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America and the second world war
美國和二戰(zhàn)
That special relationship
那種特殊的關(guān)系
Those Angry Days: Roosevelt, Lindbergh, and America's Fight Over World War II, 1939-1941. By Lynne Olson.
書名：《那些憤怒的日子：羅斯福、林白及美國對是否參加二戰(zhàn)的爭論，1939至1941年》作者：Lynne Olson
WHEN “the chips are down”, David Cameron declared on a visit to Washington last year, Britain and America know that they can always count on each other. Standing beside Barack Obama on a sun-drenched White House lawn, Britain's prime minister invoked the memory of their respective grandfathers, serving in the same campaign to drive Hitler's forces from France. The message was clear. Seven decades on, when the British need to claim a special relationship with America, nothing approaches the second world war's talismanic power.
去年，卡梅倫在訪問華盛頓時說：在“危急時刻”，英美兩國明白，雙方總是可以互相信賴的?？穫愂紫嗯c奧巴馬一同站在白宮灑滿陽光的草坪上，卡梅倫喚起了雙方對各自先輩的回憶：他們并肩作戰(zhàn)，將*的軍隊從法國驅(qū)趕出去?？穫悅鬟_了一條明確的信息：七十年后的今天，當英國需要與美國保持一種特殊關(guān)系時，什么也比不了二戰(zhàn)的特殊魔力。
In truth, for two terrifying years after it declared war on Germany, Britain did not know that America would come to its aid. Winston Churchill's government wavered between a conviction that President Franklin Roosevelt did not want Hitler to control the whole of Europe and so would send help, and a suspicion that many in his government dreamed of scavenging the assets of a doomed British empire. Britain made an extraordinary effort to bring America into the war before it was too late. With Roosevelt's tacit approval, hundreds of British agents flooded neutral America, secretly spying on isolationist politicians, Axis diplomats and Nazi sympathisers and more openly wooing public opinion with lectures, radio broadcasts and stories planted in friendly newspapers. Marrying a historian's thoroughness with a biographer's eye for human nature, Lynne Olson's magnificent new account shows what a close-run thing their campaign was.
實際上，在英國向德國宣戰(zhàn)后可怕的兩年中，英國不知道美國會對其提供幫助。丘吉爾政府搖擺不定，時而堅信羅斯福不會讓*控制整個歐洲，因此會向英國提供援助;時而又懷疑羅斯福政府中的一些人，認為他們夢想著大英帝國會毀滅，然后蠶食其資產(chǎn)。英國竭盡全力及時地拉動美國參戰(zhàn)。在羅斯福的默許下，數(shù)百名英國間諜涌入中立的美國，秘密監(jiān)視孤立派政治家、軸心國外交官和納粹的同情者，他們還發(fā)表演講、進行電臺廣播，同時在親英的報紙上刊登故事，來更加公開地爭取民心。在這部精彩絕倫的新書中，作者Lynne Olson結(jié)合歷史學(xué)家的全面性和傳記作家對人性的探尋，向讀者展示了他們的行動是如何地驚險。
“Those Angry Days” describes a divided America that is little remembered now, amid praise for the greatest-generation years that followed. She depicts an anti-war country in which bars near army bases sported signs banning soldiers, and generals wore mufti to testify on Capitol Hill, lest their uniforms provoke isolationist members of Congress.
《那些憤怒的日子》一書描述了一個現(xiàn)在鮮為人知的分裂的美國，字里行間也體現(xiàn)了對之后數(shù)年內(nèi)最偉大一代的贊許。她描述了一個反戰(zhàn)的國家，在那里，軍事基地附近的酒吧掛著禁止士兵入內(nèi)的標識，將軍則在美國國會山身穿便服作證，以免他們的制服惹惱議會中不主張美國參戰(zhàn)的人。
In defence of that pacifism, she explains how Americans felt that their country had been dragged into the first world war by clever British propaganda and promises that Americans killed in Europe's mud were making the world “safe for democracy”. Twenty years later, many Americans believed that Europe's squabbling powers once again seemed unwilling or unable to defend democracy. Less defensibly, a series of grandees—whether army officers, senators, press barons, or students at Yale and Harvard—are shown questioning whether there was any great moral difference between Britain and Nazi Germany, a view that was often tinged with anti-Semitism.
