china daily雙語新聞：中概股危機的真正根源
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission threw down a gauntlet against Beijing last week. The SEC filed administrative proceedings against five Chinese accounting firms─all of them affiliates of global firms─for failing to hand over audit working papers related to their work for Chinese companies that are now under SEC investigation. The firms say complying with U.S. disclosure laws would violate Chinese secrecy law, with which they also must comply.
上個星期，美國證券交易委員會(Securities and Exchange Commission，簡稱SEC)跟北京鉚上了。SEC對中國的五家會計師事務(wù)所（全都是國際所的合作所）發(fā)起行政訴訟，原因是它們未能提交與其審計的中國公司相關(guān)的工作文件，這些中國公司正在接受SEC調(diào)查。這些事務(wù)所稱，遵守美國的披露法律將違反它們必須同時遵守的中國保密法律。
For now, investors are concerned that the auditors may lose their ability to audit U.S.-listed companies, and that the listed companies may not be able to find new auditors that would satisfy U.S. regulatory requirements. In the extreme, this could force the Chinese companies to delist entirely.
從目前來看，投資者擔心的是這些審計機構(gòu)可能將無法審計在美國上市的公司，而這些上市公司可能也找不到滿足美國監(jiān)管要求的新審計機構(gòu)。在極端情況下，在美國上市的中國公司可能不得不全盤退市。
But investors' real problems with China run much deeper. The latest SEC action provides an opening to start examining some of the root causes of the Chinese fraud epidemic. The fundamental problem is Beijing's ambivalence about its companies' desire to access foreign capital markets.
但投資者投資中國概念遇到的真正問題要深刻得多。SEC的最新行動提供了一個契機，讓我們來著手考察中國公司欺詐成風的部分根源。根本問題在于北京對中國公司赴海外資本市場融資的愿望持一種模棱兩可的態(tài)度。
Chinese private-sector companies rushed to list on U.S. markets over the last decade. Their home country's capital markets had been slow to develop for private companies, although that has been rapidly changing in recent years.
過去10年中國民營企業(yè)爭先恐后地跑到美國市場上市。國內(nèi)資本市場對于民營企業(yè)來說發(fā)展太慢，雖然這種情況近幾年已經(jīng)迅速發(fā)生變化。
Beijing has resisted embracing this phenomenon. China still imposes onerous regulations on companies trying to raise equity capital overseas, including limits on which industries are able to do so. These rules are often out of step with the needs of the Chinese economy. For instance, some of the country's most important and successful companies, especially in the Internet industry, were technically prohibited from listing overseas without permission that was considered unobtainable.
北京一直不愿接受這種現(xiàn)象。中國仍對那些希望赴海外募集股權(quán)資本的企業(yè)施加繁重的監(jiān)管，包括限制能夠在海外上市的行業(yè)類別。這些法規(guī)常常落后于中國經(jīng)濟的需要。比如中國一些最重要、最成功的企業(yè)、特別是互聯(lián)網(wǎng)企業(yè)，嚴格地說是禁止在沒有許可的情況下赴海外上市的，而這種許可被認為根本拿不到。
To circumvent onerous regulations, these private companies listed through offshore holding companies that were typically organized in the Cayman Islands. They also developed the so-called variable interest entity, or VIE, structure of ownership. In this model, the offshore listed company owns a Chinese shell company. That shell company forms contractual relationships with the underlying Chinese firm, under which the firm will pass all of its profits to the shell company.
為規(guī)避繁重的監(jiān)管，這些民營企業(yè)借助往往是在開曼群島注冊的海外控股公司上市。它們還開發(fā)出被稱為“可變利益實體”(VIE)的所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)。在這種模式下，海外上市公司持有一家中國殼公司，這家殼公司跟作為基礎(chǔ)的中國公司形成合同關(guān)系，讓基礎(chǔ)公司把全部利潤轉(zhuǎn)讓給殼公司。
The accounts of the Chinese firm can then be consolidated into the overseas-listed company. But since technically the foreign investors don't own the Chinese business, the arrangement satisfies the letter, although not the spirit, of Chinese rules.
