The isolation ward
閉關(guān)鎖國(guó) （陳繼龍 譯）
Mar 1st 2007
From The Economist print edition
MOST writing about the benighted[1] land of Burma, dubbed Myanmar by the grotesque[2] junta running it, falls into one of two traps. Either it plumps[3] for simplification, which is pardonable given the justness of its moral outrage. The conflict does indeed come closer than almost any other to one between baddies （the junta） and the followers of a super-goody （the almost-permanently detained opposition leader, Aung San Suu Kyi）.At the other extreme, some writers become bogged down[4] in the bewildering complexity underneath this simple framework: the tangled[5] skein of ethnic rivalries and grudges that have fuelled one of the world's longest running civil wars, fought by more than a dozen armed insurgencies around Myanmar's borders.
緬甸（Myanmar）是一個(gè)愚昧落后的國(guó)家，荒唐可笑的執(zhí)政軍政府又稱之為Burma.有關(guān)該國(guó)的大多數(shù)文學(xué)作品都難免走向兩個(gè)極端之一。有的過于簡(jiǎn)單化，這倘若出于合情合理的道德義憤，倒是可以原諒的。這些作品通篇展現(xiàn)的幾乎都是反派（指軍政府）與正派（指幾乎遭永久軟禁的*領(lǐng)袖昂山素季）之間的沖突，別無它物。這是一個(gè)極端，另一個(gè)極端則是，有的作家過分糾纏于這一簡(jiǎn)單構(gòu)架中所蘊(yùn)藏的令人眼花繚亂的復(fù)雜性：緬甸邊境地區(qū)十多個(gè)武裝叛亂力量挑起的內(nèi)戰(zhàn)，在紛繁蕪雜的種族對(duì)峙和積怨的推波助瀾下，成了世界最曠日持久的內(nèi)戰(zhàn)之一。
Thant Myint-U's fine book seeks the middle ground. An academic historian and a former United Nations official, Mr Thant accuses the simplifiers of an “ahistorical” approach. He argues, justifiably, that Myanmar is “seen within the prism[6] of the past ten or 20 years, as if three Anglo-Burmese wars, a century of colonial rule, an immensely destructive Japanese invasion and occupation, and five decades of civil war, foreign intervention and Communist insurgency had never happened.”
相比上述兩個(gè)極端，吳丹敏（Thant Myint-U）的優(yōu)秀著作則中規(guī)中矩。吳丹敏是一位注重理論研究的歷史學(xué)家，曾在聯(lián)合國(guó)任職。他指責(zé)簡(jiǎn)單化者在對(duì)待緬甸歷史問題上“一葉障目”。他認(rèn)為，“這些人的眼里只有過去10年或20年的緬甸，三次英緬戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)（Anglo-Burmese wars）、一個(gè)世紀(jì)的殖民統(tǒng)治、日本人侵占造成的巨大破壞以及長(zhǎng)達(dá)五十年的內(nèi)戰(zhàn)、外國(guó)干涉內(nèi)政和緬共叛亂，等等這些似乎從未發(fā)生過。”
His book is part personal memoir, part history and part polemic[7]. He tells the history of Myanmar from ancient times in an accessible and engaging way. But this is intended also as a contribution to a debate that has raged for nearly two decades among Myanmar's exiled democrats: should the West shun, isolate and bully the generals into engaging with Ms Suu Kyi and her many supporters? Or should it encourage the junta in the hope that, through the blandishments[8] of modernity and economic advancement, it will eventually be coaxed[9] to reform?
他的作品集個(gè)人回憶、歷史記述與觀點(diǎn)爭(zhēng)鳴于一身。他從遠(yuǎn)古時(shí)代開始講述緬甸歷史，行文深入淺出，引人入勝。這也意在引出緬甸流亡民主人士爭(zhēng)論了近20年的一個(gè)問題：西方國(guó)家是應(yīng)當(dāng)躲開并孤立那些將軍，從而逼迫他們與昂山素季及其眾多追隨者兵戎相見，還是應(yīng)當(dāng)打著現(xiàn)代性和經(jīng)濟(jì)進(jìn)步的幌子對(duì)軍政府好言相勸，誘使其走上改革之路呢？
Mr Thant is entitled to a hearing. The grandson of U Thant, UN secretary-general in the 1960s, he grew up in America and Thailand, with summer visits to his ancestral homeland. But when Myanmar's pro-democracy movement was brutally crushed in 1988, and thousands of young people fled to makeshift[10] camps on the Thai border, he joined them for some months.