美國人感到正是英國人狡猾的宣傳和保證才把美國卷入了第一次世界大戰(zhàn)，這些感受還是有原因的。作者為反戰(zhàn)主義辯護，解釋了美國人為什么這樣想。二十年后，許多美國人認為歐洲爭吵不休的大國再次似乎不愿意或不能夠保衛(wèi)民主。作者還較客觀地指出：一系列的大人物—不管是軍官、議員、報業(yè)巨頭或是耶魯和哈佛大學(xué)的學(xué)生—都在質(zhì)疑英國和納粹德國之間是否存在任何道義上的不同，這種觀點常常帶有一絲反*主義色彩。
Many pages are devoted to an isolationist leader whose clay feet are well known: the transatlantic air pioneer, Charles Lindbergh (pictured), who came grievously close to sympathising with the Nazis. But the book's power lies in its finely shaded portraits of figures more usually remembered in poster-bright hues of heroism.
作者還用了許多筆墨來描述一位孤立派領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人，他就是跨大西洋飛行員查爾斯-林白，他的致命弱點廣為人知：他十分接近于同情納粹。但是本書的妙處就在于作者擅于用委婉的手法對一些人物進行描述，這些人物在當今人們的眼中英雄色彩更濃一些。
George Marshall, who would later become a great war commander, is shown resisting help for embattled Britain until late in 1941. Marshall never quite rebelled openly, but he shielded aides as they leaked and schemed against government policy. Several senior officers were“essentially pro-German”. For his part Roosevelt is shown as perilously indecisive, poring over opinion polls and “waiting to be pushed into war”, as he told his treasury secretary. Even after the attack on Pearl Harbour, which was greeted with champagne by British officials in America, the president hesitated, detecting a “l(fā)ingering distinction” in public opinion between war with Japan and a second front with Germany. In the end, Hitler made the decision for him by declaring war on America.
本書寫道：后來成為戰(zhàn)時指揮官的馬歇爾一直拒絕向四面楚歌的英國提供幫助，這種情況一直持續(xù)到1941年年末。盡管馬歇爾基本上從來沒有公開反對向英國提供援助，但是當來自美國的援助一點點流向英國時，他對之進行了阻止;馬歇爾還暗中反對政府的政策。幾名美國高級軍官“實際上是親德的”。在本書中，羅斯福優(yōu)柔寡斷至極、埋頭研究民意調(diào)查、“等著被推入戰(zhàn)爭”—羅斯福就是這么告訴他的財政部長的。珍珠港襲擊發(fā)生后，在美的英國軍官用香檳酒慶祝，甚至在那以后，羅斯?？偨y(tǒng)仍然猶豫不決，認為“向日本開戰(zhàn)”和“在第二戰(zhàn)線與德國開戰(zhàn)”這兩種民意“一直存在區(qū)別”。最后，*率先向美國開戰(zhàn)，從而為羅斯福做了決定。
The British are not let off scot-free. In addition to planting propaganda, British agents broke American laws with a will. The British tapped phones, opened letters and even forged a map given to Roosevelt, supposedly showing Nazi plans to take over Latin America. Snobbery played into Britain's hands. The book could be sub- titled “Wasps at War”, as east-coast anglophiles and Wall Street millionaires pushed their country towards engagement, against isolationist forces drawn from the prairies and small towns of middle America.