然后基礎(chǔ)公司的賬戶就可以被整合進海外上市公司。但由于外國投資者理論上并不擁有該中國公司，這種安排滿足的是中國法規(guī)的形式而非精神。
This clumsy corporate structure has created nothing but trouble for regulators and shareholders alike. There is little clarity on the enforceability under Chinese law of the contracts at the center of VIEs, so Western shareholders risk finding themselves owning shares in a shell company with no assets and no business if the contracts fall apart.
這種繁雜的公司結(jié)構(gòu)給監(jiān)管機構(gòu)和股東帶來的只有麻煩。在中國法律中，VIE合同的強制性很不明朗，所以如果合同無效，到時候西方股東持有的可能就是一家沒有資產(chǎn)也沒有業(yè)務(wù)的殼公司。
Investors have also become concerned that many companies accumulate profits in the VIEs, with no apparent attempt to ever make them available to the public shareholders. Companies often accumulate the profit in the VIE because there is considerable tax cost to getting it out.
投資者感到擔心的還有，很多公司把利潤積存在VIE中，表明看來并沒有打算要把這些利潤分給流通股股東。公司常常會把利潤積存在VIE中，因為要想把這些利潤拿出來需要繳納相當高的稅款。
The offshore shell companies also leave Chinese regulators with limited jurisdiction in fraud cases since the listed company is technically not Chinese. Meanwhile, China has not allowed U.S. regulators to access the people and records of these companies because these people and records are in China. The result is a regulatory hole in which fraud propagates.
離岸的殼公司還使中國監(jiān)管部門對欺詐案件只有有限的司法管轄權(quán)，因為此類上市公司理論上講并非中國公司。與此同時，中國一直不允許美國監(jiān)管部門接觸這些公司的人員和記錄，因為這些人員和記錄都在中國境內(nèi)。結(jié)果就造成了監(jiān)管漏洞，欺詐案件越來越多。
Ultimately, the solution is to close this underlying regulatory hole. Washington proposes to do this by allowing U.S. regulators access to people and records in China, and diplomatic negotiations are underway to make this possible despite Beijing's resistance on grounds of national sovereignty. However, that will not solve shareholders' biggest China challenges.
最后，解決方法是堵上這個深層的監(jiān)管漏洞。華盛頓提議允許美國監(jiān)管部門接觸位于中國的人員和記錄進而堵上漏洞，而相應(yīng)的外交談判也在進行之中，雖然北京以國家主權(quán)為由拒絕這樣做。不過，這并不能解決股東在中國的一些挑戰(zhàn)。
A long-term fix will have to come from the Chinese side. First, Beijing should allow its private-sector companies to list directly overseas in the same way it has allowed state-owned enterprises to list. This would eliminate the need for the VIE structure and the web of offshore entities and contractual relationships, and clarify regulatory jurisdiction. Western shareholders would almost certainly even tolerate two-tiered ownership structures in which ultimate control vested in Chinese nationals in sensitive industries, if Beijing insisted on this.
長遠的解決之道必須來自中方。首先，中國應(yīng)該允許該國民營部門企業(yè)可以像國有企業(yè)一樣直接在海外上市。這將使VIE、離岸實體網(wǎng)絡(luò)和合約關(guān)系失去存在的必要，并厘清監(jiān)管部門的管轄權(quán)。西方股東甚至幾乎可以肯定會容忍兩級所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)。在這種結(jié)構(gòu)中，如果北京堅持的話，對敏感行業(yè)的最終控制權(quán)將掌握在中國人手中。
Such a reform would also pave the way for Beijing to rationalize its regulation of overseas-listed companies in general. Beijing long ago consolidated securities regulation for domestically listed companies at the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), which now reports directly to the State Council. But a divide persists for regulation of overseas-listed firms, for whom oversight is divided between CSRC and the Ministry of Finance. This sows confusion and encourages bureaucratic turf wars.
