William Pitt
ON HIS REFUSAL TO NEGOTIATE WITH BONAPARTE
February 3，1800
That Bonaparte has an interest in making peace is at best but a doubtful proposition，and that he has an interest in preserving it is still more uncertain.That it is his interest to negotiate，I do not indeed deny.It is his interest，above all，to engage this country in separate negotiation，in order to loosen and dissolve the whole system of the confederacy on the Continent，to palsy at once the arms of Russia，or of Austria，or of any other country that might look to you for support；and then either to break off his separate treaty，or，if he should have concluded it，to apply the lesson which is taught in his school of policy in Egypt，and to revive at his pleasure those claims of indemnification which may have been reserved to some happier period.
This is precisely the interest which he has in negotiation.But on what grounds are we to be convinced that he has an interest in concluding and observing a solid and permanent pacification？Under all the circumstances of his personal character，and his newly acquired power，what other security has he for retaining that power but the sword？His hold upon France is the sword，and he has no other.Is he connected with the soil，or win megabits，the affections，or the prejudices of the country？He is a stranger，a foreigner，and a usurper.He unites in his own person everything that a pure republican must detest；everything that an enraged Jacobin has abjured；everything that a sincere and faithful royalist must feel as an insult.If he is opposed at any time in his career，what is his appeal？He appeals to his fortune；in other words，to his army and his sword.Placing，thed，his whole reliance upon military support，can he afford to let his military renown pass away，to let his laurels wither，to let the memory of his trophies sink in obscurity？IS it certain that with his army confined within France，and restrained from inroads upon her neighbors，that he can maintain，at his devotion，a force sufficiently numerous to support his power？Having no object but the pos-session of absolute dominion，no passion but military glory，is it to he reckoned as certain that he can feel such an interest in permanent peace as would justify us in laying down our arms，reducing our expense，and relinquishing our means of security，on the faith of his engagements？Do we believe that，after the conclusion of peace，he would not still sigh over the lost trophies of Egypt，wrested from him by the celebrated victory of Aboukir，and the brilliant exertions of that heroic band of British seamen，whose influence and example rendered the Turkish troops invincible at Acre？Can he forget that the effect of these exploits enabled Austria and Prussia，in one campaign，to re-cover from France all which she had acquired by his victories，to dissolve the charm which for a time fascinated Europe，and to show that their generals，contending in a just cause，could efface，even by their success and their military glory，the most dazzling triumphs of his victorious and desolating ambition？
Can we believe，with these impressions on his mind，that if，after a year，eighteen months，or two years of peace had elapsed，he should be tempted by the appearance of fresh insurrection in Ireland，encouraged by renewed and unrestrained communication with France，and fomented by the fresh infusion of Jacobin principles；if we were at such a moment without a fleet to watch the ports of France，or to guard the coasts of Ireland，with- out a disposable army，or an embodied militia capable of supplying a speedy and adequate reinforcement，and that he had suddenly the means of transporting thither a body of twenty or thirty thousand French troops；can we believe that，at such a moment，his ambition and vindictive spirit would be restrained by the recollection of engagements or the obligation of treaty？Or if，in some new crisis of difficulty and danger to the Ottoman Empire，with no British navy in the Mediterranean，no confederacy formed，no force collected to support it，an opportunity should pre- sent itself for resuming the abandoned expedition to Egypt，for renewing the avowed and favorite project of conquering and colonizing that rich and fertile country，and of opening the way to wound some of the vital interests of England，and to plunder the treasures of the East，in order to fill the bankrupt coffers of France—would it be the interest of Bonaparte，under such circumstances，or his principles，his moderation，his love of peace，his aversion to conquest，and his regard for the independence of other nations—would it be all or any of these that would secure us against an attempt which would leave us only the option of submitting without a struggle to certain loss and disgrace，or of renewing the contest which we had prematurely terminated，without allies，without preparation，with diminished means，and with increased difficulty and hazard？
What，then，is the inference I draw from all that I have now stated？Is it that we will in no case treat with Bonaparte？I say no such thing.But I say，as has been said in the answer returned to the French note，that we ought to wait for“experience and the evidence of facts” before we are convinced that such a treaty is admissible.The circumstances I have stated would well justify us if we should be slow in being convinced；but on a question of peace and war，everything depends upon degree and up-on comparison.If，on the one hand，there should be an appearance that the policy of France is at length guided by different maxims from those which have hitherto prevailed；if we should here-after see signs of stability in the government which are not now to be traced；if the progress of the al-lied army should not call forth such a spirit in France as to make it probable that the act of the country itself will destroy the system now prevailing；if the danger，the difficulty，the risk of continuing the contest should increase，while the hope of complete ultimate success should be diminished；all these，in their due place，are considerations which，with myself and，I can answer for it，with every one of my colleagues，will have their just weight.But at present these considerations all operate one way；at present there is nothing from which we can presage a favorable disposition to change in the French councils.There is the greatest reason to rely on powerful cooperation from our allies；there are the strongest marks of a disposition in the interior of France to active resistance against this new tyranny；and there is every ground to believe，on reviewing our situation and that of the enemy，that，if we are ultimately disappointed of that complete success which we are at present entitled to hope，the continuance of the contest，instead of making our situation comparatively worse，will have made it comparatively better.
