優(yōu)秀的托福閱讀能力來自于多讀原汁原味的文章，經(jīng)濟達人上面的文章就是一個好選擇。那么今天就和出國留學網(wǎng)的小編一起來看看托福閱讀素材：絲銀軸心
The silk-silver axis
The world’s most important economic relationship is also its most fraught
中美經(jīng)濟關(guān)系
絲銀軸心
世界上最重要的經(jīng)濟關(guān)系也最令人擔憂
IN 1784 the Empress of China set sail from New York， on the first American trade mission to China. Carrying ginseng， lead and woollen cloth， the merchants aboard dreamed of cracking open the vast Asian market. But the real profit， they found， came on their return， when they brought Chinese teas and porcelain to America. As other ships followed in its wake， the pattern became clear. Americans wanted more from China than Chinese wanted from America， and the difference was made up with a steady outflow of silver from America into China. The Empress had launched not just commercial ties between the two great countries but also an American deficit in its trade with China.
1784年，中國皇后號帆船從紐約起航，踏上美國對中國的首次通商之旅。船上滿載著人參、鉛和毛料，商人們渴望能夠打開廣闊的亞洲市場。但他們發(fā)現(xiàn)，從中國帶回的茶葉和瓷器才是真正的利潤之源。隨著其他船只步其后塵，這種貿(mào)易模式逐漸清晰起來。美國人想要的中國貨多過中國人想要的美國貨，其中的差額由美國源源不斷地向中國支付銀元來補足。中國皇后號不僅開啟了兩個大國間的商業(yè)聯(lián)系，也開啟了美國對中國的貿(mào)易逆差。
The modern incarnation of this deficit is still driven by the flow of consumer goods， but nowadays electronic gadgets. In recent years it has reached a record size （see chart 1）. When Xi Jinping， China’s president， meets Donald Trump—a meeting is reportedly planned in Florida early in April—the deficit will top the agenda. In his run to the White House， Mr Trump promised a combative stance against China on trade. Some expect America to slap punitive tariffs on Chinese goods， triggering an all-out trade war. Others think a grand bargain that defuses tensions is possible.
這種赤字的現(xiàn)代化身仍由消費品貿(mào)易驅(qū)動，只不過貨物變成了電子產(chǎn)品。近年來這一赤字已達到新高（見圖表1）。據(jù)報道，中國國家主席習近平將于4月初在佛羅里達與特朗普會晤，屆時貿(mào)易赤字將成為首要議題。在總統(tǒng)競選期間，特朗普承諾將就貿(mào)易問題對中國采取強硬姿態(tài)。有人預計美國會對中國商品征收懲罰性關(guān)稅，引發(fā)全面貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)。其他人則認為雙方可能會達成“大妥協(xié)”以緩和緊張局勢。
Many American businesses， bruised in their dealings with China， cautiously welcome a harder line. For their part， Chinese businesses feel unjustly singled out. Both sides are nervous， conscious that the world’s most important economic relationship is also its most complex. America and China are bound together by cross-border flows of goods， cash， people and ideas that are bigger than ever. These ties have greatly benefited the two countries’ prosperity. A rupture would be severely damaging for both.
許多在跟中國打交道時吃過苦頭的美國企業(yè)謹慎歡迎政府更強硬地處理經(jīng)貿(mào)關(guān)系。而中國企業(yè)覺得獨獨自己成為矛頭所向有失公允。雙方都有些緊張，都意識到世界上最重要的經(jīng)濟關(guān)系也是最復雜的。中美之間貨物、資金、人員和思想的跨國往來規(guī)?？涨?，關(guān)系密不可分，大大有利于兩國的繁榮。關(guān)系一旦破裂，兩方都會嚴重受損。
The original sin， for Mr Trump’s most hawkish advisers， is the trade imbalance. Before China joined the World Trade Organisation （WTO） in 2001， China accounted for less than a quarter of America’s total trade deficit； over the past five years， it has made up two-thirds. Peter Navarro， head of Mr Trump’s new National Trade Council， sees the deficit as a drag on America’s economy. Close it， he argues， and America’s GDP will be bigger. And he sees a way to do so： take on China over its unfair trade practices， from currency meddling to export subsidies. In 2012 he released a documentary， “Death by China”， as a call to arms.
