Sir Edward Grey
ENGLAND's POSITION
August 3，1914
In the present crisis，it has not been possible to se－cure the peace of Europe；because there has beenlittle time，and there has been a disposition—atany rate in some quarters on which I will not dwell—to force things rapidly to an issue，at anyrate，to the great risk of peace，and，as we nowknow，the result of that is that the policy of peace，as far as the Great Powers are concerned，is indanger.I do not want to dwell on that，and to comment on it，and to say where the blame seemsto lie，which Powers were most in favor of peace，which were most disposed to risk or endanger peace，because I would like the House to approachthis crisis in which we are now，from the point ofview of British interests，British honor，and British obligations，free from all passion as to whypeace has not been preserved.
It now appears from the news I have receivedto-day—which has come quite recently，and I amnot yet quite sure how far it has reached me in anaccurate form—that an ultimatum has been given to Belgium by Germany，the object of which wasto offer Belgium friendly relations with Germanyon condition that she would facilitate the passageof German troops through Belgium.Well，Sir，un－til one has these things absolutely definitely，up tothe last moment，I do not wish to say all that one would say if one were in a position to give the House full，complete，and absolute informationupon the point.We were sounded in the course oflast week as to whether if a guarantee were given that，after the war，Belgian integrity would be preserved that would content us.We replied that we could not bargain away whatever interests or obligations we had in Belgian neutrality.
We have great and vital interests in the inde-pendence—and integrity is the least part—of Bel-gium.If Belgium is compelled to submit to allow her neutrality to be violated，of course the situa-tion is clear.Even if by agreement she admitted the violation of her neutrality，it is clear she could only do so under duress.The smaller states in that region of Europe ask but one thing.Their one de－sire is that they should be left alone and indepen-dent.The one thing they fear is，I think，not so much that their integrity but that their indepen－dence should be interfered with.If in this war which is before Europe the neutrality of one of those countries is violated，if the troops of one of the combatants violate its neutrality and no action can be taken to resent it，at the end of the war，whatever the integrity may be，the independence will be gone.
Sir，if it be the case that there has been any－thing in the nature of an ultimatum to Belgium，asking her to compromise or violate her neutrality，whatever may have been offered to her in return，her independence is gone if that holds.If her inde-pendence goes，the independence of Holland willfollow.I ask the House from the point of view ofBritish interests，to consider what may be atstake.If France is beaten in a struggle of life anddeath，beaten to her knees，loses her position as a great Power，becomes subordinate to the will and power of one greater than herself—consequences which I do not anticipate，because I am sure that France has the power to defend herself with all the energy and ability and patriotism which she has shown so often—still，if that were to happen，and if Belgium fell under the same dominating influ－ence，and then Holland，and then Denmark，then would not Mr.Gladstone's words come true，that just opposite to us there would be a common inter-est against the unmeasured aggrandizement of any Power.
If may be said，I suppose，that we might stand aside，husband our strength，and whatever happened in the course of this war，at the end of it intervene with effect to put things right，and to ad-just them to our own point of view.If，in a crisis like this，we run away from those obligations of honor and interest as regards the Belgian Treaty，I doubt whether，whatever material force we might have at the end，it would be of very much value in face of the respect that we should have lost.And I do not believe，whether a great Power stands out-side this war or not，it is going to be in a position at the end of it to exert its superior strength.For us，with a powerful fleet，which we believe able to protect our commerce，to protect our shores，and to protect our interests，if we are engaged in war，we shall suffer but little more than we shall suffer even if we stand aside.
There is but one way in which the Govern- ment could make certain at the present moment of keeping outside this war，and that would be that it should immediately issue a proclamation of uncon－ditional neutrality.We cannot do that.We have made the commitment to France that I have read to the House which prevents us from doing that.We have got the consideration of Belgium which pre－vents us also from any unconditional neutrality，and，without those conditions absolutely satisfied and satisfactory，we are bound not to shrink from proceeding to the use of all the forces in our pow－er.If we did take that line by saying，“We will have nothing whatever to do with this matter un－der any conditions”—the Belgian treaty obliga－tions，the possible position in the Mediterranean，with damage to British interests，and what may happen to France from our failure to support France—if we were to say that all these things mattered nothing，were as nothing，and to say we would stand aside，we should，I believe，sacrifice our respect and good name and reputation before the world，and should not escape the most serious and grave economic consequences.