威廉·皮特
論拒絕與波拿巴談判
1800年2月3日
波拿巴對(duì)媾和的興趣充其量也不過是一項(xiàng)值得懷疑的建議，至于他對(duì)保持和平的興趣就更不可靠了。我并不否認(rèn)波拿巴有興趣談判。首先，他企圖與我國單獨(dú)談判，以便削弱乃至瓦解歐洲大陸同盟，并同時(shí)使俄國、奧地利或其他可能向你們求助的國家的軍隊(duì)陷于癱瘓；然后或者中止他與別國單獨(dú)簽訂協(xié)定的談判；或者，如果他已簽定了該協(xié)定，他就會(huì)運(yùn)用他在埃及的政策學(xué)校里講授的經(jīng)驗(yàn)，并且在他樂意時(shí)重提那些也許是保留到某個(gè)較合適的時(shí)期才提出的賠償要求。
這就是波拿巴對(duì)談判感興趣的地方，但我們有什么理由可以相信波拿巴對(duì)締結(jié)和遵守永久和平協(xié)定感興趣呢？從其個(gè)人性格和新近獲得的權(quán)力等各方面情況來看，他為保持政權(quán)除了用劍外還有其他保證嗎？他控制法國靠的是劍而不是其他東西。他威廉·皮特（1759—1806），查塔姆伯爵威廉·皮特之子。英國首相（1783—1801、1804—1806）。這篇演說選自他在下院所作的關(guān)于這方面斗爭(zhēng)的報(bào)告。
和那個(gè)國家的土地、風(fēng)俗習(xí)慣、情感乃至偏見血肉相連嗎？他是一個(gè)陌路人，一個(gè)外國人，一個(gè)篡政者。在他身上集中了純粹的共和黨人必定嫉惡的東西；集中了憤怒的雅各賓黨人發(fā)誓棄絕的東西；集中了每一個(gè)誠實(shí)而忠誠的?；庶h人視為侮辱的東西。如果波拿巴在其事業(yè)的任何時(shí)刻都遭人反對(duì)，那么他求助于什么呢？求助于他手中掌握的財(cái)富，換句話說，求助于他的軍隊(duì)和劍。那么，既然完全依靠軍隊(duì)的支持，他經(jīng)受得住讓自己的軍事聲望煙消云散，名聲減色，戰(zhàn)功淹沒無聞的損失嗎？如果他的軍隊(duì)僅限于在法國活動(dòng)，不能侵襲鄰國，他是否能保持一支忠誠于他、在數(shù)量上足以支持他的政權(quán)的軍隊(duì)？除了攫取絕對(duì)統(tǒng)治權(quán)外別無目的，除了軍事榮譽(yù)外再無熱情，據(jù)此是否可以確實(shí)認(rèn)為：他對(duì)永久和平的興趣足以使我們相信應(yīng)該放下武器，減少開支，相信其保證的誠意而放棄安全手段？難道我們相信締造和平之后，他不會(huì)因失去埃及戰(zhàn)利品而嘆息（那是的阿布基爾勝利從他手中奪走的），不會(huì)因英勇的英國水兵的光輝業(yè)績(jī)的影響和榜樣使土耳其軍隊(duì)在阿喀拉獲勝而嘆息嗎？難道波拿巴能忘卻這些戰(zhàn)斗業(yè)績(jī)使奧地利和普魯士在一次戰(zhàn)役中從法國收回了她因他的勝利而獲得的所有戰(zhàn)利品，消除了那曾一度吸引歐洲的魔力，并向世人表明奧、普兩國那些為正義事業(yè)而斗爭(zhēng)的將軍們能夠以其成功和戰(zhàn)斗榮譽(yù)抹去他那事事如愿卻又令他沮喪的野心所獲得的輝煌的勝利嗎？
難道我們能夠相信，和平了一年、一年半或兩年之后，如果心頭壓著這些想法的他受到愛爾蘭新出現(xiàn)的*的誘惑，受到重新開通的與法國不受拘束的通訊的鼓舞，受到新注入的雅各賓黨人原則的挑唆；倘若我們此時(shí)沒有一支海軍去監(jiān)視法國港口或保衛(wèi)愛爾蘭海岸，沒有一支可隨時(shí)調(diào)動(dòng)的軍隊(duì)或一支已建成的國民軍提供迅速、足夠的增援，而他卻突然獲得向各處運(yùn)送2萬至3萬法國士兵的手段；難道我們能夠相信，此時(shí)此刻，他的野心和復(fù)仇心態(tài)會(huì)因想到自己所作的那些保證或他所承擔(dān)的條約義務(wù)而受到約束嗎？奧斯曼帝國若遭遇新的困難和危機(jī)，在地中海若無英國海軍，若不結(jié)成同盟，若不集中力量給以支援，他就有了機(jī)會(huì)重新開始那已放棄的對(duì)埃及的遠(yuǎn)征，重新致力于已公開宣布的征服那個(gè)富饒國家，使它成為殖民地，并開辟傷害英國某些利益的途徑，以及為補(bǔ)充無力償債的法國國庫而掠奪東方財(cái)寶的心愛計(jì)劃。在此情況下，波拿巴的利益或原則難道會(huì)是適當(dāng)節(jié)制、愛好和平、厭惡征戰(zhàn)并尊重他國的獨(dú)立？難道所有這一切或者其中某一件事會(huì)保證我們有力量反對(duì)這樣的企圖：它給我們留下的選擇僅僅是不加抵抗地忍受損失和丟臉，或者恢復(fù)那過早結(jié)束的、沒有盟國、沒有準(zhǔn)備、缺乏手段而困難和危險(xiǎn)卻增多的爭(zhēng)奪？
