ADDRESS TO SECURITY COUNCIL ON IRAQI VIOLATIONS OF RES. 1441
COLIN L. POWELL, 10:30 A.M. EST, 2003.2.5
1. Thank you, Mr. President. Mr. President and Mr. Secretary General, distinguished colleagues, I would like to begin by expressing my thanks for the special effort that each of you made to be here today. This is an important day for us all as we review the situation with respect to Iraq and its disarmament obligations under UN Security Council Resolution 1441.
2. Last November 8th, this Council passed Resolution 1441 by a unanimous vote. The purpose of that resolution was to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction. Iraq had already been found guilty of material breach of its obligations stretching back over 16 previous resolutions and 12 years.
3. Resolution 1441 was not dealing with an innocent party, but a regime this Council has repeatedly convicted over the years.
4. Resolution 1441 gave Iraq one last chance, one last chance to come into compliance or to face serious consequences. No Council member present and voting on that day had any illusions about the nature and intent of the resolution or what serious consequences meant if Iraq did not comply.
5. And to assist in its disarmament, we called on Iraq to cooperate with returning inspectors from UNMOVIC and IAEA. We laid down tough standards for Iraq to meet to allow the inspectors to do their job.
6. This Council placed the burden on Iraq to comply and disarm, and not on the inspectors to find that which Iraq has gone out of its way to conceal for so long. Inspectors are inspectors; they are not detectives.
7. I asked for this session today for two purposes. First, to support the core assessments made by Dr. Blix and Dr. El Baradei. As Dr. Blix reported to this Council on January 27th, "Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament which was demanded of it."
8. And as Dr. El Baradei reported, Iraq's declaration of December 7th "did not provide any new information relevant to certain questions that have been outstanding since 1998."
9. My second purpose today is to provide you with additional information, to share with you what the United States knows about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, as well as Iraq's involvement in terrorism, which is also the subject of Resolution 1441 and other earlier resolutions.
10. I might add at this point that we are providing all relevant information we can to the inspection teams for them to do their work.
11. The material I will present to you comes from a variety of sources. Some are U.S. sources and some are those of other countries. Some are the sources are technical, such as intercepted telephone conversations and photos taken by satellites. Other sources are people who have risked their lives to let the world know what Saddam Hussein is really up to.
12. I cannot tell you everything that we know, but what I can share with you, when combined with what all of us have learned over the years, is deeply troubling. What you will see is an accumulation of facts and disturbing patterns of behavior. The facts and Iraqis' behavior, Iraq's behavior, demonstrate that Saddam Hussein and his regime have made no effort, no effort, to disarm, as required by the international community.
13. Indeed, the facts and Iraq's behavior show that Saddam Hussein and his regime are concealing their efforts to produce more weapons of mass destruction.
14. Let me begin by playing a tape for you. What you're about to hear is a conversation that my government monitored. It takes place on November 26th of last year, on the day before United Nations teams resumed inspections in Iraq. The conversation involves two senior officers, a colonel and a brigadier general from Iraq's elite military unit, the Republican Guard. (The tape is played.)
15. Let me pause and review some of the key elements of this conversation that you just heard between these two officers.
16. First, they acknowledge that our colleague, Mohammed El Baradei is coming, and they know what he's coming for and they know he's coming the next day. He's coming to look for things that are prohibited. He is expecting these gentlemen to cooperate with him and not hide things.
17. But they're worried. We have this modified vehicle. What do we say if one of them sees it? What is their concern? Their concern is that it's something they should not have, something that should not be seen.
18. The general was incredulous: (tape script)
"You didn't get it modified. You don't have one of those, do you?" "I have one." "Which? From where?" "From the workshop. From the Al-Kindi Company." "What?" "From Al-Kindi." "I'll come to see you in the morning. I'm worried you all have something left." "We evacuated everything. We don't have anything left."
19. Note what he says: "We evacuated everything." We didn't destroy it. We didn't line it up for inspection. We didn't turn it into the inspectors. We evacuated it to make sure it was not around when the inspectors showed up. "I will come to you tomorrow."
20. The Al-Kindi Company. This is a company that is well known to have been involved in prohibited weapons systems activity.