英國人的所作所為我們可不能不追究。除了四處播撒言論，英國間諜還大肆破壞美國的法律。英方竊聽電話、私拆信件、甚至虛造了一幅地圖給了羅斯福，讓他以為納粹可能有占領(lǐng)拉丁美洲的計劃。英國人正是利用某些美國人的勢利眼而達到了自己的目的。該書的副標題可作“戰(zhàn)時的VIP們”，因為那時美國東海岸的親英派和華爾街百萬富翁將美國推向了參戰(zhàn)之路，盡管那些來自北美大牧場和美國中部小鎮(zhèn)的孤立派反對這么做。
Among the heroes are Wendell Willkie, the Republican presidential candidate in 1940, who after his defeat backed Roosevelt and vitally campaigned for Americans to be conscripted and trained for war and for Britain to be sent aid. That enraged many in Willkie's party, but may have helped avert a Nazi victory.
溫德爾?威爾基是眾多英雄之一，他在1940年是共和黨總統(tǒng)候選人，在總統(tǒng)競選失敗后他支持羅斯福，并積極動員美國人為戰(zhàn)爭應(yīng)征入伍并接受訓(xùn)練、推動為英國送去援助。這激怒了很多共和黨人，但這很可能扭轉(zhuǎn)了戰(zhàn)局，防止了納粹的勝利。
In the end, the public was ahead of many in the elite. Even before Pearl Harbour, polls showed Americans preferring entry into the war to a German victory over Britain. Japan had hoped its bombs would demoralise Americans. Instead, America was united by the attack. Two years of savage debate had already aired every argument for and against war, Ms Olson notes. Democracy was America's strength, as an anxious Britain had hoped it would be. It was a point despotic enemies could never have understood.
最后，民眾反而走在了很多上層人士的前面。甚至在珍珠港事件發(fā)生以前，民意測驗就顯示美國人更傾向于美國參戰(zhàn)，而不是德國戰(zhàn)勝英國。日本原本希望在珍珠港投下的炸彈能使美國人人心渙散;然而，那場襲擊讓美國人團結(jié)一心。作者Olson指出，在兩年的激烈辯論中，人們可以聽到各種支持和反對美國參戰(zhàn)的言論。民主是美國的力量所在，而這正是焦慮的英國所希望能做到的。而這一點是任何專制的敵人永遠也不會明白的。
America and the second world war
美國和二戰(zhàn)
That special relationship
那種特殊的關(guān)系
Those Angry Days: Roosevelt, Lindbergh, and America's Fight Over World War II, 1939-1941. By Lynne Olson.
書名：《那些憤怒的日子：羅斯福、林白及美國對是否參加二戰(zhàn)的爭論，1939至1941年》作者：Lynne Olson
WHEN “the chips are down”, David Cameron declared on a visit to Washington last year, Britain and America know that they can always count on each other. Standing beside Barack Obama on a sun-drenched White House lawn, Britain's prime minister invoked the memory of their respective grandfathers, serving in the same campaign to drive Hitler's forces from France. The message was clear. Seven decades on, when the British need to claim a special relationship with America, nothing approaches the second world war's talismanic power.
去年，卡梅倫在訪問華盛頓時說：在“危急時刻”，英美兩國明白，雙方總是可以互相信賴的?？穫愂紫嗯c奧巴馬一同站在白宮灑滿陽光的草坪上，卡梅倫喚起了雙方對各自先輩的回憶：他們并肩作戰(zhàn)，將*的軍隊從法國驅(qū)趕出去?？穫悅鬟_了一條明確的信息：七十年后的今天，當英國需要與美國保持一種特殊關(guān)系時，什么也比不了二戰(zhàn)的特殊魔力。
In truth, for two terrifying years after it declared war on Germany, Britain did not know that America would come to its aid. Winston Churchill's government wavered between a conviction that President Franklin Roosevelt did not want Hitler to control the whole of Europe and so would send help, and a suspicion that many in his government dreamed of scavenging the assets of a doomed British empire. Britain made an extraordinary effort to bring America into the war before it was too late. With Roosevelt's tacit approval, hundreds of British agents flooded neutral America, secretly spying on isolationist politicians, Axis diplomats and Nazi sympathisers and more openly wooing public opinion with lectures, radio broadcasts and stories planted in friendly newspapers. Marrying a historian's thoroughness with a biographer's eye for human nature, Lynne Olson's magnificent new account shows what a close-run thing their campaign was.