那么，從上所述我可以得到什么樣的結(jié)論呢？是否在任何情況下我們都不跟波拿巴談判？我說不是。但是我認(rèn)為，正如對(duì)法國照會(huì)的答復(fù)所說的，在相信這種條約是可以考慮的之前，我們應(yīng)該等著看到“經(jīng)驗(yàn)和事實(shí)證據(jù)”。再說我上面所說的這些情況充分證明不要很快相信別人所說的東西；但在戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)與和平問題上，一切都取決于程度和對(duì)比。一方面，假如出現(xiàn)這樣的情況，即法國的政策終于接受現(xiàn)在廣為流行的行為準(zhǔn)則的引導(dǎo)；假如今后能看到那些現(xiàn)在還看不到的政府穩(wěn)定的跡象；假如同盟軍的進(jìn)展不能在法國鼓起勇氣使得該國的行動(dòng)本身即足以破壞其現(xiàn)行制度；假如危險(xiǎn)、困難和繼續(xù)爭(zhēng)奪的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)增加而徹底成功的希望破滅；那么，所有這些都是我本人應(yīng)負(fù)責(zé)作出交代并和我的每個(gè)同事加以考慮的，它們都將起到應(yīng)有的影響。但是，這些考慮都還只是我們這一方面的行動(dòng)；目前尚無法預(yù)言法國議會(huì)是否作出有利于變化的處理。我們有充分的理由依靠盟國的強(qiáng)有力的合作；在法國內(nèi)部存在著積極反對(duì)這種新的*的極為明顯的標(biāo)志；回顧敵我形勢(shì)，我們完全有理由相信，如果我們現(xiàn)在對(duì)全面勝利所寄予的希望最后竟然落空，繼續(xù)爭(zhēng)奪會(huì)使我們的處境變得相對(duì)地更好，而并非變得相對(duì)地更壞。
ON HIS REFUSAL TO NEGOTIATE WITH BONAPARTE
February 3，1800
That Bonaparte has an interest in making peace is at best but a doubtful proposition，and that he has an interest in preserving it is still more uncertain.That it is his interest to negotiate，I do not indeed deny.It is his interest，above all，to engage this country in separate negotiation，in order to loosen and dissolve the whole system of the confederacy on the Continent，to palsy at once the arms of Russia，or of Austria，or of any other country that might look to you for support；and then either to break off his separate treaty，or，if he should have concluded it，to apply the lesson which is taught in his school of policy in Egypt，and to revive at his pleasure those claims of indemnification which may have been reserved to some happier period.
