英語資源頻道為大家整理的china daily雙語新聞：美國切勿步歐洲緊縮后塵，供大家學(xué)習(xí)參考:)
When viewing the US fiscal stand-off from Europe, it all looks eerily familiar. The US has become very European. But for me the main problem is not an inability to deal with the structural deficit, as the Economist argued in its latest cover story, but rather the contrary. I fear that the US is blindly rushing into semi-automated austerity, which is exactly the mistake we have made in Europe. The problem is not the size of the national debt as such, which is manageable in both cases, but our policies in dealing with it.
從歐洲角度審視美國財政僵局時，一切都似曾相識得令人恐怖。美國已變得非常像歐洲。但我認(rèn)為，美國的主要問題并非最新一期《經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家》(Economist)的封面報道所述，無法消除結(jié)構(gòu)性赤字，而是恰恰相反。我擔(dān)心美國會盲目、草率地推行半自動的緊縮措施——這正是歐洲國家所犯下的錯誤。問題不在于國家債務(wù)的規(guī)模（美歐的債務(wù)規(guī)模都是可控制的），而在于我們用以應(yīng)對赤字的政策。
The various measures in last week’s US budget deal imply revenue increases in the order of about 2 per cent of gross domestic product. This is the absolute size of the agreed measures. It does not include any further spending cuts that may, or may not, come as part of an agreement on a debt ceiling. The gross fiscal contraction of the US will be larger than the UK’s in 2013, though not as large as that in Spain, Portugal or Greece. Still, this would make the US an honorary member of Europe’s austerity club.
從上周達(dá)所成預(yù)算協(xié)議中的諸多舉措來看，未來美國的收入增幅約為國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值(GDP)的2%。這就是協(xié)議共識的全部內(nèi)容。協(xié)議不包括進(jìn)一步的支出削減——這些削減可能會（也可能不會）成為債務(wù)上限協(xié)議的內(nèi)容。2013年美國財政收縮總額將高于英國，但低于西班牙、葡萄牙或希臘。即便如此，這也足以將讓美國成為歐洲緊縮俱樂部的名譽(yù)會員。
If there has been an overriding lesson from the eurozone crisis, then it must be that the fiscal multipliers – the effect of austerity on growth – become very high when monetary policy has reached the zero bound, and when everyone pursues austerity at the same time. The International Monetary Fund started a debate on the multiplier last year, culminating in a recent paper by Olivier Blanchard and Daniel Leigh, explaining why economic forecasts have been so persistently wrong during the crisis. Just how large the multiplier will be this year is difficult to say exactly and may vary across countries, but it is certainly higher now than before the crisis.
如果說歐元區(qū)危機(jī)提供了什么最重要教訓(xùn)的話，那必定是當(dāng)利率達(dá)到零區(qū)域，以及所有國家同時實(shí)施緊縮措施的時候，財政乘數(shù)（反映的是緊縮對增長的影響）效應(yīng)就會變得非常高。國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)去年就財政乘數(shù)展開了一場辯論，奧利維爾·布蘭查德(Olivier Blanchard)和丹尼爾·利(Daniel Leigh)最近一篇解釋危機(jī)期間經(jīng)濟(jì)預(yù)測為何總是出錯的文章，將這場辯論推向了高潮。很難說今年的財政乘數(shù)效應(yīng)到底有多高，目前各國的乘數(shù)效應(yīng)可能有所不同，但肯定會高于危機(jī)前。
I would expect the multiplier to become smaller as the economy returns to normal, but that has not happened yet, and will probably not happen for a while. In Europe, a recession started in the middle of 2012 and is likely to persist for most of this year. The latest US data show that manufacturers may have come out of recession and that employment is rising modestly. But the size of these fiscal measures may well undo this incipient recovery.