The most awful responsibility is resting upon the Government in deciding what to advise the House of Commons to do.We have disclosed our mind to the House of Commons.We have disclosed the issue，the information which we have，and made clear to the House，I trust，that we are pre－pared to face that situation，and that should it de－velop，as probably it may develop，we will face it.We worked for peace up to the last moment，and beyond the last moment.How hard，how persis-tently，and how earnestly we strove for peace last week，the House will see from the Papers that will be before it.
But that is over，as far as the peace of Europe is concerned.We are now face to face with a situa-tion and all the consequences which it may yet have to unfold.We believe we shall have the support of the House at large in proceeding to whatever the consequence may be and whatever measures may be forced upon us by the development of facts or action taken by others.
I have put the vital facts before the House，and if，as seems not improbable，we are forced，and rapidly forced，to take our stand upon those is-sues，then I believe，when the country realizes what is at stake，what the real issues are，the magnitude of the impending dangers in the West of Europe，which I have endeavored to describe to the House，we shall be supported throughout，not on－ly by the House of Commons，but by the determi-nation，the resolution，the courage，and the en-durance of the whole country.
愛德華·格雷爵士
英國(guó)的立場(chǎng)
1914年 8月3日
在當(dāng)前的危機(jī)之中，歐洲和平已不可能保證；因?yàn)闀r(shí)間已經(jīng)不多了，已經(jīng)有軍事部署——至少在某些地區(qū)，對(duì)此我不想詳談——在迫使事情迅速走向某種結(jié)局，至少是走向?qū)推降臉O大危險(xiǎn)。正如我們現(xiàn)在所知道的，其結(jié)果是：對(duì)大國(guó)們來說，和平政策已處于危險(xiǎn)之中。對(duì)此我不想詳細(xì)講述，并加以評(píng)論，說明責(zé)任誰屬，指出哪些大國(guó)最愛好和平，哪些大國(guó)有使和平遭受危險(xiǎn)的傾向，因?yàn)槲蚁Ｍ略簭挠?guó)的利益、英國(guó)的榮譽(yù)和英國(guó)的義務(wù)出發(fā)來著手處理這個(gè)我們已身臨其境的危機(jī)，而不要對(duì)和平為什么沒有受到保護(hù)有一點(diǎn)點(diǎn)情緒激動(dòng)。
從我今天收到的消息來看 ——消息相當(dāng)新，我還不能完全肯定這個(gè)消息到達(dá)我這里時(shí)有多大程度的準(zhǔn)確性——似乎德國(guó)已向比利時(shí)遞交了最后通牒，其目的是表示與比利時(shí)交好，條件是比利時(shí)要為德國(guó)軍隊(duì)通過比利時(shí)國(guó)境提供便利。是的，先生們，只要我能夠向下院提供有關(guān)要害問題的充分、完整和確實(shí)的情報(bào)，我就會(huì)告訴你們，而不到完全弄清這些情況的最后一刻，我是什么也不愿意說的。上周內(nèi)，有人為此試探過我們：如果保證戰(zhàn)后比利時(shí)的完整受到保護(hù)，我們對(duì)此是否感到滿意。我們的回答是，我們不能出賣我們?cè)诒壤麜r(shí)的中立問題上的任何利益和義務(wù)。
我們?cè)诒壤麜r(shí)的獨(dú)立——領(lǐng)土完整是最起碼的部分——中擁有極其重大的利益。如果比利時(shí)被迫任其中立遭受侵犯，情況自然是很清楚的。即使比利時(shí)依照協(xié)定容許其中立受侵犯，那么顯然也是她在脅迫下別無選擇。歐洲那個(gè)地區(qū)的小國(guó)只要求一件事。他們的愿望是保持獨(dú)立不受干涉。他們感到擔(dān)憂的，我想與其說是領(lǐng)土完整，還不如說是獨(dú)立遭到干擾。如果在這場(chǎng)歐洲面臨的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)中有一個(gè)這樣的小國(guó)的中立遭到侵犯，如果有一個(gè)參戰(zhàn)國(guó)的軍隊(duì)侵犯了它的中立而不能有任何行動(dòng)對(duì)此表示憤慨，那么到戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)結(jié)束時(shí)，不管領(lǐng)土怎樣完整，獨(dú)立將不復(fù)存在。