This is precisely the interest which he has in negotiation.But on what grounds are we to be convinced that he has an interest in concluding and observing a solid and permanent pacification？Under all the circumstances of his personal character，and his newly acquired power，what other security has he for retaining that power but the sword？His hold upon France is the sword，and he has no other.Is he connected with the soil，or win megabits，the affections，or the prejudices of the country？He is a stranger，a foreigner，and a usurper.He unites in his own person everything that a pure republican must detest；everything that an enraged Jacobin has abjured；everything that a sincere and faithful royalist must feel as an insult.If he is opposed at any time in his career，what is his appeal？He appeals to his fortune；in other words，to his army and his sword.Placing，thed，his whole reliance upon military support，can he afford to let his military renown pass away，to let his laurels wither，to let the memory of his trophies sink in obscurity？IS it certain that with his army confined within France，and restrained from inroads upon her neighbors，that he can maintain，at his devotion，a force sufficiently numerous to support his power？Having no object but the pos-session of absolute dominion，no passion but military glory，is it to he reckoned as certain that he can feel such an interest in permanent peace as would justify us in laying down our arms，reducing our expense，and relinquishing our means of security，on the faith of his engagements？Do we believe that，after the conclusion of peace，he would not still sigh over the lost trophies of Egypt，wrested from him by the celebrated victory of Aboukir，and the brilliant exertions of that heroic band of British seamen，whose influence and example rendered the Turkish troops invincible at Acre？Can he forget that the effect of these exploits enabled Austria and Prussia，in one campaign，to re-cover from France all which she had acquired by his victories，to dissolve the charm which for a time fascinated Europe，and to show that their generals，contending in a just cause，could efface，even by their success and their military glory，the most dazzling triumphs of his victorious and desolating ambition？
Can we believe，with these impressions on his mind，that if，after a year，eighteen months，or two years of peace had elapsed，he should be tempted by the appearance of fresh insurrection in Ireland，encouraged by renewed and unrestrained communication with France，and fomented by the fresh infusion of Jacobin principles；if we were at such a moment without a fleet to watch the ports of France，or to guard the coasts of Ireland，with- out a disposable army，or an embodied militia capable of supplying a speedy and adequate reinforcement，and that he had suddenly the means of transporting thither a body of twenty or thirty thousand French troops；can we believe that，at such a moment，his ambition and vindictive spirit would be restrained by the recollection of engagements or the obligation of treaty？Or if，in some new crisis of difficulty and danger to the Ottoman Empire，with no British navy in the Mediterranean，no confederacy formed，no force collected to support it，an opportunity should pre- sent itself for resuming the abandoned expedition to Egypt，for renewing the avowed and favorite project of conquering and colonizing that rich and fertile country，and of opening the way to wound some of the vital interests of England，and to plunder the treasures of the East，in order to fill the bankrupt coffers of France—would it be the interest of Bonaparte，under such circumstances，or his principles，his moderation，his love of peace，his aversion to conquest，and his regard for the independence of other nations—would it be all or any of these that would secure us against an attempt which would leave us only the option of submitting without a struggle to certain loss and disgrace，or of renewing the contest which we had prematurely terminated，without allies，without preparation，with diminished means，and with increased difficulty and hazard？
What，then，is the inference I draw from all that I have now stated？Is it that we will in no case treat with Bonaparte？I say no such thing.But I say，as has been said in the answer returned to the French note，that we ought to wait for“experience and the evidence of facts” before we are convinced that such a treaty is admissible.The circumstances I have stated would well justify us if we should be slow in being convinced；but on a question of peace and war，everything depends upon degree and up-on comparison.If，on the one hand，there should be an appearance that the policy of France is at length guided by different maxims from those which have hitherto prevailed；if we should here-after see signs of stability in the government which are not now to be traced；if the progress of the al-lied army should not call forth such a spirit in France as to make it probable that the act of the country itself will destroy the system now prevailing；if the danger，the difficulty，the risk of continuing the contest should increase，while the hope of complete ultimate success should be diminished；all these，in their due place，are considerations which，with myself and，I can answer for it，with every one of my colleagues，will have their just weight.But at present these considerations all operate one way；at present there is nothing from which we can presage a favorable disposition to change in the French councils.There is the greatest reason to rely on powerful cooperation from our allies；there are the strongest marks of a disposition in the interior of France to active resistance against this new tyranny；and there is every ground to believe，on reviewing our situation and that of the enemy，that，if we are ultimately disappointed of that complete success which we are at present entitled to hope，the continuance of the contest，instead of making our situation comparatively worse，will have made it comparatively better.