如此講述，吳丹敏是有資格的。作為上世紀(jì)60年代聯(lián)合國(guó)秘書長(zhǎng)吳丹的孫子，他在美國(guó)和泰國(guó)長(zhǎng)大，曾多次在夏天造訪其祖國(guó)。1988年緬甸*遭殘酷鎮(zhèn)壓后，數(shù)千青年逃至泰國(guó)邊境上的難民營(yíng)，他與他們共度了幾個(gè)月的時(shí)光。
He has since parted company with the exile movement's pro-isolation orthodoxy. Time has moved on, he points out. Most of Myanmar's population was born after 1988. Thus, those for whom that was a life-defining moment are now in a minority. Isolation has not worked: it is “both counterproductive and dangerous”.
他一直都不同意流亡*分子主張閉關(guān)自守的觀點(diǎn)。他指出，時(shí)代是在前進(jìn)的。緬甸人口大多數(shù)是1988年后出生的，曾經(jīng)遭受命運(yùn)浩劫的那一代人現(xiàn)已所剩無幾。閉關(guān)自守是無益的：它已釀成“事與愿違甚至危險(xiǎn)的后果”。
There is much in this argument; and it is easy to share the exasperation he seems to feel with some exiled lobbyists. Some have so lost sight of the ends in pursuing the means that each new government sanction or consumer-boycott-induced withdrawal of a foreign investor is celebrated as a triumph in itself.
此話意味深長(zhǎng)，內(nèi)中流露的憤懣明擺著是沖著某些流亡說客去的。每當(dāng)政府出臺(tái)新制約措施或消費(fèi)者抵制造成外國(guó)投資人撤資，這些流亡人士都會(huì)歡呼雀躍，并且一條道走到黑，樂此不疲。
Mr Thant, however, skirts three difficulties. First, it is wrong to argue, as he does, that “the difference between the Burmese military regime and its counterparts in South Korea, Thailand and Indonesia is not that [it] has been any more repressive.” Oh yes it has; though it is also true, as he goes on, that “the others trusted the advice of technocrats[11], presided over long periods of economic growth and allowed for the development of civil society.”
然而，有三個(gè)問題吳丹敏處理不得當(dāng)。首先，他和別人一樣，認(rèn)為“緬甸軍事政權(quán)與韓國(guó)（此處可能為North Korea之誤——譯者按）、泰國(guó)、印度尼西亞軍事政權(quán)的差異并不在于（前者）更專制?！边@種觀點(diǎn)是不正確的，事實(shí)上緬甸軍事政權(quán)就是特別專制；盡管他接下來也指出，“其他國(guó)家采納專家政治論者的諫言，引領(lǐng)經(jīng)濟(jì)長(zhǎng)期增長(zhǎng)，允許公民社會(huì)發(fā)展”，確有其事。
Second, isolation has been neither complete nor entirely involuntary. The generals have excluded the world as much as it has shunned them, and have found in China, India and South-East Asia neighbours who are more than ready to deal with them.
其次，一直以來，緬甸并非完全閉關(guān)自守，政府也并非全然不顧。將軍們排斥這個(gè)世界，但世界照樣也在躲避他們，而且他們已然察覺，中國(guó)、印度和東南亞鄰國(guó)都非常樂于與他們開展貿(mào)易往來。
Third, unlike many other dictatorships, Myanmar has held an election, and lost it comprehensively. That was a long time ago, in 1990. But nothing that has happened since suggests the winners—Ms Suu Kyi's party—could not repeat the feat if given the chance. So their views, which do not match Mr Thant's, also carry weight.
