Looking at the just-concluded General Election as a veteran Member of Parliament who had given way for new blood, my feelings were rather different from when I was a candidate myself. When you were in the thick of a election campaign - fighting tooth and nail with your opponent and canvassing for voter support - it was easy to lose sight of changes in the big picture. This time round, I was able to take a more detached view.
As I see it, the loose alliance of some opposition parties was a far cry from the ruling People's Action Party's well-thought-out and highly flexible gameplan. Even on Nomination Day itself, it was clear that the line-up from the opposition could hardly pose a serious challenge to the PAP.
The PAP had long done its calculation, or what was called “miao suan” （in ancient times, before going to battles, meetings must be held in a temple to map out the war plans and assess the chances of a victory or defeat） and knew what it had to do to secure a victory. The opposition, on the other hand, was represented by a motley group of people, a loose alliance and also lacked unity.
The ruling party had obviously taken into consideration the timing and feelings of the people. In addition to the re-drawing of electoral boundaries and the calling of a snap election, it did away with the four-member Group Representation Constituencies to provide for mega constituencies - the five or six-member GRCs - a move that sent the opposition into disarray.
The PAP had its finger on the pulse of every constituency and was able to fine-tune its strategies with ease. For instance, Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong gave the initial impression that he was not keen on wrestling Potong Pasir and Hougang back from the opposition, thus lowered the guard of their incumbents.
But with an opportunity created by Chee Soon Juan halfway through the hustings, he changed tactics and started wooing voters in the two opposition strongholds. That put Chiam See Tong and Low Thia Khiang on the defensive.
Meanwhile, Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew visited Nee Soon East to perform a “surgery” for the single-member constituency. The ward was like a patient suffering from acute appendicitis, but was back in the pink of health immediately after the “operation”。 The result： the expected close fight fizzled out and it ceased to be a hot spot.
The strategies employed by the PAP were executed superbly. The small number of opposition candidates and constituencies contested was also a key reason why the PAP was able to display its political skills with finesse.
The September 11 tragedy and the recession worked to the advantage of the PAP, but the “by-election effect” did not materialise for the opposition. The reason was simple： There were few credible candidates in the opposition camp. In other words, the quality of the candidates was the decisive factor.
The PAP might have scored a landslide victory with a higher percentage of valid votes, but it still failed to win back Potong Pasir and Hougang. And though the share of valid votes for Mr Chiam and Mr Low both saw a drop, the fact that they managed to retain their seats in spite of the unfavourable conditions was already quite a feat.
Their triumphs also proved the importance of having capable candidates. They are both considered competent by voters and they had also proven themselves capable of delivering. In spite of the lure of upgrading, voters chose to give the two opposition MPs a fair chance. This showed that they were not only rational but were also “l(fā)oyal”。
（The writer is a former MP for Marine Parade GRC.Translated by Yap Gee Poh）
我看這次大選● 吳俊剛
這次大選,我以退役老兵的心情觀戰(zhàn),別有一番感受。置身其中,鏖戰(zhàn)前線,在一個(gè)選區(qū)范圍內(nèi)沖鋒陷陣,往往看不到大棋局的變幻。這回就不同了。
我覺(jué)得,這回大選,執(zhí)政黨的布局非常嚴(yán)密,兼之變化靈活,確乎不是*的松散聯(lián)盟所能望其項(xiàng)背的。提名當(dāng)天,兩軍對(duì)立,我們馬上就可以看出,雙方勢(shì)力懸殊。
一方是早已作了廟算（古時(shí)候興師作戰(zhàn),要在廟堂舉行會(huì)議,謀劃作戰(zhàn)大計(jì),預(yù)計(jì)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)勝負(fù),這就叫廟算）,成竹在胸,一方則是臨時(shí)拼湊,松散結(jié)盟,也無(wú)法做到全面團(tuán)結(jié)。