先生們，假如對(duì)比利時(shí)真有那么一個(gè)具有最后通牒性質(zhì)的東西——要求比利時(shí)妥協(xié)，或者侵犯比利時(shí)的中立，那么不管給比利時(shí)什么作為回報(bào)，一旦這種圖謀得逞，比利時(shí)的獨(dú)立就會(huì)喪失。如果比利時(shí)失去獨(dú)立，荷蘭的獨(dú)立就會(huì)跟著喪失。我請(qǐng)求下院從英國(guó)的利益著眼，想一想什么會(huì)處于危險(xiǎn)之中。如果法國(guó)在生死之戰(zhàn)中被打敗，俯首稱臣，失去一個(gè)大國(guó)的地位，變得屈從于一個(gè)比她更強(qiáng)的大國(guó)的意志和力量——我想不會(huì)產(chǎn)生這樣的結(jié)果，因?yàn)槲蚁嘈欧▏?guó)有力量用她所時(shí)常展示出來的全部活力、能力和愛國(guó)精神來保衛(wèi)自己——不過，如果這樣的事情果真發(fā)生，如果比利時(shí)受到同一個(gè)統(tǒng)治勢(shì)力的控制，然后荷蘭，然后丹麥，那么格萊斯頓先生關(guān)于就在我們的對(duì)面將形成一個(gè)反對(duì)任何強(qiáng)國(guó)無限擴(kuò)張的共同利益集團(tuán)的預(yù)言就不可能實(shí)現(xiàn)了。
我想，也許有人認(rèn)為我們應(yīng)該置身局外，保存實(shí)力，不管戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)期間發(fā)生什么情況，到戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)結(jié)束時(shí)進(jìn)行有效的調(diào)停，恢復(fù)正常秩序，改變他們以適應(yīng)我們的觀點(diǎn)。在目前這種危機(jī)中，如果我們逃避與比利時(shí)條約有關(guān)的涉及榮譽(yù)和利益的義務(wù)，我懷疑在戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)結(jié)束時(shí)，無論我們有多大的物質(zhì)力量，在我們將會(huì)失去人們的尊敬的情況下，這是否還會(huì)有很大意義。而且我也不相信，一個(gè)大國(guó)不論她是否置身于這場(chǎng)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)之外，在戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)結(jié)束時(shí)它還會(huì)有能力發(fā)揮它的優(yōu)勢(shì)力量。對(duì)我們來說，我們有一支強(qiáng)大的艦隊(duì)，我們相信它能夠保衛(wèi)我們的貿(mào)易，保衛(wèi)我們的海岸，保衛(wèi)我們的利益，如果我們參戰(zhàn)，那么我們所遭受的損失將不會(huì)比置身局外多多少。
在當(dāng)前這個(gè)時(shí)刻，政府無疑只有一個(gè)辦法可以置身于戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)之外，那就是立即發(fā)表一項(xiàng)絕對(duì)中立的聲明。我們不能這樣做。我剛才向下院宣讀的我們對(duì)法國(guó)所作的承諾不允許我們那么做。我們所贏得的比利時(shí)的尊敬同樣不容許我們采取任何無條件的中立。即使不具備那些令人完全滿意的條件，我們也有義務(wù)繼續(xù)使用我們手中的全部軍事力量而不退縮。如果我們采取那樣的方針，宣稱“我們?cè)谌魏吻闆r下都與此事毫無關(guān)系”——不管是比利時(shí)條約的義務(wù)、在地中海可能的地位、對(duì)英國(guó)利益的損害，還是因我們未能支援法國(guó)而法國(guó)可能出現(xiàn)的情況——如果我們宣稱這一切都無關(guān)緊要，微不足道，宣稱我們將置身局外，那么我認(rèn)為我們將在全世界面前喪失我們所獲得的尊敬和好名聲，也將無法逃避最嚴(yán)重的經(jīng)濟(jì)后果。
政府正擔(dān)負(fù)著最棘手的任務(wù)：確定就下院應(yīng)采取什么樣的行動(dòng)而提出的建議。我們已經(jīng)向下院透露了我們的想法。我們已經(jīng)透露了問題的焦點(diǎn)和我們獲得的情報(bào)，我相信我們已經(jīng)向下院表明我們已準(zhǔn)備好正視這種局勢(shì)，萬一局勢(shì)有變——局勢(shì)很可能會(huì)變——我們也能正視它。我們已經(jīng)為和平努力到了最后一刻，甚至超越了最后一刻。上個(gè)星期我們?cè)?jīng)多么艱苦地、堅(jiān)持不懈地、誠(chéng)懇認(rèn)真地力爭(zhēng)和平，下院將從提供給它的文件中看到這一點(diǎn)。
但是這些努力對(duì)歐洲和平來說已經(jīng)結(jié)束了?，F(xiàn)在我們正面對(duì)著一種局面和它必將展現(xiàn)出來的全部后果。我們相信，不管后果如何，也不管實(shí)際情況或者別國(guó)所采取的行動(dòng)的發(fā)展迫使我們采取什么樣的步驟，我們將繼續(xù)獲得整個(gè)下院的支持。
我已經(jīng)把極其重要的事實(shí)提供給了下院，如果我們被迫，而且很快被迫對(duì)這些問題表明自己的立場(chǎng)——看來這不無可能，那么我相信，如果國(guó)家弄清楚危險(xiǎn)何在，真正的問題何在，弄清楚我所竭力向下院描述的西歐迫在眉睫的危險(xiǎn)的嚴(yán)重性，我們將獲得全面的支持，不僅獲得下院的支持，還將獲得舉國(guó)上下的決心、毅力、勇氣和耐力的支持。