第三，不同于其他許多專制國(guó)家，緬甸曾舉行過一次大選，后來再也沒有了。那是在1990年，距今已經(jīng)很多年。大選后一切如舊，說明選舉獲勝者昂山素季的政黨倘若還有這樣的機(jī)會(huì)，也不可能再奏凱歌。所以，他們的觀點(diǎn)雖然與吳丹敏相左，但還是有分量的。
閉關(guān)鎖國(guó) （陳繼龍 譯）
Mar 1st 2007
From The Economist print edition
MOST writing about the benighted[1] land of Burma, dubbed Myanmar by the grotesque[2] junta running it, falls into one of two traps. Either it plumps[3] for simplification, which is pardonable given the justness of its moral outrage. The conflict does indeed come closer than almost any other to one between baddies （the junta） and the followers of a super-goody （the almost-permanently detained opposition leader, Aung San Suu Kyi）.At the other extreme, some writers become bogged down[4] in the bewildering complexity underneath this simple framework: the tangled[5] skein of ethnic rivalries and grudges that have fuelled one of the world's longest running civil wars, fought by more than a dozen armed insurgencies around Myanmar's borders.
緬甸（Myanmar）是一個(gè)愚昧落后的國(guó)家，荒唐可笑的執(zhí)政軍政府又稱之為Burma.有關(guān)該國(guó)的大多數(shù)文學(xué)作品都難免走向兩個(gè)極端之一。有的過于簡(jiǎn)單化，這倘若出于合情合理的道德義憤，倒是可以原諒的。這些作品通篇展現(xiàn)的幾乎都是反派（指軍政府）與正派（指幾乎遭永久軟禁的*領(lǐng)袖昂山素季）之間的沖突，別無它物。這是一個(gè)極端，另一個(gè)極端則是，有的作家過分糾纏于這一簡(jiǎn)單構(gòu)架中所蘊(yùn)藏的令人眼花繚亂的復(fù)雜性：緬甸邊境地區(qū)十多個(gè)武裝叛亂力量挑起的內(nèi)戰(zhàn)，在紛繁蕪雜的種族對(duì)峙和積怨的推波助瀾下，成了世界最曠日持久的內(nèi)戰(zhàn)之一。
Thant Myint-U's fine book seeks the middle ground. An academic historian and a former United Nations official, Mr Thant accuses the simplifiers of an “ahistorical” approach. He argues, justifiably, that Myanmar is “seen within the prism[6] of the past ten or 20 years, as if three Anglo-Burmese wars, a century of colonial rule, an immensely destructive Japanese invasion and occupation, and five decades of civil war, foreign intervention and Communist insurgency had never happened.”
相比上述兩個(gè)極端，吳丹敏（Thant Myint-U）的優(yōu)秀著作則中規(guī)中矩。吳丹敏是一位注重理論研究的歷史學(xué)家，曾在聯(lián)合國(guó)任職。他指責(zé)簡(jiǎn)單化者在對(duì)待緬甸歷史問題上“一葉障目”。他認(rèn)為，“這些人的眼里只有過去10年或20年的緬甸，三次英緬戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)（Anglo-Burmese wars）、一個(gè)世紀(jì)的殖民統(tǒng)治、日本人侵占造成的巨大破壞以及長(zhǎng)達(dá)五十年的內(nèi)戰(zhàn)、外國(guó)干涉內(nèi)政和緬共叛亂，等等這些似乎從未發(fā)生過。”
His book is part personal memoir, part history and part polemic[7]. He tells the history of Myanmar from ancient times in an accessible and engaging way. But this is intended also as a contribution to a debate that has raged for nearly two decades among Myanmar's exiled democrats: should the West shun, isolate and bully the generals into engaging with Ms Suu Kyi and her many supporters? Or should it encourage the junta in the hope that, through the blandishments[8] of modernity and economic advancement, it will eventually be coaxed[9] to reform?
他的作品集個(gè)人回憶、歷史記述與觀點(diǎn)爭(zhēng)鳴于一身。他從遠(yuǎn)古時(shí)代開始講述緬甸歷史，行文深入淺出，引人入勝。這也意在引出緬甸流亡民主人士爭(zhēng)論了近20年的一個(gè)問題：西方國(guó)家是應(yīng)當(dāng)躲開并孤立那些將軍，從而逼迫他們與昂山素季及其眾多追隨者兵戎相見，還是應(yīng)當(dāng)打著現(xiàn)代性和經(jīng)濟(jì)進(jìn)步的幌子對(duì)軍政府好言相勸，誘使其走上改革之路呢？
Mr Thant is entitled to a hearing. The grandson of U Thant, UN secretary-general in the 1960s, he grew up in America and Thailand, with summer visits to his ancestral homeland. But when Myanmar's pro-democracy movement was brutally crushed in 1988, and thousands of young people fled to makeshift[10] camps on the Thai border, he joined them for some months.