威廉·皮特
論拒絕與波拿巴談判
1800年2月3日
波拿巴對(duì)媾和的興趣充其量也不過是一項(xiàng)值得懷疑的建議，至于他對(duì)保持和平的興趣就更不可靠了。我并不否認(rèn)波拿巴有興趣談判。首先，他企圖與我國單獨(dú)談判，以便削弱乃至瓦解歐洲大陸同盟，并同時(shí)使俄國、奧地利或其他可能向你們求助的國家的軍隊(duì)陷于癱瘓；然后或者中止他與別國單獨(dú)簽訂協(xié)定的談判；或者，如果他已簽定了該協(xié)定，他就會(huì)運(yùn)用他在埃及的政策學(xué)校里講授的經(jīng)驗(yàn)，并且在他樂意時(shí)重提那些也許是保留到某個(gè)較合適的時(shí)期才提出的賠償要求。
這就是波拿巴對(duì)談判感興趣的地方，但我們有什么理由可以相信波拿巴對(duì)締結(jié)和遵守永久和平協(xié)定感興趣呢？從其個(gè)人性格和新近獲得的權(quán)力等各方面情況來看，他為保持政權(quán)除了用劍外還有其他保證嗎？他控制法國靠的是劍而不是其他東西。他威廉·皮特（1759—1806），查塔姆伯爵威廉·皮特之子。英國首相（1783—1801、1804—1806）。這篇演說選自他在下院所作的關(guān)于這方面斗爭(zhēng)的報(bào)告。
和那個(gè)國家的土地、風(fēng)俗習(xí)慣、情感乃至偏見血肉相連嗎？他是一個(gè)陌路人，一個(gè)外國人，一個(gè)篡政者。在他身上集中了純粹的共和黨人必定嫉惡的東西；集中了憤怒的雅各賓黨人發(fā)誓棄絕的東西；集中了每一個(gè)誠實(shí)而忠誠的?；庶h人視為侮辱的東西。如果波拿巴在其事業(yè)的任何時(shí)刻都遭人反對(duì)，那么他求助于什么呢？求助于他手中掌握的財(cái)富，換句話說，求助于他的軍隊(duì)和劍。那么，既然完全依靠軍隊(duì)的支持，他經(jīng)受得住讓自己的軍事聲望煙消云散，名聲減色，戰(zhàn)功淹沒無聞的損失嗎？如果他的軍隊(duì)僅限于在法國活動(dòng)，不能侵襲鄰國，他是否能保持一支忠誠于他、在數(shù)量上足以支持他的政權(quán)的軍隊(duì)？除了攫取絕對(duì)統(tǒng)治權(quán)外別無目的，除了軍事榮譽(yù)外再無熱情，據(jù)此是否可以確實(shí)認(rèn)為：他對(duì)永久和平的興趣足以使我們相信應(yīng)該放下武器，減少開支，相信其保證的誠意而放棄安全手段？難道我們相信締造和平之后，他不會(huì)因失去埃及戰(zhàn)利品而嘆息（那是的阿布基爾勝利從他手中奪走的），不會(huì)因英勇的英國水兵的光輝業(yè)績(jī)的影響和榜樣使土耳其軍隊(duì)在阿喀拉獲勝而嘆息嗎？難道波拿巴能忘卻這些戰(zhàn)斗業(yè)績(jī)使奧地利和普魯士在一次戰(zhàn)役中從法國收回了她因他的勝利而獲得的所有戰(zhàn)利品，消除了那曾一度吸引歐洲的魔力，并向世人表明奧、普兩國那些為正義事業(yè)而斗爭(zhēng)的將軍們能夠以其成功和戰(zhàn)斗榮譽(yù)抹去他那事事如愿卻又令他沮喪的野心所獲得的輝煌的勝利嗎？