1. 鮑威爾國務(wù)卿：謝謝你，主席先生。主席先生和秘書長先生，尊敬的同事們，首先我對(duì)各位今天專門到這里來表示感謝。今天是我們審議伊拉克局勢(shì)和它履行聯(lián)合國安理會(huì)第1441號(hào)決議規(guī)定的解除武器義務(wù)情況的重要一天。
2. 去年11月8日，聯(lián)合國安理會(huì)一致投票通過第1441號(hào)決議。決議的目的是解除伊拉克的大規(guī)模毀滅性武器。此前，伊拉克已經(jīng)被確定實(shí)質(zhì)性地違反了12年來的16項(xiàng)聯(lián)合國決議所規(guī)定的義務(wù)。
3. 第1441號(hào)決議針對(duì)的不是一個(gè)無辜的政權(quán)，而是一個(gè)被安理會(huì)多年來屢次確定違規(guī)的政權(quán)。
4. 第1441號(hào)決議給伊拉克最后一次機(jī)會(huì)，最后一次機(jī)會(huì)去履行聯(lián)合國決議，否則將面臨嚴(yán)重后果。那天在場(chǎng)投票的安理會(huì)成員，沒有人對(duì)決議的實(shí)質(zhì)和意圖、或者對(duì)如果伊拉克不履行決議的“嚴(yán)重后果”意味著什么有任何錯(cuò)覺。
5. 為了協(xié)助伊拉克消除武器，我們要求伊拉克為聯(lián)合國監(jiān)測(cè)、核查和視察委員會(huì)(UNMOVIC)和國際原子能機(jī)構(gòu)(IAEA)核查人員返回伊拉克提供合作。我們提出了要伊拉克遵守的嚴(yán)格標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，以便使核查人員展開工作。
6. 安理會(huì)規(guī)定，履行決議和消除武器的責(zé)任在于伊拉克，而不是靠核查人員找出伊拉克這么久以來所竭盡全力隱藏的東西。核查人員的工作是核查；他們不是偵探。
7. 我請(qǐng)求召開今天這個(gè)會(huì)議有兩個(gè)目的。第一，支持布利克斯博士和厄爾巴拉迪博士做出的評(píng)估要點(diǎn)。正如布利克斯博士1月27日向安理會(huì)報(bào)告時(shí)所說，"甚至在今天，伊拉克看來仍沒有真正接受對(duì)它的解除武器的要求。"
8. 也正如厄爾巴拉迪博士所報(bào)告的，伊拉克12月7日提交的報(bào)告"沒有提供任何與1998年以來一直懸而未決的某些問題相關(guān)的新的信息"。
9. 我今天的第二個(gè)目的，是向你們提供更多的信息，向你們介紹美國掌握的有關(guān)伊拉克大規(guī)模毀滅性武器和伊拉克與恐怖主義的聯(lián)系的情況。這也是第1441號(hào)決議和其他早期決議涉及的問題。
10. 我不妨在此補(bǔ)充一句，我們正在盡可能地將所有相關(guān)信息提供給武器核查小組，便于他們進(jìn)行工作。
11. 我將向你們提供的材料來自許多方面。有些是美國的來源，有些來自其他國家。有些是通過技術(shù)手段，如偵聽截獲的電話談話和衛(wèi)星拍攝的照片。另有些是那些冒著生命危險(xiǎn)讓全世界了解薩達(dá)姆·侯賽因究竟在搞什么陰謀詭計(jì)的人。
12. 我無法向你們公布我們所掌握的全部情況，但是，一旦把我將能向你們介紹的情況與我們所有人多年來所已經(jīng)了解的情況聯(lián)系到一起，情況深深令人不安。你們所將看到的，是積累起來的大量事實(shí)和令人不安的行為模式。事實(shí)和伊拉克的行徑表明，薩達(dá)姆·侯賽因及其政權(quán)絲毫沒有 - 絲毫沒有 - 按照國際社會(huì)的要求消除武器。
13. 事實(shí)上，事實(shí)和伊拉克的行徑表明，薩達(dá)姆·侯賽因及其政權(quán)在隱藏其生產(chǎn)更多的大規(guī)模毀滅性武器的努力。
14. 讓我先給你們放一段錄音。你們即將聽到的是我國政府監(jiān)聽的一段對(duì)話。對(duì)話時(shí)間是去年11月26日，也就是聯(lián)合國小組恢復(fù)在伊拉克的核查工作的前一天。對(duì)話雙方是伊拉克的精銳部隊(duì)"共和國衛(wèi)隊(duì)"中的兩名高級(jí)軍官，一名上校和一名準(zhǔn)將。(放錄音)
15. 讓我停下來重復(fù)一下你們剛剛聽到的這兩名軍官之間對(duì)話中的一些關(guān)鍵內(nèi)容。
16. 首先，他們提到我們的同事穆罕默德·厄爾巴拉迪要來，他們知道他要來的目的，知道他第二天到。他是來查找違禁物品的。他期待這兩位先生同他合作，不藏匿物品。
17. 但是他們很擔(dān)心。我們有這種經(jīng)過改裝的車輛。如果被他們其中一個(gè)人看見了，我們?cè)趺凑f？他們擔(dān)心什么？他們擔(dān)心的是，這種東西是他們不應(yīng)當(dāng)有的，這種東西是不能被發(fā)現(xiàn)的。
18. 那位將軍表示懷疑：(錄音稿)
"你沒有那種改裝過的車輛。你沒有那樣的東西，是不是？" "我有一輛。"
"哪一輛？從哪里來的？" "從車間，從'金迪'公司。"
"什么？" "從'金迪'公司來的。"
"我早上去你那里看看。我擔(dān)心你們都有些遺留的東西。"
"我們撤走了每樣?xùn)|西。我們沒有留下任何東西。"
19. 請(qǐng)注意他說的話："我們撤走了每樣?xùn)|西。"我們沒有銷毀它們。我們沒有把它們一一拿出來接受檢查。我們沒有把它們交給核查人員。我們把它們撤走了，以確保在核查人員出現(xiàn)時(shí)，它們不在那里。"我明天去你那里看看。"
20. "金迪"公司，這是一家眾所周知的進(jìn)行同違禁武器系統(tǒng)有關(guān)的活動(dòng)的公司。
