在競爭殘酷的美國商界，首席執(zhí)行官們很少被人視為可以訴苦的對象，或者是職業(yè)發(fā)展方面可信賴的顧問。
In America's dog-eat-dog business world, chief executives are rarely seen as friendly shoulders to cry on or trusted advisers on career development.
然而，代表投資者對公司進行批判性分析的華爾街分析師，卻把其研究對象公司的首席執(zhí)行官視為這樣的人。
But that is exactly how Wall Street analysts - whose job is to cast a critical eye on companies on behalf of investors - appeared to have regarded the executives of companies they covered.
日前公布的一份學(xué)術(shù)研究報告顯示，數(shù)百名股票分析師曾向企業(yè)首席執(zhí)行官們尋求幫助，涉及內(nèi)容包羅萬象，從如何與該銀行的客戶見面，到他們的個人問題。
According to an academic study to be released today, hundreds of equity analysts asked executives for favours ranging from meetings with their banks' clients to advice on personal matters.
多數(shù)首席執(zhí)行官會答應(yīng)這些請求，但這種慷慨的價碼很高：如果公司業(yè)績遜色，或進行了一宗風(fēng)險較高的并購交易，接受幫忙的分析師將不太可能調(diào)降該公司的評級。
Most executives obliged but their generosity came at a price: analysts on the receiving end of executives' favours were less likely to downgrade a company as a result of poor earnings or a risky acquisition.
相應(yīng)的，如果知道另一位分析師因為發(fā)布了對該公司不利的研究報告，因而在尋求幫助時遭到該公司拒絕，那么，其他分析師們采取類似行為的可能性也大大降低。
Similarly, knowing that another analyst had been denied favours as a result of negative coverage made analysts much less likely to take similar action.
這一史無前例的研究顯示，近年來一直縈繞在華爾街和美國企業(yè)界關(guān)系上的利益沖突問題依然存在，且相當(dāng)嚴重。該研究報告的作者為密歇根大學(xué)(University of Michigan)的詹姆斯o韋斯特法爾(James Westphal)和得克薩斯大學(xué)(University of Texas)的邁克爾o克萊門特(Michael Clement)。
The unprecedented research - by James Westphal of the University of Michigan and Michael Clement of the University of Texas - suggests that the conflicts of interests that have plagued the interaction between Wall Street and corporate America in recent years are alive and well.
韋斯特法爾表示："這是首席執(zhí)行官和分析師之間關(guān)系的副作用，這種關(guān)系可能會削弱分析師建議的客觀性。"如果分析師確實受到了首席執(zhí)行官幫忙的影響，那么投資者，尤其是散戶投資者，怎么能信賴分析師的研究報告呢？
"This is a side-effect of the relationship between executives and analysts that can perhaps compromise the objectivity of their recommendations," says Mr Westphal. But if analysts are indeed swayed by chief executives' largesse, how could investors, especially retail investors, trust their calls?
華爾街分析師的獨立性曾多次遭到質(zhì)疑。然而，直到現(xiàn)在，監(jiān)管機構(gòu)的重點一直放在將投行內(nèi)部的業(yè)務(wù)員和薦股分析師脫離關(guān)系上。自從安然(Enron)丑聞爆發(fā)后，美國已經(jīng)進行了相關(guān)改革，兩者的關(guān)系已不那么密切了。
The independence of Wall Street analysts has been repeatedly questioned. Until now, however, the regulatory spotlight had focused on unwinding the relationship between dealmakers and stockpickers within investment banks, which has become much less cosy since post-Enron reforms.
至于分析師和企業(yè)首席執(zhí)行官之間的關(guān)系，多數(shù)觀察人士認為，主要問題在2000年就已解決了。當(dāng)時，美國監(jiān)管者將企業(yè)向某些分析師透露股價敏感信息列為非法行為。
As for the links between analysts and executives, most observers believed the main problem had been resolved in 2000, when US regulators outlawed the disclosure of price-sensitive information to selected analysts.
