PRIME Minister Goh Chok Tong first visited China in 1971. He was on a business trip for Neptune Orient Lines Ltd, the company he was then working for.
At that time, recalled PM Goh, it was very difficult for Singaporeans to visit China. The “cultural revolution” was in full swing, and everywhere one could hear songs in praise of Chairman Mao Zedong － on the train, in hotels, or even in toilets. To him, that was a strange and fascinating society.
That was a time full of steam and stir, and full of political taboos, too. China as described by PM Goh was at once familiar and strange to many Singaporeans in those years. After all, although they had heard so much about the country, few of them could see it for themselves.
Yet the physical distance did not stop the contact of minds. Those who were Chinese-educated could well feel the century-long humiliation suffered by their ancestral country. Who could remain unmoved when hearing the proclamation by Mao that “the Chinese people have finally stood up”？
Thirty years later, in his recent visit to China, PM Goh probably could hardly hear any eulogy to the late Mao Zedong such as “The east is red； the sun rises”。 Much more likely, it is the soft melodies by Teresa Teng the late star singer that people are now listening to.
Meanwhile, the ties between Singapore and China have turned colourless, without being tinged with either Red threat or White Terror.
Frequent exchanges between the two peoples make no news any longer. When a joint statement was issued recently by the two governments to mark the 10th anniversary of the establishment of their diplomatic ties and to map out an all-round cooperation, it turned out to be a non-event without raising any controversies, despite the far-reaching significance of the statement.
Yet it is of interest that, while the two peoples are increasingly close in contacts and still affectionate to each other, the passion of the past years is dying out between them. The heart-stirring language of revolution has given way to brisk business talks.
Seemingly paradoxical, this bears out a good cause-and-effect logic. Without some distance in thought and sentiment, there would not have been today's“multi-level and broad-based cooperation” between the two countries.
There needs to be some distance between countries；otherwise there can't be such thing as sovereignty. Yet this is only part of the reason why we should keep a distance.
Pressure in many aspects requires that we handle our relations with China with great caution. Singapore cannot afford to bear the label of “the third China”。
To steer clear of suspicion, Singapore established diplomatic ties with China only after all the other Asean countries had done so. Before or after a visit to China, leaders of the island-state would always make a trip to other major states in Asia.
Years ago, PM Goh said he needed to arouse a fever for things Indian, since there had been a fever for things Chinese.
At home, those who lead public opinion have described ethnic Chinese sentiments and culture as a hangover from history. These are seen as detrimental to the building of a national identity and to multiracialism.
The sentimental distance between Singapore and China stems from a desire for a distinct nationhood. Yet it is not without positive significance.
Singapore is not identical to China, hence our cool detachedness and objectivity. Herein lies Singapore's strength, which explains why Westerners have often consulted our leaders for advice on China-related issues.
In Singapore-China relations, there is always a tension between closeness and distance. Besides the need for distance, there is also a need for closer ties.
Ours is a commercial society, and naturally we would not distance ourselves from the huge market of China, given the advantages we have in cultural connections.
It is our assumption that, even though our Chinese language is far from perfect, we can outdo Westerners in business with China.
It takes further observation, though, to find out whether such an assumption will stand the test of reality, and whether the setback with Suzhou Industrial Park project is a mere exception.
Chinese-educated Singaporeans have been wavering between optimism and pessimism about the future of their ethnic language and culture. To some extent, this has been influenced by experts' views on China's economic growth.
On the whole, experts are optimistic. The question is, how long will China take to prosper economically, 30 or 40 years, or even longer？
The Chinese language and culture in Singapore are losing their vigour and strength, and time is of crucial importance for their revival. It is interesting that part of the cultural foundation of a society should hinge on the economic growth of another country. In the final analysis, Singaporean society still lacks a deep cultural root.
Throughout history, our island-state had absorbed cultural nutrition from the mainland of China. But there were times of back feeding, too. For instance, the locals joined efforts with people in China during the National Revolution led by Dr Sun Yat-sen and the War of Resistance against Japan.
Gone are the years of revolution and war, and Singapore is now an independent state. Today, Chinese Singaporeans relate themselve to their ancestral country in a cultural sense only, without identifying with it politically. Nevertheless, there is still ample scope for cooperation on a state-to-state basis.
Within China, two currents of development are contending for the leading role. One stands for the inland north driven by political power, the other, the coastal south propelled by economic growth.
Mostly from the south, our ancestors had characters of the southerners － they were flexible, open-minded, and adventurous.