我本來預(yù)期財政乘數(shù)效應(yīng)會隨著經(jīng)濟(jì)回歸正常而降低，但目前還未出現(xiàn)這種情況，可能暫時也不會出現(xiàn)。歐洲在2012年中期開始陷入衰退，而且在今年大部分時間可能會持續(xù)衰退。最新的美國數(shù)據(jù)表明，制造業(yè)可能已經(jīng)擺脫衰退，同時就業(yè)率也在溫和上升。但大規(guī)模的財政舉措很可能把復(fù)蘇扼殺在搖籃里。
The medium-term dynamics are even worse. This is because austerity is not a one-off shock, whose negative effects would dissipate over time, but a multi-annual programme. What spooks me is the likely austerity pursued even in a moderated form over longer periods. That is already happening, at least in Europe. The German finance ministry is already planning an austerity budget for 2014 to meet the constitutional target of a structurally balanced budget. The eurozone’s fiscal pact will have exactly the same effect on the other countries. Its prescription of a near-zero structural deficitwill force everybody to continue austerity indefinitely. It leaves room for automatic stabilisers, but only up to a point. If long-run growth falls, as I would expect, the structural deficit would be revised upwards, requiring further austerity.
中期前景甚至更為黯淡。這是因?yàn)榫o縮是持續(xù)多年的措施，所帶來的沖擊不是一次性的，其負(fù)面效果只能隨時間推移而慢慢消散。我擔(dān)心的是，緊縮措施可能以溫和方式延續(xù)更長時間。至少在歐洲已出現(xiàn)這種情況。德國財政部已經(jīng)在制定2014年緊縮預(yù)算計劃，來實(shí)現(xiàn)憲法規(guī)定的預(yù)算結(jié)構(gòu)性平衡的目標(biāo)。歐元區(qū)的財政協(xié)議將對其他國家產(chǎn)生同樣的影響。該協(xié)議開出的接近于零的結(jié)構(gòu)性赤字解決方案，將迫使所有國家無止境地實(shí)施緊縮措施。自動穩(wěn)定器仍可發(fā)揮效用，但只在一定程度上有效。如果長期增長下降（正如我預(yù)期的那樣），結(jié)構(gòu)性赤字將被修正為升高，這需要實(shí)行進(jìn)一步的緊縮。
In Europe, “perma-austerity”comes primarily in the form of social entitlements cuts. In most countries, the scope for tax increases is relatively small. There are a few genuine structural fiscal reforms that may well be worth undertaking – cuts in levels of regional government, plugging tax loopholes, or ending subsidies. But these are hard to do, and governments find it more expedient to cut welfare benefits, which is what European conservatives usually mean when they talk about “economic reforms”.
在歐洲，“永久性緊縮”主要是以削減社會福利支出的形式出現(xiàn)。在大多數(shù)國家，增稅余地相對較校一些可能具有實(shí)效的純粹的結(jié)構(gòu)性財政改革措施包括，地方政府層面的減支，封堵稅收漏洞或者停止補(bǔ)貼。但這些措施很難實(shí)施，各國政府發(fā)現(xiàn)削減福利支出更是權(quán)宜之計——?dú)W洲保守人士談?wù)摗敖?jīng)濟(jì)改革”時，通常就會建議此類舉措。
In southern Europe, austerity has already led to a big increase in poverty and inequality. A report by Oxfam in Spain says that if the current policies are not reversed, Spain could see an increase in the percentage of the population below the poverty line from 27 per cent to 40 per cent in a decade. I find it hard to see how Spain could maintain its current course politically if that prediction turns out to be true.
在歐洲南部國家，緊縮已導(dǎo)致貧困和不平等現(xiàn)象大幅上升。西班牙樂施會(Oxfam)的一篇報告顯示，如果不扭轉(zhuǎn)當(dāng)前政策，西班牙低于貧困線以下的人口比例可能在十年內(nèi)從27%升至40%。如果這種預(yù)測沒錯的話，我很難看出西班牙何以維持當(dāng)前的政治進(jìn)程。
All over Europe, governments have pushed themselves into a corner where austerity has become the default choice. George Osborne, the UK chancellor, said recently he expected austerity to continue until 2018. I would take this as a ballpark estimate for most of the North Atlantic region. This is not an environment in which companies invest, or in which consumers step up spending. My conclusion is that we are not going to see a return to pre-crisis growth rates in the austerity club for a several years. If the US becomes a fully-paid subscriber to this club, then I would expect the same to happen there.