實際上，在英國向德國宣戰(zhàn)后可怕的兩年中，英國不知道美國會對其提供幫助。丘吉爾政府搖擺不定，時而堅信羅斯福不會讓*控制整個歐洲，因此會向英國提供援助;時而又懷疑羅斯福政府中的一些人，認為他們夢想著大英帝國會毀滅，然后蠶食其資產(chǎn)。英國竭盡全力及時地拉動美國參戰(zhàn)。在羅斯福的默許下，數(shù)百名英國間諜涌入中立的美國，秘密監(jiān)視孤立派政治家、軸心國外交官和納粹的同情者，他們還發(fā)表演講、進行電臺廣播，同時在親英的報紙上刊登故事，來更加公開地爭取民心。在這部精彩絕倫的新書中，作者Lynne Olson結(jié)合歷史學(xué)家的全面性和傳記作家對人性的探尋，向讀者展示了他們的行動是如何地驚險。
“Those Angry Days” describes a divided America that is little remembered now, amid praise for the greatest-generation years that followed. She depicts an anti-war country in which bars near army bases sported signs banning soldiers, and generals wore mufti to testify on Capitol Hill, lest their uniforms provoke isolationist members of Congress.
《那些憤怒的日子》一書描述了一個現(xiàn)在鮮為人知的分裂的美國，字里行間也體現(xiàn)了對之后數(shù)年內(nèi)最偉大一代的贊許。她描述了一個反戰(zhàn)的國家，在那里，軍事基地附近的酒吧掛著禁止士兵入內(nèi)的標識，將軍則在美國國會山身穿便服作證，以免他們的制服惹惱議會中不主張美國參戰(zhàn)的人。
In defence of that pacifism, she explains how Americans felt that their country had been dragged into the first world war by clever British propaganda and promises that Americans killed in Europe's mud were making the world “safe for democracy”. Twenty years later, many Americans believed that Europe's squabbling powers once again seemed unwilling or unable to defend democracy. Less defensibly, a series of grandees—whether army officers, senators, press barons, or students at Yale and Harvard—are shown questioning whether there was any great moral difference between Britain and Nazi Germany, a view that was often tinged with anti-Semitism.
美國人感到正是英國人狡猾的宣傳和保證才把美國卷入了第一次世界大戰(zhàn)，這些感受還是有原因的。作者為反戰(zhàn)主義辯護，解釋了美國人為什么這樣想。二十年后，許多美國人認為歐洲爭吵不休的大國再次似乎不愿意或不能夠保衛(wèi)民主。作者還較客觀地指出：一系列的大人物—不管是軍官、議員、報業(yè)巨頭或是耶魯和哈佛大學(xué)的學(xué)生—都在質(zhì)疑英國和納粹德國之間是否存在任何道義上的不同，這種觀點常常帶有一絲反*主義色彩。
Many pages are devoted to an isolationist leader whose clay feet are well known: the transatlantic air pioneer, Charles Lindbergh (pictured), who came grievously close to sympathising with the Nazis. But the book's power lies in its finely shaded portraits of figures more usually remembered in poster-bright hues of heroism.
作者還用了許多筆墨來描述一位孤立派領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人，他就是跨大西洋飛行員查爾斯-林白，他的致命弱點廣為人知：他十分接近于同情納粹。但是本書的妙處就在于作者擅于用委婉的手法對一些人物進行描述，這些人物在當今人們的眼中英雄色彩更濃一些。
George Marshall, who would later become a great war commander, is shown resisting help for embattled Britain until late in 1941. Marshall never quite rebelled openly, but he shielded aides as they leaked and schemed against government policy. Several senior officers were“essentially pro-German”. For his part Roosevelt is shown as perilously indecisive, poring over opinion polls and “waiting to be pushed into war”, as he told his treasury secretary. Even after the attack on Pearl Harbour, which was greeted with champagne by British officials in America, the president hesitated, detecting a “l(fā)ingering distinction” in public opinion between war with Japan and a second front with Germany. In the end, Hitler made the decision for him by declaring war on America.
