這一講我們要跟您談?wù)劧兰o(jì)末發(fā)生在亞洲的金融危機(jī)。
澳洲廣播電臺金融節(jié)目主持人巴里克拉克首先介紹了這場亞洲金融風(fēng)暴是如何爆發(fā)的。他在談話中使用了這樣一些詞匯：
1 overseas creditors 海外債權(quán)人2 international capital flows 國際資本流動3 short-term capital 短期資本4 herd behavior 群體恐慌行為
巴里克拉克說：
The crisis became evident in July, 1997. Overseas creditors began withdrawing short-term capital from the region, placing intense pressure on the exchange rates for the currencies of Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and South Korea.
These five countries had been heavily dependent on international capital flows. In 1996, there was an inflow of $US 93 billion. But a year later the flow was reversed. In 1997 there was an outflow of $12 billion.
As capital was withdrawn from the region and the exchange rates of the five countries depreciated, or fell, panic set in amongst foreign creditors.
The result was a deepening spiral. As capital was withdrawn, the exchange rate depreciated, leading to more capital outflows.
Economists call these panics 'herd behaviour'; where the creditors in a market all rush, or stampede, for the exit, trying to get out first.
Usually, their behaviour is not based on the real underlying economic conditions in the market (the fundamentals), but rather on the behaviour and expected behaviour of other creditors.
接下來我們把巴里克拉克的這段談話及中文翻譯分段聽一遍：（英文略）
這場危機(jī)在一九九七年七月變得顯而易見。海外債權(quán)人開始從這一地區(qū)撤出短期資本，使泰國、印尼、馬來西亞、菲律賓和韓國這五國貨幣的兌換率受到極大壓力。
這五國都嚴(yán)重依賴國際資本的注入。一九九六年，流入這些國家的資本是九百三十億美元，但一年之后資本的流向逆轉(zhuǎn)。一九九七年時有一百二十億美元的資本流出。
隨著資本撤出這一地區(qū)以及五國的貨幣匯率下調(diào)或跌落，外國債權(quán)人開始感到恐慌。
其結(jié)果是惡性循環(huán)。隨著資本的撤出，匯率下跌，導(dǎo)致更多的資本流出。
經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家稱這種恐慌是群體恐慌行為，就是市場上的債權(quán)人全都蜂擁或驚慌地要搶先退出市場。
通常他們不是根據(jù)市場的基本經(jīng)濟(jì)條件（根本準(zhǔn)則）來采取行動，而是根據(jù)其他債權(quán)人的行為或是預(yù)計的行為來采取行。
接下來我們把巴里克拉克的這段談話原文再完整聽一遍。（略）
二十世紀(jì)末亞洲的這場金融風(fēng)暴爆發(fā)之迅速，破壞之嚴(yán)重，令經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家目瞪口呆。澳洲廣播電臺金融節(jié)目主持人巴里克拉克接下來分析了這場金融風(fēng)暴的部分起因：
If financial panics are not new, the Asian crisis came as a complete surprise to virtually all commentators. After all, the five Asian countries had shown remarkable growth in output, employment, productivity and exports over the past 20 years.
Warning signs became apparent from 1996, as these countries faced increased competition from China and Mexico in markets for manufacturing exports. Growth rates began to slow. But the real problem lay in their reliance on short-term capital flows from overseas. This capital can be moved quite quickly in and out of an economy. Economists call such flows 'indirect foreign investment' to distinguish them from longer term or 'direct foreign investment'.
While the five countries had deregulated their financial systems, increasing the number of banks and the ease of foreign borrowing, there was inadequate regulation and supervision of financial institutions. Indeed, in some cases, banks were allowed to break regulations on lending. The degree of risk in borrowing was seriously underestimated. Their exchange rates were also mildly overvalued as they targeted the US dollar.
These policy errors contributed to produce a fragile financial system - one which was vulnerable to a rapid reversal of capital flows. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the 1997 panic cannot be explained by the extent of the policy errors. Foreign creditors had a superficial understanding of the long-term prospects of the region, which meant that their behaviour was subject to wild swings.
