāi)難的方向發(fā)展。
Germany’s institutions and public opinion may not permit a timely response to the political upheaval provoked by economic suffering on Europe’s southern periphery; nor are they likely to accept a decisive move towards a full-blown fiscal transfer union. After the bruising experience of 2005, when it rejected the European constitution in a referendum, France would also find it hard to go for a federal EU.
德國(guó)的制度和輿論不會(huì)允許德國(guó)對(duì)歐洲南部經(jīng)濟(jì)困難引發(fā)的政治動(dòng)蕩做出及時(shí)回應(yīng)，也不太可能接受關(guān)于成立完善的財(cái)政轉(zhuǎn)移聯(lián)盟的決定性舉措。在2005年公投否決歐洲憲法的不愉快經(jīng)歷后，法國(guó)也很難贊同歐盟實(shí)行聯(lián)邦制。
Yet the real game-changer could come from the third big EU player: Britain. If the UK left, France would find herself locked into a situation in which Germany’s distinctive strategic culture and security policy would prevail. This would not be easy to accept for the French, who continue, like the British, to have their own views on international security and the use of force. France could then be tempted to balance the German centre through the systematic practice of countervailing coalitions with the other members of the EU. And, with that, the spirit of the Elysée treaty would be irrevocably lost.
但真正的“勝負(fù)手”可能來(lái)自歐盟的另一大國(guó)：英國(guó)。如果英國(guó)脫離歐盟，法國(guó)將陷入德國(guó)鮮明的戰(zhàn)略文化和安全政策占據(jù)主導(dǎo)的局面。與英國(guó)人相同，法國(guó)人對(duì)國(guó)際安全和武力的使用仍然持有自己的觀點(diǎn)，因此他們將很難接受這一局面。法國(guó)可能忍不住與其他歐盟成員國(guó)系統(tǒng)性地結(jié)成反制聯(lián)盟，對(duì)德國(guó)的主導(dǎo)地位起到制衡作用。但這樣一來(lái)，《法德友好合作條約》的精神便將徹底不復(fù)存在。
The writer is special adviser at the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique
本文作者為法國(guó)戰(zhàn)略研究基金會(huì)(Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique)特別顧問(wèn)
The official rationale may have been prudent monetary policy. But coming on the eve of the anniversary of the treaty that cemented postwar reconciliation between France and Germany, last week’s announcement of the Bundesbank’s repatriation of its gold from the Banque de France was a poignant symbol of the fraying of the relationship between the two powers at the heart of the EU.
過(guò)去，審慎的貨幣政策或許是德國(guó)官方的基調(diào)。然而，就在奠定戰(zhàn)后法德和解的條約迎來(lái)周年紀(jì)念日之際，上周德國(guó)央行(Bundesbank)卻宣布計(jì)劃將存放在法國(guó)央行(Banque de France)的黃金運(yùn)回本國(guó)。此舉犀利地折射出歐盟(EU)兩大核心國(guó)家之間關(guān)系的裂痕。
From the eurozone crisis to intervention in Libya and Mali, and the failed merger of EADS and BAE Systems, the differences and tensions between Paris and Berlin are palpable. The fabled Franco-German motor appears no longer to be driving European integration.
從歐元區(qū)危機(jī)到介入利比亞和馬里局勢(shì)，再到歐洲航空防務(wù)與航天集團(tuán)(EADS)與BAE系統(tǒng)公司(BAE Systems)的合并失敗，法德之間的分歧和沖突已經(jīng)十分明顯?！胺ǖ掳l(fā)動(dòng)機(jī)”的神話似乎難以繼續(xù)推動(dòng)歐洲一體化。
It all seems a world away from 50 years ago this week, when Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer signed the Elysée treaty. This was no standard intergovernmental pact. They were creating the conditions for the exercise of joint leadership in shaping Europe’s “ever closer union”. They also hoped to lay the foundations of a common strategic – not merely economic – destiny. Even if the partnership has not sundered, those initial high spirits and lofty aspirations seem long gone.