Indeed, Singapore has been an experiment in cultural fusion, as it combines the culture of south China and the management system of the West.
If our experiment can keep on bearing fruit, won't it provide some inspiration to China in her quest for modernisation？
（Translated by Allen Zhuang）
發(fā)展新中“全方位”關(guān)系
吳作棟總理第一次走訪中國(guó)是在1971年。那時(shí),他任職于?；瘦喆?到中國(guó)是為了公司業(yè)務(wù)?？偫砘貞浾f(shuō),當(dāng)時(shí),新加坡人要到中國(guó)非常困難。文化*正如火如荼的展開(kāi),在火車(chē)上,在旅店內(nèi),在廁所里,到處都可聽(tīng)到歌頌毛主席的歌曲。在他看來(lái),這是一個(gè)陌生但又令人入迷的社會(huì)。
那是一個(gè)熱哄哄的時(shí)代,也是一個(gè)充滿(mǎn)政治禁忌的時(shí)代?？偫硭枥L的中國(guó),對(duì)當(dāng)時(shí)許多島國(guó)人民來(lái)說(shuō),是既陌生又熟悉。畢竟,人們對(duì)神州大地的種種,是百聞但難得一見(jiàn),然而,空間的阻隔,無(wú)礙思想的溝通。念方塊字的人,感受的到這古老大地百年來(lái)所忍受的恥辱,對(duì)于“中國(guó)人民站起來(lái)了”的宣告,誰(shuí)能無(wú)動(dòng)于衷？
事隔30年,總理最近在訪問(wèn)中國(guó)時(shí),已難聽(tīng)到“東方紅,太陽(yáng)升”的頌歌,人們更常聽(tīng)到的是鄧麗君的靡靡之音。中國(guó)已經(jīng)從“后毛”時(shí)代進(jìn)入“后鄧”時(shí)代,姓“資”還是姓“社”都變的不相干了。
新中兩地的關(guān)系早已進(jìn)入一種沒(méi)有色彩的境界——沒(méi)有紅色的威脅,也就沒(méi)有白色的恐怖。
兩地人民頻繁的往來(lái),已經(jīng)不是什么新聞了。也因?yàn)槿绱?當(dāng)兩國(guó)政府趁建交十周年發(fā)表聯(lián)合聲明,表示要全方位發(fā)展兩國(guó)關(guān)系時(shí),其意義和影響雖然深遠(yuǎn),島國(guó)內(nèi)外的輿論界都以平常心對(duì)待,沒(méi)有引起爭(zhēng)議。
有趣的是,正當(dāng)兩地人民接觸日益頻繁,彼此在精神和思想的溝通上,雖然仍覺(jué)親切,但少了往日的那股激情。令人心激動(dòng)的革命話語(yǔ),正由訴不盡的生意經(jīng)所取代。利之所及,人心難免生分。這看來(lái)矛盾,其實(shí),在這之間也存在一種因果關(guān)系——沒(méi)有情感和思想上的距離,也就難有今日“全方位”的關(guān)系。
國(guó)與國(guó)之間,總要有個(gè)距離,否則便無(wú)主權(quán)可言。然而,除了這個(gè)客觀道理,我們還面對(duì)各種內(nèi)外壓力,使我們加倍小心的經(jīng)營(yíng)與中國(guó)的關(guān)系?！暗谌袊?guó)”這頂大帽,我們?nèi)f萬(wàn)擔(dān)當(dāng)不起。為了避嫌,我們是亞細(xì)安國(guó)家中最遲與中國(guó)建交的一個(gè)。我們的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人走訪中國(guó)之前或之后,總會(huì)到其他亞洲大國(guó)走一趟。多年前,總理曾說(shuō),國(guó)內(nèi)已經(jīng)掀起“中國(guó)熱”,他因此要激起一點(diǎn)“印度熱”。
在國(guó)內(nèi),位居主流的輿論領(lǐng)袖已經(jīng)把民族情感,甚至母族文化,界定為歷史的包袱,說(shuō)它有礙國(guó)家認(rèn)同感的塑造,也有礙多元種族政策的貫徹。像蘇州工業(yè)園這樣的合作計(jì)劃,就觸動(dòng)了不少敏感的神經(jīng)。
新中兩地的感情距離,是出自防衛(wèi)心理,不過(guò),它也不乏積極意義。我們和中國(guó)不盡相同,因此就有了旁觀者的冷靜與客觀,這也正是我們對(duì)中國(guó)的價(jià)值所在,否則,西方人也不會(huì)經(jīng)常征求我國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人對(duì)中國(guó)的看法。