ENGLAND's POSITION
August 3，1914
In the present crisis，it has not been possible to se－cure the peace of Europe；because there has beenlittle time，and there has been a disposition—atany rate in some quarters on which I will not dwell—to force things rapidly to an issue，at anyrate，to the great risk of peace，and，as we nowknow，the result of that is that the policy of peace，as far as the Great Powers are concerned，is indanger.I do not want to dwell on that，and to comment on it，and to say where the blame seemsto lie，which Powers were most in favor of peace，which were most disposed to risk or endanger peace，because I would like the House to approachthis crisis in which we are now，from the point ofview of British interests，British honor，and British obligations，free from all passion as to whypeace has not been preserved.
It now appears from the news I have receivedto-day—which has come quite recently，and I amnot yet quite sure how far it has reached me in anaccurate form—that an ultimatum has been given to Belgium by Germany，the object of which wasto offer Belgium friendly relations with Germanyon condition that she would facilitate the passageof German troops through Belgium.Well，Sir，un－til one has these things absolutely definitely，up tothe last moment，I do not wish to say all that one would say if one were in a position to give the House full，complete，and absolute informationupon the point.We were sounded in the course oflast week as to whether if a guarantee were given that，after the war，Belgian integrity would be preserved that would content us.We replied that we could not bargain away whatever interests or obligations we had in Belgian neutrality.
We have great and vital interests in the inde-pendence—and integrity is the least part—of Bel-gium.If Belgium is compelled to submit to allow her neutrality to be violated，of course the situa-tion is clear.Even if by agreement she admitted the violation of her neutrality，it is clear she could only do so under duress.The smaller states in that region of Europe ask but one thing.Their one de－sire is that they should be left alone and indepen-dent.The one thing they fear is，I think，not so much that their integrity but that their indepen－dence should be interfered with.If in this war which is before Europe the neutrality of one of those countries is violated，if the troops of one of the combatants violate its neutrality and no action can be taken to resent it，at the end of the war，whatever the integrity may be，the independence will be gone.