COLIN L. POWELL, 10:30 A.M. EST, 2003.2.5
1. Thank you, Mr. President. Mr. President and Mr. Secretary General, distinguished colleagues, I would like to begin by expressing my thanks for the special effort that each of you made to be here today. This is an important day for us all as we review the situation with respect to Iraq and its disarmament obligations under UN Security Council Resolution 1441.
2. Last November 8th, this Council passed Resolution 1441 by a unanimous vote. The purpose of that resolution was to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction. Iraq had already been found guilty of material breach of its obligations stretching back over 16 previous resolutions and 12 years.
3. Resolution 1441 was not dealing with an innocent party, but a regime this Council has repeatedly convicted over the years.
4. Resolution 1441 gave Iraq one last chance, one last chance to come into compliance or to face serious consequences. No Council member present and voting on that day had any illusions about the nature and intent of the resolution or what serious consequences meant if Iraq did not comply.
5. And to assist in its disarmament, we called on Iraq to cooperate with returning inspectors from UNMOVIC and IAEA. We laid down tough standards for Iraq to meet to allow the inspectors to do their job.
6. This Council placed the burden on Iraq to comply and disarm, and not on the inspectors to find that which Iraq has gone out of its way to conceal for so long. Inspectors are inspectors; they are not detectives.
7. I asked for this session today for two purposes. First, to support the core assessments made by Dr. Blix and Dr. El Baradei. As Dr. Blix reported to this Council on January 27th, "Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament which was demanded of it."
8. And as Dr. El Baradei reported, Iraq's declaration of December 7th "did not provide any new information relevant to certain questions that have been outstanding since 1998."
9. My second purpose today is to provide you with additional information, to share with you what the United States knows about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, as well as Iraq's involvement in terrorism, which is also the subject of Resolution 1441 and other earlier resolutions.
10. I might add at this point that we are providing all relevant information we can to the inspection teams for them to do their work.