執(zhí)政黨很顯然的是把天時(shí)、地利和人和三大因素都考慮到了,除了閃電出擊,重劃選區(qū),也派出了一隊(duì)“奇兵”,那就是去掉四人集選區(qū),增加六人和五人集選區(qū)。這使得*陣營(yíng)倉(cāng)皇失措,陣腳大亂。
提名過(guò)后,行動(dòng)黨很顯然的也密切關(guān)注各區(qū)選情的變化,并在及時(shí)調(diào)整戰(zhàn)略方面表現(xiàn)了極大的靈活性。比方,開(kāi)始時(shí),吳總理談笑用兵,給人的印象是他并不想奪回波東巴西和后港,使對(duì)手放松了警戒。
競(jìng)選中途,戰(zhàn)略突然改變,借用徐順全提供的一個(gè)天賜缺口,轉(zhuǎn)而集中火力猛攻這兩個(gè)*堡壘。迫使詹時(shí)中和劉程強(qiáng)不得不掉轉(zhuǎn)馬頭,保衛(wèi)各自的據(jù)點(diǎn)。
與此同時(shí),李資政親身出馬,到義順東替這個(gè)單選區(qū)做了一場(chǎng)“手術(shù)”。這個(gè)單選區(qū)就像患上急性盲腸炎的病人,手術(shù)過(guò)后,馬上化險(xiǎn)為夷,使到行動(dòng)黨能夠把戰(zhàn)線拉短,而且轉(zhuǎn)移熱點(diǎn)。
行動(dòng)黨在這次大選中各種選戰(zhàn)戰(zhàn)術(shù)的運(yùn)用,可以說(shuō)是發(fā)揮得淋漓盡致。而*參選范圍小,人數(shù)少,則是行動(dòng)黨在變化戰(zhàn)術(shù)上能夠如此得心應(yīng)手的關(guān)鍵因素。
盡管九一一和經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)等因素對(duì)執(zhí)政黨有利,*競(jìng)選人數(shù)減少,卻完全沒(méi)有發(fā)揮補(bǔ)選的效應(yīng)。為什么？一言以蔽之,*陣營(yíng)人才凋零。換言之,人才是最后的決定因素。
選戰(zhàn)結(jié)果,盡管行動(dòng)黨總的得票率提高,它還是無(wú)法奪回波東巴西和后港兩區(qū)。這兩區(qū)的*在任議員得票率固然是下降了,但是,在大環(huán)境極為不利的情形下,他們能有如次戰(zhàn)果,已算是難能可貴了。
這其實(shí)也可以反證人才的重要性。他們是選民認(rèn)同的*人才。他們?cè)谌纹趦?nèi)也證明能替選民辦事,選民銘記在心,即使有翻新計(jì)劃的誘惑,大部分人還是選擇給詹、劉二人一個(gè)公平的機(jī)會(huì)?？磥?lái),選民不僅是理智的,也很講義氣哩。
。作者為馬林百列集選區(qū)前議員
As I see it, the loose alliance of some opposition parties was a far cry from the ruling People's Action Party's well-thought-out and highly flexible gameplan. Even on Nomination Day itself, it was clear that the line-up from the opposition could hardly pose a serious challenge to the PAP.
The PAP had long done its calculation, or what was called “miao suan” （in ancient times, before going to battles, meetings must be held in a temple to map out the war plans and assess the chances of a victory or defeat） and knew what it had to do to secure a victory. The opposition, on the other hand, was represented by a motley group of people, a loose alliance and also lacked unity.
The ruling party had obviously taken into consideration the timing and feelings of the people. In addition to the re-drawing of electoral boundaries and the calling of a snap election, it did away with the four-member Group Representation Constituencies to provide for mega constituencies - the five or six-member GRCs - a move that sent the opposition into disarray.
The PAP had its finger on the pulse of every constituency and was able to fine-tune its strategies with ease. For instance, Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong gave the initial impression that he was not keen on wrestling Potong Pasir and Hougang back from the opposition, thus lowered the guard of their incumbents.
But with an opportunity created by Chee Soon Juan halfway through the hustings, he changed tactics and started wooing voters in the two opposition strongholds. That put Chiam See Tong and Low Thia Khiang on the defensive.
Meanwhile, Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew visited Nee Soon East to perform a “surgery” for the single-member constituency. The ward was like a patient suffering from acute appendicitis, but was back in the pink of health immediately after the “operation”。 The result： the expected close fight fizzled out and it ceased to be a hot spot.
The strategies employed by the PAP were executed superbly. The small number of opposition candidates and constituencies contested was also a key reason why the PAP was able to display its political skills with finesse.
The September 11 tragedy and the recession worked to the advantage of the PAP, but the “by-election effect” did not materialise for the opposition. The reason was simple： There were few credible candidates in the opposition camp. In other words, the quality of the candidates was the decisive factor.
The PAP might have scored a landslide victory with a higher percentage of valid votes, but it still failed to win back Potong Pasir and Hougang. And though the share of valid votes for Mr Chiam and Mr Low both saw a drop, the fact that they managed to retain their seats in spite of the unfavourable conditions was already quite a feat.