Sir，if it be the case that there has been any－thing in the nature of an ultimatum to Belgium，asking her to compromise or violate her neutrality，whatever may have been offered to her in return，her independence is gone if that holds.If her inde-pendence goes，the independence of Holland willfollow.I ask the House from the point of view ofBritish interests，to consider what may be atstake.If France is beaten in a struggle of life anddeath，beaten to her knees，loses her position as a great Power，becomes subordinate to the will and power of one greater than herself—consequences which I do not anticipate，because I am sure that France has the power to defend herself with all the energy and ability and patriotism which she has shown so often—still，if that were to happen，and if Belgium fell under the same dominating influ－ence，and then Holland，and then Denmark，then would not Mr.Gladstone's words come true，that just opposite to us there would be a common inter-est against the unmeasured aggrandizement of any Power.
If may be said，I suppose，that we might stand aside，husband our strength，and whatever happened in the course of this war，at the end of it intervene with effect to put things right，and to ad-just them to our own point of view.If，in a crisis like this，we run away from those obligations of honor and interest as regards the Belgian Treaty，I doubt whether，whatever material force we might have at the end，it would be of very much value in face of the respect that we should have lost.And I do not believe，whether a great Power stands out-side this war or not，it is going to be in a position at the end of it to exert its superior strength.For us，with a powerful fleet，which we believe able to protect our commerce，to protect our shores，and to protect our interests，if we are engaged in war，we shall suffer but little more than we shall suffer even if we stand aside.
There is but one way in which the Govern- ment could make certain at the present moment of keeping outside this war，and that would be that it should immediately issue a proclamation of uncon－ditional neutrality.We cannot do that.We have made the commitment to France that I have read to the House which prevents us from doing that.We have got the consideration of Belgium which pre－vents us also from any unconditional neutrality，and，without those conditions absolutely satisfied and satisfactory，we are bound not to shrink from proceeding to the use of all the forces in our pow－er.If we did take that line by saying，“We will have nothing whatever to do with this matter un－der any conditions”—the Belgian treaty obliga－tions，the possible position in the Mediterranean，with damage to British interests，and what may happen to France from our failure to support France—if we were to say that all these things mattered nothing，were as nothing，and to say we would stand aside，we should，I believe，sacrifice our respect and good name and reputation before the world，and should not escape the most serious and grave economic consequences.
The most awful responsibility is resting upon the Government in deciding what to advise the House of Commons to do.We have disclosed our mind to the House of Commons.We have disclosed the issue，the information which we have，and made clear to the House，I trust，that we are pre－pared to face that situation，and that should it de－velop，as probably it may develop，we will face it.We worked for peace up to the last moment，and beyond the last moment.How hard，how persis-tently，and how earnestly we strove for peace last week，the House will see from the Papers that will be before it.
But that is over，as far as the peace of Europe is concerned.We are now face to face with a situa-tion and all the consequences which it may yet have to unfold.We believe we shall have the support of the House at large in proceeding to whatever the consequence may be and whatever measures may be forced upon us by the development of facts or action taken by others.
I have put the vital facts before the House，and if，as seems not improbable，we are forced，and rapidly forced，to take our stand upon those is-sues，then I believe，when the country realizes what is at stake，what the real issues are，the magnitude of the impending dangers in the West of Europe，which I have endeavored to describe to the House，we shall be supported throughout，not on－ly by the House of Commons，but by the determi-nation，the resolution，the courage，and the en-durance of the whole country.