11. The material I will present to you comes from a variety of sources. Some are U.S. sources and some are those of other countries. Some are the sources are technical, such as intercepted telephone conversations and photos taken by satellites. Other sources are people who have risked their lives to let the world know what Saddam Hussein is really up to.
12. I cannot tell you everything that we know, but what I can share with you, when combined with what all of us have learned over the years, is deeply troubling. What you will see is an accumulation of facts and disturbing patterns of behavior. The facts and Iraqis' behavior, Iraq's behavior, demonstrate that Saddam Hussein and his regime have made no effort, no effort, to disarm, as required by the international community.
13. Indeed, the facts and Iraq's behavior show that Saddam Hussein and his regime are concealing their efforts to produce more weapons of mass destruction.
14. Let me begin by playing a tape for you. What you're about to hear is a conversation that my government monitored. It takes place on November 26th of last year, on the day before United Nations teams resumed inspections in Iraq. The conversation involves two senior officers, a colonel and a brigadier general from Iraq's elite military unit, the Republican Guard. (The tape is played.)
15. Let me pause and review some of the key elements of this conversation that you just heard between these two officers.
16. First, they acknowledge that our colleague, Mohammed El Baradei is coming, and they know what he's coming for and they know he's coming the next day. He's coming to look for things that are prohibited. He is expecting these gentlemen to cooperate with him and not hide things.
17. But they're worried. We have this modified vehicle. What do we say if one of them sees it? What is their concern? Their concern is that it's something they should not have, something that should not be seen.
18. The general was incredulous: (tape script)
"You didn't get it modified. You don't have one of those, do you?" "I have one." "Which? From where?" "From the workshop. From the Al-Kindi Company." "What?" "From Al-Kindi." "I'll come to see you in the morning. I'm worried you all have something left." "We evacuated everything. We don't have anything left."
19. Note what he says: "We evacuated everything." We didn't destroy it. We didn't line it up for inspection. We didn't turn it into the inspectors. We evacuated it to make sure it was not around when the inspectors showed up. "I will come to you tomorrow."