歐洲各國政府把自己逼入了緊縮成為默認(rèn)選項(xiàng)的絕境。英國財政大臣喬治·奧斯本(George Osborne)最近表示，預(yù)計緊縮將持續(xù)至2018年。我將認(rèn)為這種預(yù)測大致適用于北大西洋地區(qū)的大多數(shù)國家。這種環(huán)境不適合企業(yè)投資，也不適合消費(fèi)者加大支出。我的結(jié)論是，緊縮俱樂部國家的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長率不會在幾年內(nèi)恢復(fù)至危機(jī)前水平。如果美國晉升為這個俱樂部的完全付費(fèi)會員，那我將預(yù)計美國也會是同樣局面。
There is a deeper reason why we are all in this mess. It has become more difficult for political systems to defend the collective interest – which I would define as the pursuit of policies to end the recession, then deal with the debt overhang vigorously afterwards. The collective action problem is a natural deficiency of a monetary union with decentralised decision making. But it can also occur at the level of sovereign nation states when society lacks broad consensus over economic policy. In their respective pathologies, the US and the eurozone have become remarkably similar.
美歐都陷入這種亂局有更深層次的原因。政治體系捍衛(wèi)集體利益變得更加困難——我將把它定義為推行終結(jié)衰退的政策，然后大力解決債務(wù)危機(jī)。一個有著分散決策機(jī)制的貨幣聯(lián)盟，本來就會出現(xiàn)集體行動的問題。但是當(dāng)社會未能就經(jīng)濟(jì)政策達(dá)成廣泛共識時，也可以在主權(quán)國家層面采取集體行動。就它們各自的病理而言，美國和歐元區(qū)變得非常相似。
When viewing the US fiscal stand-off from Europe, it all looks eerily familiar. The US has become very European. But for me the main problem is not an inability to deal with the structural deficit, as the Economist argued in its latest cover story, but rather the contrary. I fear that the US is blindly rushing into semi-automated austerity, which is exactly the mistake we have made in Europe. The problem is not the size of the national debt as such, which is manageable in both cases, but our policies in dealing with it.
從歐洲角度審視美國財政僵局時，一切都似曾相識得令人恐怖。美國已變得非常像歐洲。但我認(rèn)為，美國的主要問題并非最新一期《經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家》(Economist)的封面報道所述，無法消除結(jié)構(gòu)性赤字，而是恰恰相反。我擔(dān)心美國會盲目、草率地推行半自動的緊縮措施——這正是歐洲國家所犯下的錯誤。問題不在于國家債務(wù)的規(guī)模（美歐的債務(wù)規(guī)模都是可控制的），而在于我們用以應(yīng)對赤字的政策。
The various measures in last week’s US budget deal imply revenue increases in the order of about 2 per cent of gross domestic product. This is the absolute size of the agreed measures. It does not include any further spending cuts that may, or may not, come as part of an agreement on a debt ceiling. The gross fiscal contraction of the US will be larger than the UK’s in 2013, though not as large as that in Spain, Portugal or Greece. Still, this would make the US an honorary member of Europe’s austerity club.