然而，這一最新研究卻采取了與眾不同的方式。調(diào)查于2001年至2003年進行，針對1800多名分析師進行了問卷調(diào)查，他們的回答得到了數(shù)百名首席執(zhí)行官的驗證。
But the new study - carried out between 2001 and 2003 on more than 1,800 analysts whose responses were cross-checked with those of hundreds of executives - takes a different approach.
調(diào)查的出發(fā)點是兩個心理學(xué)公理：第一，個人會對那些向他們提供幫助的人心存感激。第二，如果人認為自己能從幫助中得到某些東西，他們更有可能向他人提供幫助。
Its starting point is two psychological axioms: that individuals feel grateful to those doing them a favour; and that human beings are more likely to bestow a favour on someone when they think there is something in it for them.
然而，調(diào)查結(jié)果甚至令報告的作者感到意外。他們表示，他們就爭議性較小的事情提出長長的問題，再把這個問題隱藏在其中，這樣，分析師就會承認曾接受過幫助。
The findings, however, surprised even the authors of the report, who say they were able to get analysts to admit to receiving favours by burying the questions within a long questionnaire on less controversial, issues.
研究者發(fā)現(xiàn)，公司未能實現(xiàn)業(yè)績預(yù)期的次數(shù)越多，首席執(zhí)行官們向分析師提供幫忙的可能性也就越大，尤其是對于那些的分析師。
The researchers found that the more a company missed its earnings forecast, the more chief executives were likely to offer favours to analysts, particularly the highly rated ones.
可能更為令人意外的是，這一策略似乎很有用。
Perhaps more surprisingly, the tactic appeared to work.
如果一家公司在其核心市場之外進行高風(fēng)險并購，"接受幫忙"的分析師對該公司降級的可能性減少了65%。
In the case of a risky acquisition that moved the company away from its core markets, the likelihood of a downgrade by a "favoured" analyst was cut by 65 per cent.
華爾街觀察人士表示，接受研究對象的幫忙，違反了行業(yè)組織CFA協(xié)會(CFA Institute)的行為準則。
Wall Street observers said that accepting favours from companies under coverage is a breach of the code of conduct of the CFA Institute, the trade body.
然而，前電信業(yè)高級分析師、《一位華爾街分析師的自白》(Confessions of a Wall Street Analyst)作者丹o萊因戈爾德(Dan Reingold)表示，盡管這些調(diào)查結(jié)果令人意外，但它提醒人們，研究分析中存在利益沖突。
But Dan Reingold, a former top telecoms analyst and author of Confessions of a Wall Street Analyst, said that, although the findings were surprising, they served as a reminder that there remained conflicts of interest in research.
他表示，主要的利益沖突包括接近公司管理層以及獲得公司信息，但他補充稱，這對于機構(gòu)投資者的重要性要小于散戶投資者。
He said the key conflicts involved access to company management and information flow, but added that they were less important for institutional investors than for retail investors.
"機構(gòu)投資者通常都知道某一位分析師是否與某家公司的管理層關(guān)系非常密切，因此，它們會有意無意地質(zhì)疑分析師的推薦。它們會擠掉分析師建議中的水分。但閱讀這份研究報告的散戶投資者對里面的這些關(guān)系毫不知情。"
"Institutional investors will often know if a particular analyst is very close to certain managements and therefore might either consciously or unconsciously tilt their recommendations. They can discount the recommendations. The retail client who reads the research has no idea about any of these relationships."
德意志銀行(Deutsche Bank)銀行業(yè)分析師邁克o梅奧(Mike Mayo)很早之前就表示，分析師面臨的來自研究對象的壓力，與來自投資銀行同事的壓力一樣大。
Mike Mayo, banking analyst at Deutsche Bank, has long argued that the pressure analysts come under from the companies they cover is as significant as the pressure from their investment banking colleagues.
2002年安然丑聞爆發(fā)后，梅奧在向美國參議院銀行委員會(Senate banking committee)作證表示，公司及其管理層是的信息來源，"看好這個公司并存在利益沖突的分析師"可能最了解這些信息。
In testimony to the Senate banking committee following the Enron scandal in 2002, Mr Mayo said that companies and their managements were the best source of information and "bullish and conflicted analysts" may have the best access to this information.