愛德華·格雷爵士
英國(guó)的立場(chǎng)
1914年 8月3日
在當(dāng)前的危機(jī)之中，歐洲和平已不可能保證；因?yàn)闀r(shí)間已經(jīng)不多了，已經(jīng)有軍事部署——至少在某些地區(qū)，對(duì)此我不想詳談——在迫使事情迅速走向某種結(jié)局，至少是走向?qū)推降臉O大危險(xiǎn)。正如我們現(xiàn)在所知道的，其結(jié)果是：對(duì)大國(guó)們來說，和平政策已處于危險(xiǎn)之中。對(duì)此我不想詳細(xì)講述，并加以評(píng)論，說明責(zé)任誰屬，指出哪些大國(guó)最愛好和平，哪些大國(guó)有使和平遭受危險(xiǎn)的傾向，因?yàn)槲蚁Ｍ略簭挠?guó)的利益、英國(guó)的榮譽(yù)和英國(guó)的義務(wù)出發(fā)來著手處理這個(gè)我們已身臨其境的危機(jī)，而不要對(duì)和平為什么沒有受到保護(hù)有一點(diǎn)點(diǎn)情緒激動(dòng)。
從我今天收到的消息來看 ——消息相當(dāng)新，我還不能完全肯定這個(gè)消息到達(dá)我這里時(shí)有多大程度的準(zhǔn)確性——似乎德國(guó)已向比利時(shí)遞交了最后通牒，其目的是表示與比利時(shí)交好，條件是比利時(shí)要為德國(guó)軍隊(duì)通過比利時(shí)國(guó)境提供便利。是的，先生們，只要我能夠向下院提供有關(guān)要害問題的充分、完整和確實(shí)的情報(bào)，我就會(huì)告訴你們，而不到完全弄清這些情況的最后一刻，我是什么也不愿意說的。上周內(nèi)，有人為此試探過我們：如果保證戰(zhàn)后比利時(shí)的完整受到保護(hù)，我們對(duì)此是否感到滿意。我們的回答是，我們不能出賣我們?cè)诒壤麜r(shí)的中立問題上的任何利益和義務(wù)。
我們?cè)诒壤麜r(shí)的獨(dú)立——領(lǐng)土完整是最起碼的部分——中擁有極其重大的利益。如果比利時(shí)被迫任其中立遭受侵犯，情況自然是很清楚的。即使比利時(shí)依照協(xié)定容許其中立受侵犯，那么顯然也是她在脅迫下別無選擇。歐洲那個(gè)地區(qū)的小國(guó)只要求一件事。他們的愿望是保持獨(dú)立不受干涉。他們感到擔(dān)憂的，我想與其說是領(lǐng)土完整，還不如說是獨(dú)立遭到干擾。如果在這場(chǎng)歐洲面臨的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)中有一個(gè)這樣的小國(guó)的中立遭到侵犯，如果有一個(gè)參戰(zhàn)國(guó)的軍隊(duì)侵犯了它的中立而不能有任何行動(dòng)對(duì)此表示憤慨，那么到戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)結(jié)束時(shí)，不管領(lǐng)土怎樣完整，獨(dú)立將不復(fù)存在。
先生們，假如對(duì)比利時(shí)真有那么一個(gè)具有最后通牒性質(zhì)的東西——要求比利時(shí)妥協(xié)，或者侵犯比利時(shí)的中立，那么不管給比利時(shí)什么作為回報(bào)，一旦這種圖謀得逞，比利時(shí)的獨(dú)立就會(huì)喪失。如果比利時(shí)失去獨(dú)立，荷蘭的獨(dú)立就會(huì)跟著喪失。我請(qǐng)求下院從英國(guó)的利益著眼，想一想什么會(huì)處于危險(xiǎn)之中。如果法國(guó)在生死之戰(zhàn)中被打敗，俯首稱臣，失去一個(gè)大國(guó)的地位，變得屈從于一個(gè)比她更強(qiáng)的大國(guó)的意志和力量——我想不會(huì)產(chǎn)生這樣的結(jié)果，因?yàn)槲蚁嘈欧▏?guó)有力量用她所時(shí)常展示出來的全部活力、能力和愛國(guó)精神來保衛(wèi)自己——不過，如果這樣的事情果真發(fā)生，如果比利時(shí)受到同一個(gè)統(tǒng)治勢(shì)力的控制，然后荷蘭，然后丹麥，那么格萊斯頓先生關(guān)于就在我們的對(duì)面將形成一個(gè)反對(duì)任何強(qiáng)國(guó)無限擴(kuò)張的共同利益集團(tuán)的預(yù)言就不可能實(shí)現(xiàn)了。