從上周達(dá)所成預(yù)算協(xié)議中的諸多舉措來看，未來美國的收入增幅約為國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值(GDP)的2%。這就是協(xié)議共識的全部內(nèi)容。協(xié)議不包括進(jìn)一步的支出削減——這些削減可能會（也可能不會）成為債務(wù)上限協(xié)議的內(nèi)容。2013年美國財政收縮總額將高于英國，但低于西班牙、葡萄牙或希臘。即便如此，這也足以將讓美國成為歐洲緊縮俱樂部的名譽(yù)會員。
If there has been an overriding lesson from the eurozone crisis, then it must be that the fiscal multipliers – the effect of austerity on growth – become very high when monetary policy has reached the zero bound, and when everyone pursues austerity at the same time. The International Monetary Fund started a debate on the multiplier last year, culminating in a recent paper by Olivier Blanchard and Daniel Leigh, explaining why economic forecasts have been so persistently wrong during the crisis. Just how large the multiplier will be this year is difficult to say exactly and may vary across countries, but it is certainly higher now than before the crisis.
如果說歐元區(qū)危機(jī)提供了什么最重要教訓(xùn)的話，那必定是當(dāng)利率達(dá)到零區(qū)域，以及所有國家同時實(shí)施緊縮措施的時候，財政乘數(shù)（反映的是緊縮對增長的影響）效應(yīng)就會變得非常高。國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)去年就財政乘數(shù)展開了一場辯論，奧利維爾·布蘭查德(Olivier Blanchard)和丹尼爾·利(Daniel Leigh)最近一篇解釋危機(jī)期間經(jīng)濟(jì)預(yù)測為何總是出錯的文章，將這場辯論推向了高潮。很難說今年的財政乘數(shù)效應(yīng)到底有多高，目前各國的乘數(shù)效應(yīng)可能有所不同，但肯定會高于危機(jī)前。
I would expect the multiplier to become smaller as the economy returns to normal, but that has not happened yet, and will probably not happen for a while. In Europe, a recession started in the middle of 2012 and is likely to persist for most of this year. The latest US data show that manufacturers may have come out of recession and that employment is rising modestly. But the size of these fiscal measures may well undo this incipient recovery.
我本來預(yù)期財政乘數(shù)效應(yīng)會隨著經(jīng)濟(jì)回歸正常而降低，但目前還未出現(xiàn)這種情況，可能暫時也不會出現(xiàn)。歐洲在2012年中期開始陷入衰退，而且在今年大部分時間可能會持續(xù)衰退。最新的美國數(shù)據(jù)表明，制造業(yè)可能已經(jīng)擺脫衰退，同時就業(yè)率也在溫和上升。但大規(guī)模的財政舉措很可能把復(fù)蘇扼殺在搖籃里。
The medium-term dynamics are even worse. This is because austerity is not a one-off shock, whose negative effects would dissipate over time, but a multi-annual programme. What spooks me is the likely austerity pursued even in a moderated form over longer periods. That is already happening, at least in Europe. The German finance ministry is already planning an austerity budget for 2014 to meet the constitutional target of a structurally balanced budget. The eurozone’s fiscal pact will have exactly the same effect on the other countries. Its prescription of a near-zero structural deficitwill force everybody to continue austerity indefinitely. It leaves room for automatic stabilisers, but only up to a point. If long-run growth falls, as I would expect, the structural deficit would be revised upwards, requiring further austerity.
中期前景甚至更為黯淡。這是因?yàn)榫o縮是持續(xù)多年的措施，所帶來的沖擊不是一次性的，其負(fù)面效果只能隨時間推移而慢慢消散。我擔(dān)心的是，緊縮措施可能以溫和方式延續(xù)更長時間。至少在歐洲已出現(xiàn)這種情況。德國財政部已經(jīng)在制定2014年緊縮預(yù)算計劃，來實(shí)現(xiàn)憲法規(guī)定的預(yù)算結(jié)構(gòu)性平衡的目標(biāo)。歐元區(qū)的財政協(xié)議將對其他國家產(chǎn)生同樣的影響。該協(xié)議開出的接近于零的結(jié)構(gòu)性赤字解決方案，將迫使所有國家無止境地實(shí)施緊縮措施。自動穩(wěn)定器仍可發(fā)揮效用，但只在一定程度上有效。如果長期增長下降（正如我預(yù)期的那樣），結(jié)構(gòu)性赤字將被修正為升高，這需要實(shí)行進(jìn)一步的緊縮。
In Europe, “perma-austerity”comes primarily in the form of social entitlements cuts. In most countries, the scope for tax increases is relatively small. There are a few genuine structural fiscal reforms that may well be worth undertaking – cuts in levels of regional government, plugging tax loopholes, or ending subsidies. But these are hard to do, and governments find it more expedient to cut welfare benefits, which is what European conservatives usually mean when they talk about “economic reforms”.