特朗普的強硬派顧問大多認為，雙邊關(guān)系的原罪是貿(mào)易不平衡。中國于2001年加入世貿(mào)組織之前，在美國總貿(mào)易逆差中只占了不到四分之一；過去五年中，中國已經(jīng)占到三分之二。彼得·納瓦羅（Peter Navarro）是特朗普新組建的全國貿(mào)易委員會的主席，他認為貿(mào)易赤字拖累了美國經(jīng)濟。納瓦羅說，如果消除這一赤字，美國的GDP總量會更大。他認為有個辦法可以消除貿(mào)易赤字：挑戰(zhàn)中國從貨幣干預到出口補貼等不公平貿(mào)易的做法。2012年，納瓦羅發(fā)布了紀錄片《致命中國》（Death by China），如同貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)的檄文。
Mr Navarro’s views rely on crude arithmetic that defies the most basic economic logic. In fact， big deficits often accompany fast growth. And it is misleading to focus on bilateral imbalances in an age of global supply chains. Counting the bits and pieces from other countries that go into “made in China” smartphones， fridges and televisions， China’s trade surplus with America is about a third smaller than officially reported.
納瓦羅的觀點基于粗略的計算，違背了最基本的經(jīng)濟邏輯。事實上，高逆差往往伴隨著高增長而出現(xiàn)，而且在全球供應鏈的時代緊盯雙邊貿(mào)易失衡問題會有誤導性。“中國制造”的智能手機、冰箱和電視機里有很多零部件來自其他國家，如果算上這些的話，中國對美國的貿(mào)易順差比官方公布的結(jié)果要少三分之一。
Yet the gap ought perhaps to be smaller still. American companies insist that， with a level playing field， they would be able to sell much more to China. Some of the obstacles in their way are obvious. Carmakers， for instance， face 25% import tariffs. More often， barriers are subtler. Medical-device makers cite onerous licensing procedures and seed firms lengthy approvals.
然而，這一差距也許本應該更小一些。美國公司堅持認為，在公平競爭的環(huán)境下，它們能夠向中國出口的產(chǎn)品要多得多。美國公司面臨的貿(mào)易壁壘有些是顯而易見的，例如，汽車制造商需繳納25%的進口關(guān)稅。但在更多情況下，貿(mào)易壁壘更為隱蔽，比如醫(yī)療器械制造商辦理進口許可時程序繁瑣，種子公司審批時間過長。
Indeed， America had been adopting a firmer approach to China on trade long before the election. Barack Obama’s administration stepped up pressure through the WTO. Of America’s 25 formal WTO complaints filed after 2008， 16 were against China. The administration also initiated 99 anti-dumping and countervailing-duty investigations against China， more than against any other country （see chart 2）.
事實上，美國早在大選很久之前就已在貿(mào)易問題上對中國采取更為強硬的做法。奧巴馬政府通過世貿(mào)組織施加了更多壓力。2008年以后美國向世貿(mào)組織提出的25項正式投訴中，有16項是針對中國。奧巴馬政府還對中國發(fā)起了99次反傾銷和反補貼調(diào)查，多于任何其他國家（見圖表2）。
China sees a pattern of unfair treatment. For Mei Xinyu， a researcher at the commerce ministry， what is wrong with the bilateral relationship is obvious： “American protectionism”. America has to cure its own ills and building walls won’t help， he says. Most emblematic is America’s decision to withhold “market-economy status” from China， which allows higher duties to be put on Chinese imports.