綜觀新中關(guān)系,在密與疏之間一直存在著深刻的張力。在求“密”這一端的動(dòng)力也不小。我們是工商業(yè)社會(huì),自然不愿自絕于這個(gè)龐大市場(chǎng)之外,更何況我們自認(rèn)擁有一點(diǎn)的優(yōu)勢(shì)。我國(guó)的一家新聞電視臺(tái)的賣(mài)點(diǎn)不就是：“我們了解亞洲”。我們的假設(shè)是,即使華語(yǔ)講的結(jié)結(jié)巴巴,我們?cè)谥袊?guó)市場(chǎng)上總比洋人強(qiáng)。這樣的假設(shè)是不是經(jīng)得起考驗(yàn)？蘇州工業(yè)園的經(jīng)驗(yàn)是不是一個(gè)例外？還有待觀察。
自古以來(lái),經(jīng)濟(jì)往往帶動(dòng)一切。美國(guó)是世界經(jīng)濟(jì)首富,美國(guó)文化席卷全球并非偶然。東方人因此深感壓力,非有一頭金發(fā),非有一個(gè)洋名,就不像一個(gè)現(xiàn)代人。這或許是悲哀,但是,經(jīng)濟(jì)的力量的確是鋪天蓋地,影響所及,包括一個(gè)民族的自尊。
在新加坡,受華文教育者對(duì)文化前景的看法,時(shí)而悲觀,時(shí)而樂(lè)觀,這與專(zhuān)家對(duì)中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)展望的看法不無(wú)關(guān)系?？傮w來(lái)說(shuō),專(zhuān)家還是樂(lè)觀的,問(wèn)題在于時(shí)間：中國(guó)是需要30年、40年或更長(zhǎng)的時(shí)間,才能算上岸？。本地的華文華語(yǔ),生命力漸失,因此時(shí)間至為緊要。說(shuō)來(lái)也妙,一個(gè)社會(huì)的文化本質(zhì),竟然維系于另一個(gè)國(guó)家的經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展。追根究底,是因?yàn)槲覀兊纳鐣?huì)缺乏足夠的文化自發(fā)力。其實(shí),我們這個(gè)小島國(guó),本來(lái)就缺乏孕育文化的沃土,本來(lái)就有一條連接文化母體的臍帶,因?yàn)榉N種的政治社會(huì)因素,這條臍帶日益退化。
翻開(kāi)歷史,島國(guó)不斷從大陸吸收文化養(yǎng)分,但也有反哺的時(shí)候。
孫中山發(fā)起的革命運(yùn)動(dòng),中國(guó)八年抗日戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng),本地人都熱烈的響應(yīng),出錢(qián)出力,也因此付出了代價(jià),在二次大戰(zhàn)期間受到日軍無(wú)情的對(duì)待。
我們已是一個(gè)獨(dú)立的國(guó)家,那個(gè)灑熱血的時(shí)代已經(jīng)過(guò)去,我們現(xiàn)在只談“文化中國(guó)”,避免“政治中國(guó)”的認(rèn)同。但是,在國(guó)與國(guó)基礎(chǔ)上,新中仍大有合作和互相學(xué)習(xí)之處。
在中國(guó),象征內(nèi)陸中國(guó)和象征南部沿海中國(guó)的兩股巨流正在角逐,前者以政治掛帥,后者則以經(jīng)濟(jì)掛帥。我們的祖先多來(lái)自南方,他們深具南方人的特性：機(jī)靈、開(kāi)放和敢于冒險(xiǎn)。他們?cè)谶@個(gè)島國(guó)上開(kāi)拓了與中國(guó)大陸截然不同的政治和經(jīng)濟(jì)天地。
實(shí)際上,新加坡本身就是一個(gè)文化融合的實(shí)驗(yàn)：南中國(guó)文化和西方管理制度的融合。如果我們這場(chǎng)實(shí)驗(yàn)?zāi)芾^續(xù)開(kāi)花結(jié)果,這對(duì)中國(guó)或許也是一個(gè)小小的啟示。
本月初,江澤民主席說(shuō),他很高興吳總理在“春光明媚”的時(shí)候訪問(wèn)北京。但愿兩國(guó)關(guān)系在如沐春風(fēng)之際,我們還能薪盡火傳,還能欣賞一年比一年秀麗的北國(guó)春光。
At that time, recalled PM Goh, it was very difficult for Singaporeans to visit China. The “cultural revolution” was in full swing, and everywhere one could hear songs in praise of Chairman Mao Zedong － on the train, in hotels, or even in toilets. To him, that was a strange and fascinating society.