這樣一種改革還將為北京精簡海外上市公司監(jiān)管的整個工作鋪平道路。北京很久以前將國內(nèi)上市公司證券監(jiān)管工作整合到證監(jiān)會。目前證監(jiān)會直接向國務(wù)院負責。不多，對海外上市公司的監(jiān)管仍不統(tǒng)一，證監(jiān)會和財政部都插手其中。監(jiān)管上的不統(tǒng)一會造成混亂，加劇各監(jiān)管部門之間的爭奪。
The CSRC has grown more sophisticated as it has gained more experience overseeing domestic markets. It also has signaled its sympathy for American regulators on the accounting issue. Beijing would do well to put regulation of all listed Chinese companies, no matter where they're listed, under one experienced regulator.
證監(jiān)會在監(jiān)管國內(nèi)市場方面積累了更多的經(jīng)驗，變得更加成熟老練。該機構(gòu)還在赴美上市中國公司的會計問題上對美國監(jiān)管部門表示同情。北京應(yīng)該將所有上市中國公司（無論在哪上市）的監(jiān)管工作整合到一個經(jīng)驗豐富的監(jiān)管機構(gòu)。
The SEC is correct that more and better disclosure, both to regulators and shareholders, will be central to cleaning up fraud cases and boosting shareholder confidence─and returns─in the future. But no one should think last week's administrative filing will fix the problem. A lasting, pro-shareholder solution will require greater reforms from Beijing.
SEC說的沒錯，向監(jiān)管機構(gòu)和股東披露更多信息、更充分合理地披露信息，這將是今后治理欺詐案件和提升股東信心（以及回報）的關(guān)鍵。但絕不要以為上周的行政訴訟會解決這個問題。一種有利于股東的長期解決方案需要北京進行更大力度的改革。
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission threw down a gauntlet against Beijing last week. The SEC filed administrative proceedings against five Chinese accounting firms─all of them affiliates of global firms─for failing to hand over audit working papers related to their work for Chinese companies that are now under SEC investigation. The firms say complying with U.S. disclosure laws would violate Chinese secrecy law, with which they also must comply.
上個星期，美國證券交易委員會(Securities and Exchange Commission，簡稱SEC)跟北京鉚上了。SEC對中國的五家會計師事務(wù)所（全都是國際所的合作所）發(fā)起行政訴訟，原因是它們未能提交與其審計的中國公司相關(guān)的工作文件，這些中國公司正在接受SEC調(diào)查。這些事務(wù)所稱，遵守美國的披露法律將違反它們必須同時遵守的中國保密法律。
For now, investors are concerned that the auditors may lose their ability to audit U.S.-listed companies, and that the listed companies may not be able to find new auditors that would satisfy U.S. regulatory requirements. In the extreme, this could force the Chinese companies to delist entirely.
從目前來看，投資者擔心的是這些審計機構(gòu)可能將無法審計在美國上市的公司，而這些上市公司可能也找不到滿足美國監(jiān)管要求的新審計機構(gòu)。在極端情況下，在美國上市的中國公司可能不得不全盤退市。
But investors' real problems with China run much deeper. The latest SEC action provides an opening to start examining some of the root causes of the Chinese fraud epidemic. The fundamental problem is Beijing's ambivalence about its companies' desire to access foreign capital markets.
但投資者投資中國概念遇到的真正問題要深刻得多。SEC的最新行動提供了一個契機，讓我們來著手考察中國公司欺詐成風的部分根源。根本問題在于北京對中國公司赴海外資本市場融資的愿望持一種模棱兩可的態(tài)度。
Chinese private-sector companies rushed to list on U.S. markets over the last decade. Their home country's capital markets had been slow to develop for private companies, although that has been rapidly changing in recent years.