而中國則看到了一種不公平待遇。商務部研究員梅新育認為雙邊關(guān)系的癥結(jié)顯而易見，那就是“美國保護主義”。他說美國必須先解決自己的問題，搭建藩籬并無好處。這種保護主義最具代表性的動作是美國決定不給予中國“市場經(jīng)濟地位”，這樣便可對進口自中國的產(chǎn)品征收更高的關(guān)稅。
Chinese officials cite another example of unequal standards—the time-worn American complaint， made especially loudly by Mr Trump， that China fiddles its currency to cheapen its exports. China certainly does manage the yuan， but over the past decade it has let it appreciate by nearly two-fifths against a broad currency basket—more than any other big economy has.
中國官員還指出了另一個雙重標準的例子——美國一直老生常談地抱怨中國操縱貨幣以降低出口產(chǎn)品價格，特朗普喊得尤其大聲。中國的確在管理人民幣，但是在過去十年里，它已經(jīng)讓人民幣對廣泛的貨幣籃子升值了近五分之二，比任何其他大經(jīng)濟體的貨幣升值幅度都大。
Left to its own devices， the trade relationship between China and America should become more balanced in time. As China’s middle class grows， its consumers are buying more from abroad. Chinese demand for American agricultural products， especially soyabeans， has boomed. China is already buying more services from America then vice versa. One of America’s biggest exports to China is education. The number of Chinese students in America has reached nearly 330，000—almost a third of all foreign students—and is up more than fivefold over the past decade.
順其自然的話，中美貿(mào)易關(guān)系最終應該會變得更平衡。隨著中國中產(chǎn)階級的壯大，消費者會購買更多進口產(chǎn)品。中國對美國農(nóng)產(chǎn)品（尤其是大豆）的需求一直在增長。而中國對美國的服務貿(mào)易已經(jīng)為逆差；教育是美國對華最大的出口產(chǎn)品之一，留美的中國學生人數(shù)已接近33萬，幾乎是外國學生總數(shù)的三分之一，而且在過去十年中增加了五倍多。
Battle lines
But if Mr Trump carries out his most extreme threats and whacks a 45% across-the-board tariff on Chinese goods， trade flows between the two giants—the world’s biggest bilateral trading relationship—would shrivel. Collateral damage to the global economy would be immense. The very survival of the rules-based international trading system would be at stake.
戰(zhàn)線
但倘若特朗普果真兌現(xiàn)了他最偏激的威嚇之言，對中國商品全面征收45%的關(guān)稅，那么中美兩大國之間的貿(mào)易往來就會萎縮，這一全球最大的雙邊貿(mào)易關(guān)系的倒退會令全球經(jīng)濟連帶遭受巨大損害，基于規(guī)則的國際貿(mào)易體系將岌岌可危。
China would， in a conventional analysis， suffer more in a trade war. About a fifth of its exports go to America， equating to nearly 4% of Chinese GDP. Less than a tenth of American exports go to China， worth less than 1% of American GDP. But a fight would also hit America hard. No other country could easily replace China in making many of the products， from toys to textiles， that fill American shops. Consumers would face sharply higher prices. American companies that have used China as a production base would struggle to reconfigure their supply chains. If American firms brought factories back home， prices would rocket. Goldman Sachs， an investment bank， estimates that the cost of producing clothing would increase by 46% and smartphones by 37%.
按照傳統(tǒng)的分析，中國在貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)中損失會更大。中國約五分之一的出口流向了美國，相當于中國GDP的近4%；而美國只有不到十分之一的出口流向中國，不到美國GDP的1%。但貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)也將令美國遭受重創(chuàng)。美國的商場里擺滿了中國制造的產(chǎn)品，從玩具到紡織品無不如此，在這一點上沒有其他國家可以輕易地取代中國。消費者將面臨價格暴漲的局面，以中國為生產(chǎn)基地的美國公司將必須重新配置供應鏈，困難重重。假如美國公司把工廠遷回本國，價格將會飆升。投資銀行高盛估計，服裝生產(chǎn)成本將增長46%，智能手機生產(chǎn)成本將增長37%。
Moreover， China would retaliate. Even if America as a whole runs a deficit， it has industries and companies that increasingly rely on Chinese demand. Nearly half its fruit and seed exports go to China. China is in some months the world’s biggest market for iPhones. Semiconductor-makers such as Qualcomm and Broadcom derive most of their revenues from China （see chart 3）.