50年前的本周，夏爾·戴高樂(lè)(Charles de Gaulle)與康拉德·阿登納(Konrad Adenauer)簽署《法德友好合作條約》(Elysée treaty)。與現(xiàn)在的情景相比，這簡(jiǎn)直是恍若隔世。該條約并非標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的政府間條約，但兩國(guó)為合力主導(dǎo)建立歐洲的“更緊密聯(lián)盟”創(chuàng)造了條件，并且憧憬著為共同的戰(zhàn)略前景——不只是經(jīng)濟(jì)前景——奠定基矗不過(guò)，即便合作關(guān)系尚未破裂，最初的意氣風(fēng)發(fā)和雄心壯志似乎也已經(jīng)一去不復(fù)返。
So what went wrong, and what will happen now? One ambition was unrealistic from the start. Under US pressure, the Bundestag ratified the treaty with language that precluded any prospect of fulfilling its strategic goals. No surprise, then, that the recent war in Libya, for instance, was not a Franco-German enterprise. It takes time and patience to nurture a common strategic culture.
出了什么問(wèn)題，現(xiàn)在會(huì)發(fā)生什么？從一開(kāi)始，同一個(gè)目標(biāo)就是不現(xiàn)實(shí)的。在美國(guó)的壓力下，德國(guó)聯(lián)邦議院(Bundestag)最終批準(zhǔn)的條約排除了一切實(shí)現(xiàn)其戰(zhàn)略目標(biāo)的可能性。因此，法德沒(méi)能在某些局面下（如近期利比亞戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)）形成戰(zhàn)略聯(lián)盟便不出意外。培養(yǎng)共同的戰(zhàn)略文化需要時(shí)間和耐心。
Conversely, the attempt to jointly shape the EU integration process was largely successful, and its consequences are embedded in institutions and culture. German-style subsidiarity, whereby powers are devolved to the lowest appropriate level, coexists with French-style technocracy. This success was facilitated, not hindered, by the deep divergences in Adenauer and de Gaulle’s visions for Europe – a federal entity for the former, a collection of nation-states for the latter – as once they or their successors had agreed on what to do, the other countries followed. But this process has lost its impetus as a result of bloc’s enlargement – starting with the UK in 1973 – and the rise of generations of leaders who no longer carry the historical baggage of the founding fathers.
相反，兩國(guó)共同塑造歐盟一體化進(jìn)程的努力則在很大程度上取得了成功，其影響已經(jīng)深入歐盟的機(jī)構(gòu)和文化中。德式的輔助性原則(subsidiarity)——即將權(quán)力盡可能下放到合適的層級(jí)——與法式的技術(shù)官僚政治在歐洲共存。阿登納和戴高樂(lè)對(duì)歐洲的設(shè)想存在嚴(yán)重分歧，前者的設(shè)想是聯(lián)邦實(shí)體，后者的設(shè)想是單一民族國(guó)家的集合。不過(guò)，這種分歧非但沒(méi)有阻礙歐盟的成功，反而是促進(jìn)了歐盟的成功——一旦阿登納和戴高樂(lè)或二人的繼任者商定了行事方針，其他國(guó)家就會(huì)效仿。但隨著1973年英國(guó)加入以來(lái)的歐盟擴(kuò)張，以及不再肩負(fù)奠基者歷史重任的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人上臺(tái)，這一進(jìn)程失去了動(dòng)力。
More importantly, the willingness of Berlin and Paris to overcome their differences – the imperative underpinning the treaty – has dissipated. The initial division of labour between French political and strategic power and German economic and monetary strength ended with the Soviet Union. A reunited Germany rediscovered its national interests, which no longer needed to be systematically set in a European framework implying French agreement.
更重要的是，法德政府克服分歧的意愿（這正是《法德友好合作條約》的基石）卻在消褪。最初的分工局面——法國(guó)拿出政治與戰(zhàn)略力量，德國(guó)拿出經(jīng)濟(jì)和貨幣力量——已經(jīng)隨著蘇聯(lián)的解體而煙消云散。統(tǒng)一后的德國(guó)重新開(kāi)始謀求國(guó)家利益，而它不用再將國(guó)家利益系統(tǒng)性地置于一個(gè)需要法國(guó)點(diǎn)頭同意的歐洲框架之內(nèi)。
France’s diminishing usefulness in Germany’s eyes, and the change in their relative strength, reduced the incentive to plan together. This in turn removed the complicity characterising relations in the 1970s and 1980s under presidents Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and Fran ois Mitterand and chancellors Helmut Schmidt and Helmut Kohl. Having been involved in the Franco-German security and defence dialogue for the past 30 years, I am deeply struck by this loss of intimacy.