That was a time full of steam and stir, and full of political taboos, too. China as described by PM Goh was at once familiar and strange to many Singaporeans in those years. After all, although they had heard so much about the country, few of them could see it for themselves.
Yet the physical distance did not stop the contact of minds. Those who were Chinese-educated could well feel the century-long humiliation suffered by their ancestral country. Who could remain unmoved when hearing the proclamation by Mao that “the Chinese people have finally stood up”？
Thirty years later, in his recent visit to China, PM Goh probably could hardly hear any eulogy to the late Mao Zedong such as “The east is red； the sun rises”。 Much more likely, it is the soft melodies by Teresa Teng the late star singer that people are now listening to.
Meanwhile, the ties between Singapore and China have turned colourless, without being tinged with either Red threat or White Terror.
Frequent exchanges between the two peoples make no news any longer. When a joint statement was issued recently by the two governments to mark the 10th anniversary of the establishment of their diplomatic ties and to map out an all-round cooperation, it turned out to be a non-event without raising any controversies, despite the far-reaching significance of the statement.
Yet it is of interest that, while the two peoples are increasingly close in contacts and still affectionate to each other, the passion of the past years is dying out between them. The heart-stirring language of revolution has given way to brisk business talks.
Seemingly paradoxical, this bears out a good cause-and-effect logic. Without some distance in thought and sentiment, there would not have been today's“multi-level and broad-based cooperation” between the two countries.
There needs to be some distance between countries；otherwise there can't be such thing as sovereignty. Yet this is only part of the reason why we should keep a distance.
Pressure in many aspects requires that we handle our relations with China with great caution. Singapore cannot afford to bear the label of “the third China”。
To steer clear of suspicion, Singapore established diplomatic ties with China only after all the other Asean countries had done so. Before or after a visit to China, leaders of the island-state would always make a trip to other major states in Asia.
Years ago, PM Goh said he needed to arouse a fever for things Indian, since there had been a fever for things Chinese.
At home, those who lead public opinion have described ethnic Chinese sentiments and culture as a hangover from history. These are seen as detrimental to the building of a national identity and to multiracialism.
The sentimental distance between Singapore and China stems from a desire for a distinct nationhood. Yet it is not without positive significance.
Singapore is not identical to China, hence our cool detachedness and objectivity. Herein lies Singapore's strength, which explains why Westerners have often consulted our leaders for advice on China-related issues.
In Singapore-China relations, there is always a tension between closeness and distance. Besides the need for distance, there is also a need for closer ties.
Ours is a commercial society, and naturally we would not distance ourselves from the huge market of China, given the advantages we have in cultural connections.
It is our assumption that, even though our Chinese language is far from perfect, we can outdo Westerners in business with China.
It takes further observation, though, to find out whether such an assumption will stand the test of reality, and whether the setback with Suzhou Industrial Park project is a mere exception.
Chinese-educated Singaporeans have been wavering between optimism and pessimism about the future of their ethnic language and culture. To some extent, this has been influenced by experts' views on China's economic growth.
On the whole, experts are optimistic. The question is, how long will China take to prosper economically, 30 or 40 years, or even longer？
The Chinese language and culture in Singapore are losing their vigour and strength, and time is of crucial importance for their revival. It is interesting that part of the cultural foundation of a society should hinge on the economic growth of another country. In the final analysis, Singaporean society still lacks a deep cultural root.
Throughout history, our island-state had absorbed cultural nutrition from the mainland of China. But there were times of back feeding, too. For instance, the locals joined efforts with people in China during the National Revolution led by Dr Sun Yat-sen and the War of Resistance against Japan.
Gone are the years of revolution and war, and Singapore is now an independent state. Today, Chinese Singaporeans relate themselve to their ancestral country in a cultural sense only, without identifying with it politically. Nevertheless, there is still ample scope for cooperation on a state-to-state basis.
Within China, two currents of development are contending for the leading role. One stands for the inland north driven by political power, the other, the coastal south propelled by economic growth.
Mostly from the south, our ancestors had characters of the southerners － they were flexible, open-minded, and adventurous.