過去10年中國民營企業(yè)爭先恐后地跑到美國市場上市。國內(nèi)資本市場對于民營企業(yè)來說發(fā)展太慢，雖然這種情況近幾年已經(jīng)迅速發(fā)生變化。
Beijing has resisted embracing this phenomenon. China still imposes onerous regulations on companies trying to raise equity capital overseas, including limits on which industries are able to do so. These rules are often out of step with the needs of the Chinese economy. For instance, some of the country's most important and successful companies, especially in the Internet industry, were technically prohibited from listing overseas without permission that was considered unobtainable.
北京一直不愿接受這種現(xiàn)象。中國仍對那些希望赴海外募集股權(quán)資本的企業(yè)施加繁重的監(jiān)管，包括限制能夠在海外上市的行業(yè)類別。這些法規(guī)常常落后于中國經(jīng)濟的需要。比如中國一些最重要、最成功的企業(yè)、特別是互聯(lián)網(wǎng)企業(yè)，嚴格地說是禁止在沒有許可的情況下赴海外上市的，而這種許可被認為根本拿不到。
To circumvent onerous regulations, these private companies listed through offshore holding companies that were typically organized in the Cayman Islands. They also developed the so-called variable interest entity, or VIE, structure of ownership. In this model, the offshore listed company owns a Chinese shell company. That shell company forms contractual relationships with the underlying Chinese firm, under which the firm will pass all of its profits to the shell company.
為規(guī)避繁重的監(jiān)管，這些民營企業(yè)借助往往是在開曼群島注冊的海外控股公司上市。它們還開發(fā)出被稱為“可變利益實體”(VIE)的所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)。在這種模式下，海外上市公司持有一家中國殼公司，這家殼公司跟作為基礎(chǔ)的中國公司形成合同關(guān)系，讓基礎(chǔ)公司把全部利潤轉(zhuǎn)讓給殼公司。
The accounts of the Chinese firm can then be consolidated into the overseas-listed company. But since technically the foreign investors don't own the Chinese business, the arrangement satisfies the letter, although not the spirit, of Chinese rules.
然后基礎(chǔ)公司的賬戶就可以被整合進海外上市公司。但由于外國投資者理論上并不擁有該中國公司，這種安排滿足的是中國法規(guī)的形式而非精神。
This clumsy corporate structure has created nothing but trouble for regulators and shareholders alike. There is little clarity on the enforceability under Chinese law of the contracts at the center of VIEs, so Western shareholders risk finding themselves owning shares in a shell company with no assets and no business if the contracts fall apart.
這種繁雜的公司結(jié)構(gòu)給監(jiān)管機構(gòu)和股東帶來的只有麻煩。在中國法律中，VIE合同的強制性很不明朗，所以如果合同無效，到時候西方股東持有的可能就是一家沒有資產(chǎn)也沒有業(yè)務(wù)的殼公司。
Investors have also become concerned that many companies accumulate profits in the VIEs, with no apparent attempt to ever make them available to the public shareholders. Companies often accumulate the profit in the VIE because there is considerable tax cost to getting it out.
投資者感到擔心的還有，很多公司把利潤積存在VIE中，表明看來并沒有打算要把這些利潤分給流通股股東。公司常常會把利潤積存在VIE中，因為要想把這些利潤拿出來需要繳納相當高的稅款。
The offshore shell companies also leave Chinese regulators with limited jurisdiction in fraud cases since the listed company is technically not Chinese. Meanwhile, China has not allowed U.S. regulators to access the people and records of these companies because these people and records are in China. The result is a regulatory hole in which fraud propagates.