澳洲廣播電臺金融節(jié)目主持人巴里克拉克首先介紹了這場亞洲金融風(fēng)暴是如何爆發(fā)的。他在談話中使用了這樣一些詞匯：
1 overseas creditors 海外債權(quán)人2 international capital flows 國際資本流動3 short-term capital 短期資本4 herd behavior 群體恐慌行為
巴里克拉克說：
The crisis became evident in July, 1997. Overseas creditors began withdrawing short-term capital from the region, placing intense pressure on the exchange rates for the currencies of Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and South Korea.
These five countries had been heavily dependent on international capital flows. In 1996, there was an inflow of $US 93 billion. But a year later the flow was reversed. In 1997 there was an outflow of $12 billion.
As capital was withdrawn from the region and the exchange rates of the five countries depreciated, or fell, panic set in amongst foreign creditors.
The result was a deepening spiral. As capital was withdrawn, the exchange rate depreciated, leading to more capital outflows.
Economists call these panics 'herd behaviour'; where the creditors in a market all rush, or stampede, for the exit, trying to get out first.
Usually, their behaviour is not based on the real underlying economic conditions in the market (the fundamentals), but rather on the behaviour and expected behaviour of other creditors.
接下來我們把巴里克拉克的這段談話及中文翻譯分段聽一遍：（英文略）
這場危機(jī)在一九九七年七月變得顯而易見。海外債權(quán)人開始從這一地區(qū)撤出短期資本，使泰國、印尼、馬來西亞、菲律賓和韓國這五國貨幣的兌換率受到極大壓力。
這五國都嚴(yán)重依賴國際資本的注入。一九九六年，流入這些國家的資本是九百三十億美元，但一年之后資本的流向逆轉(zhuǎn)。一九九七年時有一百二十億美元的資本流出。
隨著資本撤出這一地區(qū)以及五國的貨幣匯率下調(diào)或跌落，外國債權(quán)人開始感到恐慌。
其結(jié)果是惡性循環(huán)。隨著資本的撤出，匯率下跌，導(dǎo)致更多的資本流出。
經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家稱這種恐慌是群體恐慌行為，就是市場上的債權(quán)人全都蜂擁或驚慌地要搶先退出市場。
通常他們不是根據(jù)市場的基本經(jīng)濟(jì)條件（根本準(zhǔn)則）來采取行動，而是根據(jù)其他債權(quán)人的行為或是預(yù)計的行為來采取行。
接下來我們把巴里克拉克的這段談話原文再完整聽一遍。（略）
二十世紀(jì)末亞洲的這場金融風(fēng)暴爆發(fā)之迅速，破壞之嚴(yán)重，令經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家目瞪口呆。澳洲廣播電臺金融節(jié)目主持人巴里克拉克接下來分析了這場金融風(fēng)暴的部分起因：
If financial panics are not new, the Asian crisis came as a complete surprise to virtually all commentators. After all, the five Asian countries had shown remarkable growth in output, employment, productivity and exports over the past 20 years.
Warning signs became apparent from 1996, as these countries faced increased competition from China and Mexico in markets for manufacturing exports. Growth rates began to slow. But the real problem lay in their reliance on short-term capital flows from overseas. This capital can be moved quite quickly in and out of an economy. Economists call such flows 'indirect foreign investment' to distinguish them from longer term or 'direct foreign investment'.
While the five countries had deregulated their financial systems, increasing the number of banks and the ease of foreign borrowing, there was inadequate regulation and supervision of financial institutions. Indeed, in some cases, banks were allowed to break regulations on lending. The degree of risk in borrowing was seriously underestimated. Their exchange rates were also mildly overvalued as they targeted the US dollar.
These policy errors contributed to produce a fragile financial system - one which was vulnerable to a rapid reversal of capital flows. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the 1997 panic cannot be explained by the extent of the policy errors. Foreign creditors had a superficial understanding of the long-term prospects of the region, which meant that their behaviour was subject to wild swings.