Their triumphs also proved the importance of having capable candidates. They are both considered competent by voters and they had also proven themselves capable of delivering. In spite of the lure of upgrading, voters chose to give the two opposition MPs a fair chance. This showed that they were not only rational but were also “l(fā)oyal”。
（The writer is a former MP for Marine Parade GRC.Translated by Yap Gee Poh）
我看這次大選● 吳俊剛
這次大選,我以退役老兵的心情觀戰(zhàn),別有一番感受。置身其中,鏖戰(zhàn)前線,在一個(gè)選區(qū)范圍內(nèi)沖鋒陷陣,往往看不到大棋局的變幻。這回就不同了。
我覺(jué)得,這回大選,執(zhí)政黨的布局非常嚴(yán)密,兼之變化靈活,確乎不是*的松散聯(lián)盟所能望其項(xiàng)背的。提名當(dāng)天,兩軍對(duì)立,我們馬上就可以看出,雙方勢(shì)力懸殊。
一方是早已作了廟算（古時(shí)候興師作戰(zhàn),要在廟堂舉行會(huì)議,謀劃作戰(zhàn)大計(jì),預(yù)計(jì)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)勝負(fù),這就叫廟算）,成竹在胸,一方則是臨時(shí)拼湊,松散結(jié)盟,也無(wú)法做到全面團(tuán)結(jié)。
執(zhí)政黨很顯然的是把天時(shí)、地利和人和三大因素都考慮到了,除了閃電出擊,重劃選區(qū),也派出了一隊(duì)“奇兵”,那就是去掉四人集選區(qū),增加六人和五人集選區(qū)。這使得*陣營(yíng)倉(cāng)皇失措,陣腳大亂。
提名過(guò)后,行動(dòng)黨很顯然的也密切關(guān)注各區(qū)選情的變化,并在及時(shí)調(diào)整戰(zhàn)略方面表現(xiàn)了極大的靈活性。比方,開(kāi)始時(shí),吳總理談笑用兵,給人的印象是他并不想奪回波東巴西和后港,使對(duì)手放松了警戒。
競(jìng)選中途,戰(zhàn)略突然改變,借用徐順全提供的一個(gè)天賜缺口,轉(zhuǎn)而集中火力猛攻這兩個(gè)*堡壘。迫使詹時(shí)中和劉程強(qiáng)不得不掉轉(zhuǎn)馬頭,保衛(wèi)各自的據(jù)點(diǎn)。
與此同時(shí),李資政親身出馬,到義順東替這個(gè)單選區(qū)做了一場(chǎng)“手術(shù)”。這個(gè)單選區(qū)就像患上急性盲腸炎的病人,手術(shù)過(guò)后,馬上化險(xiǎn)為夷,使到行動(dòng)黨能夠把戰(zhàn)線拉短,而且轉(zhuǎn)移熱點(diǎn)。
行動(dòng)黨在這次大選中各種選戰(zhàn)戰(zhàn)術(shù)的運(yùn)用,可以說(shuō)是發(fā)揮得淋漓盡致。而*參選范圍小,人數(shù)少,則是行動(dòng)黨在變化戰(zhàn)術(shù)上能夠如此得心應(yīng)手的關(guān)鍵因素。
盡管九一一和經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)等因素對(duì)執(zhí)政黨有利,*競(jìng)選人數(shù)減少,卻完全沒(méi)有發(fā)揮補(bǔ)選的效應(yīng)。為什么？一言以蔽之,*陣營(yíng)人才凋零。換言之,人才是最后的決定因素。
選戰(zhàn)結(jié)果,盡管行動(dòng)黨總的得票率提高,它還是無(wú)法奪回波東巴西和后港兩區(qū)。這兩區(qū)的*在任議員得票率固然是下降了,但是,在大環(huán)境極為不利的情形下,他們能有如次戰(zhàn)果,已算是難能可貴了。
這其實(shí)也可以反證人才的重要性。他們是選民認(rèn)同的*人才。他們?cè)谌纹趦?nèi)也證明能替選民辦事,選民銘記在心,即使有翻新計(jì)劃的誘惑,大部分人還是選擇給詹、劉二人一個(gè)公平的機(jī)會(huì)?？磥?lái),選民不僅是理智的,也很講義氣哩。
。作者為馬林百列集選區(qū)前議員