此外，中國一定會報復。即使美國對中國的貿(mào)易整體處于赤字，它的某些行業(yè)和企業(yè)還是日益依賴中國市場的需求。近一半的美國水果和種子都出口到中國；中國一度是全球最大的iPhone銷售市場；高通和博通等半導體制造商的大部分收入都來自中國（見圖表3）。
All this helps explain why Mr Trump has so far trod softly in confronting China. James McGregor， Greater China chairman of APCO Worldwide， a lobbying firm， says that American bosses have been streaming into Washington for meetings with the Trump team to appeal for calm and to teach them that “China is not a country to be toyed with.” But perhaps Mr Trump has merely been distracted by the rocky start to his domestic agenda and it is only a matter of time before he lashes out at China. If he does， though， he will soon learn that trade is not the only show in town. Investment gets much less attention but is also vital to the relationship.
鑒于以上原因，迄今為止特朗普應對中國時一直小心謹慎。游說機構(gòu)安可顧問公司（APCO Worldwide）大中華區(qū)董事長詹姆斯·麥格雷戈（James McGregor）說，美國企業(yè)老板紛紛前往華盛頓與特朗普團隊會晤，呼吁他們保持冷靜，讓他們明白“對待中國不可兒戲”。但特朗普也許只是在國內(nèi)事務上開局不利，有些分心，對付中國是遲早的事。不過，如果特朗普真要開始瞄準中國，他很快就會知道，貿(mào)易并不是唯一影響雙邊關(guān)系的問題。投資問題受到的關(guān)注要少得多，但對兩國關(guān)系同樣至關(guān)重要。
Start with a myth—that China can bankrupt the American government. Over the past decade， China has invested more than $1trn in Treasuries. At its peak， America owed more money to China than to anywhere else. Pundits fret that， were China to dump its bonds， American interest rates would shoot up and the dollar plummet.
先從一個謬見說起，即認為中國能讓美國政府破產(chǎn)。在過去十年中，中國投資美國國債超過一萬億美元。在高峰期，中國是美國最大的債權(quán)國。專家擔心一旦中國拋售美國國債，美國利率會暴漲，美元則會暴跌。
But that is to misunderstand the financial mechanics. The Federal Reserve has demonstrated that it can buy far more government bonds than any foreign or domestic holder can sell. China thus cannot dictate interest rates in America， much less push it into penury. And the volatility of the dollar is also a Chinese concern. Because Chinese companies borrowed heavily abroad， dollar strength has made their debts more costly in yuan terms.
但這種判斷誤解了金融機制。美聯(lián)儲已經(jīng)證明，不論國內(nèi)外持有人拋售多少國債，美聯(lián)儲都有能力收購，財力綽綽有余。因此，中國無法左右美國利率，更不能把美國推向絕境。而美元的波動也會讓中國擔憂。因為中國企業(yè)在國外大量舉債，美元走強會讓這些債務以人民幣計價的成本更加高昂。
Financial exposure goes the other way， too. Back in 2015 the Fed was planning to embark on a series of interest-rate increases. In the end it managed to deliver its second rise only at the very end of 2016. Jitters over China’s economy had stayed its hand. American investors have learned that news out of China can wreak havoc on their portfolios. Anxiety about China has triggered two of the three most recent “risk-off” episodes in global markets， as captured by the VIX， a measure of stockmarket volatility， popularly known as the “fear gauge”. This is the crucial point： it is not that China has the financial upper hand over America， or vice versa； it is that they are increasingly joined at the hip.