本書寫道：后來成為戰(zhàn)時指揮官的馬歇爾一直拒絕向四面楚歌的英國提供幫助，這種情況一直持續(xù)到1941年年末。盡管馬歇爾基本上從來沒有公開反對向英國提供援助，但是當來自美國的援助一點點流向英國時，他對之進行了阻止;馬歇爾還暗中反對政府的政策。幾名美國高級軍官“實際上是親德的”。在本書中，羅斯福優(yōu)柔寡斷至極、埋頭研究民意調(diào)查、“等著被推入戰(zhàn)爭”—羅斯福就是這么告訴他的財政部長的。珍珠港襲擊發(fā)生后，在美的英國軍官用香檳酒慶祝，甚至在那以后，羅斯?？偨y(tǒng)仍然猶豫不決，認為“向日本開戰(zhàn)”和“在第二戰(zhàn)線與德國開戰(zhàn)”這兩種民意“一直存在區(qū)別”。最后，*率先向美國開戰(zhàn)，從而為羅斯福做了決定。
The British are not let off scot-free. In addition to planting propaganda, British agents broke American laws with a will. The British tapped phones, opened letters and even forged a map given to Roosevelt, supposedly showing Nazi plans to take over Latin America. Snobbery played into Britain's hands. The book could be sub- titled “Wasps at War”, as east-coast anglophiles and Wall Street millionaires pushed their country towards engagement, against isolationist forces drawn from the prairies and small towns of middle America.
英國人的所作所為我們可不能不追究。除了四處播撒言論，英國間諜還大肆破壞美國的法律。英方竊聽電話、私拆信件、甚至虛造了一幅地圖給了羅斯福，讓他以為納粹可能有占領(lǐng)拉丁美洲的計劃。英國人正是利用某些美國人的勢利眼而達到了自己的目的。該書的副標題可作“戰(zhàn)時的VIP們”，因為那時美國東海岸的親英派和華爾街百萬富翁將美國推向了參戰(zhàn)之路，盡管那些來自北美大牧場和美國中部小鎮(zhèn)的孤立派反對這么做。
Among the heroes are Wendell Willkie, the Republican presidential candidate in 1940, who after his defeat backed Roosevelt and vitally campaigned for Americans to be conscripted and trained for war and for Britain to be sent aid. That enraged many in Willkie's party, but may have helped avert a Nazi victory.
溫德爾?威爾基是眾多英雄之一，他在1940年是共和黨總統(tǒng)候選人，在總統(tǒng)競選失敗后他支持羅斯福，并積極動員美國人為戰(zhàn)爭應(yīng)征入伍并接受訓(xùn)練、推動為英國送去援助。這激怒了很多共和黨人，但這很可能扭轉(zhuǎn)了戰(zhàn)局，防止了納粹的勝利。
In the end, the public was ahead of many in the elite. Even before Pearl Harbour, polls showed Americans preferring entry into the war to a German victory over Britain. Japan had hoped its bombs would demoralise Americans. Instead, America was united by the attack. Two years of savage debate had already aired every argument for and against war, Ms Olson notes. Democracy was America's strength, as an anxious Britain had hoped it would be. It was a point despotic enemies could never have understood.
最后，民眾反而走在了很多上層人士的前面。甚至在珍珠港事件發(fā)生以前，民意測驗就顯示美國人更傾向于美國參戰(zhàn)，而不是德國戰(zhàn)勝英國。日本原本希望在珍珠港投下的炸彈能使美國人人心渙散;然而，那場襲擊讓美國人團結(jié)一心。作者Olson指出，在兩年的激烈辯論中，人們可以聽到各種支持和反對美國參戰(zhàn)的言論。民主是美國的力量所在，而這正是焦慮的英國所希望能做到的。而這一點是任何專制的敵人永遠也不會明白的。