20. The Al-Kindi Company. This is a company that is well known to have been involved in prohibited weapons systems activity.
1. 鮑威爾國務(wù)卿：謝謝你，主席先生。主席先生和秘書長先生，尊敬的同事們，首先我對(duì)各位今天專門到這里來表示感謝。今天是我們審議伊拉克局勢(shì)和它履行聯(lián)合國安理會(huì)第1441號(hào)決議規(guī)定的解除武器義務(wù)情況的重要一天。
2. 去年11月8日，聯(lián)合國安理會(huì)一致投票通過第1441號(hào)決議。決議的目的是解除伊拉克的大規(guī)模毀滅性武器。此前，伊拉克已經(jīng)被確定實(shí)質(zhì)性地違反了12年來的16項(xiàng)聯(lián)合國決議所規(guī)定的義務(wù)。
3. 第1441號(hào)決議針對(duì)的不是一個(gè)無辜的政權(quán)，而是一個(gè)被安理會(huì)多年來屢次確定違規(guī)的政權(quán)。
4. 第1441號(hào)決議給伊拉克最后一次機(jī)會(huì)，最后一次機(jī)會(huì)去履行聯(lián)合國決議，否則將面臨嚴(yán)重后果。那天在場(chǎng)投票的安理會(huì)成員，沒有人對(duì)決議的實(shí)質(zhì)和意圖、或者對(duì)如果伊拉克不履行決議的“嚴(yán)重后果”意味著什么有任何錯(cuò)覺。
5. 為了協(xié)助伊拉克消除武器，我們要求伊拉克為聯(lián)合國監(jiān)測(cè)、核查和視察委員會(huì)(UNMOVIC)和國際原子能機(jī)構(gòu)(IAEA)核查人員返回伊拉克提供合作。我們提出了要伊拉克遵守的嚴(yán)格標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，以便使核查人員展開工作。
6. 安理會(huì)規(guī)定，履行決議和消除武器的責(zé)任在于伊拉克，而不是靠核查人員找出伊拉克這么久以來所竭盡全力隱藏的東西。核查人員的工作是核查；他們不是偵探。
7. 我請(qǐng)求召開今天這個(gè)會(huì)議有兩個(gè)目的。第一，支持布利克斯博士和厄爾巴拉迪博士做出的評(píng)估要點(diǎn)。正如布利克斯博士1月27日向安理會(huì)報(bào)告時(shí)所說，"甚至在今天，伊拉克看來仍沒有真正接受對(duì)它的解除武器的要求。"
8. 也正如厄爾巴拉迪博士所報(bào)告的，伊拉克12月7日提交的報(bào)告"沒有提供任何與1998年以來一直懸而未決的某些問題相關(guān)的新的信息"。
9. 我今天的第二個(gè)目的，是向你們提供更多的信息，向你們介紹美國掌握的有關(guān)伊拉克大規(guī)模毀滅性武器和伊拉克與恐怖主義的聯(lián)系的情況。這也是第1441號(hào)決議和其他早期決議涉及的問題。
10. 我不妨在此補(bǔ)充一句，我們正在盡可能地將所有相關(guān)信息提供給武器核查小組，便于他們進(jìn)行工作。
11. 我將向你們提供的材料來自許多方面。有些是美國的來源，有些來自其他國家。有些是通過技術(shù)手段，如偵聽截獲的電話談話和衛(wèi)星拍攝的照片。另有些是那些冒著生命危險(xiǎn)讓全世界了解薩達(dá)姆·侯賽因究竟在搞什么陰謀詭計(jì)的人。
12. 我無法向你們公布我們所掌握的全部情況，但是，一旦把我將能向你們介紹的情況與我們所有人多年來所已經(jīng)了解的情況聯(lián)系到一起，情況深深令人不安。你們所將看到的，是積累起來的大量事實(shí)和令人不安的行為模式。事實(shí)和伊拉克的行徑表明，薩達(dá)姆·侯賽因及其政權(quán)絲毫沒有 - 絲毫沒有 - 按照國際社會(huì)的要求消除武器。
13. 事實(shí)上，事實(shí)和伊拉克的行徑表明，薩達(dá)姆·侯賽因及其政權(quán)在隱藏其生產(chǎn)更多的大規(guī)模毀滅性武器的努力。
14. 讓我先給你們放一段錄音。你們即將聽到的是我國政府監(jiān)聽的一段對(duì)話。對(duì)話時(shí)間是去年11月26日，也就是聯(lián)合國小組恢復(fù)在伊拉克的核查工作的前一天。對(duì)話雙方是伊拉克的精銳部隊(duì)"共和國衛(wèi)隊(duì)"中的兩名高級(jí)軍官，一名上校和一名準(zhǔn)將。(放錄音)
15. 讓我停下來重復(fù)一下你們剛剛聽到的這兩名軍官之間對(duì)話中的一些關(guān)鍵內(nèi)容。
16. 首先，他們提到我們的同事穆罕默德·厄爾巴拉迪要來，他們知道他要來的目的，知道他第二天到。他是來查找違禁物品的。他期待這兩位先生同他合作，不藏匿物品。
17. 但是他們很擔(dān)心。我們有這種經(jīng)過改裝的車輛。如果被他們其中一個(gè)人看見了，我們?cè)趺凑f？他們擔(dān)心什么？他們擔(dān)心的是，這種東西是他們不應(yīng)當(dāng)有的，這種東西是不能被發(fā)現(xiàn)的。
18. 那位將軍表示懷疑：(錄音稿)
"你沒有那種改裝過的車輛。你沒有那樣的東西，是不是？" "我有一輛。"
"哪一輛？從哪里來的？" "從車間，從'金迪'公司。"
"什么？" "從'金迪'公司來的。"
"我早上去你那里看看。我擔(dān)心你們都有些遺留的東西。"
"我們撤走了每樣?xùn)|西。我們沒有留下任何東西。"
19. 請(qǐng)注意他說的話："我們撤走了每樣?xùn)|西。"我們沒有銷毀它們。我們沒有把它們一一拿出來接受檢查。我們沒有把它們交給核查人員。我們把它們撤走了，以確保在核查人員出現(xiàn)時(shí)，它們不在那里。"我明天去你那里看看。"
20. "金迪"公司，這是一家眾所周知的進(jìn)行同違禁武器系統(tǒng)有關(guān)的活動(dòng)的公司。