金融風險也是雙向的。在2015年，美聯(lián)儲計劃進行一系列加息，最終只在2016年底才完成了第二次加息，對中國經(jīng)濟的擔憂讓美聯(lián)儲放緩了加息。美國投資者明白了一個道理，中國的任何風吹草動都可能會重創(chuàng)其投資組合。VIX是股票市場的波動指標，即人們常說的“恐慌指數(shù)”，其數(shù)據(jù)顯示，全球市場近期歷經(jīng)了三次大規(guī)?！帮L險規(guī)避”，其中兩次都是出于對中國經(jīng)濟的焦慮。有一點至關(guān)重要：在金融領(lǐng)域，中國并不比美國更占上風，反之也是如此；實情是兩國之間的聯(lián)系日漸緊密，休戚與共。
Mutually assured destruction
And these are just the financial linkages， which remain limited by China’s capital controls. Look at the physical investment ties between China and America and the mutual vulnerabilities are even more glaring. According to official data， roughly 1% of the stock of American direct investment abroad （money spent on assets such as factories， warehouses and shops） is in China. But this misses much of the cash routed through the Cayman Islands or Hong Kong for accounting reasons. An analysis last year by the Rhodium Group， an American research firm， took a granular approach to calculate that the true stock of American foreign direct investment （FDI） in China built up from 1990 to 2015 was $228bn， three times the official figure.
一損俱損
這些還只是金融領(lǐng)域的聯(lián)系，而這些聯(lián)系仍然受到中國資本管制的限制。再看看中美之間的實際投資關(guān)系，雙方相互依賴又相互威脅的情況則更為明顯。官方數(shù)據(jù)顯示，美國的對外直接投資存量（投資于工廠、倉庫和商店等資產(chǎn)的資金）約1%在中國，但這個數(shù)據(jù)未包括因會計原因經(jīng)由開曼群島或香港流入中國的大部分資金。美國研究公司榮鼎集團（Rhodium Group）去年采用精細方法進行分析，結(jié)果顯示在1990年至2015年間，美國在中國的對外直接投資存量實際為2280億美元，是官方數(shù)字的三倍。
American companies initially lighted on China as a cheap manufacturing base； as costs there have risen， that wave of investment has tailed off. A new influx seeks to tap China’s consumer demand. In 2016 China was the leading emerging market into which American firms poured FDI. China’s booming middle class is forecast by McKinsey， a consultancy， to grow from just 6% of urban households in 2010 to over half of the total by 2020.
美國公司最初將中國作為廉價制造業(yè)基地來投資，隨著中國生產(chǎn)成本的上升，這一輪投資大潮已近尾聲。新一輪資本涌入中國，意在挖掘中國市場的消費需求。2016年，美國企業(yè)對外直接投資的首選新興市場是中國。中國的中產(chǎn)階級不斷壯大，2010年，中產(chǎn)階級僅占城鎮(zhèn)家庭的6%，咨詢公司麥肯錫預測，2020年這一數(shù)字將增長到一半以上。
For firms that have made it in China， the rewards have been immense. Through joint ventures with local partners， GM sells more cars， and makes more profits， in China than it does anywhere in the world. Over the next two decades， Boeing estimates， China will buy 6，000 new aeroplanes， becoming its first trillion-dollar market. Starbucks is opening new cafés in China at a pace of over one a day. On official estimates， some 1.6m people in China now work for American subsidiaries.
在中國獲得成功的美國企業(yè)回報巨大。通過與當?shù)睾献骰锇楹腺Y經(jīng)營，通用汽車在中國市場的汽車銷量和盈利要好于在世界上任何其他地方。波音公司估計，在接下來的20年中，中國將購買6000架新飛機，成為波音首個萬億美元市場。星巴克在中國每天都新開設一家以上的連鎖店。據(jù)官方估計，目前中國約有160萬人就職于美國企業(yè)的子公司。
But success stories of American companies in China will not exactly warm the hearts of Mr Trump’s band of economic nationalists. What they want is money invested in America， not more profits made abroad. Forget for a moment that this policy risks doing more harm than good （preventing Apple or GM from going big in China would hurt them financially）. The more relevant point—the one likelier to sway Mr Trump—is that the bigger investment flows these days are from China into America.