In America's dog-eat-dog business world, chief executives are rarely seen as friendly shoulders to cry on or trusted advisers on career development.
然而，代表投資者對公司進行批判性分析的華爾街分析師，卻把其研究對象公司的首席執(zhí)行官視為這樣的人。
But that is exactly how Wall Street analysts - whose job is to cast a critical eye on companies on behalf of investors - appeared to have regarded the executives of companies they covered.
日前公布的一份學(xué)術(shù)研究報告顯示，數(shù)百名股票分析師曾向企業(yè)首席執(zhí)行官們尋求幫助，涉及內(nèi)容包羅萬象，從如何與該銀行的客戶見面，到他們的個人問題。
According to an academic study to be released today, hundreds of equity analysts asked executives for favours ranging from meetings with their banks' clients to advice on personal matters.
多數(shù)首席執(zhí)行官會答應(yīng)這些請求，但這種慷慨的價碼很高：如果公司業(yè)績遜色，或進行了一宗風(fēng)險較高的并購交易，接受幫忙的分析師將不太可能調(diào)降該公司的評級。
Most executives obliged but their generosity came at a price: analysts on the receiving end of executives' favours were less likely to downgrade a company as a result of poor earnings or a risky acquisition.
相應(yīng)的，如果知道另一位分析師因為發(fā)布了對該公司不利的研究報告，因而在尋求幫助時遭到該公司拒絕，那么，其他分析師們采取類似行為的可能性也大大降低。
Similarly, knowing that another analyst had been denied favours as a result of negative coverage made analysts much less likely to take similar action.
這一史無前例的研究顯示，近年來一直縈繞在華爾街和美國企業(yè)界關(guān)系上的利益沖突問題依然存在，且相當(dāng)嚴重。該研究報告的作者為密歇根大學(xué)(University of Michigan)的詹姆斯o韋斯特法爾(James Westphal)和得克薩斯大學(xué)(University of Texas)的邁克爾o克萊門特(Michael Clement)。
The unprecedented research - by James Westphal of the University of Michigan and Michael Clement of the University of Texas - suggests that the conflicts of interests that have plagued the interaction between Wall Street and corporate America in recent years are alive and well.
韋斯特法爾表示："這是首席執(zhí)行官和分析師之間關(guān)系的副作用，這種關(guān)系可能會削弱分析師建議的客觀性。"如果分析師確實受到了首席執(zhí)行官幫忙的影響，那么投資者，尤其是散戶投資者，怎么能信賴分析師的研究報告呢？
"This is a side-effect of the relationship between executives and analysts that can perhaps compromise the objectivity of their recommendations," says Mr Westphal. But if analysts are indeed swayed by chief executives' largesse, how could investors, especially retail investors, trust their calls?
華爾街分析師的獨立性曾多次遭到質(zhì)疑。然而，直到現(xiàn)在，監(jiān)管機構(gòu)的重點一直放在將投行內(nèi)部的業(yè)務(wù)員和薦股分析師脫離關(guān)系上。自從安然(Enron)丑聞爆發(fā)后，美國已經(jīng)進行了相關(guān)改革，兩者的關(guān)系已不那么密切了。
The independence of Wall Street analysts has been repeatedly questioned. Until now, however, the regulatory spotlight had focused on unwinding the relationship between dealmakers and stockpickers within investment banks, which has become much less cosy since post-Enron reforms.
至于分析師和企業(yè)首席執(zhí)行官之間的關(guān)系，多數(shù)觀察人士認為，主要問題在2000年就已解決了。當(dāng)時，美國監(jiān)管者將企業(yè)向某些分析師透露股價敏感信息列為非法行為。
As for the links between analysts and executives, most observers believed the main problem had been resolved in 2000, when US regulators outlawed the disclosure of price-sensitive information to selected analysts.