我想，也許有人認(rèn)為我們應(yīng)該置身局外，保存實(shí)力，不管戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)期間發(fā)生什么情況，到戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)結(jié)束時(shí)進(jìn)行有效的調(diào)停，恢復(fù)正常秩序，改變他們以適應(yīng)我們的觀點(diǎn)。在目前這種危機(jī)中，如果我們逃避與比利時(shí)條約有關(guān)的涉及榮譽(yù)和利益的義務(wù)，我懷疑在戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)結(jié)束時(shí)，無論我們有多大的物質(zhì)力量，在我們將會(huì)失去人們的尊敬的情況下，這是否還會(huì)有很大意義。而且我也不相信，一個(gè)大國(guó)不論她是否置身于這場(chǎng)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)之外，在戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)結(jié)束時(shí)它還會(huì)有能力發(fā)揮它的優(yōu)勢(shì)力量。對(duì)我們來說，我們有一支強(qiáng)大的艦隊(duì)，我們相信它能夠保衛(wèi)我們的貿(mào)易，保衛(wèi)我們的海岸，保衛(wèi)我們的利益，如果我們參戰(zhàn)，那么我們所遭受的損失將不會(huì)比置身局外多多少。
在當(dāng)前這個(gè)時(shí)刻，政府無疑只有一個(gè)辦法可以置身于戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)之外，那就是立即發(fā)表一項(xiàng)絕對(duì)中立的聲明。我們不能這樣做。我剛才向下院宣讀的我們對(duì)法國(guó)所作的承諾不允許我們那么做。我們所贏得的比利時(shí)的尊敬同樣不容許我們采取任何無條件的中立。即使不具備那些令人完全滿意的條件，我們也有義務(wù)繼續(xù)使用我們手中的全部軍事力量而不退縮。如果我們采取那樣的方針，宣稱“我們?cè)谌魏吻闆r下都與此事毫無關(guān)系”——不管是比利時(shí)條約的義務(wù)、在地中海可能的地位、對(duì)英國(guó)利益的損害，還是因我們未能支援法國(guó)而法國(guó)可能出現(xiàn)的情況——如果我們宣稱這一切都無關(guān)緊要，微不足道，宣稱我們將置身局外，那么我認(rèn)為我們將在全世界面前喪失我們所獲得的尊敬和好名聲，也將無法逃避最嚴(yán)重的經(jīng)濟(jì)后果。
政府正擔(dān)負(fù)著最棘手的任務(wù)：確定就下院應(yīng)采取什么樣的行動(dòng)而提出的建議。我們已經(jīng)向下院透露了我們的想法。我們已經(jīng)透露了問題的焦點(diǎn)和我們獲得的情報(bào)，我相信我們已經(jīng)向下院表明我們已準(zhǔn)備好正視這種局勢(shì)，萬一局勢(shì)有變——局勢(shì)很可能會(huì)變——我們也能正視它。我們已經(jīng)為和平努力到了最后一刻，甚至超越了最后一刻。上個(gè)星期我們?cè)?jīng)多么艱苦地、堅(jiān)持不懈地、誠(chéng)懇認(rèn)真地力爭(zhēng)和平，下院將從提供給它的文件中看到這一點(diǎn)。
但是這些努力對(duì)歐洲和平來說已經(jīng)結(jié)束了?，F(xiàn)在我們正面對(duì)著一種局面和它必將展現(xiàn)出來的全部后果。我們相信，不管后果如何，也不管實(shí)際情況或者別國(guó)所采取的行動(dòng)的發(fā)展迫使我們采取什么樣的步驟，我們將繼續(xù)獲得整個(gè)下院的支持。
我已經(jīng)把極其重要的事實(shí)提供給了下院，如果我們被迫，而且很快被迫對(duì)這些問題表明自己的立場(chǎng)——看來這不無可能，那么我相信，如果國(guó)家弄清楚危險(xiǎn)何在，真正的問題何在，弄清楚我所竭力向下院描述的西歐迫在眉睫的危險(xiǎn)的嚴(yán)重性，我們將獲得全面的支持，不僅獲得下院的支持，還將獲得舉國(guó)上下的決心、毅力、勇氣和耐力的支持。