然而，美國公司盡管在中國獲得了成功，卻并不能讓以特朗普為首的那班經(jīng)濟民族主義者回心轉(zhuǎn)意。他們希望看到錢投資在美國，而不是在國外賺取更多的利潤。先不管這一政策有可能弊大于利（阻止蘋果或通用汽車在中國發(fā)展將有損它們的經(jīng)濟利益），更重要、也更有可能改變特朗普心意的一點是，如今中國對美國的投資要多過美國對中國的投資。
Chinese investment into America used to be tiny. No longer （see chart 4）. Rhodium estimates that it leapt from about $16bn in 2015 to some $46bn in 2016， compared with $13bn invested by American firms in China. Chinese investments are already thought to support roughly 90，000 American jobs across several dozen states. The money is spread across virtually every area of the economy. Chinese companies have bought Hollywood production companies， car-parts- and appliance-makers， semiconductor firms and more.
過去，中國對美國的投資規(guī)模很小。今非昔比（見圖表4）。中國對美國的投資在2015年約為160億美元，榮鼎集團估計，這一數(shù)字在2016年大幅上漲至約460億美元，而美國企業(yè)在中國的投資僅為130億美元。據(jù)信，中國的投資已經(jīng)為幾十個州的美國人帶來了約九萬個工作崗位。而且中國的投資幾乎涉及所有經(jīng)濟領(lǐng)域。中國公司收購了好萊塢影視制作公司、汽車零部件企業(yè)、家電制造商以及半導體公司，不一而足。
China is well aware that its investors can also convey a positive message. Witness Jack Ma’s meeting with Mr Trump， just before his inauguration. Mr Ma， founder of Alibaba， a Chinese e-commerce giant， boasted that his shopping portal would create 1m jobs in America， giving small businesses and farmers a platform to export to Asia. The promise was far-fetched （Mr Trump might appreciate that）. But there was a kernel of truth： Chinese investors are only getting started in America.
中國很清楚其投資者也能傳遞一個積極的信息?？纯瘩R云在特朗普就職前和他進行的會面，這位中國電子商務巨頭阿里巴巴的創(chuàng)始人夸口說，他的購物門戶網(wǎng)站將在美國創(chuàng)造100萬個就業(yè)機會，為小企業(yè)和農(nóng)民提供出口亞洲的平臺。這個承諾有些牽強（盡管特朗普可能很欣賞），但有一點不假：中國投資者在美國才剛剛開始伸展拳腳。
Were it just a question of money， these investment trends ought to be the clincher， giving America and China every reason to stay on each other’s good side. But investment cannot be divorced from power， and that poses complications. Most obvious are national-security concerns. Both China and America have become more active in restricting each other’s technology and blocking deals that they fear might compromise their security.
如果一切僅僅是錢的問題，這些投資趨勢就應該足以決定大局，讓美國和中國都有充分的理由相互尊重對方的利益。但投資不能孤立于政治，而政治將局面復雜化了。這其中最明顯的是國家安全問題，對于中美雙方認為可能會損害各自國家安全的技術(shù)和交易，它們都已更積極地加以限制和阻礙。
But commercial competition casts an even bigger shadow. China and America are increasingly butting heads. “Made in China 2025”， an industrial plan unveiled in 2015， is indicative of how China is gunning for industries that America and other foreign countries have dominated. China aims to become a leader in ten strategic sectors， ranging from next-generation IT to agricultural machinery.