如此講述，吳丹敏是有資格的。作為上世紀(jì)60年代聯(lián)合國(guó)秘書長(zhǎng)吳丹的孫子，他在美國(guó)和泰國(guó)長(zhǎng)大，曾多次在夏天造訪其祖國(guó)。1988年緬甸*遭殘酷鎮(zhèn)壓后，數(shù)千青年逃至泰國(guó)邊境上的難民營(yíng)，他與他們共度了幾個(gè)月的時(shí)光。
He has since parted company with the exile movement's pro-isolation orthodoxy. Time has moved on, he points out. Most of Myanmar's population was born after 1988. Thus, those for whom that was a life-defining moment are now in a minority. Isolation has not worked: it is “both counterproductive and dangerous”.
他一直都不同意流亡*分子主張閉關(guān)自守的觀點(diǎn)。他指出，時(shí)代是在前進(jìn)的。緬甸人口大多數(shù)是1988年后出生的，曾經(jīng)遭受命運(yùn)浩劫的那一代人現(xiàn)已所剩無幾。閉關(guān)自守是無益的：它已釀成“事與愿違甚至危險(xiǎn)的后果”。
There is much in this argument; and it is easy to share the exasperation he seems to feel with some exiled lobbyists. Some have so lost sight of the ends in pursuing the means that each new government sanction or consumer-boycott-induced withdrawal of a foreign investor is celebrated as a triumph in itself.
此話意味深長(zhǎng)，內(nèi)中流露的憤懣明擺著是沖著某些流亡說客去的。每當(dāng)政府出臺(tái)新制約措施或消費(fèi)者抵制造成外國(guó)投資人撤資，這些流亡人士都會(huì)歡呼雀躍，并且一條道走到黑，樂此不疲。
Mr Thant, however, skirts three difficulties. First, it is wrong to argue, as he does, that “the difference between the Burmese military regime and its counterparts in South Korea, Thailand and Indonesia is not that [it] has been any more repressive.” Oh yes it has; though it is also true, as he goes on, that “the others trusted the advice of technocrats[11], presided over long periods of economic growth and allowed for the development of civil society.”
然而，有三個(gè)問題吳丹敏處理不得當(dāng)。首先，他和別人一樣，認(rèn)為“緬甸軍事政權(quán)與韓國(guó)（此處可能為North Korea之誤——譯者按）、泰國(guó)、印度尼西亞軍事政權(quán)的差異并不在于（前者）更專制?！边@種觀點(diǎn)是不正確的，事實(shí)上緬甸軍事政權(quán)就是特別專制；盡管他接下來也指出，“其他國(guó)家采納專家政治論者的諫言，引領(lǐng)經(jīng)濟(jì)長(zhǎng)期增長(zhǎng)，允許公民社會(huì)發(fā)展”，確有其事。
Second, isolation has been neither complete nor entirely involuntary. The generals have excluded the world as much as it has shunned them, and have found in China, India and South-East Asia neighbours who are more than ready to deal with them.
其次，一直以來，緬甸并非完全閉關(guān)自守，政府也并非全然不顧。將軍們排斥這個(gè)世界，但世界照樣也在躲避他們，而且他們已然察覺，中國(guó)、印度和東南亞鄰國(guó)都非常樂于與他們開展貿(mào)易往來。
Third, unlike many other dictatorships, Myanmar has held an election, and lost it comprehensively. That was a long time ago, in 1990. But nothing that has happened since suggests the winners—Ms Suu Kyi's party—could not repeat the feat if given the chance. So their views, which do not match Mr Thant's, also carry weight.
第三，不同于其他許多專制國(guó)家，緬甸曾舉行過一次大選，后來再也沒有了。那是在1990年，距今已經(jīng)很多年。大選后一切如舊，說明選舉獲勝者昂山素季的政黨倘若還有這樣的機(jī)會(huì)，也不可能再奏凱歌。所以，他們的觀點(diǎn)雖然與吳丹敏相左，但還是有分量的。