Indeed, Singapore has been an experiment in cultural fusion, as it combines the culture of south China and the management system of the West.
If our experiment can keep on bearing fruit, won't it provide some inspiration to China in her quest for modernisation？
（Translated by Allen Zhuang）
發(fā)展新中“全方位”關(guān)系
吳作棟總理第一次走訪中國(guó)是在1971年。那時(shí),他任職于?；瘦喆?到中國(guó)是為了公司業(yè)務(wù)?？偫砘貞浾f(shuō),當(dāng)時(shí),新加坡人要到中國(guó)非常困難。文化*正如火如荼的展開(kāi),在火車(chē)上,在旅店內(nèi),在廁所里,到處都可聽(tīng)到歌頌毛主席的歌曲。在他看來(lái),這是一個(gè)陌生但又令人入迷的社會(huì)。
那是一個(gè)熱哄哄的時(shí)代,也是一個(gè)充滿(mǎn)政治禁忌的時(shí)代?？偫硭枥L的中國(guó),對(duì)當(dāng)時(shí)許多島國(guó)人民來(lái)說(shuō),是既陌生又熟悉。畢竟,人們對(duì)神州大地的種種,是百聞但難得一見(jiàn),然而,空間的阻隔,無(wú)礙思想的溝通。念方塊字的人,感受的到這古老大地百年來(lái)所忍受的恥辱,對(duì)于“中國(guó)人民站起來(lái)了”的宣告,誰(shuí)能無(wú)動(dòng)于衷？
事隔30年,總理最近在訪問(wèn)中國(guó)時(shí),已難聽(tīng)到“東方紅,太陽(yáng)升”的頌歌,人們更常聽(tīng)到的是鄧麗君的靡靡之音。中國(guó)已經(jīng)從“后毛”時(shí)代進(jìn)入“后鄧”時(shí)代,姓“資”還是姓“社”都變的不相干了。
新中兩地的關(guān)系早已進(jìn)入一種沒(méi)有色彩的境界——沒(méi)有紅色的威脅,也就沒(méi)有白色的恐怖。
兩地人民頻繁的往來(lái),已經(jīng)不是什么新聞了。也因?yàn)槿绱?當(dāng)兩國(guó)政府趁建交十周年發(fā)表聯(lián)合聲明,表示要全方位發(fā)展兩國(guó)關(guān)系時(shí),其意義和影響雖然深遠(yuǎn),島國(guó)內(nèi)外的輿論界都以平常心對(duì)待,沒(méi)有引起爭(zhēng)議。
有趣的是,正當(dāng)兩地人民接觸日益頻繁,彼此在精神和思想的溝通上,雖然仍覺(jué)親切,但少了往日的那股激情。令人心激動(dòng)的革命話語(yǔ),正由訴不盡的生意經(jīng)所取代。利之所及,人心難免生分。這看來(lái)矛盾,其實(shí),在這之間也存在一種因果關(guān)系——沒(méi)有情感和思想上的距離,也就難有今日“全方位”的關(guān)系。
國(guó)與國(guó)之間,總要有個(gè)距離,否則便無(wú)主權(quán)可言。然而,除了這個(gè)客觀道理,我們還面對(duì)各種內(nèi)外壓力,使我們加倍小心的經(jīng)營(yíng)與中國(guó)的關(guān)系?！暗谌袊?guó)”這頂大帽,我們?nèi)f萬(wàn)擔(dān)當(dāng)不起。為了避嫌,我們是亞細(xì)安國(guó)家中最遲與中國(guó)建交的一個(gè)。我們的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人走訪中國(guó)之前或之后,總會(huì)到其他亞洲大國(guó)走一趟。多年前,總理曾說(shuō),國(guó)內(nèi)已經(jīng)掀起“中國(guó)熱”,他因此要激起一點(diǎn)“印度熱”。
在國(guó)內(nèi),位居主流的輿論領(lǐng)袖已經(jīng)把民族情感,甚至母族文化,界定為歷史的包袱,說(shuō)它有礙國(guó)家認(rèn)同感的塑造,也有礙多元種族政策的貫徹。像蘇州工業(yè)園這樣的合作計(jì)劃,就觸動(dòng)了不少敏感的神經(jīng)。