難道我們能夠相信，和平了一年、一年半或兩年之后，如果心頭壓著這些想法的他受到愛爾蘭新出現(xiàn)的*的誘惑，受到重新開通的與法國不受拘束的通訊的鼓舞，受到新注入的雅各賓黨人原則的挑唆；倘若我們此時(shí)沒有一支海軍去監(jiān)視法國港口或保衛(wèi)愛爾蘭海岸，沒有一支可隨時(shí)調(diào)動(dòng)的軍隊(duì)或一支已建成的國民軍提供迅速、足夠的增援，而他卻突然獲得向各處運(yùn)送2萬至3萬法國士兵的手段；難道我們能夠相信，此時(shí)此刻，他的野心和復(fù)仇心態(tài)會(huì)因想到自己所作的那些保證或他所承擔(dān)的條約義務(wù)而受到約束嗎？奧斯曼帝國若遭遇新的困難和危機(jī)，在地中海若無英國海軍，若不結(jié)成同盟，若不集中力量給以支援，他就有了機(jī)會(huì)重新開始那已放棄的對(duì)埃及的遠(yuǎn)征，重新致力于已公開宣布的征服那個(gè)富饒國家，使它成為殖民地，并開辟傷害英國某些利益的途徑，以及為補(bǔ)充無力償債的法國國庫而掠奪東方財(cái)寶的心愛計(jì)劃。在此情況下，波拿巴的利益或原則難道會(huì)是適當(dāng)節(jié)制、愛好和平、厭惡征戰(zhàn)并尊重他國的獨(dú)立？難道所有這一切或者其中某一件事會(huì)保證我們有力量反對(duì)這樣的企圖：它給我們留下的選擇僅僅是不加抵抗地忍受損失和丟臉，或者恢復(fù)那過早結(jié)束的、沒有盟國、沒有準(zhǔn)備、缺乏手段而困難和危險(xiǎn)卻增多的爭(zhēng)奪？
那么，從上所述我可以得到什么樣的結(jié)論呢？是否在任何情況下我們都不跟波拿巴談判？我說不是。但是我認(rèn)為，正如對(duì)法國照會(huì)的答復(fù)所說的，在相信這種條約是可以考慮的之前，我們應(yīng)該等著看到“經(jīng)驗(yàn)和事實(shí)證據(jù)”。再說我上面所說的這些情況充分證明不要很快相信別人所說的東西；但在戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)與和平問題上，一切都取決于程度和對(duì)比。一方面，假如出現(xiàn)這樣的情況，即法國的政策終于接受現(xiàn)在廣為流行的行為準(zhǔn)則的引導(dǎo)；假如今后能看到那些現(xiàn)在還看不到的政府穩(wěn)定的跡象；假如同盟軍的進(jìn)展不能在法國鼓起勇氣使得該國的行動(dòng)本身即足以破壞其現(xiàn)行制度；假如危險(xiǎn)、困難和繼續(xù)爭(zhēng)奪的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)增加而徹底成功的希望破滅；那么，所有這些都是我本人應(yīng)負(fù)責(zé)作出交代并和我的每個(gè)同事加以考慮的，它們都將起到應(yīng)有的影響。但是，這些考慮都還只是我們這一方面的行動(dòng)；目前尚無法預(yù)言法國議會(huì)是否作出有利于變化的處理。我們有充分的理由依靠盟國的強(qiáng)有力的合作；在法國內(nèi)部存在著積極反對(duì)這種新的*的極為明顯的標(biāo)志；回顧敵我形勢(shì)，我們完全有理由相信，如果我們現(xiàn)在對(duì)全面勝利所寄予的希望最后竟然落空，繼續(xù)爭(zhēng)奪會(huì)使我們的處境變得相對(duì)地更好，而并非變得相對(duì)地更壞。