但商業(yè)競爭帶來了更大的陰影，中美之間的角力日益激烈?！爸袊圃?025”是2015年發(fā)布的一項產(chǎn)業(yè)計劃，表明中國力圖在美國和其他國家主導的行業(yè)里奮起直追。在包括下一代IT和農(nóng)業(yè)機械的十個戰(zhàn)略領(lǐng)域里，中國都志在成為領(lǐng)導者。
Critics in America warn that China’s state-driven model for advancing in these industries will cause damage around the world. Their worry is that China will deploy much the same industrial policy that it has used in sectors from wind power to high-speed rail： pressure on foreign firms to share technology； protection of local firms； targets to phase out imports； and generous state funding. “This could lead not only to China taking over market share but， because of its scale， destroying entire business models，” says Scott Kennedy of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies， a think-tank in Washington， DC.
美國的批評家警告說，中國由國家推動這些行業(yè)發(fā)展的模式將在全球范圍內(nèi)造成破壞。中國在風力發(fā)電和高鐵等多個行業(yè)里采用的產(chǎn)業(yè)政策是施壓外國企業(yè)分享技術(shù)、保護本地企業(yè)、逐步替代進口，以及國家大力資助。他們擔心中國繼續(xù)沿用類似的策略。華盛頓特區(qū)的智庫戰(zhàn)略與國際研究中心（Centre for Strategic and International Studies）的斯科特·肯尼迪（Scott Kennedy）表示：“這不僅可能讓中國獲取市場份額，而且由于其規(guī)模巨大，還可能破壞整個商業(yè)模式。”
Another casus belli
How America might respond to this perceived threat remains hazy. A committee recommended to Congress last year a ban on all investment in America by China’s state-owned enterprises （SOEs）—a measure as likely to lead to a full-blown trade war as Mr Trump’s 45% tariff wall. A recent review of the semiconductor industry called for a stiffer response to China’s market distortions. Others argue that fears of “Made in China 2025” are overblown. Government interventions may work in industries such as solar power and railways， which are dominated by subsidies and public-sector procurement. But they have already been seen to fail in consumer industries such as carmaking.
另一條導火索
美國會如何應對這種潛在的威脅仍不明朗。一個委員會去年向國會提出建議，禁止中國國有企業(yè)對美國的所有投資，這和特朗普45%的關(guān)稅壁壘一樣可能會引發(fā)全面貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)。最近一份半導體行業(yè)的報告要求對中國扭曲市場的行為作出更強硬的回應。其他人則認為對“中國制造2025”的擔心有些過度。諸如太陽能發(fā)電和鐵路等行業(yè)的發(fā)展主要依靠補貼和政府采購，在這些領(lǐng)域政府的干預措施可能會發(fā)揮作用，但在汽車制造等消費行業(yè)，這種干預已經(jīng)有過失敗的先例。
China’s government has tried to rebut critics of its industrial plan. The point， it says， is merely to give companies guidance about future trends. Meanwhile， Chinese firms， for their part， fear that obstacles in America are proliferating. He Fan， a prominent Chinese economist， says the feeling is that business in America is becoming more politicised. “You can only have long-term investment when the rules are clear，” he says. “Previously that was America’s strong point. Now it’s uncertain.”
中國政府試圖反駁對其產(chǎn)業(yè)計劃的批評，表示這一計劃只是為了在未來發(fā)展趨勢方面給予企業(yè)指引。同時，中國企業(yè)也擔心美國的壁壘激增。著名中國經(jīng)濟學家何帆表示，美國市場讓人感覺越來越政治化了?！耙?guī)則明確才能有長期投資，”他說， “這以前是美國的強項，現(xiàn)在就難說了?！?BR> Easily lost amid the blaze of recriminations is the extent to which competition between China and America can also yield benefits. The two countries are already spurring each other to innovate. American venture capitalists are well embedded in the software cluster in Beijing and the hardware ecosystem in Shenzhen， a city in southern China. American private-equity firms are prominent in China， making bets on industries ranging from health care to energy. American multinationals used to build shiny R&D centres in Shanghai and Beijing to please officials， but did little original work in them. Now， firms ranging from industrial conglomerates like GE to biotech giants such as Amgen are doing some of their cutting-edge research in China.