新中兩地的感情距離,是出自防衛(wèi)心理,不過(guò),它也不乏積極意義。我們和中國(guó)不盡相同,因此就有了旁觀者的冷靜與客觀,這也正是我們對(duì)中國(guó)的價(jià)值所在,否則,西方人也不會(huì)經(jīng)常征求我國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人對(duì)中國(guó)的看法。
綜觀新中關(guān)系,在密與疏之間一直存在著深刻的張力。在求“密”這一端的動(dòng)力也不小。我們是工商業(yè)社會(huì),自然不愿自絕于這個(gè)龐大市場(chǎng)之外,更何況我們自認(rèn)擁有一點(diǎn)的優(yōu)勢(shì)。我國(guó)的一家新聞電視臺(tái)的賣(mài)點(diǎn)不就是：“我們了解亞洲”。我們的假設(shè)是,即使華語(yǔ)講的結(jié)結(jié)巴巴,我們?cè)谥袊?guó)市場(chǎng)上總比洋人強(qiáng)。這樣的假設(shè)是不是經(jīng)得起考驗(yàn)？蘇州工業(yè)園的經(jīng)驗(yàn)是不是一個(gè)例外？還有待觀察。
自古以來(lái),經(jīng)濟(jì)往往帶動(dòng)一切。美國(guó)是世界經(jīng)濟(jì)首富,美國(guó)文化席卷全球并非偶然。東方人因此深感壓力,非有一頭金發(fā),非有一個(gè)洋名,就不像一個(gè)現(xiàn)代人。這或許是悲哀,但是,經(jīng)濟(jì)的力量的確是鋪天蓋地,影響所及,包括一個(gè)民族的自尊。
在新加坡,受華文教育者對(duì)文化前景的看法,時(shí)而悲觀,時(shí)而樂(lè)觀,這與專(zhuān)家對(duì)中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)展望的看法不無(wú)關(guān)系?？傮w來(lái)說(shuō),專(zhuān)家還是樂(lè)觀的,問(wèn)題在于時(shí)間：中國(guó)是需要30年、40年或更長(zhǎng)的時(shí)間,才能算上岸？。本地的華文華語(yǔ),生命力漸失,因此時(shí)間至為緊要。說(shuō)來(lái)也妙,一個(gè)社會(huì)的文化本質(zhì),竟然維系于另一個(gè)國(guó)家的經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展。追根究底,是因?yàn)槲覀兊纳鐣?huì)缺乏足夠的文化自發(fā)力。其實(shí),我們這個(gè)小島國(guó),本來(lái)就缺乏孕育文化的沃土,本來(lái)就有一條連接文化母體的臍帶,因?yàn)榉N種的政治社會(huì)因素,這條臍帶日益退化。
翻開(kāi)歷史,島國(guó)不斷從大陸吸收文化養(yǎng)分,但也有反哺的時(shí)候。
孫中山發(fā)起的革命運(yùn)動(dòng),中國(guó)八年抗日戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng),本地人都熱烈的響應(yīng),出錢(qián)出力,也因此付出了代價(jià),在二次大戰(zhàn)期間受到日軍無(wú)情的對(duì)待。
我們已是一個(gè)獨(dú)立的國(guó)家,那個(gè)灑熱血的時(shí)代已經(jīng)過(guò)去,我們現(xiàn)在只談“文化中國(guó)”,避免“政治中國(guó)”的認(rèn)同。但是,在國(guó)與國(guó)基礎(chǔ)上,新中仍大有合作和互相學(xué)習(xí)之處。
在中國(guó),象征內(nèi)陸中國(guó)和象征南部沿海中國(guó)的兩股巨流正在角逐,前者以政治掛帥,后者則以經(jīng)濟(jì)掛帥。我們的祖先多來(lái)自南方,他們深具南方人的特性：機(jī)靈、開(kāi)放和敢于冒險(xiǎn)。他們?cè)谶@個(gè)島國(guó)上開(kāi)拓了與中國(guó)大陸截然不同的政治和經(jīng)濟(jì)天地。
實(shí)際上,新加坡本身就是一個(gè)文化融合的實(shí)驗(yàn)：南中國(guó)文化和西方管理制度的融合。如果我們這場(chǎng)實(shí)驗(yàn)?zāi)芾^續(xù)開(kāi)花結(jié)果,這對(duì)中國(guó)或許也是一個(gè)小小的啟示。
本月初,江澤民主席說(shuō),他很高興吳總理在“春光明媚”的時(shí)候訪問(wèn)北京。但愿兩國(guó)關(guān)系在如沐春風(fēng)之際,我們還能薪盡火傳,還能欣賞一年比一年秀麗的北國(guó)春光。