在歐洲，“永久性緊縮”主要是以削減社會福利支出的形式出現(xiàn)。在大多數(shù)國家，增稅余地相對較校一些可能具有實(shí)效的純粹的結(jié)構(gòu)性財政改革措施包括，地方政府層面的減支，封堵稅收漏洞或者停止補(bǔ)貼。但這些措施很難實(shí)施，各國政府發(fā)現(xiàn)削減福利支出更是權(quán)宜之計——?dú)W洲保守人士談?wù)摗敖?jīng)濟(jì)改革”時，通常就會建議此類舉措。
In southern Europe, austerity has already led to a big increase in poverty and inequality. A report by Oxfam in Spain says that if the current policies are not reversed, Spain could see an increase in the percentage of the population below the poverty line from 27 per cent to 40 per cent in a decade. I find it hard to see how Spain could maintain its current course politically if that prediction turns out to be true.
在歐洲南部國家，緊縮已導(dǎo)致貧困和不平等現(xiàn)象大幅上升。西班牙樂施會(Oxfam)的一篇報告顯示，如果不扭轉(zhuǎn)當(dāng)前政策，西班牙低于貧困線以下的人口比例可能在十年內(nèi)從27%升至40%。如果這種預(yù)測沒錯的話，我很難看出西班牙何以維持當(dāng)前的政治進(jìn)程。
All over Europe, governments have pushed themselves into a corner where austerity has become the default choice. George Osborne, the UK chancellor, said recently he expected austerity to continue until 2018. I would take this as a ballpark estimate for most of the North Atlantic region. This is not an environment in which companies invest, or in which consumers step up spending. My conclusion is that we are not going to see a return to pre-crisis growth rates in the austerity club for a several years. If the US becomes a fully-paid subscriber to this club, then I would expect the same to happen there.
歐洲各國政府把自己逼入了緊縮成為默認(rèn)選項(xiàng)的絕境。英國財政大臣喬治·奧斯本(George Osborne)最近表示，預(yù)計緊縮將持續(xù)至2018年。我將認(rèn)為這種預(yù)測大致適用于北大西洋地區(qū)的大多數(shù)國家。這種環(huán)境不適合企業(yè)投資，也不適合消費(fèi)者加大支出。我的結(jié)論是，緊縮俱樂部國家的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長率不會在幾年內(nèi)恢復(fù)至危機(jī)前水平。如果美國晉升為這個俱樂部的完全付費(fèi)會員，那我將預(yù)計美國也會是同樣局面。
There is a deeper reason why we are all in this mess. It has become more difficult for political systems to defend the collective interest – which I would define as the pursuit of policies to end the recession, then deal with the debt overhang vigorously afterwards. The collective action problem is a natural deficiency of a monetary union with decentralised decision making. But it can also occur at the level of sovereign nation states when society lacks broad consensus over economic policy. In their respective pathologies, the US and the eurozone have become remarkably similar.
美歐都陷入這種亂局有更深層次的原因。政治體系捍衛(wèi)集體利益變得更加困難——我將把它定義為推行終結(jié)衰退的政策，然后大力解決債務(wù)危機(jī)。一個有著分散決策機(jī)制的貨幣聯(lián)盟，本來就會出現(xiàn)集體行動的問題。但是當(dāng)社會未能就經(jīng)濟(jì)政策達(dá)成廣泛共識時，也可以在主權(quán)國家層面采取集體行動。就它們各自的病理而言，美國和歐元區(qū)變得非常相似。