然而，這一最新研究卻采取了與眾不同的方式。調(diào)查于2001年至2003年進行，針對1800多名分析師進行了問卷調(diào)查，他們的回答得到了數(shù)百名首席執(zhí)行官的驗證。
But the new study - carried out between 2001 and 2003 on more than 1,800 analysts whose responses were cross-checked with those of hundreds of executives - takes a different approach.
調(diào)查的出發(fā)點是兩個心理學(xué)公理：第一，個人會對那些向他們提供幫助的人心存感激。第二，如果人認為自己能從幫助中得到某些東西，他們更有可能向他人提供幫助。
Its starting point is two psychological axioms: that individuals feel grateful to those doing them a favour; and that human beings are more likely to bestow a favour on someone when they think there is something in it for them.
然而，調(diào)查結(jié)果甚至令報告的作者感到意外。他們表示，他們就爭議性較小的事情提出長長的問題，再把這個問題隱藏在其中，這樣，分析師就會承認曾接受過幫助。
The findings, however, surprised even the authors of the report, who say they were able to get analysts to admit to receiving favours by burying the questions within a long questionnaire on less controversial, issues.
研究者發(fā)現(xiàn)，公司未能實現(xiàn)業(yè)績預(yù)期的次數(shù)越多，首席執(zhí)行官們向分析師提供幫忙的可能性也就越大，尤其是對于那些的分析師。
The researchers found that the more a company missed its earnings forecast, the more chief executives were likely to offer favours to analysts, particularly the highly rated ones.
可能更為令人意外的是，這一策略似乎很有用。
Perhaps more surprisingly, the tactic appeared to work.
如果一家公司在其核心市場之外進行高風(fēng)險并購，"接受幫忙"的分析師對該公司降級的可能性減少了65%。
In the case of a risky acquisition that moved the company away from its core markets, the likelihood of a downgrade by a "favoured" analyst was cut by 65 per cent.
華爾街觀察人士表示，接受研究對象的幫忙，違反了行業(yè)組織CFA協(xié)會(CFA Institute)的行為準則。
Wall Street observers said that accepting favours from companies under coverage is a breach of the code of conduct of the CFA Institute, the trade body.
然而，前電信業(yè)高級分析師、《一位華爾街分析師的自白》(Confessions of a Wall Street Analyst)作者丹o萊因戈爾德(Dan Reingold)表示，盡管這些調(diào)查結(jié)果令人意外，但它提醒人們，研究分析中存在利益沖突。
But Dan Reingold, a former top telecoms analyst and author of Confessions of a Wall Street Analyst, said that, although the findings were surprising, they served as a reminder that there remained conflicts of interest in research.
他表示，主要的利益沖突包括接近公司管理層以及獲得公司信息，但他補充稱，這對于機構(gòu)投資者的重要性要小于散戶投資者。
He said the key conflicts involved access to company management and information flow, but added that they were less important for institutional investors than for retail investors.
"機構(gòu)投資者通常都知道某一位分析師是否與某家公司的管理層關(guān)系非常密切，因此，它們會有意無意地質(zhì)疑分析師的推薦。它們會擠掉分析師建議中的水分。但閱讀這份研究報告的散戶投資者對里面的這些關(guān)系毫不知情。"
"Institutional investors will often know if a particular analyst is very close to certain managements and therefore might either consciously or unconsciously tilt their recommendations. They can discount the recommendations. The retail client who reads the research has no idea about any of these relationships."
德意志銀行(Deutsche Bank)銀行業(yè)分析師邁克o梅奧(Mike Mayo)很早之前就表示，分析師面臨的來自研究對象的壓力，與來自投資銀行同事的壓力一樣大。
Mike Mayo, banking analyst at Deutsche Bank, has long argued that the pressure analysts come under from the companies they cover is as significant as the pressure from their investment banking colleagues.
2002年安然丑聞爆發(fā)后，梅奧在向美國參議院銀行委員會(Senate banking committee)作證表示，公司及其管理層是的信息來源，"看好這個公司并存在利益沖突的分析師"可能最了解這些信息。
In testimony to the Senate banking committee following the Enron scandal in 2002, Mr Mayo said that companies and their managements were the best source of information and "bullish and conflicted analysts" may have the best access to this information.