離岸的殼公司還使中國監(jiān)管部門對欺詐案件只有有限的司法管轄權(quán)，因為此類上市公司理論上講并非中國公司。與此同時，中國一直不允許美國監(jiān)管部門接觸這些公司的人員和記錄，因為這些人員和記錄都在中國境內(nèi)。結(jié)果就造成了監(jiān)管漏洞，欺詐案件越來越多。
Ultimately, the solution is to close this underlying regulatory hole. Washington proposes to do this by allowing U.S. regulators access to people and records in China, and diplomatic negotiations are underway to make this possible despite Beijing's resistance on grounds of national sovereignty. However, that will not solve shareholders' biggest China challenges.
最后，解決方法是堵上這個深層的監(jiān)管漏洞。華盛頓提議允許美國監(jiān)管部門接觸位于中國的人員和記錄進而堵上漏洞，而相應(yīng)的外交談判也在進行之中，雖然北京以國家主權(quán)為由拒絕這樣做。不過，這并不能解決股東在中國的一些挑戰(zhàn)。
A long-term fix will have to come from the Chinese side. First, Beijing should allow its private-sector companies to list directly overseas in the same way it has allowed state-owned enterprises to list. This would eliminate the need for the VIE structure and the web of offshore entities and contractual relationships, and clarify regulatory jurisdiction. Western shareholders would almost certainly even tolerate two-tiered ownership structures in which ultimate control vested in Chinese nationals in sensitive industries, if Beijing insisted on this.
長遠的解決之道必須來自中方。首先，中國應(yīng)該允許該國民營部門企業(yè)可以像國有企業(yè)一樣直接在海外上市。這將使VIE、離岸實體網(wǎng)絡(luò)和合約關(guān)系失去存在的必要，并厘清監(jiān)管部門的管轄權(quán)。西方股東甚至幾乎可以肯定會容忍兩級所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)。在這種結(jié)構(gòu)中，如果北京堅持的話，對敏感行業(yè)的最終控制權(quán)將掌握在中國人手中。
Such a reform would also pave the way for Beijing to rationalize its regulation of overseas-listed companies in general. Beijing long ago consolidated securities regulation for domestically listed companies at the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), which now reports directly to the State Council. But a divide persists for regulation of overseas-listed firms, for whom oversight is divided between CSRC and the Ministry of Finance. This sows confusion and encourages bureaucratic turf wars.
這樣一種改革還將為北京精簡海外上市公司監(jiān)管的整個工作鋪平道路。北京很久以前將國內(nèi)上市公司證券監(jiān)管工作整合到證監(jiān)會。目前證監(jiān)會直接向國務(wù)院負責。不多，對海外上市公司的監(jiān)管仍不統(tǒng)一，證監(jiān)會和財政部都插手其中。監(jiān)管上的不統(tǒng)一會造成混亂，加劇各監(jiān)管部門之間的爭奪。
The CSRC has grown more sophisticated as it has gained more experience overseeing domestic markets. It also has signaled its sympathy for American regulators on the accounting issue. Beijing would do well to put regulation of all listed Chinese companies, no matter where they're listed, under one experienced regulator.
證監(jiān)會在監(jiān)管國內(nèi)市場方面積累了更多的經(jīng)驗，變得更加成熟老練。該機構(gòu)還在赴美上市中國公司的會計問題上對美國監(jiān)管部門表示同情。北京應(yīng)該將所有上市中國公司（無論在哪上市）的監(jiān)管工作整合到一個經(jīng)驗豐富的監(jiān)管機構(gòu)。
The SEC is correct that more and better disclosure, both to regulators and shareholders, will be central to cleaning up fraud cases and boosting shareholder confidence─and returns─in the future. But no one should think last week's administrative filing will fix the problem. A lasting, pro-shareholder solution will require greater reforms from Beijing.
SEC說的沒錯，向監(jiān)管機構(gòu)和股東披露更多信息、更充分合理地披露信息，這將是今后治理欺詐案件和提升股東信心（以及回報）的關(guān)鍵。但絕不要以為上周的行政訴訟會解決這個問題。一種有利于股東的長期解決方案需要北京進行更大力度的改革。