法國(guó)在德國(guó)眼里越來(lái)越無(wú)用，兩國(guó)的實(shí)力對(duì)比也在發(fā)生變化，使得兩國(guó)缺乏共同規(guī)劃的動(dòng)力。這反過(guò)來(lái)破壞了兩國(guó)的融洽，而融洽正是20世紀(jì)70年代和80年代瓦萊里·吉斯卡爾·德斯坦(Valéry Giscard d’Estaing)和弗朗索瓦·密特朗(Fran ois Mitterand)總統(tǒng)及赫爾穆特·施密特(Helmut Schmidt)和赫爾穆特·科爾(Helmut Kohl)總理時(shí)期法德關(guān)系的顯著特征。我參與了過(guò)去30年的法德安全和國(guó)防對(duì)話，兩國(guó)如今的疏遠(yuǎn)讓我深感震驚。
Yet if happiness has become impossible, divorce is quite improbable, and for the most banal reasons. Splitting would be costly and is best avoided for the sake of the “children” (the European project). Abandoning the exclusivity of the relationship would force each partner to build ad hoc coalitions for every initiative in an uncongenial, EU-wide context of economic recession and political acrimony. Both countries would pay an enormous price were the euro and the EU to collapse – and, without French-German convergence, such an implosion becomes more likely.
但即使和睦已成奢望，分道揚(yáng)鑣也不太可能發(fā)生，原因則是老生常談。“分手”代價(jià)高昂，為了“孩子”（歐洲一體化）著想應(yīng)該盡量避免。在全歐盟經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退、政治不和的緊張氣氛下，放棄法德之間牢不可破的關(guān)系，將迫使雙方為每項(xiàng)計(jì)劃組建臨時(shí)的聯(lián)盟。如果歐元和歐盟崩潰，兩國(guó)均將付出巨大的代價(jià)；法國(guó)和德國(guó)若不能取得一致，這種崩潰發(fā)生的概率將更高。
Divorce could become an option if the EU suffers game-changing shocks, the most obvious of which would be a catastrophic evolution of the euro crisis.
如果歐盟遭遇*格局的重大打擊，兩國(guó)可能會(huì)選擇分道揚(yáng)鑣。最明顯的一種可能場(chǎng)景，就是歐元區(qū)危機(jī)向?yàn)?zāi)難的方向發(fā)展。
Germany’s institutions and public opinion may not permit a timely response to the political upheaval provoked by economic suffering on Europe’s southern periphery; nor are they likely to accept a decisive move towards a full-blown fiscal transfer union. After the bruising experience of 2005, when it rejected the European constitution in a referendum, France would also find it hard to go for a federal EU.
德國(guó)的制度和輿論不會(huì)允許德國(guó)對(duì)歐洲南部經(jīng)濟(jì)困難引發(fā)的政治動(dòng)蕩做出及時(shí)回應(yīng)，也不太可能接受關(guān)于成立完善的財(cái)政轉(zhuǎn)移聯(lián)盟的決定性舉措。在2005年公投否決歐洲憲法的不愉快經(jīng)歷后，法國(guó)也很難贊同歐盟實(shí)行聯(lián)邦制。
Yet the real game-changer could come from the third big EU player: Britain. If the UK left, France would find herself locked into a situation in which Germany’s distinctive strategic culture and security policy would prevail. This would not be easy to accept for the French, who continue, like the British, to have their own views on international security and the use of force. France could then be tempted to balance the German centre through the systematic practice of countervailing coalitions with the other members of the EU. And, with that, the spirit of the Elysée treaty would be irrevocably lost.
但真正的“勝負(fù)手”可能來(lái)自歐盟的另一大國(guó)：英國(guó)。如果英國(guó)脫離歐盟，法國(guó)將陷入德國(guó)鮮明的戰(zhàn)略文化和安全政策占據(jù)主導(dǎo)的局面。與英國(guó)人相同，法國(guó)人對(duì)國(guó)際安全和武力的使用仍然持有自己的觀點(diǎn)，因此他們將很難接受這一局面。法國(guó)可能忍不住與其他歐盟成員國(guó)系統(tǒng)性地結(jié)成反制聯(lián)盟，對(duì)德國(guó)的主導(dǎo)地位起到制衡作用。但這樣一來(lái)，《法德友好合作條約》的精神便將徹底不復(fù)存在。
The writer is special adviser at the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique
本文作者為法國(guó)戰(zhàn)略研究基金會(huì)(Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique)特別顧問(wèn)