在一片相互指責聲中，很容易忽略一個事實，即雙方的競爭在一定程度上也會帶來益處。兩國已經(jīng)相互激發(fā)創(chuàng)新了。美國的風險資本家已經(jīng)深入到北京的軟件產(chǎn)業(yè)集群和深圳的硬件生態(tài)系統(tǒng)中；美國私募股權(quán)投資公司在中國市場表現(xiàn)突出，廣泛投資于醫(yī)療保健、能源等各個行業(yè)。美國跨國公司為討好政府官員，曾在上海和北京建立了光鮮靚麗的研發(fā)中心，但并未在那些地方開展多少原創(chuàng)性工作?，F(xiàn)在，各大美國企業(yè)都正在中國進行一些前沿性研究，包括通用汽車等工業(yè)集團和安進（Amgen）等生物科技巨頭。
China’s most inventive firms are also investing heavily in America in search of talent and new patents. Just last week， Tencent， a tech giant， said it was spending $1.8bn to buy 5% of Tesla， a maker of electric cars. Huawei， Alibaba and Baidu are its near-neighbours in Silicon Valley. BGI， the world’s biggest genome-sequencing firm， is opening a laboratory in Seattle to be closer to the Gates foundation， a big client. Mindray， a medical-devices firm， has a couple of American R&D labs. Lenovo， the world’s biggest maker of personal computers， is inventing and manufacturing B2B products in North Carolina.
中國最具創(chuàng)造性的企業(yè)也在美國大量投入，搜羅人才和新專利。就在上周，科技巨頭騰訊表示，將斥資18億美元收購電動汽車制造商特斯拉5%的股份。華為、阿里巴巴、百度和騰訊在硅谷都是近鄰。世界上最大的基因組測序公司華大基因正在西雅圖開設實驗室，因為這里更接近其大客戶蓋茨基金會。醫(yī)療器械公司邁瑞在美國也有幾個研發(fā)實驗室。世界上最大的個人電腦制造商聯(lián)想也正在北卡羅來納研發(fā)和制造B2B產(chǎn)品。
One possibility is that， as these kinds of cross-border business operations become more widespread， the Chinese-American economic relationship will settle down. Competition will be welcomed as healthy， not feared as destructive. But it is likely to be a long time before that happens. It would help if the governments could see eye to eye—in particular， if they could agree on a long-stalled bilateral investment treaty； and if they could reach an understanding on trade before their disagreements threaten the WTO itself.
有一種可能性是，隨著這類跨境企業(yè)運營越來越普遍，中美經(jīng)濟關(guān)系也將趨于穩(wěn)定。雙方會視競爭為健康而非破壞性的，因而會歡迎而不是懼怕競爭，但要發(fā)展到那一步可能還要很久。如果雙方政府能取得共識，尤其是如果能就擱置已久的雙邊投資協(xié)定達成一致，并能在雙邊分歧威脅到世貿(mào)組織的存亡之前能就貿(mào)易問題達成諒解，將對雙邊關(guān)系有所助益。
Both outcomes， however， are highly unlikely. The diplomacy needed to navigate the shoals of their economic ties is in short supply. China’s success in low-end manufacturing has already caused a backlash in America. As Chinese firms take on companies at the heart of the American economy， the friction will surely increase. It is enough to make one nostalgic for the days when their business involved little more than swapping silver for silk.
然而，出現(xiàn)這兩個結(jié)果的可能性都很小。目前應對雙邊經(jīng)濟問題的外交手段比較匱乏。中國在低端制造業(yè)方面的成功已經(jīng)引發(fā)了美國的抵制。隨著中國企業(yè)挑戰(zhàn)處于美國經(jīng)濟核心的公司，摩擦勢必會更多。這足以讓人懷念做生意僅以白銀交換絲綢的年代，那時候一切都要簡單多了。